TELOS

Number 54 Winter 1982-83

SPECIAL ISSUE ON TERRORISM AND STATE TERRORISM

CORRADI: *Terror in Argentina*
LOVAS, ANDERSON: *Friendly Repression in Hungary*
STANISZKIS: *Martial Law in Poland*
REIMAN: *Political Trials of the Stalinist Era*
JOHNSTONE: *State Terror in South Africa*
BOBBIO: *Italy's Permanent Crisis*
ELIAS: *Civilization and Violence*
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INTRODUCTION

As Vasilii Grossman, a Soviet writer and one of the shrewdest observers of Stalinism and Nazism, has pointed out: "Our century is the century of the greatest violence ever committed against human beings by the state" (in *Forever Flowing* [New York: Harper and Row, 1970], p. 239). Such a pessimistic conclusion is probably explained by the fact that Grossman always managed to be among the state's victims. But maybe it's stretching things a little to call him a "victim." After all, Grossman died in his bed. Only his novels were mutilated by state censorship; it was only his major novel that the state security committee confiscated, with the warning from only the head of state ideology that it would be possible to publish such a novel only in 200 years, no earlier.

People who find themselves in a more comfortable relation to the state have different views. Jean Kirkpatrick, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, has recently drawn a much more sanguine conclusion about state terrorism: "Coercion exercised by governments was judged more harshly than the violence of terrorists despite the historic view that, by virtue of their responsibility for maintaining order, government possesses a monopoly of legitimate force. Treating governments and terrorists as equals deprives the former of all claims to legitimacy" (*Commentary*, 71:4 [April 1981], p. 16). Be that as it may, if one compares the number of victims and the amount of suffering generated by individuals or groups on the one hand, to that generated by governments on the other, one cannot avoid paying immensely more attention to state terrorism, while putting aside apologies of *apparatchiki* or equivalent Western functionaries.

The following special issue on "Terror and State Terrorism" is meant to clarify the relation between terrorism by states, groups and individuals. While it would have been impossible to cover all or even most instances of the phenomenon, the seven articles on the subject do examine some of the most important cases. Two deal with relatively advanced capitalist societies, three with "really existing socialist" societies, and two with countries from the Southern hemisphere.

In recent years, there has been much discussion of state terrorism in "socialist" societies, especially after the Khrushchev revelations in 1956. One of the most blatant forms of state terrorism is to be found in political trials — of which those in the Soviet Union in the 1930s are only the most well-known examples. Reiman, who has had some direct experience with things of this sort in Czechoslovakia, examines their function and evaluates prospects for reviewing them in the near future. In view of the present possibility of such trials in Poland, it is all the more important to understand how they fit in with the logic of domination in these societies. As Michnik's letter (also in this issue) indicates, KOR activists — himself included — may be targets of such trials soon. The situation in Poland has deteriorated so much that one of the main fears is that such trials will not be public and the accused may end up summarily executed after secret trials.

Staniszkis' discussion of martial law in Poland clarifies the conditions that could lead to such an outcome. In describing how Poland is undergoing a "translocating revolution" meant to place it squarely in areas she considers characterized by the Asiatic mode of production, she provides a clear analysis of the configuration of forces constituting the present ruling elite. Combined with Charwat's discussion of French-Polish evaluations of the present situation in Poland and Warecki's speculations about a possible army-church compromise, the emerging picture indicates the various future directions state terrorism may take in a country where most options concerning how to overcome the present economic and socio-political crisis have long since been exhausted by the power elite.

But state terrorism need not always be overt. Especially in countries such as Hungary, which learned well the lessons of 1956, it can take covert and seemingly friendly forms.

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Lovas and Anderson carefully unveil the "iron fist" of state terror hidden under the velvet glove of "liberal" policies in Hungary. This state of affairs is further exemplified by Comisso's review of two critical books dealing with conditions in Hungarian factories. She shows how even the most damning criticism has become admissible — as long as it does not explicitly point the finger at the party apparatus. When that happens — as is the case of Haraszti's book — the velvet glove is readily removed. This despite apologies for such repressive policies (also bought, surprisingly enough, by other well-meaning Western intellectuals), which tend to be clothed in dubious philosophical arguments about the alleged incompatibility of "literary merit" and "political commitment."

The internalization of relations of domination — and, therefore, the subsequent shift from direct to indirect state terrorism — is a phenomenon not limited solely to "actually existing socialist" societies. As Johnstone argues, such a pattern can clearly be discerned in South Africa. Contrary to liberal economistic analyses of apartheid, which saw apartheid as growing increasingly obsolete as a result of the extension of advanced capitalist relations, Johnstone describes how the terror apparatus has become systematically institutionalized — hence, hidden behind forms of "legality" — and its dynamics rendered independent of any "laws" of capitalist development.

Unlike the South African case, where state terrorism appears as an effective mechanism of repressive social integration, in Argentina the situation is almost the opposite. As Corradi shows, the widely publicized terror and state terrorism in Argentina during the last decade may be primarily epiphenomena of a much broader general social disintegration. To the extent that the Argentinian situation is far from unique in Latin America, Corradi's analysis does not provide much room for optimism concerning possibilities for democratization in those countries.

In those advanced Western societies most directly touched by terrorism during the past decade or so, West Germany and Italy, interpretations of its causes have fallen primarily in two groups. The first one has tended to see it as a result of external influences seeking to destabilize Western societies (e.g., Kissinger and the Italian Communist Party); while the second one has focused on processes of social marginalization of youth and the growing distance of the state from social realities, presumably triggering the violent reactions of terrorism. All the information necessary to develop a definitive account of these events is far from being available. Yet, it is clear that, even if not the *only* or the most decisive factor, there is an institutional crisis facilitating the growth of these social pathologies. By examining such an institutional crisis in Italy, Bobbio suggests that what has happened in the post-war years is that a *sub-government* has developed under the visible and democratically elected government. It is this sub-government that actually runs the country so that the periodic collapses of the various visible governments do not substantially affect "business as usual." Within such a context — resembling the situation created in the United States by incresaingly powerful lobbies and political action committees — it becomes understandable, even if far from justifiable, how marginalized groups may give up on the established political process and turn to desperate, extreme alternatives.

In a similar vein, Elias compares the right-wing terrorism of the Free Corps immediately after World War I and foreshadowing the rise of Hitler to power, with its more recent left-wing counterpart in West Germany. His conclusion — that the phenomenon is related to a crisis of meaning or of successful integration of the new generations into the existing institutional and axiological framework — also points to the distance existing between state and society. Thus, far from being exceptional occurrences, acts of terrorism can be said to be in some sense rooted in the very nature of

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modern Western states and can always reappear as long as the conditions engendering them in West Germany remain unaltered.

All of these contributions point to the dismal conclusion that both terrorism and state terrorism are not likely to diminish in the immediate future. If anything, present trends intensifying ongoing crises in the societies under examination lead to the conclusion that they are likely to increase. It is because of this that the question of new emancipatory forces and movements becomes all the more urgent. Thus, this issue of *Telos* also contains an English translation of Horkheimer's crucial, but practically forgotten, article on "Egoism and the Freedom Movement," originally published in 1936. While Jay may be right that the movements discussed by Horkheimer are quite different from contemporary ones, such a historical perspective remains essential to understanding the present predicament.

Continuing debates undertaken in the last few issues of the journal concerning new social movements — especially the European peace movements — this issue also contains two additional contributions: one by Kovel, on technocracy and the nuclear state (views more fully developed in his forthcoming book on the subject); and the other by Segbers, criticizing the American interpretation of European peace movements — specifically, interpretations that have appeared in this journal. Given the *actuality* of these questions, the discussion is far from exhausted and will continue in future numbers of *Telos*.

Paul Piccone and Victor Zaslavsky

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INTRODUCTION TO HORKHEIMER

by Martin Jay

In the steadily burgeoning literature on Critical Theory, the figure of Max Horkheimer has assumed an ambiguous status. Although his seminal role in organizing the work of his colleagues at the Institute of Social Research is widely acknowledged, the precise nature of his own contribution remains somewhat clouded. Aside from his programmatic theoretical and methodological statements — most notably his so-called "manifesto" of 1937, "Traditional and Critical Theory"[1] — Horkheimer's substantive work as a philosopher and social critic has received relatively little attention. The recent focus on Benjamin's influence on Adorno, which tends to make the most exciting elements of the latter's work cryto-Benjaminian,[2] has led to a corresponding de-emphasis on Horkheimer's own intellectual partnership with Adorno. Although the judgement of Perry Anderson that Horkheimer "was always intellectually of secondary rank as a thinker within the Frankfurt School"[3] is idiosyncratically harsh, it is symptomatic of a more general disparagement, evinced also by the lack of a major intellectual biography devoted to Horkheimer.[4]

The personal testimony of anyone connected with the Institute has, however, always contradicted this evaluation of Horkheimer's role in its intellectual development. And there is, in fact, abundant evidence to demonstrate his responsibility for many of Critical Theory's most trenchant insights. No better example of this claim can be offered than the essay he published in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* in 1936 entitled "Egoism and the Freedom Movement: On the Anthropology of the Bourgeois Era."[5] Praised by Alfred Schmidt as "one of the best that he ever wrote"[6] and included in the two-volume German edition of *Kritische Theorie* in 1968, it was unfortunately left out of the one-volume English edition published four years later. As a result, it has been largely ignored in the Anglo-American reception of the Frankfurt School.

And yet, as a seed-bed for much of the Frankfurt School's later work, it is virtually unparalleled. Herbert Marcuse, who called it "one of the most successful elaborations and nearest to the paradigmatic ideal of early Critical Theory,"[7]

1. Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," *Critical Theory; Selected Essays,* trans. Matthew J. O'Connell et. al. (New York, 1972); the term "manifesto" has been applied by Phil Slater in *Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School; A Marxist Perspective* (London, 1977), p. 27.

2. See especially Susan Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics; Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute* (New York, 1977). For a recent analysis that modifies Buck-Morss's argument, see Eugene Lunn, *Marxism and Modernism; An Historical Study of Lukács, Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno* (Berkeley, 1982), p. 200f.

3. Anderson, *Considerations on Western Marxism* (London, 1976), p. 93.

4. There are short studies of Horkheimer in German by Helmjt Gumnior and Rolf Ringguth, Anslem Skuhra, and Frank Lienert, but nothing even of their length in English. Seyla Benhabib and Wolfgang Bonss are preparing a collection of essays on Horkheimer for the MIT series of Studies in Contemporary Social Thought.

5. Horkheimer,"Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung," "Zeitschrift für *Sozialfurschung*, V. 2 (1936).

6. Schmidt, *Die Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung: Geschichte und gegenwärtige Bedeutung*(Munich, 1970), p. 21.

7. Marcuse, quoted in Alfons Söllner, *Geschichte und Herrschaft; Studien zur materialistischen Sozialwissenschaft 1929-1942* (Frankfurt, 1979), p.231.

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acknowledged that it inspired his influential analysis of "The Affirmative Character of Culture."[8] It was no less important for his other *Zeitschrift* essay "On Hedonism,"[9] and lurks behind many of the arguments in his later appropriation of Freud. Walter Benjamin praised it in his 1937 essay on "Edward Fuchs, Collector and Historian"[10] for inaugurating the revision of the mistaken belief that bourgeois revolutions were the genealogical roots of their proletarian successors. Fuchs' seemingly paradoxical combination of moralism and materialism Benjamin explained by reference to Horkheimer's analysis of its psycho-social significance. For Adorno, "Egoism and the Freedom Movement" was "intimately bound up"[11] with the argument of *In Search of Wagner*, written in 1937-38 and published in full only in 1953. In particular, Horkheimer's analysis of the proto-fascist Roman tribune Cola di Rienzo provided him with a key to understand Wagner's opera on the same subject. Many years later, the essay was also explicitly credited by Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman with providing the historical frame of reference that contextualized their analysis of the demagogic *Prophets of Deceit*.[12] And even more recently, the Institute collection entitled *Aspects of Sociology*, written after its return to Frankfurt, cited it approvingly in its discussion of "the masses."[13].

For all its later resonance, "Egoism and the Freedom Movement" is clearly a document of the Frankfurt School's earliest period, which has been aptly called its most explicitly "materialist."[14] Underlying its argument is the "hidden orthodoxy" that Habermas and others have detected in the Frankfurt School before the war. Horkheimer still operated with an essentially optimistic materialist interpretation of history which could allow him to say: "The extremely progressive significance which this transformation process of energies has acquired is not at issue here. The disciplining of all strata of the population, which followed from the need to incorporate the masses into the bourgeois mode of production, affected the development of this form of economy: not just the astonishing development of technology, the simplification of the work-process, in short the increase of human power over nature, but also the human preconditions for a higher form of society are unthinkable without the spiritualization and internalization."[15]

We are clearly a long way from the Horkheimer of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. In "Egoism and the Freedom Movement," he was also still very much the champion of Fromm's early attempt to combine Marxism and psychoanalysis

8. Marcuse, "The Affirmative Character of Culture," *Negations; Essays in Critical Theory*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 1968), p. 277.

9. Marcuse, "On Hedonism," *Negations*, p. 282.

10. Benjamin, "Edward Fuchs: Collector and Historian," *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, eds. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, (New York, 1978), pp. 360-361.

11. Adorno, *In Search of Wagner*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London, 1981), p. 9.

12. Lowenthal and Guterman, *Prophets of Deceit* (New York, 1949), p. xvi.

13. *Aspects of Sociology*, with a Preface by Horkheimer and Adorno, trans. John Viertel (Boston, 1972), p. 88.

14. Helmut Dubiel, *Wissenschaftsorganisation und politische Erfahrung; Studien zur frühen Kritischen Theorie* (Frankfurt, 1978), p.47.

15. Horkheimer, "Egoism and the Freedom Movement," p. 30.

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at the cost of the latter's more pessimistic implications. The death instinct, in particular, Horkheimer dismissed as a pseudo-biological ideology that reflects Freud's defeatist anti-utopian liberalism. Also like Fromm, he chastized Reich for narrowly relying on sexual liberation as the answer to social problems, preferring instead a more orthodox Marxist stress on transforming the mode of production. That such a transformation was not yet ruled out by Horkheimer in 1936 is demonstrated by his appeal to "the task of the historical persons in whom theory and historical practice became a unity."[16]

The materialism of "Egoism and the Freedom Movement" is not, however, confined to these expressions of a soon-to-be-abandoned confidence in traditional Marxist formulas. It is also evident in a more fruitful and, for Critical Theory, more lasting way: Horkheimer's heterodox defense of egoism and personal happiness against the moral asceticism of bourgeois — and by extension, proletarian — revolutionaries. Here Critical Theory's debt to 18th-century materialists like Helvétius, Sade and Mandeville, all of whom Horkheimer cites with approval, is apparent. Implicity against Lukács with his rigorously ascetic revolutionary moralism, which led to the chilling denial of individualism in *History and Class Consciousness*,[17] Horkheimer argued for an egoism that is more than the self-interest of *homo oeconomicus.*

In fact, the major intention of his argument is to demonstrate that this narrow type of egoism is the dialectical inverse of the spiritualized universalism defended by bourgeois moralists. Together they form one of the central antinomies of the bourgeois era, whose boundaries, Horkheimer argues, can be stretched to include Rienzo in the 14th century as well as Robespierre in the 18th. In writing an "anthropology of the bourgeois era," as Horkheimer called it, he extended the analysis he had made of the philosophical texts of the early modern period in his 1930 study of *The Origins of the Bourgeois Philosophy of History*[18] to more concrete examples of social and political movements. With an eye on their more recent descendents, whose sinister implications he had experienced at first hand, Horkheimer attempted to show how the antinomy of narrow egoistic practice in the market place and high-sounding ideals motivating movements for emancipation characterized the process of bourgeois rationalization. Against Weber, he emphasized the irrationality that was an essential byproduct of that process, rather than its putative target.[19] In concrete historical terms, he detected its trace in the sado-

16. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

17 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness; Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, trans. Rodney Living stone (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p. 315.

18. Horkheimer, *Anfänge der bürgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie* (Stuttgart, 1930). Horkheimer continued this type of analysis in several of his *Zeitschrift* essays, most notably "Montaigne und die Funktion der Skepsis," VII, 1 (1938). Horkheimer's skill as a critical historian of philosophy is demonstrated in works such as these.

19. In demonstrating the irrational side of bourgeois politics from the beginning, Horkheimer also implicitly called into question the assumption, which still can be found in influential books like Carl Schorske's *Fin-de-siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York, 1980), that only *after* the decline of liberalism did mass demagogic politics really emerge. Like Marcuse in his 1934 essay on "The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State,"reprinted in

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masochistic relationship between charismatic leaders like Cola di Rienzo, Savonarola and Robespierre and their followers. Whether in the name of divine grace or revolutionary virtue, these leaders, whose personality structures were in fact the mirror-image of their supporters, railed against the legitimate demand for personal happiness. Bourgeois culture, beginning with the Reformation, internalized this prohibition against egoism, even as it quietly countenanced its practice in narrowly economic terms.

In the essay, Horkheimer only hinted at the transformation of this process in the twentieth century. Fascism, he argued, is a "bad imitation"[20] of the movements he described; antisemitism is an expression of the "deep erotic resentment"[21] of those who think the Jews somehow escape from the moral repressiveness of bourgeois society; egoism has now "actually become destructive, both the fettered and diverted egoism of the masses as well as the archaic egoistic principle of the economy, which still shows only its most brutal side."[22] But with a still orthodox faith in the primacy of the economy, he then added that "when the latter is overcome, the former can become productive in a new sense."[23]

Whether or not the later Horkheimer would have felt so confident is doubtful, although he always remained hopeful that the legitimate egoism of the masses, however perverted it may have been by the Culture Industry, contained a still potent utopian impulse. In the post-fascist era, however, it is clear that he would have had to change his explanation of how that impulse is thwarted. For recent social movements, at least in the advanced industrial societies of the West, bear little resemblance to the models explored in "Egoism and the Freedom Movement." Neither the counter-cultural movements of the 1960s nor the recent "new social movements" of the 1980s demonstrate much affinity for the sado-masochistic type of leader-follower relationship that was so discredited by fascism. If the culture of narcissism means anything, it suggests that the self-punishing, resentment-filled victims of early bourgeois rationalization are no longer prevalent as they once were. In this sense, Horkheimer's analysis may have more applicability today for

Negations, he was at pains to show the subtle continuities between liberalism and its alleged authoritarian successors. Not all Western Marxists, however, were convinced by Horkeimer's argument. In *Naturrecht und menschliche Würde* (Frankfurt, 1961), Ernst Bloch attacked "Egoism and the Freedom Movement" for underemphasizing the positive links between bourgeois and proletarian revolutions. The former were, after all, uprisings by a repressed class with utopian dreams. To ignore bourgeois anticipations of proletarian revolutions would be to leave the latter "historyless" (pp. 194-198) Another essay written around the same time, Lukács' "Schillers Theorie des modernen Literatur" (later included in *Goethe und seine Zeit*) was more aware, so Bloch contended, of the valuable continuities between the two revolutionary movements. In so arguing, Bloch was following Lukács in extending the popular front strategy backward in time, trying to harness the "healthy" side of bourgeois culture for proletarian purposes. Horkheimer, in contrast, was more wary of the conformist implications of these expressions of "affirmative culture." He did not, however, want to leave the revolution of the future "historyless," as his positive remarks about 18th-century materialists and Nietzche indicate.

20. Horkheimer, "Egoism and the Freedom Movement," p. 49.
21. *Ibid.*,p. 52.
22. *Ibid.*,p. 58.
23. *Ibid.*

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anti-modernist movements like Islamic fundamentalism than for anything likely to appear in the West.

It can, to be sure, be argued, as Russell Berman has recently done in his thoughtful critique of the West German peace movement,[24] that there is still some validity in Horkheimer's point about the gap between spiritualized, universalist rhetoric and the specific class or individual interests inadvertently served by the logic of the protest. German business may indeed profit from an *Ostpolitik* that downplays Russian aggressive intentions in the name of nuclear disarmament. And yet, can it be denied that the genuine, non-economically defined egoism of the masses of mankind is also served by the lessening of the nuclear threat? However much one may detect certain influences or a religiously inspired new inwardness behind the peace movement or see it as a covert tool of resurgent German nationalism, its roots in the higher egoism that Horkheimer defended against its ascetic denial in both bourgeois and — let it be remembered — socialist ideology must not be underestimated. If the Horkheimer of the 1930s could have seen something progressive in the highly ambivalent movements he described, albeit for reasons that he later came to question, can we be so sure that nothing positive will ensue from the far less sinister freedom movements of our own day?

24. Berman, "Opposition to Rearmament and West German Culture," *Telos*, 51 (Spring, 1982), p. 147.

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EGOISM AND THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT: ON THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE BOURGEOIS ERA*

by Max Horkheimer

I

The contradiction in the conception of human nature that has outstanding significance in the political literature of the bourgeois era came to light in two brilliant works at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Although Machiavelli's instructions for statesmen are not based on as pessimistic an anthropology as implied by the familiar statement in Chapter 18 of *The Prince* that all men "are bad and would not observe their faith,"[1] subsequent centuries understood him essentially in that manner. In fact, Machiavelli found so many followers in this direction that Treitschke could state that "all truly great political thinkers reveal a trace of cynical contempt for man, and even if it is not too strong it always has a strong basis."[2] Thomas More's *Utopia* expresses a different view. This vision of a rational society proclaims the conviction of an originally happier constitution of human nature by the mere fact that its realization, according to the fable, is separated from the present not temporally but only spatially. References to man's bestial instincts do not lead more to limit the duration of the association of free men who regulate their lives according to plans that respect the claims of each member equally. Unlike Machiavelli, More does not describe a cycle of state forms in which every tolerable condition is necessarily followed by the same confusion and misery out of which society has emerged by arduous process. [3] Nor was More the only one to hold this view. In his fight against the Hobbesian doctrine on human nature's dangerous aggressiveness, Rousseau did not have to invoke More, because he could cite a whole series of bourgeois theoreticians that held the same viewpoint.[4]

These representative writers of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment were sparing in applying the attributes "good" and "bad" to human nature. Their works not only consider antithetical qualities — for instance Machiavelli's concept of "virtue" — but as modern thinkers they strive to exclude value judgments as much as possible. In contrast with the medieval view which understood man mainly in reference to a norm, and in which nature, as opposed to the unnatural, connoted the divinely ordained constitution of human being within all creation, early modern thought began to regard as human those traits which proved to be so in terms of historical, political, and psychological analysis. Human nature was no longer to be derived from bibli-

*Translated by David J. Parent.

1. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourse* (New York, 1950), p. 64.

2. Heinrich von Treitschke, *Politik* II (Leipzig, 1922) p. 546 f.

3. Cf. Machiavelli, *op. cit.* pp. 111-115 and *Geschichte von Florenzi* in *Gesammelte Schriften* Vol. IV, (Munich, 1925), p. 268.

4. Rousseau, "*Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'égalité parmi les hommes*," in *Oeuvres complete*, III (Frankfurt, 1853), p. 25.

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cal exegesis, or other authorities, but rather ultimately from directly accessible situations. Knowledge of man becomes a specialized problem of natural science. To the extent that the basic natural-scientific categories contain any pervasive value judgment, it is based on the claim that for everything in nature, and thus for the body and its indwelling soul, to perish represents the greatest evil, while self-preservation and the concomitant activity is the highest good. This simple naturalism was established in the Renaissance theory of emotions, especially by Cardeno and Telesio, who drew on the doctrines of antiquity, and systematically elaborated in the philosophies of Hobbes and Spinoza.[5] This concept of nature which appeared to be unprejudiced but was in reality individualistic because it asserted that self-preservation of each thing is its law and standard, corresponds to the social condition of the bourgeois individual; the interpretation of non-human nature, which lacks any intentional relation to this social origin, is eventually projected back onto man.

Yet, although philosophy and science were convinced of their own objectivity (*Wertfreiheit*), the spirit of the times formed the very layout and elaboration of their plans: not only in the sense of the unquestioned individualistic principle that regulated the relationships of owners to one another, but also by the mental and instinctive barriers caused by the combination of this principle with the fact of different classes of society. The nature of the isolated individual is itself a dubious topic for anthropology. This isolated individual is not man in general, which is its real object of study. Yet, because of the contradictions of the bourgeois order, especially the constant need for the physical and psychic repression of the masses, the analysis of this abstract subject is further obscured and constricted by subconscious considerations. With or without the authors's intention, anthropological ideas take on moral significance; confidence or disgust, indifference or sympathy contaminate the descriptions of psychic structures and the views on the nature and course of the affects and other responses. The individual, who the anthropological ideas of this epoch thematize as man in general, therefore becomes the object of philosophical investigation in an extremely distorted manner.

The explanation for this state of affairs seems obvious. The sociological attribution of thoughts and feelings to social groups and historical movements has an especially easy task in this regard. The anthropological contradiction coincides with a political one. Historians have tried to explain the contradiction between Machiavelli and More psychologically by pointing to differences in their mental attitude and ethical disposition, or politically by contrasting a divided Italy, always threatened by invasions, with England, as administratively united island, practically safe from all enemies.[6] Nonethe-

5. Cf. Dilthey, *Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. II (Leipzig and Berlin, 1914) pp. 433-435); and Bernhard Groethuysen, "*Philosophische Anthropologie*," in *Handbuch der Philosophie* Part III (Munich and Berlin, 1931) p. 139f.

6. Cf. H. Oncken, Introduction to More's *Utopia*, in *Klassiker der Politik*, Vol. 1 (Berlin, 1922), p. 38f.

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less, sociological analysis teaches us that in the subsequent development of anthropology the emphasis on man's aggressive "bestial" drives indicated an interest in oppression, whereas the emphasis placed on educability or even on moral indifference in the judgment of emotional drives, was an expression of emancipatory tendencies. Those philosophers of history differ not so much in anthropology as in politics. Had politics not separated them, they could have concurred on anthropology. Only the circumstance that anthropology was used to support political goals widened the gap between the two ways of thinking. The task of applying this theory to the anthropological ideas of modern history and tracing the changes, reversals, and complications of the pattern is not just a historical problem. It is of systematic and scientific interest: the instructional content of the great bourgeois anthropology will be uncovered and appropriated by psychological knowledge.

But this obvious connection with politics will not be treated in the following pages when we speak of how anthropological thoughts are permeated with value-ideas. A closer look at the optimistic and pessimistic trends, rather, reveals a trait common to the two ways of thinking as they developed in history, which drastically diverted and weakened the focus of knowledge of man so strong in Machiavelli and the Enlightenment: the condemnation of egoism, indeed of pleasure itself. Both in the cynical proclamation of the dangerous wickedness of human nature which had to be kept in check by a strong government apparatus, and in the corresponding Puritanical doctrine of the sinfulness of the individual, who had to suppress his own desires with iron discipline and in absolute subjection to the law of duty, as well as in the contrary assertion of man's originally pure and harmonious nature which is disturbed only by the restrictive and corrupt present conditions, the absolute renunciation of every egoistic urge is the self-evident basis. This appears as a contradiction to practice. The more purely bourgeois society comes to power, the more its influence overcomes restrictions, men oppose each other with increasing hostility and indifference as individuals, families, economic groups, and classes. In the context of the sharpened economic and social contradiction, the originally progressive principle of free competition takes on the character of a permanent state of war, internally and externally. All who are drawn into this world develop the egoistic, exclusionary, hostile sides of their being in order to survive in a hard reality. In the bourgeoisie's great historically effective anthropological views, however, any emotions or drives which do not contribute directly to concord, love, and sociability are despised, distorted, or denied.

When Machiavelli states in his *Discorsi* "that men act right only under compulsion, but from the moment that they have the option and liberty to commit wrong with impunity, they never fail to carry confusion and disorder everywhere,"[7] while in the introduction claiming for himself a "desire . . . to do what may prove for the common benefit of all,"[8] this shows clearly that he

7. Machiavelli, *The Prince, op. cit.*, p. 118.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

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does not observe the natural instincts of most men simply in a natural-scientific light, but regards them as bad and reprehensible. As cold and unprejudiced a stand as he consciously takes toward Christianity, he is substantially here in complete agreement with Luther and Calvin. As exponents of similar historical interests, they all break with Catholic tolerance toward certain human modes of reaction that disturb the installation of the new economic order. At the outset of this form of society, as well as in its latest phases, the wretchedness of the individual is asserted. "Luther sees in all clarity," a German treatise states,[9] "that man's will is evil, and this means not that something in man is evil, but that man himself is evil right to the root, that evil is the corrupted nature itself." In contrast with Catholicism, there is here no neutral sphere of instinctual life; the essence of man as such is evil and rotten. Similarly, Calvin teaches: "Original sin is the inherited perversion and corruption of our nature in all its parts . . . Cognitive reason and the heart's will are possessed by sin. From head to foot man is immersed in this flood so that no part of his whole being remains free of sin. Everything he does must be counted as sin, as Paul says (Romans 8,7), that all desires and thoughts of the flesh are enmity to God, and hence death.[10] Rousseau's sharp opposition to this does not refer at all to the condemnation of the "bad" drives and the pleasure in prohibited instinctual goals, but to their ubiquity, their origin and possible change. Not only Rousseau and the enthusiasm for everything natural and primitive connected with his name, (and always evident in a heartfelt style regardless of content), not only harmony-philosophers such as Cumberland and Shaftesbury who, contrary to Hobbes' anthropology, teach an innate morality, but the whole tradition of thought that glorifies the natural proves to be identical with its misanthropic counterpart since it does not at all attack the legitimacy of condemning the allegedly corrupt instincts but only the views on their development and extent.

The allusion to the figure of Robespierre, the orthodox disciple of Rousseau, suffices to exemplify the moral rigorism inherent in this sentimental theory of man. His concept of virtue agreed very closely with the Puritan view; condemnation was changed into real persecution under his reign. Political and moral opposition cannot be separated in him. He speaks of the sad consequences of Epicurean thought with the same disgust as a militant theologian.[11] There are two kinds of human behavior, according to him, virtue and vice: "Depending on the direction he gives to his passions, man rises as high as heaven or he plunges into the murky abyss."[12] This separation is exclusive; on the one hand, base, reprehensible pleasure, synonymous with crass egoism — the

9. H. Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen* (Berlin, 1935) p. 15.

10. Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae,* Transl. by E.F.K. Müller into German (Neukirchen, 1928) p. 118-120; cf. also H. Engelland, *Gott und Mensch bei Calvin* (Munich, 1934) p. 49.

11. Cf. for example the speech on "The Relations between the Religious and Moral Ideas and Republican Principles," in the 18 Floréal 1794 session of the National Convention; German by W. Blochwitz in Maximilian Robespierre, *Habt ihr eine Revolution ohne Revolution gewollt?* ed. by Kurt Schnelle (Reclam: Leipzig, undated) p. 361f.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 351.

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doctrines of materialism and atheism run in this direction — and on the other, love of country and self-denial. There are "two kinds of egoism: the one base and cruel, which separates man from his own kind and strives for a solitary well-being purchased with the hardships of others; and other magnanimous and beneficial, which dissolves our personal happiness into the welfare of all while linking our reputation with the fatherland's."[13] Man is comprehended in terms of the behavior which society expects of him, and this means that an instinctual disposition that contradicts the principles actually governing social reality is proclaimed as so-called virtue. Religion, metaphysics, and moral declamation fulfilled the task of measuring man by the opposite of what necessarily had to become of him in the underlying historical world with their own cooperation. Apart from the works of a few undaunted writers, the analysis of man in the bourgeois epoch was impeded and falsified by this contradiction.

The need for an idealistic morality follows from the bourgeoisie's economic situation. The increased unchaining of free competiton needed certain inhibitions — aside from a few cynical economists of last century, even according to its own advocates and defenders. Private and criminal law see to it that this play of forces maintains a balance, however unstable, and can guarantee a relatively constant functioning of society. In addition, habits and customs likewise keep competition within certain forms and restrict it. But even insofar as the liberal principle is restricted only by such juridical and traditional limits as in a part of nineteenth-century England, its rule is a special case in economic history. Before and afterwards, far-reaching state measures were needed for the social whole to be able to reproduce itself in the given form at all. Social interests that go beyond the horizon of the individual economic subject were recognized by juridical, economico-political and other state institutions, by church and private organizations and by a philosophically grounded morality. One of the causes of bourgeois morality lies in the social need to restrain the principle of competition in the epoch dominated by it. Thus, the moralistic view of man contains a rational principle, albeit in mystified, idealistic form.[14] Furthermore, the rejection of antisocial drives is understandable from the severity of social domination. It was less necessary to preach moderation in mutual competition to the poor of recent centuries. For them, morality was supposed to mean submissiveness, resignation, discipline and sacrifice for the whole, i.e., simply the repression of their material claims. Their competition with one another, on the contrary, was desired; its mitigation by the formation of economic and political associations was hampered. The expression of their material interests, which morality here sought to restrict, was not private enterprise but common action; this was fought ideologically by disparaging those interests.

Both motifs, the general social interest and the class interest, pervade the

13. *Ibid.*

14. Cf. the remarks on "Materialism and Morality," Vol. I, p. 71ff.

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critique of egoism. The contradiction contained in morality, stemming from this dual root, gives the bourgeois concept of virtue, as it appears even among progressive thinkers and politicians, its vagueness and ambiguity. The condemnation of egoism, to which anthropology counterposes the thesis of a nobler human nature or its sheer stigmatization as bestiality, basically does not apply to the striving of the mighty for power, prosperity within sight of misery, and the maintenance of anachronistic and unjust forms of society. Since the bourgeoisie's victory, philosophical morality has applied ever greater mental acumen to maintain impartiality on this point. The majority of mankind should, rather, accustom itself to restraining its own demand for happiness, repressing its wish to live as well as that small minority which was quite willing to have its existence be condemned by this useful moral verdict. This importance of bourgeois morality as a means of domination became increasingly important. In today's totalitarian states, where all intellectual life is understood solely from the viewpoint of manipulating the masses, the more radical, humanist elements of morality are intentionally stripped away and the individual's purposes are declared inconsequent, vis-à-vis whatever the government designates as a common goal. In a few currents of utilitarianism, particularly in liberal national economy, self-interest is proclaimed to be the legitimate root of action, and then reconciled by farfetched constructions and obvious sophistries with the unselfish behavior required of the masses. Yet other authors, who did not advocate egoism merely within conventional bounds, purely 'theoretically" and, as it were, tongue-in-cheek,[15] but proclaimed and recommended it openly as the essence of this form of social existence, were considered suspect and hated. The critique of egoism fits better into this system of egoistic reality than its open defense, for it is based increasingly on the denial of its own nature. Public acceptance of its rule would simultaneously mean its end. However little the average member of the ruling strata can secretly understand any other but narrowly egoistic motives, he nevertheless becomes indignant when anyone publicly propagates them. The egoism that has recently been sanctified, the "sacro egoismo" of military states, is for the individual of the mass, rather, the opposite of self-interest and leads him to renounce prosperity, security and freedom. It designates the aggressive tendencies of small groups of society and has nothing to do with the happiness of most individuals. Frederick II of Prussia indignantly defended his unprejudiced, egoistic policy against Machiavelli, who had however founded it from the first; and Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees*, in which under the motto "Private vices, public benefits" he discovers egoism to

15. Cf. Jeremy Bentham. His basic moral principle is so indefinite that two German philosophers have interpreted it in exactly opposite words. According to W. Wundt, in "*Uber den wahrhaften Krieg,*" (Leipzig, 1914), p. 21f. there is no doubt that Bentham meant "Let each do what is useful to him." According to O. Kraus in J. Benthams *Grundsätze für ein künftiges Völkerrecht und einen dauernden Frieden*, ed. by O. Kraus, (Halle an der Saale, 1915), p. 8; on the other hand, it reads "Let each one make himself as useful as possible." The contradiction contained in this concept of egoism disappears if one refers back to the society whose classes it applies to in different ways. Depending on the individual's social situation it assumes one meaning or the other.

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be the foundation of present society and propagates it, was, characteristically enough, specifically refuted by one of the most representative philosophers of the ruling bourgeoisie.[16] Mandeville himself knew exactly that the open advocacy of egoism is unwelcome to precisely those persons who embody it most strongly. Each of them "would have us believe that the pomp and luxury he is served with are as many tiresome plagues to him; and all the grandeur he appears in is an ungrateful burden, which, to his sorrow, is inseparable from the high sphere he moves in; that his noble mind, so much elevated above vulgar capacities, aims at higher ends, and cannot relish such worthless enjoyments; that the highest of his ambition is to promote the public welfare, and his greatest pleasure to see his country flourish, and everybody in it made happy."[17]

What is expressed in philosophy as the contempt for instinctual desires turns out in real life to be the practice of their repression. All instincts which did not move in predesignated channels, every unconditional desire for happiness was persecuted and repressed in favor of "moral" strivings related to the "common good" and to the extent that this common good contradicted the most immediate interests of most individuals, the transference of psychic energies into socially permitted forms lacked any rational explanation, and society needed an education dominated by religion and metaphysics in addition to physical force in order to domesticate the masses. In all of history, even in periods which proved to be relatively progressive, excessive self-denial has been demanded of the vast majority. Self-discipline and conciliatoriness, both among themselves and toward the rulers, were taught them by all means of coercion and persuasion. Individuals were restrained; after all, in official consciousness and in their own, they were moral beings. Bad desires and passions might slumber at the bottom of their soul, but only weak and depraved natures fall prey to them. Though the rulers themselves were forced to act ruthlessly in the hard struggle for existence, that was one of the bitter necessities. A real specimen of the privileged bourgeoisie is so strongly indoctrinated with the moral propaganda his class directs all at the rest of society, that his own ideology does not permit him to enjoy the exploitation and control over men and things; rather he must regard it as a duty to the whole, a social accomplishment, the fulfilment of a predesignated career, so that he professes and approves it. The Renaissance paintings in which wealthy donors with unmerciful and sly faces kneel as humble saints under the cross can be regarded as symbols of this epoch of unchained self-interest. The struggle against egoism goes further than single desires; it applies to emotional life as a whole and ultimately turns against any unrationalized, free pleasure which is sought without justification. The assertion of its harmfulness is merely incidental to the argumentations. Man as he should be, the model underlying bourgeois anthropology everywhere, has a limited relation to pleasure, because he is oriented toward "higher values." In the life of the exemplary man, there

16. Cf. Berkeley, *Alciphron*, 2nd Dialogue, #4 and 5.
17. Bernard Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees* (London, 1934), p. 121.

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is little place for pleasure in its most direct form as sexual, or more extensively, material pleasure. The work done by the individual for himself and others is done for the sake of higher ideals, connected only loosely, if at all, with pleasure. Duty, honor and community determine the true man and distinguish him for the animals. In all activity that claims to have cultural value, the greatest emphasis is placed on the absence of pleasure as a motive. This does not mean that joy is rejected openly and fully. On the contrary, in the darkest work-places, in the most monotonous procedures, under the saddest conditions of existence in a life marked with deprivation, humiliation and dangers, without prospects of lasting improvement, men are, at all costs, not supposed to be depressed. The more religious consolation loses credibility, the more the cultural apparatus meant to create joy in the common man is refined and expanded. The tavern and folk-festival of the past, the sports and political mass exhibitions in the present, the fostering of a cheerful family life and the modern entertainment industries, both light and serious radio broadcasts, all are designed to evoke a satisfied mood. Nothing makes a man more suspect than when he lacks an inner harmony with life as it happens to be. The prescribed joyous temperament is, however, very different from orientation toward the pleasures of life or the joy that stems from real satisfaction. In the bourgeois type, happiness does not radiate from pleasurable moments to his whole life and color brightly even those sectors that are not as such delightful. The capacity for direct pleasure is weakened, coarsened and in many cases completely lost through the idealistic preaching of improvement and self-denial. The absence of blows of fate and conflicts of conscience, i.e. a relative freedom from external and internal pains and fears, a neutral, often very dismal state in which the soul usually oscillates between extreme activity and stolid impassivity is confused with happiness. The tabooing of "common" pleasure has succeeded so well that whoever allows himself any seems to become "base" instead of free, crude instead of grateful, stupid instead of clever. In marriage pleasure retreats before duty, but the social state to which pleasure was always ascribed as its profession has sunk so low and become so despised that it is almost on a level with crime. Pleasure has been banished from the light of cultural consciousness to the sad refuge of narrow-minded obscenity and prostitution. In the historical process in which the individual attained abstract consciousness of his own self, the abolition of slavery ended one form of class society, but not classes themselves, and so it did not only emancipate man but also enslaved him internally at the same time. In the modern age, the domination is concealed economically by the superficial independence of economic subjects, philosophically by the idealistic concept of an absolute freedom of man, while it is internalized by subduing and mortifying the claims to pleasure. This process of civilization admittedly began long before bourgeois era, in which however it first led to the formation and stabilization of representative character-types and gave social life its stamp.

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II

In the quieter periods of the last centuries, to a superficial onlooker it would seem that men had adjusted to the moral ideal of love and helpfulness, or at least were beginning to draw closer to it. The antagonistic mode of production, in which the principle of coldness and enmity necessarily dominated reality because all faced one another as competitors, developed positive aspects when compared with the earlier forms of society. Every further step of realization, every expansion of competition brought improvements and provided stronger evidence that social life could be kept running on the basis of the new principle of uncontrolled economic activity. But these calmer times, which on closer inspection were really quite turbulent, were interrupted not just by wars, famines and economic crises, but also by revolutions and counter-revolutions, and all these events provide historical material for the connection between bourgeois man's morality and his mode of behavior. This relationship does not emerge as clearly in the counter-revolutions as in the revolutions. The termporarily victorious counterattacks of Catholicism in the 17th century England, the rule of the Bourbons after the fall of Napoleon, the crushing of the Communes took place so exclusively under the sign of revenge that the contradiction between bourgeois man's morality and reality, between social existence and its ideological reflection, cannnot come fully into focus. In the counter-revolutions, reactionary groups of the bourgeoisie triumphed together with the remnants of feudalism. Typical of the historical mechanisms which reproduce the bourgeois character are, rather, movements which are evaluated, at least by more progressive historians of the bourgeoisie, as positive, i.e. as coinciding with the goals of their class. The smaller revolts of this kind, which pervade the whole history of Europe, such as the civil wars in the Italian cities in the sixteenth century, the Dutch sectarian wars in the seventeenth, the Spanish uprising in the eighteenth, the student agitation and other small revolts in Germany and France during the first half of the nineteenth century demonstrate that the major revolutionary events of any country emerge from a background of incessant struggles. The miserable situation of the impoverished population was their cause, and the urban bourgeoisie played the leading role. Only a few historical actions will be pointed out here, which show especially clearly how the peculiar dispositon of socially important groups of the bourgeoisie stood in contradiction to their own morality. While in the historical everyday life of modern times, the particular kind of wickedness and cruelty at work in this epoch is often hidden from those strata that did not experience it personally, it often becomes more clearly visible during periods of loosened social order. The following pages attempt to describe the common structural features of familiar events of modern history. Although the significance of these events for the progress of mankind varied greatly — a few are completely local, a few more religious than political — still, at these exceptional moments, the social constellation becomes recognizable with its most important mediations: the idealistic hierarchy of

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values, the theoretical condemnation of egoism, and the brutal and cruel streak in the bourgeois type's disposition. Both, real human existence and the contradictory moral consciousness, as well as their dynamic interaction, result from the social basis. Now the development of a few typical categories in terms of the historical material is necessary.

From the episode in which the Romans under the leadership of Cola di Rienzo made the untimely attempt to unite Italy under a democratically disguised dictatorship, until its modern realization on the same soil, the awakening and spread of bourgeois forms of life is marked with popular revolts. Despite all differences in their historical character and their function for social progress, they show common social-psychological features, which are especially important from the present perspective. Savonarola's rise and brief glory in Florence is symptomatic of a whole series of similar tendencies of the century. The struggle against the archaic state of ecclesiastical organization is taken up by clerical leaders who personify the interest of the rising individualistic society. The Reformationists, as successors to a series of militant religious figures, achieved the necessary changes in the ecclesiastical field. The English and French revolutions of the next centuries introduced the political form needed by the economy. Corresponding tendencies developed in Germany in connection with the wars of liberation and the resistance to the subsequent reaction. The typical course of these bourgeois movements is being repeated in the present; the form is now grotesquely distorted because the progressive function which those past strivings filled in regard to the possible elimination of the prevailing contradictory state of society is today no longer linked with the bourgeoisie's activity but has passed over to groups dominated by it. As the horror at the murderous practices of Chinese and Indian medicine, which were formerly productive, has been intensified by comparison with modern surgery, and the stupid superstition of the native patient who rejects modern medicine only to submit himself to a more primitive one causes all the greater a shock, the wider the gap between the two has grown and the more generally evident it has become, so the present movements — seen from the point of the interests of the whole society and not from those of the national power-groups — bear the stamp of futile and ridiculous fanaticism. And as those medical practices, looked at in isolation, have remained the same despite this change, the social movements have maintained their key features, despite the radical change of function.

Their foundation displays a typical structure. The urban bourgeoisie has its particular economic interests; it needs the abolition of all conditions and laws which restrict its industry, whether they be feudal prerogatives, excessively ponderous forms of administration or social protective measures, plus the establishment of large, centrally administered, sovereign economic territories, disciplined armies, the subordination of the whole cultural life under national authorities, the disappearance of all opposing powers, a jurisprudence oriented toward its needs, and safe and rapid transportation. The

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proletarianized urban and rural masses always had farther-reaching interests. While the social inequality in those historical stages was a precondition for social progress, the miserable condition of the oppressed corresponded to the utopian wish for equality and justice. The interests of the bourgeoisie in relation to the system of ownership did not agree with those of the masses; despite the progressiveness of the system which the bourgeoisie was trying to establish, from the very start it implied a gap between the owners and the majority of society which grew increasingly wide. The spread of this system ultimately meant an improvement for mankind, but by no means for all men living at any particular time. The bourgeoisie's efforts to push through its own demands for a more rational administration against the feudal powers with the help of the desperate masses of people, while simultaneously consolidating its own rule over the masses structures the peculiar way the struggle for "the people" is carried on in these movements. They are supposed to recognize that the national movement will, in the long run, bring advantages for them too. With the disappearance of the bad administration under whose abuses they previously suffered, of course no fully carefree existence could commence, as some might have dreamed in mistaken reminiscence of the Mother Church's welfare system; rather, the new freedoms mean a stronger responsibility of each individual for himself and his family, a responsibility to which he is to be held by educational efforts. A conscience has to be indoctrinated into him. By fighting for the bourgeois freedoms, he must at the same time learn to fight against himself. The bourgeois revolution led the masses not to the lasting state of a joyful existence and universal equality which they longed for, but to the hard reality of individualistic society.

This historical situation determines the character of the bourgeois leader. While his actions conform directly to the interests of particular groups of owners, his behavior and pathos are always vibrant with the misery of the masses. Because he cannot offer them the real satisfaction of needs and must instead seek to win them over to a policy which stands in variance to their own interests, he can win his followers' allegiance only in part by rational arguments for his goals; an emotional belief in his genius, which inspires exultant enthusiasm, must be at least as strong as reason. The less the policy of the bourgeois leader coincides with the immediate interests of the masres, the more exclusively his greatness must fill the public consciousness, and the more his character must be magnified into a "personality." Formal greatness, greatness regardless of its content, is in general the fetish of the modern concept of history. The pathos of justice accompanied by ascetic severity, the demand for general happiness along with hostility to carefree pleasure, justice embracing rich and poor with the same love, vacillation between partisanship for the upper and for the lower class, rhetorical spite against the benefactors of his own policy, and real blows against the masses that are to help him to victory — all these peculiarities of the leader follow from his historical function in the bourgeois world.

Particular historical phenomena are based on his role, defined by the ten-

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sion between the interests of the decisive groups and those of the masses. If the leader cannot himself directly influence the masses, he needs subordinate leaders. In the absence of a clear constellation of interests, arguments alone rarely suffice; constantly renewed emotional ties are necessary. The psychological factor in the relationship of leader and followers becomes crucial in these uprisings. The sub-leaders must in turn idolize the person of the highest leader, for the vagueness of the goals, which results from the divergent interests, extends into the leader's consciousness and limits the significance of substantial political principles to which the sub-leaders could adhere. In the course of these movements, therefore, personal friendships and rivalries play an outstanding role; important conflicts between social groups are concealed even from their own representatives behind indignation over the personal reprehensibility of competing leaders and their followers. Even the great importance placed on symbols, ceremonies, uniforms and phrases, which attain the same sanctity as flags and coats-of-arms, follows from the necessity of an irrational bond tying the masses to a policy which is not their own. The enlightenment and intellectual education of the masses, especially in times of an upward-striving bourgeoisie, are certainly part of the liberation of society from obsolete feudal forms, yet the striving to set up a stock of idols, be it in the form of "personalities," things, or concepts, corresponds to the necessity to constantly reconcile the masses with the policies of certain groups of society. The more particular interests of these groups take shape and contradict a possibly more rational form of society, the more strongly do irrationalist influences on the public consciousness emerge and the less does the effort to raise the public's theoretical level play a role. Whereas, for instance, the concept of nation could stand up to intensive scrutiny at the time of the French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic wars due to the general state of interests, during the following century with the intensification of internal contradictions such a scrutiny took on a more critical function; therefore the category of "nation" has largely disappeared. Even the early bourgeois movements show a vacillating relation and often a strong antipathy toward spirit and reason; only in more recent history does this anti-humanistic and barbarianizing factor, which depresses the attained intellectual level, become clearly predominant.

The modern uprisings mentioned above clearly display the implied structural similarities, Rienzo's regime obviously asserted the bourgeois demands current at the time. His modern biographer recalls expressly that his tribunate was motivated by the ideas of the reconciliation of nations and world peace, which we associate with names like Leibniz, Rousseau, Kant, Lessing and Schiller.[18] Freedom, peace and justice were his slogans.[19] His appointment as Papal Rector was an act directed against the feudal regime of the Roman barons,[20] and his entire program centered on the struggle against

18. K. Burdach, *Briefwechsel des Cola di Rienzo*, Part I (Berlin, 1913-1928), p. 448.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 445.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

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these "tyrants" and for the national Roman-Italian idea. "...For I will continue to act impartially as I have done all my life; I am working for the peace and prosperity of all Tuscany and Italy."[21] There is no doubt that the notary public Rienzo came to power essentially due to the support of the property-owning strata in Rome. Gregorovius describes how "citizens of the second estate including prosperous merchants zealously participated"[22] in the conspiracy he led. "The guard he organized was comprised of 390 Cavalerotti, magnificently equipped burghers on horseback, and a foot-militia of thirteen platoons of 100 men each."[23] The "class of Cavalerotti, i.e., of rich burghers of old patrician houses" represented, according to Gregorovius,[24] the bourgeois upper stratum, a "new nobility" which took up the struggle against the old nobility in Rome together with the other bourgeois groups, the craftsmen and peasants. Strict justice against disturbers of public order, the establishment of a people's army, the uniform regulation of pensions and subsidies, state control of tariffs, the protection of merchants and of all transportation, a central administration, and the like, all were objects of Rienzo's first decrees. He stated from the first that he "was willing to sacrifice his life for love of the Pope and to save the people."[25] The Roman bourgeoisie looked to the Pope as the representative of a centralist counter-authority to the arbitrary rule of the aristocrats, and after Rienzo's fall Papal power in the following centuries tried to realize those demands, though with extremely varying success. Not long after Rienzo's fall, the Emperor and the Pope in Avignon consulted on how to purge France and Italy of robbers and companies of freebooters that roamed the countryside threatening trade and traffic. The same cardinal (Albornoz), who years before had brought Cola out of exile back to Rome, was assigned to convince the feudal captains to leave Italy and to move instead against the Turks.[26]

Cola's relation to the owners is clear; he represents their interests directly. His contradictory relation to the masses becomes clear with his fall. The popular uprising to which he falls prey was certainly stirred up by hostile aristocratic families. But the objective cause was "Rienzo's oppressive taxes and unscrupulous financial measures."[27] He needed a great deal of money for the services he rendered to the Pope and the Roman burghers, and it became hard for him to get it. After his banishment, when Roman burghers invited him to return to Rome to rule there again, Rienzo asked them to supply him with financial means. "The rich merchants refused,"[28] and their "Tribune" had to obtain funds otherwise. His rule in their interest became more and

21. *Ibid.* Vol. II, Part III, p. 222. "nam sine parcialitate, dum vixero, perdurabo; pro pace et statu totius Tuscie et Italie laboro."
22. Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter,* Vol. II (Dresden, 1926) p. 312.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 319.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
25. *Ibid.,* p. 316.
26. *Ibid.,* p. 411.
27. Burdach, *op. cit.,* Vol. I, p. 161.
28. Gregorovius, *op. cit.,* p. 376.

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more clearly a general oppression. The practices on which he had to rely caused the dictatorship to be hated. Financial reasons were behind his betrayal of Monreal, whom he ordered executed, and this was generally understood. The guerrilla leader's money was needed for the upstart plebeian in order to pay his militia.[29] The Pope and the bourgeoisie benefited from it, but it was Rienzo who fell into general contempt, regarded increasingly as a tyrant. Besides the "violent financial exploitation of rich and mighty persons"[30] he had to rely on all possible methods of financing. The mandatory taxes on consumer goods which he imposed, although he had previously reduced them, the acceptance of money for the release of prisoners, and terrorist acts of various kinds forced him to take increasingly extensive security measures to protect his own life. "Death to the traitor who introduced taxation!" was the cry with which the people stormed the Capitol to murder him.[31] The necessity of pleasing the rich burghers and giving more or less ambiguous assurances of devotion and loyalty to their acknowledged patron, the Pope,[32] (then far away in Avignon) meant at the same time to subject the masses to bourgeois power, and thus his reign, despite its great and progressive ideas, acquired more and more a sinister and servile character. The ambiguous feelings of the masses for such leaders, whom they at first follow enthusiastically, reappeared consequently in subsequent history. Especially in situations in which the bourgeois goals pursued by the leaders definitely surpassed that the social forces of the moment could reach, it was easy to separate the masses from their leader, since their loyalty was more emotional than intellectual. As soon as failure became noticeable, which a dictatorial apparatus of course makes extremely difficult, it quickly dispelled the magic surrounding the victorious leader, magnified to superhuman proportions. The behavior of the masses at the fall of Rienzo, Savonarola, the de Witt brothers, Robespierre and many other idolized popular leaders is itself part of the cruelty at work in history under discussion here.

The importance of symbols is clearly evident in Rienzo's early-bourgeois revolt. The importance he set on his own clothing and pageantry is typical. "When going to the cathedral on the feast of St. Peter and St. Paul, he sat on a high battle-horse, in green and yellow velvet clothing, a shining steel scepter in his hand, with an escort of fifty speersmen; a Roman held the flag with his coat-of-arms over his head; another caried the sword of justice before him; a knight scattered gold among the people, while a solemn procession of *Cavalerotti* and Capitol officials, of commoners and nobility, preceded or followed. Trumpeteers blared from silver instruments and musicians played silver hand-drums. On the steps of St. Peter's the cardinals greeted Rome's dictator by singing the *Veni Creator Spiritus*."[33] Drawing on the first biography,

29. *Ibid.*, p. 380.
30. Burdach, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
31. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 381.
32. Cf. Burdach, *op. cit.*, p. 451.
33. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 321-353.

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later descriptions report how after his campaign against the barons he returned to Rome to meet the Papal legates. He "rode with his retinue to St. Peter's, got from the sacristy the precious, pearl-embroidered dalmatic in which the German Emperors were crowned, and put it on over his armor. So, with the silver crown of a tribune on his head, scepter in hand, and, while the trumpets blasted, he entered the Papal palace like a Caesar, presenting a half frightening, half fantastic sight, before the astonished legates, and he scared them into silence with grim, curt questions."[34] The Pope wrote with indignation to the Emperor about Rienzo's pagan inclinations. "Not satisfied with the office of Rector, he insolently and unashamedly usurps various titles... In contrast with the mores of the Christian religion and in accordance to pagan customs, he has worn various crowns and diadems and undertaken to pass foolish and illegal laws in the manner of the Caesars."[35] The ceremony on August 1, 1347, in which he had himself knighted and, before many dignitaries including the papal vicar, cleansed himself of all sin in the ancient bathtub of the Emperor Constantine, certainly derive from medieval customs. Yet, on the other hand, Cola posed as a man of the people: as a democratic measure he abolished the use of the titles Don and Dominus, which he reserved for the Pope, prohibited the use of aristocratic coats-of-arms on houses, and the like.[36] The tremendous emphasis he placed on symbolism in connection with his own person can therefore not be explained solely in terms of tradition. It was based on the necessity of establishing himself the new, emotionally recognized authority. Likewise, the handing of flags to delegations is essential to this leader: "On August 2, Cola celebrated the Feast of Italian Unity or the alliance of the cities, at the Capitol. He handed the envoys large and small flags with symbols and put gold rings on their fingers to signify their marriage with Rome."[37]

The striving to reintroduce old customs and to refurbish the glory of antiquity in general is connected with this symbolism. However much this kind of leader portrays himself as revolutionary and innovator, it is not in his nature to rebel against the existing order and squeeze from the conditions whatever is historically possible for human happiness. They experience themselves as executors of a higher ancient power, and the image that inspires them bears more features of the past than of a better future. The psychic structure underlying this behavior among leaders and followers has been extensively described by Fromm.[38] "In the name of God, the past, the course of nature or duty, activity is possible [for this type of character], not for the sake of the

34. Burdach, *op. cit.* p. 449.

35. *Ibid.* Vol. II, Part IV, p. 112f.: " . . . non contentus officio Rectoris, varios titulos impudenter et temere usurpavit . . . christiane religionis mores abiciens ac priscos gentilium ritus amplectens, varias coronas laureasque suscepit ac fatuas et sine lege leges more Cesarum promulgare temptavit . . . "; Vol. I, p. 31.

36. Cf. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 332.

38. *Studien über Authorität und Familie*, Schriften des Institutes für Sozialforschung, Vol. V (Paris, 1936) p. 120ff.

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unborn, the future, the still powerless, or simply happiness. The authoritarian character draws his strength for active behavior from reliance on higher powers." The masses to which those leaders turned were generally in a miserable situation, and since they were not integrated into a rational work process, they displayed an underdeveloped, both authoritarian and rebellious, psychological state[39] and had hardly a trace of independent class consciousness.[40] Despite the leader's efforts to incite the people to rebel against the prevailing conditions, he never intended to destroy the masses' disposition to mental dependancy and blind credulity in authorities. The leader's propaganda does not combine the critique of the authorities that must be toppled with any tendency for unrestricted rationality. While the old system contained the masses with the help of irrational ties, it is not immediately replaced by a society that truly represents the general interest, as bourgeois ideology nevertheless claims. The more legitimate authorities are toppled or at least attacked by the spread of freedom, the more strongly the need is felt to glorify the authority of the new rulers with reference to older powers that are untainted by the present dissatisfaction. The living "conjure up anxiously the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from their names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time honored disguise and this borrowed language."[41]

From an early age Cola was attracted to the idea of the old Romans. It is reported how, long before taking power, "a fantastic smile used to play" around his mouth "when he explained ancient statues or reliefs or read inscriptions from marble tablets scattered all around Rome."[42] Later he justified himself to the Pope by asking what harm could it do to faith, if he revived the Roman titles together with the ancient rites.[43] His choice of holidays is based on old dates and celebrations; his entire behavior is guided by the idea of restoring the Roman Empire. He speaks of "Rome's sacred soil,"[44] and seeks to place his entire program, as it were, under the aegis of his nation's glorious past. By thus surrounding himself with the aura of ancient forces, he places himself under the protection of a strong present power. "He feels that he is executer, renewer, deepener, carrier of Boniface VIII's imperial tendencies, and yet — as Clement VI writes — he wants to be just a servant and helper of the Pope and declares himself ready to abdicate immediately, if the Pope so wishes."[45] Cola always professed his loyalty to the Pope and acted in his name. Of course, he also regards himself as directly commissioned by God, as well as by these old and present forces. "He believes God has, by calling him, led the

39. On the identity of the authoritarian and rebellious character, cf. Fromm, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

40. A document on the beginnings of this social self-consciousness shortly after Cola's time is the famous speech by a worker in the Florentine uprising, reported by Machiavelli in his *History of Florence* (New York, 1901), pp. 142-144.

41. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York, 1963), p. 15.

42. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

43. Cf. Burdach, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 454; and Vol. II, Part III, p. 164.

44. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 475 and 479.

45. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 451.

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Roman people out of the darkness of tyranny, i.e., of the barons, into the light of freedom, peace and justice, and delivered Rome, the *domina gentium*, *sanctissima urbium* (mistress of the nations, most holy of cities)...from tribute, transforming it from a robbers' nest to its original nature."[46] "The people regarded him as a man chosen by God."[47] Although he and his like seek to offer the masses the spectacle of a freedom movement, at the same time they adopt the pathos of absolute obedience to higher truths and thus present the example of a submissiveness which is to be emulated by their followers' loyalty to the leaders and to the bourgeois forms of life. As much as the whole world must tremble before them in fear, they themselves display the image of fear of other yet higher supreme beings. Their role in society is repealed in their psychology: they defend the owning strata both against old, restrictive privileges which were a burden to the whole society and against the lower class's demands on the new system. Thus their drive for freedom is abstract and relative. Dependency is merely changed, not abolished. The progressive moment is more clearly evident in the works of those writers who represented the age than with the politicians. Philosophy and poetry reflect both the critique of the present and the more radical desire for a society without oppression; in contrast the ambivalent speeches of the politicians, full of slogans, reveal the brutality of the bourgeois order.

Similarly, Savonarola represented bourgeois demands which brought him into conflict with the masses in the course of the revolt he unleashed. A just administration, honest officials, political acumen, respect for privacy, the punishment of national unreliability, and especially juridical reform and in general the fulfillment of civic duties are the typical demands of the bourgeois politician. His proposal for the Florentine constitution, which he himself expressly characterized not as the result of inspiration but of his own convictions was drafted on the odel of the Venetian Republic.[49] The real enemy against which the political innovations were directed was the great noble families with their privileges, especially the Medicis, who had come into conflict with middle classes which had gained strength under their rule. In Florence, unlike Venice, no old aristocracy with a solidly established administration developed gradually to a commercial oligarchy; instead, individual houses which had risen rapidly with the expansion of commodity and currency traffic competed with others for priority. To side with the majority of the ascending burghers and craftsmen meant an anti-aristocratic struggle which bore many petit-bourgeois traits. Just as Cola 150 years earlier had ranted against the barons, Savonarola assailed the "tyrants." While his treatise on Florence's constitution and government[50] addressed mainly religious reforms, the hatred with which the feudal nobility and its system is discussed

46. *Ibid.*, p. 450.

47. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

48. Cf. J. Schnitzer, *Savonarola*, Vol. I (Munich, 1924), p. 227.

49. Cf. K. Kretschmayr, *Geschichte von Venedig*, Vol. II (Gotha, 1920) p. 130f.; also J. Schnitzer, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 210.

50. *Trattato circa il reggimento e governo della città di Firenze.*

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recalls Rienzo's drastic style in such matters and occasionally even the journalism of the French revolution.

In the course of the decisive disputes on an oligarchic or democratic form of government, Savonarola advocatd popular rule before meetings of 13,000 to 14,000 people;[51] all his life he fought for an orderly bourgeois government. Like Cola, he too was especially concerned that the poor, widows and orphans should receive assistance, but only insofar as they could not work. "Whoever lets himself be supported, although he can himself take care of his own support, is stealing bread from the poor and is obligated to give back everything he has received beyond his need. Finally the poor must prove themselves worthy of the benefits given them by honorable behavior, otherwise they are unworthy of the water they drink."[52] Savonarola spoke up against feudalism and for civil liberties. He spoke for the people. He both maintained and blurred the difference between the privileged bourgeois groups and the lower strata. He deeply hated riots. 'Savonarola pleaded for mercy not only for the small and lowly, but also for the great and prominent. Hardly had he returned from Pisa, when the first word he exclaimed to those burning for revenge against the followers of the fallen government was: *Misericordia*. And he repeatd this admonition untiringly in the following period." When the people question whether the evil-doers should not be punished, he explained: "If God wanted to deal with you according to the justice you are shouting for, not ten of you would be spared. If you ask me however, 'Good, monk, how then do you understand this peace?' I answer you, 'Give up all hatred and resentment and forget and forgive everything that happened before the most recent revolution, but from now on whoever errs against the republic shall be punished'," [53] The bourgeoisie's double front found clear expression in the constitution he inspired: "The lower classes, who did not belong to the guilds had as little share in the governmental power as the noble families.."[54] Membership in the great council was limited according to age and social position. In taxation "precisely the nobility, the large landowners not represented in the guilds were the ones who...were most heavily affected, no less however the lowest circles, since the most necessary foods such as grain, oil and wine were made considerably more expensive by such taxes."[55]

The difference in the concreteness of Savonarola's and Rienzo's proposals is due in great part to the much more developed social conditions which corresponded to the Dominican's activity. Although the Florentine burghers could be no means confront the Pope with the same self-consciousness of their model, the Venetians, nevertheless, Alexander Borgia's court so fully displayed all the traits of the contemporary ecclesiastical hierarchy opposed to bourgeois interests that Savonarola for a time could dare oppose Borgia openly

51. Cf. R. Roeder, *Savonarola* (New York, 1930) p. 131.
52. Schnitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 199.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 204f.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 213f.

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and not simply behind ambivalent phrases.[56] Although he could not risk a total break with the Pope because Church sanctions would have seriously damaged the city's trade, the enmity between the degenerate higher and lower clergy and their current leader and the Florentine bourgeoisie was open and mutual.[57] Savonarola himself appealed not to the current Pope but to the genuine Papacy, the genuine Church and to Christ himself. He considered Alexander an unbeliever, indeed not even a Christian. Nonetheless, he could not forego protecting his actions by appealing to this most recognized power of the time. He always regarded himself as a representative of higher powers.

Although Savonarola seems to be more clear-headed and rational than Rienzo, he regarded himself as a prophet, or a least as a man gifted with supernatural intuition. As for a series of mystical saints and founders "the mystical love of God was for the *Frate* too the lofty school of the apostolate and of the ardent love for the Church, the mystical bride of the Savior, which animated him with holy candor to reprimand with relentless severity the undutiful pastors who had surrendered their flock to the rending wolves. The mystic Savonarola was the father of the prophet Savonarola."[58] The description, in his work on the triumph of the cross, of the triumphal carriage pulled by the apostles and preachers, on which Christ with his crown of thorns and stigmata is enthroned, the Holy Scriptures in his right hand and martyr-instruments in his left, chalice, host and other cult-objects at his feet —this enthusiastically composed picture[59] recalls Cola's fantastic dreams and allegories. In the case against him, Savonarola was accused of having spoken of his journey to Paradise for his own magnification, and no doubt he had fostered belief in the magic power of his person. Shortly before his fall he had, "before an innumerable crowd of people evoked the Redeemer present in the host which he held in his hands to send down fire from heaven and wipe him from the face of the earth if he did not walk in full truth. Never had he left any doubt that God would, if necessary, prove the rightness of his prophetic mission, even by supernatural means." He threatened his opponent: "You have not yet forced me to perform a miracle; but if I am compelled to, then God will open his hand if his honor demands it, although you have already seen so many miracles that you need no further miracle."[60] But whether he accepted the trial by fire, whose failure marked the beginning of his end, more at the urging of his followers than out of conviction is uncertain. The magnifications of his person by his closest followers and by his own speeches was an indispensable means for his influence on the masses. This magnification of the person of the monk as popular tribune has been noted

56. Machiavelli's admiration for Cesare Borgia, who in some regards himself bears the traits of a dictator of the bourgeois epoch, referred mainly to his national political goals and not, for instance, to the state of the hierarchy.
57. Cf. Schnitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 324ff.
58. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 630.
59. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 465.
60. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 506f.

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repeatedly in history as a principal instrument of his policy. "I find that when Savonarola is spoken of," writes H. Grimm,[61] "his fall is depicted excessively as the result of efforts of his enemies and of papal anger. The most compelling cause for his fall was the decline of his personal power. The people grew tired. He had to stir up their spirits more and more strongly. He succeeded for a time in reviving their slumbering enthusiasm. But while from the outside it seemed to grow, it was really consuming its last energies." Of course, if the petit-bourgeois groups that stood behind Savonarola had had the capacity to set up their own power permanently, then the disproportion between his real qualities and the image of the superman his followers developed would not have led to his downfall. The endowment of the leader with magic qualities was a condition for his influence on the masses. His fall resulted from the differences between the ruling groups themselves.

In Savonarola an essential aspect of bourgeois revolts become evident. The needs of the mobilized masses are utilized as a motor for the dynamics of the revolutionary process, but the condition toward which the movement tends in terms of the historically attainable balance, i.e., the consolidation of the bourgeois order, can satisfy them only to a very limited degree. Therefore it is important that during the movement the unleashed forces be redirected inwardly and spiritualized. The process of "internalization," which began as early as the Middle Ages, has one of its roots here. Thode interpreted the work of the great founders of orders at the beginning of the thirteenth century in this manner. "No power, however great," he writes[62] in the introduction to his book on St. Francis, "can't silence the just demands of the *tiers état* which was awakening to self-consciousness, although its goals were too indefinite for the movement to have become unified, independent and self-regulating. Then, called forth by the eternal laws of logical historical development, Francis of Assisi, in his genial capacity to make and carry out intuitive decisions, found the conciliatory words! He led the impetuous progressive stream into a delimited riverbed and so acquired the merit of having preserved it from an untimely division; he gathered its forces and directed it toward a unified goal. The goal is man's internalization..." Thode sees Christian doctrine as the "beneficially restrictive riverbed," and he regards the new art as the first product of this process of sublimation. With the development of the contradiction between burghers and masses in the centuries after St. Francis this internalization of social interests changes from an expression of the immaturity of the "*tiers état*" compared with the powers that ruled the world into a practice of this class itself toward the people it dominates. The historical movements we are speaking of here thus increasingly show the translation of individuals' demands on society into moral and religious demands on the dissatisfied individuals themselves. The bourgeois leader tries to idealize and spiritualize the brutal wishes for a better life, the abolition of differences of

61. H. Grimm, *Leben Michelangelos*, Vol. I (Stuttgart, 1922) p. 188f.

62. H. Thode, *Franz von Assisi und die Anfänge der Kunst der Renaissance in Italien* (Berlin, 1926) p. xxiv.

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wealth and the introduction of real community — ideas are represented in those centuries by religious populists and theological Utopians. Not so much revolt as spiritual renewal, not so much the struggle against the wealth of the privileged as against universal wickedness, not so much external as internal satisfaction are preached to the masses in the course of the revolutionary process. The German reformer hated rioting even when it was directed against the Pope, the devil in human form. As Savonarola had called the people's revolt against the Medici "pharisaic justice,...that stems from vengefulness"[63] and wished the people would look at their own sins, Luther said of the peasants "that they wanted to punish the authorities for their sins; as if they themselves were completely pure and innocent. Therefore God had to show them the beam in their own eye so that they might forget the splinter in another's."[64] "...the common man's temper must be calmed and he must be told to refrain from inordinate desires and words that lead to revolt, and to undertake nothing without command of the authorities or action of the governmental power....But if you say: 'What should we then do if the authorities want to do nothing? Should we then endure longer and strengthen their malice?' The answer: 'No, you should do none of this: you should do three things. First: recognize your sins, for which God's strict justice has plagued you with such an eschatological authority. Second: humbly pray against the Papal authority. Thirdly: let your mouth be one mouth with the spirit of Christ, of whom St. Paul said: Our Lord will slay him with the mouth of his spirit."[65]

The extremely progressive character of this transformation process is not at issue here. The disciplining of all strata of the population, which followed from the need to incorporate the masses into the bourgeois mode of production, affected the development of the economic form; not just the astonishing development of technology, the simplification of the work-process, in short the increase of human power over nature, but also the human preconditions for a higher form of society are unthinkable without the process of spiritualization and internalization. This cultural process, as well as other aspects of the ideological process that dominate spiritual life in so-called normal times, is merely brought out with particular clarity in the activity of the leaders promoting morality and religiosity. Savonarola's Florence is permeated with a wave of religious and moral enthusiasm, similar to the way cities and countries were gripped by Protestantism. While in the later uprisings the idealistic heroism is expressed mainly as sacrificial zeal for the nation, in the earlier ones religious excitement predominates. "A religious spirit penetrated the redeemed people, Gregorovius states in describing Rienzo's revolt, "like that of the British in Cromwell's time."[66] The hypostatization of belief in a higher freedom and justice takes place, as it is ideologically detached from turgid

63. Schnitzer, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 204.
64. Luther, *Ausgewählte Werke*, ed. H.H. Borcherdt, (Munich, 1923) p. 165.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 7ff.
66. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

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common interests of the masses during these centuries. Only in later phases of the bourgeois age is this idealistic alienation abolished as the belief in the conscious solidarity of struggling humanity is reasserted. The loud-mouthed and empty heroism that still presumes to be the heir of that formerly progressive idealism has lost all cultural importance and sinks into a vain pose, a common lie.

The leadership which channels the people to particular goals and achieves the internalization of the drives which cannot be satisfied in this period employs a specific instrument: the speech at the mass meeting. The politician in the Greek city-state was also mainly an orator and at times exercised functions very similar to those of the modern leader. But in Greek antiquity the speech is presented in the assembly of free men; the slaves comprise an element that must merely be dominated, not addressed. As much as these speeches also have enthusiastic traits, they largely lack the internalizing, spiritualizing tendency that appeals to internal conversion, which belongs to the essence of modern rhetoric. Antiquity's rationality is admittedly rigid and constrained. Its logic corresponds to a fixed, self-confident upper class; it wants to convey a particular opinion on the state of affairs, not change the listeners humanly. The change of function of rhetoric that begins with Socrates already heralds the decline of the city-state. In antiquity and to a great extent in the Middle Ages, the lower class is kept under control by physical coercion and command, by the deterrent example of terrible earthly punishments and, moreover, by the threat of hell. The popular address of modern times, which is half rational argumentation, half an irrational means of domination, belongs to the essence of bourgeois leadership, despite its long prehistory.

The sermon owes its decisive place in religious life to the aforementioned function of the word in the new society. As early as the heresy movements of the twelfth century in Cologne and Southern France, the sermon is addressed to the entire people but is promoted mainly by the property-owning classes. Contrary to some interpretations which see these early preachers as stemming mainly from the lowest social strata, it turns out "that nobles, rich burghers, priests and monks have often joined the ranks of the wandering heretical preachers and that at least to their contemporaries precisely this active participation of clergymen, of prominent and wealthy persons in the heretical movement was noteworthy."[67] Even in the oldest Franciscan association of preachers "as far as we know, the very same strata of society are represented, who were everywhere the bearers of the religious poverty-movement: rich burghers, noblemen, and clergymen."[68] The urban bourgeoisie, from which the new order stemmed, conditioned the development of the sermon as a result of its particular interests. In contrast with theories which are today, though only with relative accuracy, associated with the name of Max Weber, the religious spirit of the modern age, which finds its first expression in the sermonizing popular leaders, is not a primary and independent entity.

67. H. Grundmann, *Religiöse Bewegungen im Mittelalter* (Berlin, 1935) p. 35f; cf. also p. 37.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 164f.

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Humanism and the Reformation are connected with the rise of the bourgeois class, "which with its new views of nature and religion also creates new forms of social life and of ecclesiastical cult."[69] This is clearly expressed in the relation of the mendicant preaching orders to the cities: "The two go...hand in hand: The cities became the home of the preaching monks, and the popular religion of the latter becomes the religion of the cities. Each part gives, and each receives."[70] The monks themselves, however, come mostly from the higher social strata, which were beginning to run into conflict with the hierarchy. The religious ideas living in the sermon were as such nothing new. A primary role in the origin of the bourgeois world cannot be ascribed to them; their momentous development through and with the sermon can be understood only in connection with the economically conditioned rise of the bourgeoisie.[71] The internalization of needs and drives of the masses forms an important mediation in this dialectical process. At the beginning of the 13th century, the Catholic Church itself could not close itself off from the demands of the age; in the Fourth Lateran Council it expressly recognized the necessity of developing the sermon.

Savonarola was a precursor of the Reformers. The church became the forum for the mass meetings, which Cola held at the Capitol. His magnificant eloquence cannot be praised enough by his contemporaries. "Often he had to leave the chanclery before time, because the people had broken out in tears

69. Thode, *op. cit.*, p. xix.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

71. Since the turn of the century, the reformation has been increasingly used as a background for idealist confessions; Dilthey still presented a national and a sociological vision. He attacks Ritschl for not recogizing that the "new religious valuation" which he himself described "sprang from the progress of German society . . . Germanic activity, intensified by the state of society as a will to do something, to create realities, to deal adequately with the things of this world, makes itself felt in this whole period and in Luther" W. Dilthey, "Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. II (Leipzig, 1914), p. 216. Troeltsch, as usual vacillates. The theologian defends himself against the suspicion of a materialistic conception of the Reformation by stressing that "Luther's religious idea really has a high personal originality; it emanates purely from the inner movement of religious thinking itself. It did not originate as a reflex to social or even economic transformation, but has its essential independent cause in the initiative of the religious thought from which the social, economic and political consequences themselves first come . . . At most indirectly, certain influences of those elements are recognizable . . . Precisely for that reason, the Reformation's world of ideas cannot be linked with any particular social class. If nonetheless one is inclined to accord it a bourgeois character, and in a certain sense rightly so, if it is contrasted with the seigneural early-medieval Church and against the democratically-proletarianly infected sects, then that is due only to that indirect connection. But this in turn is based on the psychologically easily understandable fact that absolutely all individualization of spiritual life that seizes broad masses is connected with urbanization," etc. E. Troeltsch, "Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen," in *Gesammelte Schriften,* Vol. I, (Tübingen, 1923), p. 432f. As if an "at most indirect" connection were not also a connection! Others spoke more clearly. With a loyalty of conviction, which can dissuade one from objective arguments, H. Delbrück, for example, announces that "economic factors cannot be accorded a place among the causes of the Reformation." See his *Weltgeschichte*, Part II, (Berlin, 1931), p. 253. The confusion seems to stem from the need to set oneself off from a falsely understood historical materialism, such as Kautsky, for example, held. But precisely this world-view materialism, because of its undialectical conception of the relation between historical facts and general principles shows a relation with the metaphysical prejudices of those historians that is concealed by the factual contradiction of principles but by no means abolished.

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and loud sobbing and were pleading with God for mercy in deepest contrition; often the scribes, overcome by emotion could no longer follow his words".[72] According to the Dominican's instructions, a supernatural fire should burn in the preacher. He must be ready to suffer a martyr's death himself. "If despite the preaching everything remains the same, and vices grow as luxuriantly as weeds, that is an unmistakable sign that the sermon, like a painted fire, does not ignite."[73] The masses should turn inwardly, they should become more moral, more unassuming, more resigned. They should learn to fear God, and the preacher is — this is true already for Savonarola[74] — the interpreter of the divine will, God's spokesman, his servant, his prophet. The bourgeois virtues, respect for the laws, peaceableness, love of work, obedience to the authorities, willingness to sacrifice for the nation and the like, are drummed into the people together with fear of God. The language of the sermon is democratic, it is addressed to all, but part of its message is that individuals and whole groups in principle remain outside as the wicked and the obdurate. The appeal to the masses to deny themselves the adequate satisfaction of their drives and turn them inward is accompanied, as a sort of consolation, with the oft repeated conviction that those who cannot achieve renunciation and exertion are damned and will not escape their terrible penalty. As cruelly and sternly as the clergyman or worldly leader may treat his followers, his brutality does not harm but rather heightens his reputation, since the crowd at least can pretend that they, unlike strangers and enemies, are loved by him. The Reformers' contempt for men is clearly evident in the attitude toward the followers. A sub-leader of Calvin's, Chauvet, shouts at the end of a sermon: "May the plague, war and famine come over you."[75] Another addresses his listeners as devils.[76] Luther himself spoke the proverb: "Secretly burghers and peasants, man and woman, child and servant, princes, officials, and vassals, all are the devil's."[77] This contempt for the masses, which is peculiar to many bourgeois leaders, does not in the least decrease their popularity as long as there are others on the outside who are radically lost. "As friendly, however, and sweet as this preaching is for Christians, who are his disciples, so annoying and intolerable it is for the Jews and their great saints."[78] There must be such a thing as Jews, Turks, and Papists, who stand outside the community.

While in more peaceful times, the school and other educational institutions, together with mass meetings, transmit the internalization effectively and constantly to the successive generations, in revolutionary periods the mass meeting takes on exclusive significance. It is the characteristic form of the guidance of dangerous social strata and is permeated with irrational

72. Schnitzer, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 685.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 682.
74. *Ibid.*
75. F.W. Kampschulte, *Johann Calvin*, Vol. II (Leipzig, 1899) p. 33f.
76. *Ibid.*
77. F.v. Bezold, *Geschichte der deutschen Reformation* (Berlin, 1800) p. 570.
78. *Luthers Werke*, ed. by Buchwald et. al. Vol. II (Berlin, 1905) p. 282.

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elements. In these situations it is crucial to treat the soul of the people mechanically, as is shown by the value set on external format, the songs before and after the speech, the speaker's solemn appearance. The speech itself is not geared essentially to the rational forces of consciousness, but uses them only to evoke certain reactions. Where, on the contrary, the real interests of the masses determine a leader, the opposite relation emerges. The speaker's goal then is for the masses to grasp the situation with their own consciousness; the action then follows from this as a rational consequence. What matters is that knowledge is achieved; for no other interests enter in except those of the audience, and the leader's personality can recede, since it is not itself supposed to act as a directly influencing factor. And like the leader, the mass too changes its character. The mass meeting is suitable for the purpose of exerting irrational influence; small groups of individuals with common interests are appropriate for discussions of theory, the analysis of a given historical situation, and the resulting considerations on the policy that should be followed. Movements striving to transcend the bourgeois order can therefore not use the mass meeting with the same exclusiveness and the same success. In historical dynamics, masses are not simply identical with one another, even if they should in part consist of the same individuals. How much the mass meeting in the bourgeois revolts must be understood as a psycho-physical influence, as a treatment or cure, can be seen even from its frequency and compulsory character. Attendence at them is considered a duty, men are commanded to go, indeed, sometimes they are detained there by force. This coercion is reflected clearly in the church regulations passed in the decades after the Reformation. The Saxon General Articles of 1557 state: "Thus, those who skip the sermon on holidays and Sunday morning and afternoon (but especially in the villages) and do not first excuse themselves to the pastors and judges of that place because of necessary business they must perform, shall be punished with a considerable fine, or if they have no fortune, with the pillory at the Church or other prison."[79] When under Calvin the Geneva suburb Gervais once did not seem entirely reliable they went so far as "to station a bailiff and two officers as guards during religious service, so that no member of the congregation could leave the church before the appointed time."[80] — Where knowledge is the real concern, assemblies display a completely different structure. Discussions and intellectual progress characterize their course, the analysis of the situation and of practical solutions remains in continuous connection with the developing conscious interests of the participants. No matter how the content of the speeches at the mass meetings may change, it only fulfills a mechanical function by suggesting a certain behavior. The religious and mass speakers of the bourgeoisie choose their words not so much for their appropriateness to the object as for effect. No development takes place during

79. *Die evangelische Kirchenordnung des 16. Jahrhunderts*, ed. by A.L. Richter, Vol. II, (Leipzig, 1871) p. 181; cf. also the Land regulation of the dukedom of Prussia of 1525, *ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 34, the Esslingen Church regulation of 1534, Vol. I, p. 247, and many other regulations.

80. Kampschulte, *op. cit.*

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the speech itself; usually no rational interaction between speaker and participant occurs that goes beyond the purely instinctual. Subsequent discussions have the same character: they lack the dialectical element. Mass movements play a role in non-bourgeois movements. Despite the undeveloped, chaotic nature of their movements, the leaders of the Roman slave uprisings and of rebellious peasants at the beginning of the modern age called their people together, consulted with them and aroused them up in tumultuous assemblies. The modern proletarian leaders prepared not only the individual demonstrations in small groups, but they also presented their views and proclaimed slogans before the masses. But though such gatherings may somewhat resemble the traits just described, just as on the other hand the bourgeois mass meetings especially in times of intensified struggle between the *tiers état* and the feudal powers at times showed revolutionary features, still the irrational, solemn, and authoritarian remains predominantly a feature of the bourgeois leader's speech.

Despite the differences between the social positions of Luther and Calvin corresponding to the circumstances in Germany and Geneva, and despite the difference in their temperaments due to their different origins and educational backgrounds, their function as mass leaders of the bourgeois age points to astonishing similarities in their behavior and character. In the first decades of the sixteenth century "the favored groups of social development" are "the bourgeois patriciate and the territorial princes, the aristocratic strata, the new particular authorities of city and country; the oppressed include the vassals, the masses, the urban proletariat, the peasants, and the small rural nobility, which is connected with the peasants' fate and displays democratic tendencies in its views and its position relative to the newly developed high nobility of the princes."[81] In Germany the property-owning bourgeois circles who were the bearers of development at that time, were completely dependent on the territorial princes in their entire policy. That Luther subjected himself completely to these princes follows from the nature of his whole life's work. He himself, "with whatever right he called himself a peasant's son, is a child of urban, mining origin and urban, mendicant-monkish education...he certainly did call farming a divine profession and the only livelihood that comes straight from heaven: 'the dear patriarchs also had it.' But he nonetheless wrote the terrible writings against the peasants, and he disapproved of the nobility's revolt. Certainly, he never hid his antipathy toward the immoral sides of patrician commercial activities, and to a certain extent he supported the canonical prohibition of usury; but that did not prevent him from understanding and approving the quest for capital as trading capital; although he was adamant against the idea of purely personal credit. And certainly he called the princes murderous rascals and God's torturers; but based on his entire situation, he had to end up "assigning a higher place to all authorities than they ever had had in the Christian world."[82]

81. Karl Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte*, Vol. V, Part 2 (Berlin, 1922) p. 372.

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Originally, the popular leaders make little distinction between the goals of the general public and those of prosperous groups. Only in the course of the movement do the lower classes discover the darker side, and the tension between them and the leader begins. This is true of Calvin in his second reign in Geneva and of the great politicians of the French Revolution. Engels underscored this circumstance in his treatise on the German Peasants' War: "Between 1517 and 1525, Luther had gone through the same transformation as the German constitutionalists between 1846 and 1849. This has been the case with every middle-class party which having marched for a while at the head of the movement, has been overwhelmed by the plebeian-proletarian party pressing from the rear. When in 1517 opposition against the dogmas and the organization of the Catholic church was first raised by Luther, it still had no definite character. Not exceeding the demands of the earlier middle-class heresy, it did not exclude any trend of opinion which went further. It could not do so because the first movement of the struggle demanded that all opposing elements be united, the most aggressive revolutionary energy be utilized, and the totality of the existing heresies fighting the Catholic orthodoxy be represented. [...] This revolutionary order did not last long. [...] The parties became separate from each other, and each found a different spokeman. Luther had to choose between the two. [...] He dropped the popular elements of the movement, and joined the train of the middle-class, the nobility and the princes."[83]

There is hardly another outstanding popular leader of the bourgeoisie in whose moral and religious pathos the nuances of the various interests he represents are so sharply expressed as in Luther's magnificent language. When the Gospel and the real bourgeois interests run into conflict with one another, there can be for Luther no doubt as to what place he concedes to the Gospel on earth. In the world a strict, hard, worldly power is needed to force and compel the wicked not to take, nor rob, and to return what they borrow, although a Christian should neither demand it back nor hope to get it back; so that the world not be devastated, peace perish, and the people's commerce and community be destroyed, all of which would happen if one were to rule the world according to the Gospel and not drive and coerce the wicked with laws and power to do and suffer what is right. Therefore, one must keep the streets clean, create peace in the cities and enforce law in the country, and hack away with the sword at violators, as St. Paul teaches in Romans 13, 4....No one must think that the world can be ruled without bloodshed, the secular sword should and must be red and bloodthirsty..."[84] As much as he rages against the rebelling peasants and wishes that one "stab, strike, and strangle"[85] them, however much he castigates mercy toward them as a sin and knows only one

82. *Ibid.*, p. 373f.

83. Friedrich Engels, *The German Revolutions* (Chicago, 1967), pp. 39-40.

84. Luther, "Von Kaufhandlung und Wucher," in *Ausgewahlte Werke*, ed. by H.H. Borchert, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 123f.

85. Luther, "Wider die mörderischen und räuberischen Rotten der Bauern," *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 300.

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advice: "such mouths have to be answered with the fist so that sweat runs out their nose," and calls for the executioner,[86] still he is sincerely concerned that among these peasants, who otherwise should and must be mowed down indiscriminately, "there may well be some who went along unwillingly, especially those who were once prosperous." Toward these, "fairness must...outweigh law... For the rebellion was against the rich as well as against the rulers, and in fairness it can be suspected that no rich person favored the rebellion."[87] And though Luther for the sake of the parts of the nobility that were allied with him sometimes even defended them against the complaints of merchants they robbed,[88] he spoke out unmistakably against those noblemen who for selfish motives refused to spare the wealthy who had been forced to go along with the peasants. He launches strong words against these "nobles": "...filth also comes from the nobility and it may boast that it comes out of the eagle's body, although it stinks and is useless. So these too may well be of the nobility. We Germans are Germans and remain Germans, that is, sows and unreasonable beasts."[89] Luther's relation to the parties of his time stands out clearly enough.

Although Calvin in republican Geneva reminds the King of France, the protector of the hated Catholic Church, of the avengers "appointed by God's rightful calling to do great deeds and raise the weapons against kings,"[90] we should not believe that this vengeance is assigned to us as private persons; "Nothing was commanded to us, but to obey and suffer."[91] Popular assemblies, however, that is, the representatives of the upper and prosperous strata, are under certain circumstances thoroughly justified to "restrict the arbitrariness of kings, like the people's tribunes among the Romans, or the estates in our monarchies."[92] He considered an aristocratic and oligarchic form of government to be the best one; like Luther he never tires of repeating that "the civil authority exercises not only its rightful, but exceedingly holy calling, which deserves the highest honor in the whole life of mortals."[93] His love for prominent and wealthy families is well-known. "He therefore had to endure hostility and sharp criticism from his enemies for this; he was accused of flattering the rich, and much worse. But such attacks made little impression on him and were the least suited to unnerve him in his principles. And his friends, disciples and helpers walked in their master's footsteps."[94] He approved the oligarchic constitution of Bern, which moreover varied greatly from Geneva's, as Savonarola had approved Venice's, trying, like his medieval predecessor, to make his and his friends' influence dominant while preserv-

86. Luther, "Ein Sendbrief von dem harten Büchlein wider die Bauern," *op. cit.*, p. 310.
87. Luther, "Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande Sein können." *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 157f.
88. Cf. Luther, "Von Kaufhandlung und Wucher," *op. cit.*, p. 134.
89. Luther, "Ob Kriegsleute auch im seligen Stande sein können, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
90. Calvin, *Institutio religionis christianae*, trans by E.F.K. Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 596.
91. *Ibid.*.
92. *Ibid.*
93. *Ibid*, p. 587.
94. Kampschulte, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 421f.

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ing the aristocratic forms. All these leaders seek to anchor their clique in state and social life, if possible for all eternity.

The Reformers' great spiritual achievement consists in the articulation of the idea that the salvation of men does not depend on the sacramental performances of a priestly caste, but on the attitude of the individual's soul; in Calvin, this idea is further strengthened by the doctrine of free selection by grace, i.e., that each person's eternal destiny is completely separate from the Church's practices. The Reformers thus gave the individual in ideology the independence to which he was called by the transformation of reality; it was however an independence that was abstract and largely imaginary, curtailed in practice by the economy which men operate but have not mastered, and in theory by the acts of grace of an inscrutable God who is designed by men but regarded as autonomous. The cultural progress of the masses initiated by the Reformers was directly connected with a much more active processing of individuals than was usual with the old clergy. The bourgeoisie had to train its members for the new economic tasks, to a completely different degree of self-discipline, responsibility, and zeal for work than in the old times of a relatively undynamic economy operating according to fixed rules. Of course, its outstanding representatives such as the old Jacob Fugger embodied the modern attitude toward life even without the Reformation. "It is a very different matter," he replied to his friend who advised him to retire, "he wanted to earn profit as long as he could."[95] The characterological preconditions of this mentality, which were required by the new economy, adhering to the activity and not its content, had to be transmitted universally and continuously to the successive generations of various strata of the bourgeoisie and, with corresponding nuances, also to the ruling classes. Not only individual Reformers were needed; they were just the first representatives of a new bureaucracy.

Here we come upon another common trait of these historical events. They do not, like social revolutions, directly affect the economic subculture, but tend to develop and enhance the bourgeoisie's position, which it has already conquered in the economy, by modern changes in the military, political, juridical, religious and artistic spheres. The most bitter struggles are fought to renew the body of functionaries in these realms, an old stratum of bureaucrats and intellectuals, a former elite, replacing it by one more suitable for the new tasks and creating more appropriate institutions. Whereas profitable economic activity, the accumulation of wealth by the bourgeois economic subjects, is achieved before and after the uprising and merely needs liberation from the restrictive orders of the ancient regime, the cultural superstructure must be reorganized. Here new personnel are needed who are qualitatively equal to the new demands. With the consolidation of a small stratum of monopolists brought about by concentration and centralization, cultural activity is determined more and more exclusively as domination of the masses. Although the culture is addressed as much to the rulers and is held in

95. P. Joachimsen, "Das Zeitalter der Reformation," in *Propyläen-Geschichte*, Vol. V (Berlin, 1930), p. 31.

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especially high esteem by them, they sometimes sense very well that this is its main function in their system; and thus — in contradiction to the great artistic and philosophical productions of his own history — deep contempt and indifference to the spirit is a trait of the ideal type of the modern bourgeois, but this shows more in his behavior than in his views and more in his instincts than in his consciousness, where the opposite scale of values generally prevails. It makes religion, the ideal values, sacrifice for the nation the highest goods of mankind, worships success in the great personalities of art and science without relation to their deeds, and remains essentially atheistic from intellectual shallowness, vulgarly materialistic and incapable of real pleasure. — Pareto blurs the distinction between the decisive economic groups and their cultural functionaries and replaces it with secondary distinctions such as between political and non-political functionaries,[96] and he thus ruined his concept of elite and elite-struggles as an instrument for understanding the whole age, an unhistorically conceived concept anyway, though it otherwise would have quite usefully characterized those cultural agents of the bourgeoisie and its doings.

While the bourgeoisie itself grows increasingly insensitive toward spiritual existence, its social situation constantly needs cultural activity, both in view of the clerical and feudal reaction and because of the need to incorporate the whole people into its system. The mighty call for inner renewal, into which at certain times the material demands of the masses are transformed, can therefore regularly be translated into the reality of the struggle between the old bureaucracy and intellectual group and one or several competing elites attempting to supplant it. A contributing factor for the promotion of the Reformation by princes and bourgeoisie, along with the contemporary concern for cultural matters, was the recognition that the Protestant church organization would not only stop the flow of money to Rome, but also run the business more economically. The Catholic clergy had in fact recognized the danger of the pro-poverty propaganda of heretical preachers at an early date, and its first great advocate, Arnold of Brescia, predecessor of Cola and the Reformers, had fallen victim to an understanding between Pope and Emperor at the end of the 12th century. Since the operation of the new, reliable and thrifty bureaucracies depends on "personalities," to an incomparably higher degree than in the feudal system, in times of transition we see leaders and leader-cliques who want to rule fighting bitterly not only against the old powers but also with one another. Under the increasing expansion of the achievement principle, which applies even to the highest officials and functionaries, they strive with all means to preserve themselves and their principles.

Outsiders must be repelled by the quarrels, personal enmities, and unchained passions of domination and revenge, which characterize the lead-

96. Vilfredo Pareto, *Traité de sociologie générale*, French ed. by P. Bovet, Vol. II (Lausanne-Paris, 1919) #2034, p. 1298; cf. also Herbert Marcuse, "Ideengeschichtlicher Teil," in *Studien über Authorität und Familie, ibid.*, p. 223ff.

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ing strata of the bourgeoisie in the Renaissance and the Reformation, the French Revolution and the later bourgeois uprisings. Giordano Bruno formulated well the feeling of a great part of the educated men of the 16th century toward the Reformation. One should just see, he writes:[97] "what a miserable kind of peace and harmony it is that these Reformers preach to the poor people, apparently seeking zealously for nothing more than to have the whole world agree with their sanctimonious and conceited stupidity and concur in their evil, degenerate conscience, while they themselves do not agree on any law, any point of justice, on any doctrine, and everywhere in the rest of the world and in all earlier centuries there never has been such disunity and strife as among them; for among a thousand such pedants hardly one is found who would not have invented his own catechism and, if he has not yet published it, would desire to do so, not one who could bring himself to approve any arrangement other than his own, none who finds anything else in others than what he believes he may condemn, reject and doubt. Indeed, a great part of them is at odds with themselves, since today they cross out and recant what they wrote and stated yesterday. Let him see what kind of consequences their teachings have, what kind of practical conduct they produce as regards the works of justice and pity, the preservation and increase of the common good, whether among their people and leadership, universities, temples, hospitals, schools, and academies of art are founded, or whether they even preserve these, wherever they have installed themselves, in the same condition as they found them, and they did not rather fall to ruin or disrepair through their neglect."

The Italian philosopher's repugnance for the Reformation's rule is understandable especially due to the streak of anti-intellectualism which it has in common with many bourgeois uprisings. In the teaching of the greatest philosophers reason is man's proudest ability even though Catholicism always made a distinction between reason before and after the fall into original sin, and in nominalism, which in any case displays bourgeois traits, its reputation declined even further. Calvin, however, stresses that "all our effort, our insight and our understanding is so wrong that in God's sight we can think and plan nothing rightly." The Holy Ghost knows "that all thoughts of the wise are vain, and proclaims clearly that the human heart's every thought and desire is completely evil."[98] In contrast to St. Thomas and his successors, Calvin holds it to be "an indubitable truth which can be shaken by no arts: man's reason is so completely alienated from God's justice that everything he desires and thinks is impious, wrong, ugly, impure, and sinful; the heart is so deeply immersed in the poison of sin that only a rotten stench can come from it."[99] Luther knows no limits to his obscene denunciations of reason. The doctrine he has received through divine grace, he says, must be

97. Giordano Bruno, "Die Vertreibung der triumphierenden Bestie," German translation by L. Kuhlenbeck, in *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. II (Leipzig, 1904) p. 123f.
98. Calvin, *Institutio*, *op. cit.*, p. 135.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 161f.

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preserved in a determined struggle against "the devil's bride, reason, the beautiful whore"; for "it is the highest whore the devil has." Luther senses the deep connection between pleasure and intellect and he persecutes both with the same hatred: "What I say of lust, which is a crude sin, must also be understood of reason, for it dishonors and offends God in spiritual gifts and has far worse whorish ailments than a whore."[100] Though the Reformers personally, within certain limits, esteemed art and science, these were greatly restricted due to the oppostion to graven images and the doctrine of good works in the Protestant areas. The hatred was directed primarily against aspects of art that run counter to the morality concept of internalization, in particular against every trace of the erotic and luxury in general.

Whoever reads the descriptions of those tumultuous periods of religious and national enthusiasm repeatedly finds references to a wave of bourgeois virtue and morality which, encouraged by the authorities, gripped the people. "A strict police punished adulterers and gamblers," Gregorovius writes about the Rome of the popular tribunes. Under Savonarola a whole system of informants was organized in order to make all kinds of immoralities impossible. The burning of "frivolities" is known. Under his influence and that of his followers, powder boxes, make-up and other cosmetics, also chess and other games, harps, etc., were burned as incompatible with the conversion of the masses. On a great bonfire before the Signorie, undesirable books also found a place: "The works of Boccaccio and Petrarch, Morgante and other battle-descriptions, as well as magic and other superstitious writings; finally immodest statues and paintings, the pictures of beautiful Florentine ladies from the hand of excellent painters and sculptors and precious foreign fabrics with unchaste depictions."[101] An anti-intellectual tendency asserts itself in all these popular uprisings. It is closely connected with the fact that the masses are not yet capable of an independent policy to satisfy their own interests and must internalize their wishes by the roundabout way of fetishized persons and ideas. Max Weber stressed the rationalistic trait of the bourgeois mind, but irrationalism is from the start no less associated with its history.

A further phenomenon connected with this irrationalism can be mentioned just briefly. Youth, even children, play a peculiar role in these movements. In times of a stale hindering progress, individual young people side with the oppressed and risk their lives in the struggle against the ruling powers; in those bourgeois uprisings swarms of boys and girls can easily be used to commit acts of violence and denunciations. The so-called purity and idealism of youth, a further magic element, then promotes the leader's goals and the power of his personality. Farel, Calvin's predecessor and friend, had been corrected mildly by the the city council on the occasion of a church invasion. "But God," said the Protestant reporter, "despised the advice of the wise and aroused adolescent youths against the wisdom of great men. On the after-

100. *Luthers Werke*, ed. by Buchwald et al. Vol. I, (Leipzig, 1924) p. 96f.
101. Schnitzer, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 392.

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noon of the very same day 'little children' unexpectedly stormed into the cathedral . . . filling the church with wild shouting. The 'awakening of the children' was the signal for the adults . . . There followed scenes of the crudest vandalism, incidents such as did not often occur even during the Reformation."[102] Savonarola had a regular "juvenile police." It helped him exercise moral discipline and carried the conflicts right into individual families.[103] The proletarian children, however, stayed away from these moral functions. "The children of the lowest classes of people not only did not belong to Savonarola's groups but on the contrary they showed open hostility toward them and missed no opportunity to play malicious tricks on them. They also vent their spleen on the *Frate* whenever they could."[104] The sentimental glorification of the child as a symbol of purity is one of those expressions of the bourgeois spirit which are both a means and expression of the compulsory internalization of instinctual desires. Freedom from the lusts, which can only be overcome by the most difficult self-denial, is attributed to the child.[105] Not as the bearer of theoretical and practical strength, as a guarantee of man's infinite possibilities, but as a symbol of "purity," "innocence," "childlikeness," does youth constitute an ideal in the bourgeois age. The ideological relation which this society has acquired to nature in general, not just to the child, the idealizing of primitiveness, of "unspoiled" nature, of the plot of land and the peasant are closely connected with these mechanisms.

The French Revolution seems, at first sight, to deviate from the structural similarity of bourgeois uprisings sketched here. The bourgeoisie and the propertyless masses had a common interest in removing the *ancien regime.* Repeated mass uprisings preceded it and the conditions brought about by the revolution, despite all setbacks, actually led to an improvement in the general situation in city and country in the first half of the nineteenth century. Especially the "democratization of the land" by the sale of nationalized properties was achieved to a certain extent.[106] Despite the relative community of interest of the wealthy bourgeoisie and the masses, however, contradictions in the overall course of the Revolution made themselves felt. The character and mode of behavior of the great leaders, from the very first, did not correspond to homogeneous interests of the general public, which were not at all realizable at that time, but to the admittedly progressive interest of the bourgeoisie, which however led to the exploitation and oppression of large parts of the population. Mathiez, who in his excellent works on the French Revolution explains and defends Robespierre's policy in detail, brings out this contradiction clearly enough. He traces the economic difficulties at the time of the Revolution essentially to the *assignat*-economy. All social strata that could not

102. Kampschulte, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 166.
103. Cf. Schnitzer, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 271ff.
104. *Ibid.*, p. 282.
105. The fetishization of childlikeness goes so far that the diminutive, the childlike form, becomes the characteristic poetic means of expression in bourgeois mysticism.
106. Cf. M. Kowalewsky, *Die ökonomische Entwicklung Europas*, transl. by A. Stein, Vol. VII (Berlin, 1914) p. 386.

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match the declining purchasing power of the *assignats* by raising the purchase price for their own wares fell victim to inflation. They took up the struggle "against the cruelty of *'laissez faire'* and *'laissez passer'*." They opposed the right to property with the right to life. Though these urban and rural masses found no significant leaders, in the course of the Revolution they finally imposed a general controlled economic policy, especially the fixing of maximum prices for grain and other necessary consumer goods. But this regulation, which was wrung from the government only under the strongest mass pressure, also included maximum wages. When the desperate effort of bourgeois circles had failed to maintain the free market situation which was impossible for the poor under inflation, or even a partial market economy, the government fell into a new contradiction with proletarian strata, since it had to impose maximum wages along with maximum prices. Under the given structure of society and the prevailing mode of production even terror was not enough to foil all evasions of the food laws. When, for example in Paris, at the time when the Hebertists dominated the revolutionary section-committees, the maximum wages were kept in line less rigorously than the laws on food prices, this was out of the question in the cities of the North. "One would be very mistaken," writes Mathiez,[107] "to imagine that the revolutionary offices showed the same zeal everywhere in applying the maximum food prices. Even in the middle of the terror, the apparently mostly Jacobin city administrations were in the hands of the owners." But quite apart from these inequities the government had to alienate the masses by the wage policy made necessary by the overall circumstances.

Robespierre discovered too late that he could not carry on his revolutionary policy without concessions to the lower classes. "On the eve of his fall, supported by his friends St. Just and Couthon, he had convinced the welfare and social security committees in their sessions on the fourth and fifth Thermidor to finally implement the Ventôse (Feb.-March) regulations which had until then remained just on paper, through which St. Just wanted to expropriate the suspects (the internal enemies) and distribute their property among the poor *sans-culottes*. This would have created an entirely new class which owed everything to the Revolution, because it owed its property to it, and which would defend the Revolution. Robespierre had gone beyond democratic policy. He was on the road to a social revolution, and that was one of the reasons for his fall."[108] These laws, which incidentally, would not have affected the bourgeois system, were never enforced. Robespierre's uneasiness, which led him to revoke them, was, however, justified. He no longer had the workers' support against the wealthy who were annoyed by the mandatory price limits. In part, a new policy had to be introduced prohibiting them from changing place of employment, in the country people had to be commanded

107. A. Mathiez, *La vie chère et le mouvement social sous la Terreur*, (Paris, 1927) p. 586.

108. A Mathiez, *La réaction thermidorienne* (Paris 1929) p. 2. Cf. the detailed discussion of the Ventôse-decrees in G. Lefebvre, *Questions agraires au temps de la Terreur* (Strasbourg, 1932) especially p. 46ff.

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to do the harvesting and laws against association were passed.[109] "On the 9th of Thermidor, the Parisian workers, dissatisfied with the new tarifs announced by the city authorities in the preceding days, remained indifferent to the political struggle going on before their eyes. Precisely on the 9th of Thermidor they demonstrated against the wage limits . . . When Robespierre and his friends were being led to execution, the workers shouted to them as they passed: 'The devil with the maximum!'"[110]

Robespierre is a bourgeois leader. Objectively his policy has a progressive content; the principle of society he represented, however, contained a contradiction to his idea of universal justice. Blindness to this contradiction stamps his character with an imprint of the fantastic, despite all passionate rationality. Even his teacher Rousseau was caught in the same illusions. In Book II of *Emile*[111] he states that the first idea one must give to a child is "less that of freedom than of ownership." The praise of ownership is repeated in many passages. "It is certain," he writes in an article on political economy,[112] "that the right of ownership is the most sacred of all a citizen's rights and in some regards more important than freedom itself." And he deludes himself with the hope that a government without ownership of the means of production could "prevent excessive inequality of wealth,"[113] ward off poverty, or at least make it bearable. Robespierre thinks in exactly the same manner. It was historically impossible for him to understand the immanent laws of the bourgeois economy which were politically anchored in the Revolution. Within the system advocated by Robespierre, no government could prevent the intensification of social conflicts against anonymous economic forces. Rousseau and Robespierre's personal world of ideas corresponded directly to the situation of the petit-bourgeoisie. They strongly resented the great fortunes. The principle of ownership showed them its dark side. For Rousseau, all mankind's unhappiness even begins with it. He nonetheless declares it sacred. "One did not need a revolution," Robespierre said in the National Assembly, when confronted with socialist tendencies,[114] "to teach everyone that excessive inequality of wealth is the source of many evils and crimes, but we are, nevertheless, convinced that equality of property is a chimera." The exclamation "*la propriete; que ce mot n'alarme personne*" stands at the beginning of the same speech. But if ownership is, for the French Revolution, a human right, still it is part of Robespierre's practice to put his own moderation and poverty in the right light. In general, he surrounded his person with the halo of poverty and virtue as diligently as Cola and Savonarola did theirs with divine grace. When he asserts that he would rather be the son of Aristides who was raised in the Prytaneum at Athen's expense than heir to Xerxes' throne,[115]

109. Cf. Mathiez, *La vie chère, op. cit.*, p. 581ff.
110. *Ibid.*, p. 605f.
111. Rousseau, *Oeuvres completes, op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 98.
112. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 183.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
114. Buchez and Roux, *Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution francaise*, Vol. XXVI (Paris, 1836) p. 130.
115. Cf. the speech just quoted.

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that is not at all so irrational. But statements such as his claim that superfluity was not merely the price of crime but also its punishment and that he wanted to be poor in order not to be unhappy[116] are just part of the bourgeois leader's necessary self-glorification. Such conscious display of one's own ascetic virtues by word and way of life are one of the most important irrational means for magnifying Robespierre's person in the eyes of his followers. Most historians have portrayed his behavior as a purely psychological fact, without understanding it as one of those practices based on the social function of these politicians. "What is the secret of his power?" Michelet asks,[117] "The opinion which he was able to convince everyone of: his incorruptible honesty and his immutability With an admirable consistency, an astonishing tactics he succeeded in maintaining the reputation for immutability. In the end he maintained it just by his own statement. And his word carried such weight that in the end one denied the obvious facts in order to recognize Robespierre's statement as the highest authority, contrary to reality . . . Faith in the priest was back again, immediately after Voltaire. This priest denied nature and made a nature of his own by his word. And this one was hard compared with the other." Indeed, Robespierre's ascetic attitude does have magical character. He uses it as a higher legitimation.

He was not able to do without symbols either. They are part of his policy and his character. The cockades and flags play a great role in the revolution. When it is reported that Marat, on the eve of the uprising on August 10, 1792, rode through the streets of Paris with a laurel wreath on his head,[118] that was certainly not Robespierre's taste. He criticized all ostentatious behavior; the feasts of reason celebrated by the Hebertists, which were a sharp affront to positive religion, especially disgusted him.[119] But his role as bourgeois leader, which requires mass presentations, forced him to attend the Feast of the Supreme Being in June 1794, which he presided over and the plan of which he had designed together with the painter David, or at least approved. When he saw the people in the Tuilerie garden, he cried out enthusiastically: "The whole world is gathered here!"[120] In the course of this ceremony he set fire to the statue of Atheism, which had been erected for this purpose. In the middle of the flame the statue of Wisdom appeared. For the organizers and their audience this made the symbolic meaning clear. In truth, the bourgeoisie's struggle against atheism shows less wisdom in general than the government's wisdom. This society needs a religion as a means of domination, because the general interest does not hold it together. The road to the military cemetery where the National Convention was to listen to hymns[121] and national songs

116. A. Aulard, *La Société des Jacobins*, Receuil de Documents, Vol. V (Paris, 1895) p. 179.
117. J. Michelet, *Histoire de la Révolution francaise*, Vol. VIII (Paris, 1879) p. 268.
118. Cf. E. Hamel, *Histoire de Robespierre*, Vol. II (Paris, undated) p. 321.
119. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 160f.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 380.
121. Among other things, Chéniers hymn "God of the people, kings, cities, lands, Luther, Calvin, and the Children of Israel" was intoned (cf. Mathiez, *Autour de Robespierre*, Paris, 1926, p. 121.)

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from a mountain built for that purpose was passed in solemn procession. "The legislative assembly followed a group of old men, mothers, children and young girls. Robespierre, in his capacity as President, led the way. He wore Nanking trousers, a cornflower-blue jacket, a belt with the national colors, on his head a hat decorated with a tri-color crest, and in his hand, like all his colleagues in office, a bouquet of grain-stalks, blossoms and fruit."[122] Not the strangeness of the procession, which is often wrongly stressed by portrayals hostile to the Revolution, but the compulsion to have such impressive symbolic rallies, which even Robespierre could not exempt himself from, is typical of popular leaders. At the height of its revolutionary development of power the bourgeoisie recalls its earliest revolts. "The brotherhood festivals of the French Revolution in Paris appear truly to be an imitation of the August festival of the popular tribunes of Rome."[123] As a consequence of the very different political situation in which their class found itself, Rienzo and Robespierre are worlds apart — and yet something in their nature is identical, because the form of society within which they were working remain ultimately the same.

Even the historian's discussions connected with their names at times show a remarkable coincidence. Thus, Cola's modern biographer[124] accuses Gregorovius' depiction of "errors" and "clumsy criticism" for speaking of "morbid hypersensitivity," of the classical carnival games, of the "insane, blossom-crowned plebeian," and so on. How often similar statements on Robespierre have provoked the critique of historians. Michelet speaks of the incorruptable man's "morbid imagination"[125] and has been more gently reproved than Gregorovius, with whom he can probably be compared in power of depiction and "theatrical pose," as Burdach says of Gregorovius.[126] Michelet and Gregorovius are partly right, partly wrong: bourgeois leaders easily tend to have a trace of the fantastic, but this is based less on their psychology than on the social conditions. They are as realistic with their fantasy as is possible in this contradictory society. The Fantastic is a symptom of their profession; there is hardly one among them who has not been considered at least "eccentric" before or after fulfilling his historical mission. The qualities that make him suited for his role, the oscillation between love for the people, strictness and cruelty, the combination of a child's gentleness with the rage of a bloody avenger, the obstinacy of the freedom-fighter and submission to the will of higher powers, the intermingling of personal simplicity and bombastic concepts, magnificance and moral severity — all this can be only partly displayed consciously at the appropriate moment; this contradictory temperament must surely be inborn; i.e. his character is pre-formed for his achievement. All these contradictions are contained in the average bourgeois existence also. The cautious, especially "calculating" businessman, on a small scale a model

122. Hamel, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 382.
123. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 332.
124. Burdach, *op. cit.*, Part I, p. 116f.
125. Michelet, *op. cit.*, p. 271.
126. *Ibid.*

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of sense of reality, precision and thrift, tends, at least secretly, to improbable, romantic enterprises, and comes out with adventurous ideas at times. The leader is just the exponential version of this type. His characterological structure corresponds to that of his followers. Contemporary popular literature contains the same unmediated mixture of blood-craze and virtue, boastfulness and modesty worshiped in the leader. In his person, this mixture is "natural." It is told that Prince Colonna at times used to like to invite the notary Rienzo to dinner and have him give a speech. "The prominent gentlemen broke out in laughter once when he said: 'When I have become ruler or emperor, I will hang this Baron or have that one beheaded," pointing his finger at the guests. He walked around in Rome as a fool . . . No one suspected that this fool would one day have the terrible power to lop the heads of prominent Romans from their shoulders."[127]

Robespierre shares with the Reformers the hostility to erotic culture. The constant exhortations for purity of morals and the concomitant mania to discover filth everywhere cannot be detached from his politics. They see physical and moral filth everywhere. They hate idleness, men of loose morals, an attitude that favors pleasure and happiness. When the Genevan Rousseau in his letter to d'Alembert, lashes out at the theater and declares it an "amusement" and that if "amusements" are necessary they ought to be limited to a minimum — "every unnecessary amusement is an evil for a being whose life is so short and whose time so valuable"[128] — when Robespierre's example propagates this hatred of pleasure, he can appeal to illustrious Genevan predecessors. Although Calvin in contrast with a few of his more radical sub-leaders was of the opinion that "one must not deprive the people of all delights,"[129] under his rule dance, play, public and private parties were either completely forbidden or tied to conditions which amounted almost to a prohibition.[130] Even theatrical performances with "a good tendency"[131] were opposed on grounds of principle, although not on his initiative, by the congregation he headed. "As could be expected," a modern study of Robespierre says,[132] "he also used his power to enforce universal morality. Maximilien and Couthon, who often ate together at noon, represented a strong puritanical element on the committee. In October they encouraged the Commune in its striving to break the wave of immorality that had inundated Paris. They obtained an order from the committee to arrest the writer and owner of a theater where an indecent play was being performed." Certainly, Robespierre is infinitely more positive toward theory and reason than Luther and his followers, both because of the historical progress which had occurred in the interim and because of his role in the left wing of the bourgeoisie. But the rule

127. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 311.
128. Rousseau, Lettre à M d'Alembert, *Oeuvres complètes, ibid.* Vol. VIII, p. 232.
129. C.A. Cornélius, *Historiche Arbeiten* (Leipzig, 1899) p. 475.
130. Kampschulte, *op. cit.*, p. 444.
131. *Ibid.*, p. 445.
132. R.S. Ward, *Maximilian Robespierre* (London, 1934) p. 229.

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that bourgeois popular leaders fall short of the knowledge expressed by the writers who prepare the way for them applies to Robespierre too. He was very critical of the Enlightenment. "Virtue and talent are both necessary qualities, but virtue is the most necessary. Virtue without talent can still be useful. Talent without virtue is just a misfortune."[133] In the speech on 18th Floreal 1794, quoted above, he inveighed against the materialism of antiquity and the modern age, especially against the Epicureans and Encyclopedists. After a very idiosyncratic digression into the history of philosophy, he reproaches it for writing against despotism and accepting a pension from it for writing books against the court and dedicating them to kings. Robespierre criticizes the materialist philosophy for "making egoism into a system, and understanding human society as a war of treachery, success as the measure for right and wrong, honesty as a matter of taste and decorum, the world as the property of clever scoundrels."[134] He plays off Rousseau against Voltaire's circle, which of course very much hated the Genevan moralist. But the hard depiction of the world rejected by Robespierre corresponded more accurately to reality than did his own belief that after the bourgeois order is consolidated justice depends on the conversion to virtue; this idealism, however, is inseparable from Robespierre's historical task. Upon his fall, this view showed its deficiency compared with the spirit of materialism which he so disdained.

III

In order to illuminate the historical consequences of unrestrained egoism, which, despite the official morality of the modern age, is an essential trait of everyday life, a few non-everyday events were pointed out above. From the key points of its development, the revolutions, a light is cast over the bourgeois spirit as a whole and is useful in the analysis of the normal state. The question arises, why this historical meditation was necessary at all. The derivation of the psychic and intellectual narrowness of the predominant character seems simple enough. Bourgeois society is not based on conscious collaboration for the existence and happiness of its members. Its vital law is a different one. Each person thinks he is working for himself, and must think of his own survival. There is no plan prescribing how the general need should be satisfied. As each tries to produce such things in exchange for which he can obtain others which he needs, production is just barely organized so that society can develop in the given form. The more a better, more rational system becomes technically possible over the course of centuries, the cruder and more clumsy this "fine" instrument, the market, proves to be, mediating the reproduction of society only with the most severe losses in human life and property, and with the advancement of the capitalist economy unable to save mankind, despite its growing wealth, from a reversion to barbarity. By the very fact that during the epoch when man is emancipating himself he experiences himself, in the underlying economic sphere, as an isolated subject of interests,

133. Quoted according to Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

134. Robespierre, *Habt ihr eine Revolution ohne Revolution gewollt? op. cit.*, p. 362.

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associated with others only by purchase and sale, alienness becomes an anthropological category. When the characteristic philosophy of the age understands man as a self-contained monad in transcendental loneliness, connected with other monads only by complicated mechanisms independent of his will, bourgeois man's form of existence appears in metaphysical form. Each one is the center of the world, and everyone else is "outside." All communication is an exchange, a transaction between solipsistically constructed realms. The conscious being of these men can be reduced to a small number of relations between fixed quantities. The language of logistics is its appropriate expression. Coldness and alienness are derivable, without further ado, from this basic culture of the epoch: nothing in the essence of the bourgeois individual opposes the repression and annihilation of one's fellow man. The circumstances, rather, that in this world each one becomes the other's competitor and that even with increasing social wealth there are increasingly too many people, gives the typical individual of the epoch that character of coldness and indifference which is satisfied with the most pitiful rationalizations about the most monstrous deeds as long as they correspond to his interest.

The above analyses dealt with only a few aspects of the historical realization of the bourgeois principle. They tried to shape the theory of bourgeois man, which results from purely theoretical derivation more concretely in regard to the trait of cruelty than is possible by purely logical derivation. If cruelty was not discussed at great length in connection with these uprisings, nothing is more familiar than this. The counter-revolutionary reactions were, as a rule, much more bloody, for they lacked even the rapidly disappearing hope of a drastic change, which in bourgeois revolutions works against resentment; the progressive elements are completely helpless and are the main target of terror. The mass is reduced from a particular factor which, though not awakened to complete self-consciousness, strives to drive the process forward and therefore plays a role of its own, to a mere instrument of revenge against the most advanced groups. In the bourgeois revolution the mass, though with changing strength and constantly vacillating, is determined by its more conscious wing; it is differentiated and alert. It must constantly be observed, convinced, and taken seriously. It is not a mass in the same sense as in the counter-revolution. Here the "mob" usually appears on the scene; it is usually, down to the psychic structure of its units, different from the mass in revolutions. The question whether the uprisings which have taken place in the most recent past in some European states must be classified more as one or the other kind of historical events, which at times have a similar character and are in any case ultimately all phases of a single process or a self-coherent totality, cannot be answered as easily as might seem from a liberal perspective. They are, at any rate, not absolutist or clerical reactions, but the inscenation of a bourgeois pseudo-revolution with radical populist trappings, opposed to any possible reorientation of society. These forms seem to be a bad imitation of the movements we have been discussing.

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The role of the bourgeois leader as functionary of the property-owning strata, the surrounding of his person with magic qualities for the masses, his "charisma," the importance of symbols and holidays, the preponderance of speech over action, the call for inner renewal, the replacement of the old bureaucracy, the personal struggles between aspirants for elite-positions, the mostly psychically determined relation of leaders, sub-leaders and followers, the religious and national emotionalism, the anchoring of the difference between poor and rich in the eternal essence of the world — all these are statements of the same dynamics: masses, which have come into movement under the slogans of freedom and justice and with a tremendous vague or clear urge to improve their situation, for a meaningful existence, peace, and happiness, are incorporated into a new phase of class society. Certainly, this is just one side of the whole process. The other is the progress, which advances in leaps and bounds in these revolutions, of precisely this society in which the preconditions for a higher social order are developed in this way and not otherwise. But as long as the epoch lasts, that negative factor has its own anthropological consequences. Since the egoism of the masses led by the bourgeois leader must not be satisfied, since their demands are repressed as inner purificaiton, obedience, submission and self-sacrifice, since love and recognition of the individual are deflected toward the leader magnified to superhuman dimensions, to lofty symbols and great concepts, and one's own being with its own needs is annihilated — the idealistic morality tends in that direction — even the individual is experienced as a nothing and the individual as such, his pleasure and happiness, is despised and denied.

The feeling of one's own absolute nothingness that dominates the members of the mass corresponds exactly to the puritanical view "that practical success is at the same time the sign and the reward for ethical superiority....The doctrine that misery is a proof of guilt, although it casts a strange light on the life of Christian saints and sages, was always liked among the wealthy."[135] That the poor person is in reality worthless, is demonstrated to him anew everyday; actually he knows it right from the first. The prevailing ideology does generally contain the opposite thesis, yet man's deeper psychic layers are not determined by it alone, but equally by the constant experience of contradictory reality. The manifest ideology is just one factor in the origin of the characters typical in the society. The humanism that pervades the history of the new spirit shows a double face. It means directly the glorification of man as the creator of his own destiny. Man's dignity lies in his power to determine himself independently of the powers of blind nature within and outside him; it lies in his power to act. In the society in which this humanism spread, however, the power of self-determination is unevenly distributed; for the inner energies depend no less on external destiny than it does on them. The more remote the abstract concept of man, glorified by humanism, was from his real situation, the more pitiful the mass-individuals had to appear to themselves; similarly the idealistic divinization of man, proclaimed in the concepts

135. R.H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (London, undated) p. 267.

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of the greatness, the genius and the grace-endowed personality of the leader constantly implied the self-abasement and the self-contempt of the concrete individual. But the latter is just a reflection of reality. If even the happiest person can, from one moment to the next, become like the most miserable and poorest person, not through the blind forces of nature, but through causes within human society without detectable guilt, and unhappiness is the only normal and certain condition, then the concrete individual does not count very much. Each hour society proves anew that only the circumstances, not persons, actually deserve respect. The Reformation, with its morally depressing anti-human pathos, its hatred for the earth-worm's vanity, its dark doctrine of predestination, is not so much the opponent of bourgeois humanism as its other, its misanthropic side. It is humanism for the masses, while humanism itself is the Reformation for the wealthy.

The necessity to move the greatest part of society by spiritual practices to a renunciation which is necessitated not by external nature but by the class organization gives the whole cultural thinking of the age an ideological character that stands in disproportion to the knowledge possible at this stage of technical development. Even with an organization in which only still unmastered external nature and not social conditions restricted human freedom, the limits set by nature would compel a part of the external wishes and needs to be internalized, and lead to the transformation of energies. Insofar as other goals, satisfactions and joys would then develop, these would completely lack the character of the higher, the more noble, the more sublime, which today invests all spiritual, all so-called cultural strivings compared with the materialistic non-internalized desires. The medicine-man solemnity that clings to the whole of life in all non-economic spheres because of the antagonistic constitution of society, disappears with the fetishes by means of which the masses are held in check and around whose grounding, cultivation and propagation this life is centered. The saving of aesthetic, literary and philosophical elements of the past epoch does not mean that the ideological context in which they stood is preserved. The affirmative character of culture, according to which the existence of an eternally better world over the real world was asserted, this false idealism vanishes completely but the materialism that is left is not the bourgeois one of indifference and competition; the preconditions of this crude atomistic materialism, which under the rule of that idealism was and is the real religion of practice, will then have passed. The words "the realm of freedom" do not mean that this activity to which culture has now developed should now spread in a "purified" condition and, as is generally said, benefit the "whole people." This undialectical view, which adopts the whole cultural concept of the bourgeoisie, its ascetic scale of priorities, and its concept of morality, but remains ignorant of its great artistic achievements, has dominated the reform strivings even of progressive nineteenth century political parties down to this day, made thinking shallow, and finally also contributed to defeat. With the increasing hopelessness of the masses' condition, the individual is finally left the choice between two modes

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of behavior: the conscious struggle against the conditions of reality — in which the positive element of bourgeois morality, the demand for freedom and justice, is retained but its ideological hypostatization abolished. Or the unbroken profession of this morality and its corresponding scale of priorities — this leads to a secret contempt for one's own concrete existence and to hatred for the happiness of others, to a nihilism[136] which has expressed itself again and again in the history of the modern age as the practical destruction of everything joyful and happy, as barbarity and destruction.

In salient historical moments, this bourgeois nihilism is expressed in the specific form of terror. In previous history terror was in certain periods an instrument of the government. But various elements must be distinguished in this. Its rational goal consists in intimidating the opponent. The gruesome acts against the enemy are protective measures of domestic and foreign policy. But terror also pursues another intention, which does not always come to the awareness of its originators, and is more rarely admitted by them: the satisfaction of their own followers. Insofar as even in such progressive movements as the French Revolution this second element plays a role, it corresponds to that deep contempt, that hatred of happiness itself, which is connected with the morally mediated compulsion to asceticism. The preaching of honorable poverty which accompanies the everyday life of this age but has made wealth its God, a preaching wich finally becomes stronger in the course of the uprising and sets the basic tone even of the most liberal bourgeois leader's speech, means for the listener's deepest instinct that after the return of order not a new meaningful, joyous existence will begin and misery really end — for this would need no terror for its satisfaction — but the return to hard work, low pay, and actual subjugation and impotence toward those who have to make no sacrifices in order to be honest. The equality which the individuals of the mass feel to be just at such moments, and which they demand, is then the general austerity of a scanty life, which is so emphatically praised to them. If pleasure, or rather the capacity for pleasure, which they had to fight in themselves since their youth, is so ruinous, then those who embody this vice and remind one of it in their whole being, in appearance, clothing and attitude shoud also be extinguished so that the scandal disappears and one's own renunciation is confirmed. For the whole life of each of these individuals of the mass would have to appear wrong to himself, if it turned out that pleasure is really worthwhile and the halo of renunciation

136. Nietzsche's critique of "European nihilism" amounts untimately to the denial of cultural development since the beginning of Christianity. The nihilism spoken of in this article is more narrowly defined. It regards the secret self-contempt of the individual on the basis of the contrradiction between bourgeois ideology and reality. This self-contempt is usually linked with an exaggerated consciousness of freedom and of one's own or another's greatness. Because Nietzsche understands the term too widely and therefore unhistorically, he cannot understand that nihilism is overcome either by society as a whole or not at all. "We have grown to dislike egoism," he complains in *The Will to Power (Complete Works* [New York, 1964], Vol. 14, p. 11). But what he intentionally promotes is, however, merely the abstract self-consciousness of ancient slave holders, and unintentionally, the good conscience of modern tyrants who reproduce the general nihilism which they carry in themselves.

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exists only in the imagination. Through the clumsy and frenzied attempts to grab whatever is possible, through the imitation of orgies as he imagines them, the little man who has one day come to power documents the same inner fear as the idiosyncratically virtuous parvenu, of missing the chance of his lifetime. For it is always a question of the soul. Driven by serious curiosity and inextinguishable hatred, people seek the forbidden behind what is alien to them, behind every door which they cannot enter,in innocent associations and sects, monastery walls and palaces. The concept of the alien becomes synonymous with that of the forbidden and dangerous, and the enmity is all the more fatal since its carriers feel that this forbidden thing is irretrievably lost for themselves by virtue of their own rigid character. Petit-bourgeois resentment against the nobility and anti-Semitism have similar psychic functions. Behind the hatred of the courtesan, the contempt for aristocratic existence, the rage over Jewish immorality, over Epicureanism and materialism is hidden a deep erotic resentment which demands the death of their representatives. They must be wiped out, if possible with torments, for the meaning of one's own existence is called into question every moment by the others. In the orgies of the aristocracy, the community of wives in rebellious cities, the bloodthirstiness of the followers of an opposed religion — in such deeds imputed to their victims —virtue betrays its own dream. It is not so much the seldomness of luxury that sets the ideologically-dominated mass in motion as the very possibility of luxury to exist. Luxury is therefore essentially considered impertinent not because there is poverty, but because poverty is considered better than it. That all are equally nothing and are reduced to it as soon as they believe to be more — this brutality toward the personal destiny, which brutality is in the bourgeois world the law for most, is presented before everyone's eyes by the guillotine and moreover gives the masses the blissful feeling of omnipotence since its own principle attains power. The guillotine symbolizes negative equality, this worst democracy, which is identical with its own opposite, the complete contempt for the person. Accordingly, a typical kind of treatment in the prisons and tribunals of the bourgeois freedom-movements and counter-revolutions is cruelty accompanied by moral abuse, castigation, and insult of the suspects. Equalization has two meanings: to bring up what is below, to set the highest claim to happiness consciously as the standard of society, or to drag down, to cancel happiness, to bring everything down to the level of the present misery of the masses. Even the liberating movements decisive for mankind in this era have something of this second meaning. Both principles are at work in the masses, and often enough they conflict. Although in the counter-revolutions only the negative one becomes reality, the positive one, which points beyond the structure of the epoch, also has determined the essence of some historical phenomena.

Nonetheless, one need not read Taine's descriptions, inspired by wild enmity,[137] to recognize this nihilism even in the terror of the French Revolu-

137. Cf. Hippolyte Taine, *Les origines de la France contemporaine,* Vol. III, (Paris, 1881) p. 294ff; also Vol. IV, p. 276ff.

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tion. The "philosophical policeman Dutard," whom Mathiez quotes, expresses the function of terror for the masses more clearly than can the juxtaposition of terrible incidents. His report on the execution of twelve condemned men says: "I must tell you that these executions have the greatest effect in politics, but the most important one consists in calming the people's resentment for the evils they have borne. They exercise their revenge in this way. The wife who has lost her husband, the father who has lost his son, the merchant who no longer has a business, the worker who pays so much for everything that his wage is reduced almost to nothing, can be reconciled with the evils that oppress them only when they see people who are even more unhappy than they are and whom they believe to be enemies."[138] Marx and Engels did not overlook the contemptible side of terror in the French Revolution. "The whole French terrorism," they wrote in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, "was nothing but a plebeian manner of getting even with the enemies of the bourgeoisie: absolutism, feudalism, philistinism."[139] And in the year 1870 Engels writes: "*La terreur*, i.e., mostly useless cruelties, are committed by people who are afraid themselves, for their reassurance. I am convinced that the guilt for the reign of terror in the year 1793 falls almost exclusively on the overfrightened bourgeois acting like patriots, on the small...philistine bourgeois and the ragged, rascally mob that profited from terror."[140] When Engels here understands terror mainly as a ridiculous exaggeration of the rational goal, his revulsion for the petit-bourgeois and ragged mob also points to the socially-conditioned sado-masochistic constitution of these strata, who were no less to blame for French terror than the opponents' activity.

In view of the indefinite postponement of a really thorough and lasting improvement for the poor and the certainty that the real inequality will continue despite the empty phrase "equality," the leaders discovered the right step and offered the masses the unhappiness of each in place of the happiness of all. The beautiful Claire Lacombe, since the August 10th revolt, in which she had distinguished herself, played a certain role in the Revolution. She was closely affiliated with the radical leftists and had decisive influence on revolutionary women. When she came into conflict with Robespierre and his followers, the execution was announced even before her final arrest with the words: "The woman or girl Lacombe is finally in prison and made incapable of doing harm; this bacchantic counter-revolutionary now drinks nothing but water; it is known that she loved wine very much, that she no less liked good food and men; proof: the intimate friendship between her, Jacques Roux, Leclerc and comrades."[141] Robespierre generally represented this petit-bourgeois spirit in his policies. Personally, he was disposed to it by his ascetic predisposition, but the great progressive significance of the Revolution is also

138. A. Mathiez, *La Révolution francaise,* Vol. III (Paris, 1928) p. 81.

139. "Bilanz der preussischen Revolution", in *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von K. Marx und F. Engels,* ed. by F. Mehring, Vol. III (Stuttgart, 1920) p. 211.

140. Engels to Marx. Letter dated 4.9.1870, in *Marx/Engels Briefwechsel* Vol. IV, (Berlin, 1931) p. 377.

141. A. Mathiez, *La vie chère....*, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

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expressed in his character. "The people," he writes in his notes,[142] "what obstacle stands in the way of instructing them? Misery. When will the people, then, be enlightened? When it will have bread, and the rich as well as the government stop buying base pens and tongues to deceive it. When their interest has fused with the people's. When will their interest have fused with the people's? Never." But these sentences actually went beyond the movement he led. He crossed them out in his manuscript. Similarly Saint-Just had arrived at a great insight. "Happiness is a new idea in Europe."[143] He expressed it in connection with the laws which conditioned the fall of his government. After Thermidor, not happiness, but lawless, unrestricted terror was put on the daily agenda.

The analysis of the psychic mechanisms by which hatred and cruelty are generated was begun in modern psychology mainly by Freud. The conceptual apparatus which he created in his early works, can render important services in understading these processes. His original theory shows that social prohibitions in the family and in the general social conditions are suited to keep man at a sadistic drive-level or to cast him back to it. His doctrine of partial drives, of repressions, the concept of ambivalence adopted from Bleuler and so on, are the precondition for a psychological understanding of the process under discussion here, although this application is not found in details in Freud.[144] The transformation of psychic energies that takes place in internalization cannot be understood today without the psychoanalytical perspective. Whereas, however, the Freudian categories originally displayed a dialectical character, since they related to the construction of the individual destiny in society and reflected the interaction between external and internal factors, in later years the historical element in his conceptualization retreated in favor of the purely biological. Today it seems as if that dialectical character of theory had entered into the early works too independently of the positivistically oriented author's will. The more he approaches more comprehensive sociological, historical or philosophical problems, the more clearly the liberal and world-view trait of his thinking comes to the fore. From his theory of narcissism it already follows that love needs more explanation than hatred. Hate, as a relation to objects, is older than love. It derives from the narissistic ego's primeval repudiation of the external world with its outpouring of stimuli."[145] Later the destruction-drive was set as the inborn human inclination to 'badness,' to aggressiveness and destructiveness, and so to cruelty as well!"[146] as a directly, biologically determined basic fact of psychic life. Freud assumes that

142. J. Jaures, *Histoire socialiste de la Révolution francaise*, Vol. VIII (Paris, 1924) p. 259.

143. Saint-Just, *Oeuvres completes,* Vol. II (Paris, 1908) p. 248.

144. A theoretically important continuation within psychoanalysis comes from Wilhelm Reich. Cf. especially *Mass Psychology of Fascism.* I agree on many points with his psychological interpretation of individual traits of the bourgeois character. Reich, however, remains a true disciple of Freud's by deriving them essentially from sexual repression; he ascribes an almost utopian significance in the changing of the present conditions to the de-inhibition of genital sexuality.

145. Sigmund Freud, *"Instincts and their Vicissitudes" in Complete Psychological Works* (London, 1962), Vol. 14, p. 139.

146. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents,* in, *op. cit.,* Vol. 21, p. 170.

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"besides the instinct to preserve living substance and to join it into ever greater units, there must exist another, contrary instinct seeking to dissolve those units and to bring them back to their primeval, inorganic state. That is to say, as well as Eros, there was an instinct of death."[147] The "meaning of cultural development" is the "struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species."[148] Freud's simple philosophy of history follows from this general schema. As a result of "this primary mutual hostility of human beings,"[149] cultural society is constantly threatened with disintegration, and a lasting improvement of social conditions is impossible. All kinds of coercion, laws, morality and religion, are attempts to counter the effects of the eternal destruction drive. An "elite" will always be needed to hold in check the destruction-prone masses. In history we get the impression that "the idealistic motives served only as an excuse for the destructive appetites; and sometimes — in the case, for instance, of the cruelties of the Inquisition — it seems as though the idealistic motives had pushed themselves forward in consciousness, while the destructive ones lent them an unconscious reinforcement. Both may be true."[150] It is certain, in any case, "that there is no question of getting rid entirely of human aggressive impulses."[151] Although, according to Freud, the life of certain primitive tribes and the teaching of the Bolsheviks seemed to confirm such Utopian ideas, he however persists in his scepticism. "That, in my opinion, is an illusion."[152] One should, especially, not think that war can so soon be abolished. The culturability, i.e. "man's personal capacity for the transformation of the egoistic impulses under the influence of eroticism,"[153] consists of "two parts, one innate and the other acquired in the course of life."[154] We are inclined to overestimate the innate one, and the acquired one is generally held of little account. Most men are "hypocrites" as regards their cultivation. Freud explains the cruelty expressed in war, and not only in war, by a transformation of drive-impulses that seek material goals, ultimately by the coercion to patiently endure misery. He is inclined to understand the "pressure of culture," insofar as it does not concern sexuality, as pressure on the innate destruction-drive instead of on all needs which the masses must repress contrary to the social possibilities. Like the devil in the Middle Ages, the eternal destruction-drive is supposedly to blame for all evil. Freud, moreover, considers himself especially daring with this view. "We should probably have met with little resistance," he writes as explanation for psychoanalysis's long hesitation to accept the death-drive into its teaching,[155]

147. *Ibid.*, p. 118f.
148. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
149. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
150. Sigmund Freud, "Why War?" in *op. cit.*, Vol. 22, p. 210.
151. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
152. *Ibid.*
153. Freud, "Thoughts on War and Death" in, *op. cit.*, Vol. 14, p. 282.
154. *Ibid.*
155. Sigmund Freud, "New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis" in *op. cit.*, Vol. 22, pp. 103-04.

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"if we had wanted to ascribe an instinct with such an aim to animals. But to include it in the human constitution seems sacrilegious; it contradicts too many religious presumptions and social conventions." He does not know how much this new phase of his doctrine and movement merely repeats the social and religious convention.

The historical phenomena we were speaking of above should confirm the view that the enmity to pleasure contained in the modern age's optimistic and pessimistic conception of man stems from the social situation of the bourgeoisie. The over-tense model of man, the both sentimental and hard concept of virtue and self-surrender, the cult of an abstract heroism have the same root as individualistic egoism and nihilism, which they simultaneously contradict and interact with. The overcoming of this morality lies not in the positing of a better one, but in the creation of conditions under which their reason for existing is eliminated. The realization of morality, of a state of society and individuals worthy of man, is not a merely psychological, but a historical problem. By this insight Hegel led idealism out beyond its original boundaries. Freedom is "first just a concept, the principle of mind and heart," but it is destined "to develop into objectivity..."[156] To a father's question on the best way to educate his son morally, a Pythagorean answered (it is also attributed to others): "If you make him a citizen of a state with good laws."[157] Thus the problem is not solely an internal one. It is at present also not a matter of good orientation and skillful selection. Whether future generations will live a life worthy of man depends on the outcome of a period of struggles whose relevance Hegel could not yet see from his own standpoint. When Freud mocks, however, that in certain people's view, man's brutality, violence, cruelty are merely temporary and provoked by the circumstances, indeed are "perhaps only consequences of the inexpedient social regulations which he has hitherto imposed on himself,"[158] he is summing up a dialectical theory in all too shallow words, but even in the pragmatic translation this view, which meets with strong opposition, corresponds to the present condition better than the biologistic metaphysics Freud subscribes to.

In no phenomenon does the relation between ruthlessness and idealistic morality come out more pregnantly than in the juxtaposition of most tender, innocent and good-natured consideration and cynical hardness which is peculiar not just to the individual who wins power but also to the ideal and fantasy figures of this era. At home the owners of huge fortunes and the politicians whose business entails a terrible ruthlessness are usually sensitive and warm-hearted people. The role of children has already been mentioned. The most gruesome day's work is framed within friendship and a smile to a child. The lower the socially weak must bend, the higher the symbol of the naturally weak, children and venerable old men, rises. In European society the impeded development of intelligence and instincts has manifested itself in

156. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, 3rd ed. § 482; 2nd ed., §483.
157. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, § 153.
158. Sigmund Freud, "New Introductory Lectures", *op. cit.*, p. 104.

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blindness to the existence of animals. Their fate in our civilization reflects the entire coldness and callousness of the predominant human type. When individuals, however, resort to especially bloody means, they have generally if not discovered, at least asserted, their love for animals. "You call me cruel, although I can't stand to watch an insect suffer," says Marat, as he recommends the killing of a series of political opponents.[159] Sentimental love for animals is one of the ideological institutions in this society. It is not a universal solidarity which naturally encompasses these living creatures but rather an alibi vis-à-vis one's own narcissism and public consciousness, a sort of test to check one's acceptance of the ideal morality. The advocacy of cruelty, the admission of enjoying the cruelty one commits, would contradict completely the necessary mood of this age. A government, among whose most important instruments used each day is that terror in a negative sense, which offers these most terrible sacrifices to the nihilistic disposition of its own followers and shows a calculated indulgence toward their spontaneous activation, would abolish itself if it were to admit this. It seeks to deny nothing more strongly than the enthusiastic function of cruelty. Indeed, it has long been a foremost trait of the business of terror to trivialize or completely deny it. Calvin praised the mildness of the Geneva city-council when they were torturing his opponents at his request, and he suppressed the tortures in a report meant for the indignant city of Zürich.[161] Voices are heard that in terrorized Geneva "incredible calm" and "harmony among all the good"[162] prevail, and those announcements to the outside world had "no further effects."[163] — "The judge is a sublimated executioner," Nietzsche says.[164] If that is true, then the state of affairs would give way if the judge really became conscious of it. Freud says rightly that the destruction-drive for cultural reasons always needs a pretext, a rationalization — the wickedness of the opponent, pedagogical purposefulness, the defense of honor, a war, or some popular uprising. Yet this rationalization does not counteract the destruction of all human community in general, but only the present one. The destruction-drive considered eternal was till now always reproduced out of social conditions and also held in check with the help of ideological practices. Under changed circumstances the effectiveness and knowledge of common interest could determine the social relations of men; the "destruction-drive" will no longer disrupt them. In the present epoch egoism has actually become destructive, both the fettered and the diverted egoism of the masses as well as the archaic egoistic principle of the economy, which still shows only its most brutal side. When the latter is overcome, the former can become productive in a new sense. The badness of egoism lies not in itself, but in the historical situation; if it is changed, then its

159. Quoted after H. Cunow, *Die Parteien der grossen französischen Revolution und ihre Presse* (Berlin, 1912) p. 334.
160. Cf. Kampschulte, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 268.
161. *Ibid.*, p. 270.
162. *Ibid.*
163. *Ibid.*, p. 271.
164. Nietzsche, *op. cit.*, Vol. XI, p. 205.

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concept transfers to that of the more rational society.

Since the practical and theoretical solution of anthropological questions can be achieved only by the progress of society itself, and since the real constitution of bourgeois man only becomes completely clear when he has changed, no philosophy and no skilled educational methods deal adequately with the problem. The idealistic morality which prevents insight should not be rejected but historically realized, and therefore cannot be eliminated even today. The question of how the fate of the universally outlawed egoism, of the "destruction-and death-drive," would be shaped in a more rational reality finds no particular answer. But in recent times there have been signs pointing in one and the same direction for a solution. Some thinkers have, in contrast with the prevailing mentality, neither concealed, nor minimalized, nor accused egoism, but professed it: not that abstract and pitiful fiction, as it appears in some national economists and in Bentham, but pleasure, the highest degree of happiness, which also includes the satisfaction of cruel emotions. They have idealized none of the drives given to them historically as primary, but have stigmatized the distortion of the drives caused by the official ideology. These thinkers, since Aristippus and Epicurus, have in modern history been understood essentially only according to their opposition to the prevailing morality. They were defended or condemned in terms of this. But there is a peculiar fact about these apologetes of unrestricted egoism. When they traced down the condemned drives and raised them to consciousness without rejection or minimalization, these powers lost their demonic power.

These hedonistic psychologists were as a rule portrayed as the enemies of mankind, or praised sky high by the latter. This happened most to Nietzsche. The superman, the problematic concept with which the psychologist left the analytical area he had mastered, has been interpreted according to the philistine bourgeois' wish-dream, and Nietzsche himself mistaken for it. The adventurous element seemed so nice. Greatness, blood and danger were always well appreciated in pictures and monuments. But Nietzsche is the opposite of this inflated sense of power. His error lies in the present's lack of historical understanding, which leads him to bizarre hypotheses where clear theoretical knowledge was possible. He was blind to the historical dynamics of his time and hence to the way to his goal; therefore, even his most magnificent analysis, the genealogy of morals and of Christianity, despite all delicate subtlety, turns out to be too crude. But this prophet of Epicurean gods and of the pleasureableness of cruelty freed himself from the coercion to rationalize. When the will to cause suffering ceases to act "in the name" of "God," "in the name of" justice, morality, honor, or the nation, it loses, by means of self-knowledge, the terrible power it exercises as long as it is hidden by its own carrier because of an ideological denial. It is taken up into the economy of real-life conduct for what it is and becomes rationally masterable. Not the abolition of ideology and its basis, i.e., the transition to a better society, but the unleashing of aggression which is presently reproduced and repressed for social reasons by the bourgeois authorities themselves, for example in war

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and national mobilization, makes it a culturally destructive power. Nietzsche himself cannot be pictured as an executioner like some of his disciples. His inoffensive existence stems from perhaps the deepest knowledge of psychic connections that has ever existed in history. Nietzsche's precursors in the analysis of egoism and cruelty, Mandeville, Helvétius, de Sade, are as free as himself from Freud's condescending tolerance toward the destruction-drive which "unfortunately" happens to exist, and of his resigned scepticism as they are of the loving Rousseau's *ressentiment*.

By their own existence these psychologists seem to point out that the liberation from ascetic morality with its nihilistic consequences can bring about a human change in the opposite sense than internalization. This process, which abolishes it, does not cast man back to the previous, psychic stage, as it were, as if that first process had never taken place, but brings it to a higher form of life. But those thinkers have contributed little to making it a universal reality; that is mainly the task of the historical persons in whom theory and historical practice became a unity. In them the mechanisms of bourgeois psychology, both as determining forces of their life and as theoretical object, are less important than their world-historical mission. Insofar as mankind, with their help, enters a higher era, it will change reality and quickly acquire the freer psychic constitution such as the great number of strugglers and martyrs for that general transformation already have without psychological mediation, because the dark, happiness-denying ethos of a dying epoch no longer has any power over them.

According to Aristotle's aesthetic theory, the sight of suffering in tragedy causes pleasure.[165] Men become purer by satisfying this drive, the pleasure in empathy. The application of Aristotle's theory to the modern age seems to be problematic, it has been reinterpreted and "moralized," even by Lessing, in the sense of idealistic morality. Catharsis by drama, by play in general, presupposes a changed humanity.

165. Cf. Chap. 6 of *Poetik*..

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THE MODE OF DESTRUCTION: TERROR IN ARGENTINA

by Juan E. Corradi

The last one hundred years of Argentine history can be neatly divided in two halves. From 1880 through 1930 it was mainly a success story, a legend of rapid economic growth, of fabulous fortunes made at the top but trickling down the social ladder, of immigration, mobility, and exceptionalism. The country was in the hands of an oligarchy of landowners in dependent association with British capital. But the wealth generated by agrarian exports opened the doors to millions of Southern Europeans that flocked to rapidly growing cities, changed the cultural texture, found new occupations, and entertained new hopes. Social progress turned into political demand, and the general prosperity, coupled with the rulers' liberal bent, allowed the extension of citizenship to a rising middle class. The next fifty years were years of turbulence ending in disappointment. They were marked, overwhelmingly, by the irruption of organized labor as a political force in a context of economic uncertainty and institutional improvisation. Argentina muddled through the industrial era unable to work out satisfactory arrangements of political conviviality. This gave rise to another, darker legend of wasted opportunities, of dereliction from great promises. Nevertheless, Argentina managed to avoid the true tragedies of the century: it did not become enmeshed in serious international conflict: its crises were never catastrophic; its political errings were more colorful than dreadful. Just as it had grown in happy non-chalance, it now seemed to falter blandly. Then suddenly, in the seventies, it caught up with the horrors of our era. It is now living through its darkest hour.

In terms of its development, Argentina represents a third type of social formation between classical liberal and post-liberal societies. It is a dependent society in which the main agent of development is neither a hegemonic bourgeoisie nor a powerful state capable of forging an alliance of pre-existing classes or generating new dynamic ones. It is the result of a development initiated and directed from outside, by a foreign bourgeoisis, and, today, by its more impersonal corporate heirs. Like other societies of this type, Argentina has become de-centered. It does not have an agency of change. It comprises, instead, a fragmentation of classes, a complex mix of old and new social relations, an over-extended state serving as an arena of compromise, a lack of structural unity. This is the direct result of the accretion of disparate patterns of development induced from outside. Yet, this has not meant social and cultural inertia. Far from it: in Argentina, the fragments are mobilized, and each pattern of development has left organized groups firmly entrenched in active and vociferous institutions. Rapid change hastily threw together different actors with no common framework within which to mediate their differences. The fragility and discontinuities in economic development made

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consensus even more elusive, and except for occasional periods of bonanza, when multiple payoffs relaxed tensions, the system that resulted was one of reciprocal vetoes, and general paralysis. Particularistic activism went hand in hand with global stalemate. Too weak to lead, each class or corporate group has been nonetheless strong enough to block the others. Thus, individual cleverness has not been balanced by a larger, collective vision and the whole has been consistently smaller than the sum of its parts. In the end, this negative pluralism has perverted the meaning of every political choice: democracy came to represent disorder, dictatorship, the temporary ransacking of the state by an armed corporation and special interests, revolution, the terrorism of youthful desperadoes.

It is hard to describe in brief this rapid, discontinuous, modernization of the country. Imagine crowding in a single lifetime the simultaneous ferment of economic, social, political, and cultural movements that elsewhere grew more gradually: the extension of citizenship to the middle and the working classes, an industrial revolution, the breakdown of old values. The result is a plethora of crises: of distribution, of legitimacy, of participation, and even institutional crises. The overload of demands from successively mobilized groups could be neither processed politically nor satisfied economically. This allowed a considerable amount of power to accumulate outside institutions from whence it broke out in various forms of violence: military coups, popular insurrections, armed insurgency, state terror, and external war — in that sequence.

These multiple crises, and the *crescenda* of violence that accompanies them, pose, on the institutional surface, an acute problem of governability and, on a deeper structural level, threaten the stability of class domination. They are not only detrimental to democratic values and rule of law, but to the very existence of the state as well. In such context, dominant groups tend to place as a first item on their agenda the re-establishment of a monopoly on coercion. On the other hand, utter fragmentation and anomie generate among other subordinate groups — in particular the middle sectors — an inchoate demand for order and a generalized readiness to subscribe a Hobbesian covenant or, at least, to endorse the forceful acquisition of sovereign power by dictators. These general and particular pressures grant temporary and partial autonomy to an authoritarian regime. They open, as it were, a credit line of power which the regime in turn may seek to consolidate by using and mixing a variety of resources (coercion against target groups, internal and external alliances, economic programs, ideological indoctrination and so forth). It is against this background that terror has made its appearance in Argentina.

Terror here is understood to mean "the arbitrary use, by organs of political authority, of severe coercion against individuals or groups, the credible threat of such use, or the arbitrary extermination of such individuals or groups."[1] As

1. Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, *Political Terror in Communist Systems* (Stanford, Cf.: Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 1. See also E. V. Walter, *Terror and Resistance. A Study of Political Violence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

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a specific form of power, terror has two dimensions, one behavioral and another ideological. On the one hand, it shapes political behavior to exact compliance with the directives of power holders. On the other hand, it molds attitudes so as to obtain voluntary obedience. It seeks to constitute new political subjects. Terror aims not only to control but also to change social actors. It is essentially a technique of disorientation, aimed at depriving subjects of the opportunity to calculate and foresee the consequences of their actions. It is a form of power in which conformity does not guarantee security. Its main effect is the generation of an atmosphere of anxiety — a "culture of fear." Terror is not confined to the actual occurence of arbitrary and severe coercion. It has a spilling effect over time and over the surrounding environment. Thus, a "terror process" refers to the inducement and multiplication of fear as a function of the initiatives of power holders. A "terror phase" is a period when the process of politically induced fear is particularly intense, when terror becomes a dominant feature of the political system. The confinement of violence and fear to specific kinds of behavior and to special groups or categories within society guarantee a "terror zone." When the terror process engulfs the entire society, the result is a "system of terror" or of "total terror."

Whereas terror is essentially the recourse to arbitrary and extreme physical sanctions, it is supplemented by other symbolic and material sanctions, by discursive and economic practices. Discursive practices comprise the formulation of a "charter myth" by power holders and the manipulation of normative power through indoctrination campaigns, control of the media and education, and so on. Material power may be wielded through detailed regulation of economic activities (a command economy) or, inversely, through their sudden de-regulation (Darwinian, as opposed to bureaucratic, controls).

The following deals with terror processes that coincide with the dominant power structure of a society, i.e., with a "regime of terror." The appearance of terror as a road to the possible overthrow of a dominant power structure, whether through organized insurgency or uncontrolled violence, is not discussed. In a larger historical context, terror seems linked to certain developmental dynamics. Two major patterns are discernible. Terror may appear as a distinctive phase in a process of revolutionary transformation of society, as for instance in a context of accelerated or forced-draft industrialization. These activities require a vast mobilization of human and natural resources within a compressed schedule. In other instances, terror is not linked to the quest for a developmental breakthrough but to the defensive, preemptive or Thermidorean action on the part of vested interests against institutional decay and the threat of rival groups. Both elements can be present in widely varying proportions in any concrete case.

Over the course of the last three decades Argentina has been subjected to three successive types of military regimes: arbitrationist dictatorships of a

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temporary sort, a dictatorship *sine die* with developmental goals, and a dictatorship *sine die* with negative reconstructionist objectives. They differ from each other in several respects: the intended length of tenure, the degree of autonomy from social and political forces, the pattern of economic development, the depth of penetration into and control over civil society. Only in the last type has terror been utilized as an instrument of power.

Since the ouster of the first Peronist regime (1955) through 1966, military interventions periodically interrupted the constitutional process but allowed it to resume its course after a while. The political regime was one of exclusionary democracy, characterized by the proscription of the main political force — Peronism — from direct participation. This system was bi-dimensional: it consisted of an institutional political facade (parties, parliament, and the executive) and a parallel network of negotiations *in camera* between corporate interests (unions, business groups, landed, financial and trade interests, and so forth), in unstable interface, which was periodically "corrected" by military interventions. The military did not stand above politics, but were part of the political process itself — one of the several actors that brought into the political arena disparate power resources. A second phase began in 1966, when the military seized power with the explicit purpose of suspending politics indefinitely and steering an ambitious program of development in dependent association with transnational capital.

The order of priorities was as follows: economic development first, social recomposition second, and political institutionalization last. However, the destruction of the existing political fabric and the social tensions brought about by the developmental process had puzzling unintended consequences that brought down the regime. The discontent of crucial social actors could not be mediated by institutional mechanisms. Instead, it generated new political alliances (notably a rapprochement between labor and middle-class sectors, between Peronists and former anti-Peronists) and a climate of generalized insurrection that threatened the state and forced the military to retreat to the barracks. A formidable amount of social power had accumulated on the margins of institutions, and the military could neither suppress nor channel it. In addition, the new mobilization carried, in its wake, the first significant anti-capitalist challenge in modern Argentine history. The task of defusing the explosive mix fell on none other that Peron, who was the predictable winner of the first truly open elections since 1955. But Peron was the victim of his own success: he could not create a viable political system capable of taming the very forces that brought him back to power.[2] After Peron's death in office (1974), his followers were even less able to control the situation. The Peronist government failed abysmally on all fronts: political stability, economic management, and the maintenance of law and order. The Peronist civilian interlude of 1973-1976 was characterized by the progressive subjection of

2. See Liliana De Riz, *Retorno y derrumbe: el último gobierno peronista* (Mexico: Folios Ediciones, 1981).

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political institutions to a "siege of terror"[3] by leftist and rightist paramilitary groups. It ended with a new seizure of power by the armed forces in 1976. The new dictatorship was the most radical of all military experiements in Argentine history. It was determined to become more impersonal, autonomous, permanent, repressive, and deeply "structural" than anything before.[4]

The military regime installed after the March 24, 1976 coup against the government of Isabel Peron, was a response to the prolonged state of war of all against all that had hitherto characterized Argentine politics. It also embodied the "learnings" of military and corporate elites from past failures. The leaders of the armed forces and their business associates proclaimed that their objective was not merely to terminate the untenable disorder of the Peronist years, but to transform the very bases of Argentine society as well. The junta vowed to abolish terrorism, to revitalize the economy by freeing it from the trammels of state guidance, to cut the Gordian knot of stalemated conflict by reducing the number of significant social actors and disciplining the remaining ones. In short, it sought to undo what had been built haphazardly since the onset of industrialization. The vision was baptized, immodestly, a "process of national reorganization," echoing another, founding process of national organization drafted by the political generation of 1837 and carried out by that of 1880 (a process that set the ground-rules for Argentine pre-industrial growth and modernization until 1930). Five years later, the first military president, General Videla, finished his mandate and conveyed power to a new president-elect, General Viola. At that point, the regime began to falter. Viola was very soon replaced by the army commander, General Galtieri. After the debacle of the South Atlantic war, the latter was replaced by General Bignone who presides, as of this writing, a difficult transition to an uncertain civilian rule. In short, after six years in power, the military have failed, once again, in attaining their objectives. Terrorism was abolished at the price of a phase of state terror. New political organizations did not appear to replace the old ones that were eliminated or suspended. The economy was not revitalized but approached bankruptcy instead, and social conflict threatens to rise again. Argentina has thus plunged into a crisis of unprecedented proportions. However, the very scope of the crisis, the depth of destructive action

3. On some of the socio-cultural roots of the insurgency, see my "Argentina: A Story Behind a War," in Irving Howe, Octavio Pax, et. al., *Decmocracy and Dictatorship in Latin America* (New York: Foundation for the Study of Independent Ideas, 1982).

4. There seems to be general agreement on what distinguishes this last regime from all others. See Liliana De Riz, "Argentina: ni democracia estable ni regimen militar solido," paper presented at the Conference on Dictatorship and Democracy in the Southern Cone, (October 12-13, 1981) at Yale University (mimeographed); Marcelo Cavarozzi, "Argentina at the Crossroads: Pathways and Obstacles to Democratization in the Present Political Conjuncture," Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, *Working Paper No. 115*, 1982; Oscar Landi, "Conjeturas politicas sobre la Argentina post-Malvinas," paper presented at the XIIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Rio de Janeiro, (August 9-14, 1982). More generally, see Norbert Lechner, ed., *Estado y poli en America Latina* (Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores, 1981) and Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflexiones sobre las tendencias generales de cambio en el Estado burocrático-autoritario," *Documento de trabajo CEDES* (Buenos Aires, 1975). See also Alain Rouquié, *Pouvoir militaire et société politique en Argetine* (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1978).

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undertaken by the military regime, may well have altered fundamental variables in the social equation. Today Argentina has a smaller industrial infrastructure, a smaller and more heterogeneous labor sector, a weaker entrepreneurial class, more empoverished middle strata, than ten years ago.[5] Paradoxically, it also has humbler armed forces — as a result of defeat in war — than at any time in its recent past. The country stands at a painful *trivium*: its options are democratic reconstruction, remilitarization, or further entropy. It may even stumble into a sequence of the three.

An important restructuration of power has taken place in Argentina since 1976. It has been accompanied by significant changes in ideology. Argentina in 1976 is a particularly complex case in which internal decay produced a movement for the forced reintegration of society around new or partially new patterns of behavior.

The military and civilian elites that seized power in 1976 had a draconian definition of the situation, reeking of medical imagery: "diagnosis," "social pathology," "cancer," "surgery," "extirpation of diseased tissues," and so forth. Civil society was seriously ill. The disease that afflicted the country and which came, as it were, from below, had to be met by decisive action from above. The explicit intention of the government of the armed forces was to close the historic cycle that Peronism had opened in the forties and initiate a new one. The political crisis of the seventies was perceived by both the military and some entrepreneurial elites as a basic threat to stable domination. Their critique went beyond the existing political regime that gave such a prominent place to Peronism: it focussed on the social bases of the political system. Illness as political metaphor served to bridge the two major components of ideological inputs to the forced reorganization of society: to articulate the discourse of warriors and the discourse of free-enterprise conservatives.

After 1976, the main feature of the military process that took over Argentine life was the conversion of the previous populist public mores into a state-political practice and discourse in which everything was reduced to a simple dichotomy: the paradigm Friend-Foe.[6] By reducing political rivals to ideological non-existence, such discourse frames them for "treatment." The construction and maintenance of this order of discourse involves the deployment of particular non-discursive sanctions which may be characterized as practices of ab-jection[7] (expulsion, confinement, torture, "disappearance," and extermination).

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5. For some estimates, see Landi, *op. cit.*

6. The most cogent formulation of that reduction can be found in a text published in 1927, written by Carl Schmitt, and which bears the innocuous title *The Concept of the Political* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1976). The author later became a self-appointed theoretician of German National Socialism. In that text we find a clear spelling of the somber logic of extreme authoritarian situations, the generative grammar of the language of national security, the rationale of states of exception. It articulates a limiting type of ideological interpellation, which negates subjectivity to the Other, and turns the political antagonist into an object.

7. On this concept, see the remarkable essay by Julia Kristeva, *Pouvoirs de l'horreur. Essai sur l'abjection* (Paris: Seuil, 1981).

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This rhetoric also performs an ideological displacement, by setting a spurious opposition between "violence" and "order." The opposition masks the real affinity between these two phenomena (as complementary modes of the disintegration of social relations).[8] It also hides a true antithesis between violence (which belongs to the domain of strategic behavior) and conflict (which belongs also to the domain of communicative action). Civil society functions "normally" when it is not forcefully integrated, when it provides a public space for debate and negotiation, when social messages are not entirely clear and require constant reinterpretation by the actors. It is a conflict society. A forcefully integrated society, on the other hand, tends to develop unitary mechanisms that collapse different orders of problems, reduce the public sphere, and distort and repress communicative action. Violence, not conflict, is a systemic attribute of that society. Violence and order belong to the same authoritarian equation, but it is precisely this connection that authoritarian ideologies seek to mask. In the contemporary world there are two main types of systemic, generalized violence (understood as the destruction of civil societies): the violence of total state order, and the violence of the unbridled market. They roughly correspond to the global division of power between East and West. In the first case, the organization of violence is despotic: it stems from the will of an autocrat or from a party-state apparatus. In the second case, violence is a function of the commodification of life, it stems from market mechanisms and their contradictions. In both cases, it penetrates deeply into every nook and cranny of society, down to the very tissues of everyday life. The originality of the authoritarian regimes of the Southern Cone lies in the conjunction of the two types, i.e., the articulation of repressive states and open markets.[9] To complete this picture,we must add other, less generalized types of political violence which, paradoxically, are more visible but also more sporadic, and yet function as the nemesis of established orders of violence. In this category belong social protests, popular revolts, collective movements that seek to wrest space and recognition from established systems, either in spontaneous fashion or by recourse to their own organization of violence, including fear tactics. These types of organic and inorganic violence interact. For instance, the refusal of social conflict, of open negotiation and debate, the transformation of a country into an armed camp, reduces order to violence, and provokes in turn the violent expression of dissent. At the same time, established ideology uses these violent eruptions — or, ideally, the memory of them after they have been neutralized — as a rationale for reinforcing the existing (violent) order.

The Terror Process

The militarization of ideology, the redefinition of society as a war zone has, as one of its main consequences, the disorientation of preexisting mechanisms of Ego- and Alter- identification. The ideological couplets Chaos/Order

8. On some of these distinctions see Alain Touraine, *La voix et le regard* (Paris: Seuil, 1980).

9. Scholars like Paul Samuelson have coined the oxymoron "market fascism" to describe this conjunction.

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and Foe/Friend reposition the subjects in a field which is extremely dangerous and utterly unpredictable at the same time. For, beyond the stern generalities of ideology, who can be identified as friend and who can be pointed out as foe? Only the whim of the repressive apparatus, only the diktat of security personnal can produce that judgement. The public arena, the previous mechanisms of representation, all free discursive exchanges have disappeared. Subjects are no longer interpellated by and recognize themselves in a familiar central Subject (Class, Government, Party). The state withdraws from the public sphere to ensconce itself in the old *arcana dominationis* from whence it arbitrarily strikes in inappellable ways. To the underlying population, punishment arrives like the unfathomable act of a *deus absconditus*. They have to work out for themselves, like latter-day political Calvinist — the rules, the signs, that distinguish a "good" for a "bad" citizen. All they know is that their safety, their goods, their lives, are at stake. A subject in such straits becomes not only obedient, but potentially punitive of self and others. Fear then acquires a life of its own. It becomes its own object.[10]

The organizational matrix of non-discursive sanctions that accompanies the discursive reinterpellation of subjects is relatively simple and has been copiously documented. It includes three basic actors: a source of punishment, a victim, and a target.[11] The victim perishes or "disappears," and the target reacts to that destruction with some manner of submission or accommodation, initially by inhibiting his or her potential resistance. An expanded model includes a division of labor in the source of punishment (a "terror staff," internally organized into a directorate of violence and various operational bodies). The selection of victims can be random or from specific social categories — e.g., members of subversive organizations, their relatives, potential political opponents, professional categories, socio-economic strata, residential or ethnic groups. They are regularly selected and dispatched with variable rates of destruction. Depending on the circumstances, the terror process is either continuous or discontinuous (in Argentina it was applied continuously from the installation of the military regime in 1976 through 1979 and discontinuously since), it goes through phases of varying intensity, and the victims are selected by specialized services, or sometimes by other potential victims themselves. In many instances, the population is made into an accomplice of the very acts perpetrated against it. In Argentina, this pattern of forced complicity was enacted widely in the armed forces. The involvement of the population at large, on the other hand, was sought through the elaboration of a "discourse of summary justice"[12] in the controlled or self-censored

10. Literature offers a richer presentation of these mechanisms than most scholarly analyses. See, for instance, Guy De Maupassant, "Lui?", in *Les soeurs Rondoli* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1973), Marta Traba, *Conversación al Sur* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1981). Cf. also Andrew Graham-Yooll, "A Matter of Fear," in his *Portrait of an Exile* (London: Junction Books, 1981), and Jean Baudrillard et. al. "La peur," *Traverses* 25 (Paris, June 1982).

11. Cf. E. V. Walter, *op. cit.*, pp. 9 ff.

12. See Heleen F. P. Ietswaart, "The Discourse of Summary Justice and the Discourse of Popular Justice: An Analysis of Legal Rhetoric in Argentina," in Richard L. Abel, ed., *The Politics of Informal Justice* (New York: Academic Press, 1980), Vol. 2, pp. 149-179.

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media. This discourse attempted to identify the "people" with the security forces, on one side of the divide, and the persons who not only actively fought the regime, but who willingly or unwillingly assisted those who did, who sympathized with them in the past, or who remained indifferent, with the "enemy," on the other side.

This terror process has been applied consistently by totalitarian governments in this century and also by terroristic regimes throughout history.[13] The specific feature of the Argentine version is the duplicity with which it has been handled. The Janus face of Argentine terror appears on several levels, from governmental disavowal of abject sanctions and the refusal of accountability, to a split structure of discourse and consciousness among large sectors of the population. Thus, to wage its war against subversion, the Argentine junta organized and armed many separate units within the armed forces and the police.[14] These units operated with total autonomy and impunity, having a free hand in the selection of their victims. This strategy had several advantages for the government: it became a network very difficult to infiltrate, precisely because of its decentralized, protean nature; it was largely immune to the influence of even well-placed relatives of the victims, and it allowed the central government to disclaim responsibility for violations of human rights. Terror went through an intense phase in Argentina from 1976 through 1979. It has since then abated, although the repressive apparatus is seemingly still in place, or in a state of latency. During the terror phase, somewhere between 10,000 and 30,000 persons were liquidated. The extermination was largely secret — a fact that makes a precise estimate of the number of victims difficult. They rather belong to a category of non-persons, between the dead and the living, for which Argentina has become sadly famous: those who have never been heard of again, the *desaparecidos*. Although repression was presented as a war against armed subversion, terror spilled over well beyond the limited zone of counter-insurgency operations. It affected nonviolent opponents of the regime, and also potential and imaginary opponents. It threatened, for a while, to become total. The main categories affected were, in addition to members of guerrilla organizations which were effectively decimated, lower and intermediate union cadres, students, civilian politicians, and professional groups (lawyers, psychiatrists, artists, social scientists, clergy, etc.) as well as relatives of initial victims. The terror process of Argentina has served three main and two subsidiary functions. As part of a "dirty war" against armed insurgency, it eliminated those engaged in or suspected of active hostility to the power structure. It also functioned as a mechanism of deterrence, aimed at intimidating other opponents. It sought to destroy institutional alternatives and postponed the reintegration of the disorganized groups into

13. In addition to E. V. Walter, *op. cit.* see Barrington Moore Jr., "Totalitarian Elements in Pre-industrial Societies," in *Political Power and Social Theory* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965).

14. An analysis of the organization of terror in Argentina appears in Emilio Fermin Mignone, "Desapariciones forzadas: elemento básico de una política," *Punto Final* (Mexico), Supplement to No. 194 (June 1981).

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new organizational patterns. Furthermore, it sought the prophylactic elimination of potential opponents, identified on the basis of an ideological diagnosis of the social "disease." Indirectly, the terror process helped the military to extend control across the country. This thorough penetration of the institutional fabric of society should not be confused, however, with the consolidation of an "authoritarian-bureaucratic" state. It was a narrower and more particularistic seizure of the state apparatus by corporate groups. It was also part of a strategy to transform the country's economic structure *without*, however, strengthening the levers of bureaucratic command over the economy. Rather, the economy was streamlined and forcefully re-privatized.

Like an old kingdom of West Africa, Argentina has been governed by both a visible and an invisible government, by dignified military officers managing the administrative machinery of the state, and by secret terroristic associations, by hidden executioners, agents from the state *absconditus* that intervene in ordinary life at certain moments, unpredictable to the victims, holding sway by virtue of the widespread fear of their powers and through the extreme violence associated with their acts. The dissociation of the invisible government from the social relations of ordinary life, the withdrawal of the state from the public sphere — a process paralleled and reinforced by the abandonment of social regulation to the "automatic" mechanisms of the market — made systematic terrorism possible. By attributing their acts to the imperatives of national security, the officials were freed from ordinary responsibility for those acts, although they were held responsible to the highest orders of military command. In essence, the state became a quasi-private and violent affair. To the privatization of civil existence under terror corresponds an increasing privatization of state power and violence.

Many allies and critics of the regime have projected an image of it as an authoritarian state representing power externally and social regulation internally — even if the latter has been often reduced to mere police regulation, without an intrinsic bond of community among the governed. It is doubtful, however, whether even a state in this restricted sense exists in Argentina today. The acquisition and consolidation of power by the military regime have issued not Leviathan but Behemoth. Something resembling a dual state has existed in Argentina during these years of intense repression, i.e., a state within which two systems have operated. One serves as a mask for the other, under the remnants of the constitution — applied only with respect to those provisions that have not been amended by the military government — to which a new body of law has been attached, comprised of laws and decrees, institutional acts and statutes, specific provisions, resolutions and instructions enacted since March 24, 1976. The other serves under individual measures in which expediency, arbitrariness, and considerations of military security override all law. But the second system is contained in the first and acts upon it in an utterly destructive way. The seeds of that destruction are often contained in texts that have the semblance of law but none of its substance. For instance, by virtue of the Institutional Act of June 18, 1976, the military

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junta assumed "the power and responsibility to consider the actions of those individuals who have injured the national interest," on grounds as vague and ill-defined as "failure to observe basic moral principles in the exercise of public, political, or union offices or activities that involve the public interest."[15] The Act led to the enactment of special laws, to the exercise of abritrary power designed to intimidate particular groups and individuals on the basis of acts committed prior to the existence of such "laws." The generic ground on which laws rest, the discretionary nature of the powers that they grant, the creation and functioning of special bodies to which they grant jurisdictional powers, the application of their provisions on a retroactive basis, the punitive measures which they authorize, the disqualification from holding office, the restriction against practicing one's profession, the confiscation of property, the loss of citizenship, liberty and life to which they lead, suggest, as in case of Nazi Germany, that "we are confronted with a form of society in which the ruling groups control the rest of the population directly, without the mediation of that rational though coercive apparatus known as the state."[16]

According to classic definitions, a state must be said to exist when individual and group conflicts are coordinated and integrated, within a given society, in a universally binding fashion, by means of an abstract legal structure or at least through a rational bureaucracy. That state structure is common to many otherwise dissimilar political systems. In the Argentine case, however, an observer with many years of journalistic experience could make the startling, though perceptive, claim that "to consider the Argentine Government authoritarian denies reality." "If labels must be applied," he added, "Argentina could be best described as feudalistic and anarchic; it is divided by the rivalries of the separate fiefdoms represented by the armed forces with their various free-wheeling intelligence services and the beleaguered, powerless Presidency. The tragedy stems from the fact that central authority, and the responsibility that goes with it, has never been established by the moderates in the military who have held nominal power since the March 1976 coup."[17] In other words, under the umbrella of a stern government, armed bands have been sovereign in many fields, powerful rival groups roam uncontrolled, having managed to control many strategic positions. Their rivalries have not been settled in a universally binding manner. At best, they have agreed informally on certain policies. The "classical" state has actually been treated as a hindrance to domination over subordinate groups. The regime has systematically avoided compromise and negotiation, and proceeded to disenfranchise political organizations and social groups. More particularly, it

15. Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina" (Washington, D.C.: OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 49 doc. 19 corr. 1, April 11, 1982), p. 19.

16. Franz Neumann, *Behemoth. The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* 1933-1944 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 470.

17. Robert Cox, "Timerman Shows that 'Authoritarian Generals' are Keepers, Captives of a 'Totalitarian Beast', " *The New York Times* (June 9, 1981).

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has closed all available spaces where such compromises could be put on a universally binding basis. Even among the few who rule, few common loyalties exist. The glue that binds them together is profit, power, and the fear of retribution. In the end, it has taken severe shocks (the threat of economic collapse and defeat in war) to instill in them a dim consciousness that it is at least as strenuous to develop the potentialities of Argentina on a dictatorial as on a democratic basis. In 1976 the military groups that seized power benefitted from the disappointment of large sectors of the population with a nominally democratic system that delivered them to chaos. Yet, after six years of rule a majority longs again for structures of representation and binding compromise, for something as undramatic as the acknowledgement of social complexity, some measure of democratic participation, and modest economic growth. Coercion and fear appear to them, in retrospect, as another form of disorder. As previously mentioned, on the level of official ideology, the operating metaphors of law and order were medical, and more precisely, surgical. They correspond to a self-presentation of the regime as punishing definite acts of subversion and breaking up seditious organizations, on the one hand, and as establishing the bases for "sound" economic behavior, on the other. These metaphors provided a common definition of the situation for the military-technocratic elites; they bridged the vision of national security with free-enterprise and technocratic utopias. Yet, behind the manifest discourse, there developed a culture of fear corresponding to the terror process.[18] This culture is mostly produced and circulated in non-discursive circuits. It has been likened to a chemical process — specifically, to a process of corrosion of social networks. Under certain conditions, the adoption of ultra-liberal economic policies by power holders can produce similar effects. In their hands, economics can even become a self-conscious attempt to dissolve previous social loyalties and corporate identities. Whereas in classical liberalism the emphasis on the market was associated with a denial of the relevance of authority, in regimes of the Argentine type, the "invisible hand" is essentially a piece of political technology.

Pseudo-Conservatism

The initial years of the present Argentine regime — the years of terror — were characterized by a sense of timelessness at the top and anxiety at the bottom. Democracy remained suspended *sine die*. Peron had been dead for four years. The guerilla movement was defeated in a bloody campaign. Terror reached a peak of intensity. Lawlessness became, paradoxically, an official routine. It consumed even the suspect. Mass silence reigned, with one exception: for several months in 1978, Argentines were allowed to pour out on the streets to attend and celebrate the world soccer championship. The outpour of collective enthusiasm was routed to a safe channel, controlled and manipulated by the regime and acted as a safety-valve for suppressed mobilization.

18. For the analysis of a comparable situation see José Joaquin Brunner, *La cultura autoritaria en Chile* (Santiago de Chile: FLACSO/University of Minnesota, 1981).

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The "Here I am" that was shouted in the streets was a nativist identification with the country's glory. Politics and independent culture were frozen, but cheering in the stadiums was allowed. While the regime acknowledged that it held nearly 3,500 political prisoners, while countless others disappeared every day, when the armed forces had seized command of all major institutions and many minor ones, from the general labor confederation to charitable associations, public life returned to a primordial state. The national sport came to mean solidarity on the cheap. It carried, no doubt, populist undertones and reminiscences of another era, but the regime felt confident enough to feign a bond of consensus with the masses and reap political profit from the event. Four years later it would try the experiment again on more dangerous ground, when it decided to occupy militarily the Malvinas Islands, tap nationalist feelings, and manipulate opinion through a brief totalitarian mobilization which backfired after the defeat, resuscitating populist mythology. These two episodes were the closest the regime came to fascism. For most of the time it preferred to combine nativism with an emphasis on discipline in a more quietistic manner, avoiding organized mass mobilization. On account of its predominately diffuse style, the regime may be called pseudo-conservative rather than fascist. In military circles around power, the sense of a crusade against political and cultural subversion was and remains strong. What guides the crusaders is a notion that culture and politics should be strictly subordinated to small-town morality, religion, and national security. These are supposed to form the core of an "Argentine life-style" that is the antithesis of "communism" and a bulwark against it. The simplicities of this official view are not without paradox. The ideas of the moral crusaders are reactive and anti-modern, yet Argentine culture is nothing but a byproduct of modern enlightenment. In consequence, the ruling ideology produces the disconcerting spectacle of a young country defending old values, a community of recent settlers endorsing traditions they never had, conservatives with little to conserve. In fact, the conservatism of officers (many of them the children and grandchildren of immigrants) who want to stamp out sociology, psychoanalysis, and even some branches of modern mathematics is phoney. It is a form of corporate paranoia, a universe plagued with demons and full of ill-digested values. This sense of cultural siege drives these officers to be critical of modern Western culture in the name of a myth of that culture which they pretend to guard against nameless "traitors."

Economics and Desocialization

The central feature of state action is neither compromise nor mobilization, but withdrawal from the pressures of organized social sectors and immunity from popular demands. Liberal economic policies and a free-enterprise ideology are pieces of that political strategy. They are designed to destroy pre-existing patterns of economic behavior and political alliance.[19]

19. For some analyses of Argentina's economic policies, see Adolfo Canitrot, "La disciplina como objetivo de la política economica. Un ensayo sobre el programa económico del gobierno

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Argentine economic liberalism has rested on two ground rules: to open the internal to the international market, and to free capital markets. The ostensive purpose of policy was to reduce inflation. Several successive measures were adopted to that effect. They were not successful in terms of the stated objective, but they had several other functions that were perfectly in accordance with the global political vision of the regime. They were: a drastic roll-back of real wages (1976-77), a reduction of the money supply (1977-78), a modulated exchange rate that produced a revaluation of the currency (1978-81). Their impact on general economic activity was cyclical until 1979 and persistently recessionary since. This pattern was accompanied by a spectacular increase of the foreign debt, until Argentina became the third-ranking debtor-nation in the world, and probably the first in per capita terms.[20]

The foremost victims of these policies were workers with fixed incomes. But other groups were also negatively affected. After 1978, farmers and exporters suffered from the overvalued currency. National industry, which saw increased benefits and expansion in 1977 and 1979, was forced to contract a debt so burdensome that it collapsed in the 80s. Only some financial sectors did spectacularly well. The period 1976-82 may well look in retrospect as one in which a dependent national economy was ravaged by international finance capital. The political effects were completely in line with the intentions of the power holders. The labor sector was fragmented and its bargaining power significantly reduced. A large number of workers has literally disappeared from the social map of Argentina, first through a combination of demographic stagnation, retirement, transfer of personnel to service and self-employed categories, and migration; and more recently through the increase of unemployment. The national business class was severely affected by the enormous pressures on the international market on which it depended, by debt and bankruptcy. Curiously, their wail has been louder than the protest of the workers. Also disgruntled were the agrarian exporters, although their position remains more solid than that of industrial entrepreneurs. The key to the whole policy was a financial manipulation that channelled resources towards a speculative economy. For some time, the bitter pill of de-industrialization was coated with what came to be popularly known as "sweet money" (*plata dulce*). The prototype of the new *homo oeconomicus* produced by the regime was the anomic speculator. If we now join the new pattern of induced economic action with the effects of political repression we complete the picture of the social climate generated by the regime. Jointly, they further sapped the sagging public spirit.

The arbitrariness of security procedures, the tales of disappearances, the

argentino desde 1976," *Estudios CEDES* 2:6 (Buenos Aires, 1980), and Adolfo Canitrot, "Teoria y práctica del liberalismo. Política antiinflacionaria y apertura económica en la Argentina (1976-1981), *Estudios CEDES* 3:10 (Buenos Aires,1981). See also Paolo Rocca, "Aspetti della politica economica argentina dal 1976 ed oggi," Tesi di Laurea, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, Università degli Studi di Milano (Milano: Matr. No. 157113, 1980).

20. It has jumped from 6 to 40 billion dollars between 1976 and the present.

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fear that anyone could be picked up, confined citizens to looking after themselves and their immediate families. Silence, denial, rationalization, mere self-regard became social norms. Everyone tended to become security-conscious, metabolizing in the microcosm of the neighborhood, the job, or in the intimacy of family life the brutal thrust coming from above.[21] Politically intimidated, Argentines were also harried by inflation and by the economic strategies to which they had to turn in order to cope. Argentina became a land of wheelers and dealers, of speculators and moonlighters, some making or losing paper fortunes overnight, others running ever faster in order to stand still. The carrot was no less demoralizing than the stick. Imagine individuals who run with their paychecks and pocket calculators to study the day's posted interest rates, then place their earnings in thirty-day, even seven-day instruments, while inflation and interest yields race each other on a three-digit lane. A speculative economy urges the individual to secure maximum value.[22] Everything conspires, from the police state to wild market forces, to turn a person into a maximizing consumer instead of a cooperating citizen, discouraging and eroding feelings of social obligation. The combined timelessness of terror and the high velocity of money, the disorienting abstraction of political and economic processes explain why traditional social conventions, such as fellowship and civil conviviality gave way to a pervasive cynicism that not even psychiatric treatment can change. Civil society reached then its "degree zero."

The Dilemmas of Pseudo-Conservatism

The preceding pages have stressed the acquisition and management of power by a military group. Any adequate account would have to take into consideration other internal and external elements. They have merely sketched a power strategy based on physical coercion and socio-economic disorientation and comprising the use of terror during one of its phases. By way of conclusion, the growth checks on power holders should be mentioned by reviewing developments on a sequence of partially overlapping crisis.

The first order of crisis comprises the decay of institutions that preceded the seizure of power by the present regime. It lasted from 1955 through 1976. The essence of that situation was that political institutions failed to satisfy and compose the expectations put upon them by a complex web of organized groups. This type of crisis came about through damage from external and internal sources to the social and political structures, and through changes in the level of consciousness.

21. See Ximena Barraza, "La vie quotidienne sous un regime autoritaire," *Cahiers Confrontation* 5 (Paris, Spring 1981), 81-95.

22. See Nikolai Stevenson, "An Inflation Libretto. The Refrain of Paper Money in Argentina," *Harper's* (November 1981). Georg Simmel's classic text, *The Philosophy of Money* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) contains brilliant insights, as does Fred Hirsch, *Social Limits to Growth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976). The original philosophical critique was developed by Hegel in *Jenaer Realphilosophie I: Die Vorlesungen von 1803/4*, ed. by J. Hoffmeister (Leipzig: 1932).

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The consequence of institutional failure was an added flow of power to military authorities, and an attempt by the latter to extensively overhaul the status quo. At this juncture the rulers imposed a draconian model of a better system and sought frantically to prevent other groups from developing alternatives. The model was based on a charter myth combining the doctrines of national security and free enterprise. It had clear totalitarian elements, notably the recourse to terror, the attempt to pulverize old structures — albeit through market mechanisms — and the use of ideological controls to dissolve previous identities.

Yet, the project of the power holders also contained a number of contradictions and self-check. First, there was a tension between the economic and the military "logics" of the regime. The corporate interests of the officers often clashed with the designs of free-market technocrats. Moreover, the radical and autonomous nature of policies deprived the regime of stable alliances among crucial economic sectors. Second, the combination of physical coercion and economic disarticulation managed to stifle organized social political opposition but failed to provide substitute structures of participation and isolated the regime from society. The latter became increasingly opaque to the rulers.[23] This situation in turn made potential opposition less predictable. The lack of early feedback signals from society compounded rather than corrected the strategic and tactical errors of the regime. When these errors were perceived, it was late. At that point the regime changed course in a fitful manner, trying to escape from one crisis by jumping into another. Thus, when the indication of economic malfunctioning became clear, the rulers switched channels and prepared a mass mobilization for a war which, much to their dismay, actually took place and which they lost. In so acting, they opened a Pandora's box of resentment, retribution, old populist myths, and alternative ideologies. These subsidiary dysfunctions of power management comprise a third order of crisis that now threatens to bring down the regime, or at the very least to put checks on its power. These growing checks on Argentine rulers have little to do with the processes that develop in mobilizing systems after they have gone through a terror phase. In the latter, the checks are associated with the emergence of a more "mature" complex society following a developmental breakthrough. Instead, a weakened regime rules over a weakened society in today's Argentina. To future historians, the Argentine terror phase may appear as an episode in the general decomposition of a social system.

23. See Oscar Oszlak, "Coerción versus información," *Clarín* (Buenos Aires, October 18, 1982), p. 13.

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STATE TERRORISM IN HUNGARY: THE CASE OF FRIENDLY REPRESSION

by Istvan Lovas and Ken Anderson

Hungary is often portrayed as a refreshingly liberal contrast to other Soviet bloc regimes of Eastern Europe. This sentiment is reflected in both the scholarly and popular press with depressing regularity. For example, Völgyes, a prolific Hungarologist writes in *Current History* that Hungary "has become a relatively free, liberal country...one of the few Communists states that has no political prisoners..."[1] And Don Cook, writing for the *Los Angeles Times* says that "...the atmosphere in Budapest is totally devoid of repression or fear."[2] Indeed, Hungary is different from other East European regimes. It boasts a relatively smoothly functioning economy,[3] a popular leader, and a reasonably satisfied and well-fed population. Hungary does not have written censorship laws,[4] the accused are tried according to the "strictest" legality, travel is virtually unrestricted by overt rules,[5] foreign publications are, to a certain extent, accessible,[6] and there are few signs of visible oppression.

1. Ivan Vö, "The Crown and the Crowd," in *Current History*, (April 1978). Moreover, says the author of this public relations piece, "Few Topics, with the exception of the role of the party, were sacrosanct [during the seventies]," p. 177. The number of political offenders tried annually is, according to the official statistics, 250. Although there is no official information as to the number of political prisoners, their number has been drastically reduced by legislative *fiat*. While in other socialist countries persons wishing to leave their respective countries without valid travel documents are sentenced as political prisoners, "unauthorized crossing of the border" (Article 217 of the new 1979 penal code) in Hungary is a common crime lumped under the chapter that deals with well poisoning, illegal drug trafficking, faith healing. Other crimes dealt with under the same category are illicit publishing, rumor mongering and sedition against laws and regulations.

2. *Los Angeles Times*, March 7, 1982.

3. Which is more or less true of the period extending, at most, to early 1977 when the effects of unfavorable terms of trade began to be felt in the Hungarian economy, producing practically zero growth in real income.

4. "there is no censorship in Hungary as a legally operating institution. Nevertheless, it can hardly be said that every manuscript intended for publication reaches the public." (Balázs Rab, "New Hungarian Samizdat," in *Index on Censorship*, v. 7., April 1978). Besides the almost perfectly functioning self-censorship (which reduces the work load of the censors) the editors do censor — reject, make "recommendations," etc. If a piece of writing is accepted for publication there are still many stages the manuscript has to go through. A sports report is checked for ideological correctness at least four times before it goes to print.

5. The new passport law that came into effect in January 1, 1982 further eases restrictions. The multiple hindrances instituted before, however, will not change. Recommendation is still required from the employer in addition to the authority of the National Bank to refuse the allocation of hard currency. An exit permit is needed before each travel (Hungarians can travel to the West every year, and they are entitled to buy hard currency once every three years. Refusal can also be given to those "whose travel endangers the economic or political interests of the state" — a measure that allows the state to treat travel to the West — and, in certain cases to other socialist countries — as a system of punishments and rewards.

6. Certain newspapers and periodicals are sold at the newsstand of selected hotels. Hungarians wishing to buy these papers have to pay an under-the-counter surcharge (bribe). Several Western periodicals can be read in a few larger libraries in their open sections. Their

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Relations between church and state are cordial, even to the point of mutual back-scratching, and education of a limited number of priests, ministers and — as is rare in Soviet-type societies — rabbis are permitted.[7]

We do not wish to deride the appearance of liberalism. A smiling totalitarianism is no doubt easier to live under than an unsmiling one, and in any case it would be hypocritical to decry the material advantages of Kádárist society in the name of some abstract liberalism. The conclusion of some writers, particularly Vajda, is that Hungarian society has traded consumer goods and private economic advantage for the depoliticization of the population,[8] which is often referred to as the Kádár compromise and which Kádár himself called a social contract. And this is not a bad choice when the alternative, as the 1956 revolution made clear, is merely frustration in the political sphere without economic gains. In other words, *Realpolitik* dictated that there was no real choice: there was only room for submission which brought along a private economic advantage. The trauma caused by the bloody crushing of the revolution by Soviet troops, the USSR's repeated and violent assertions (after East Berlin) of its sphere of influence, the lack of any tangible Western support for East European liberation movements, the mass executions in Hungary, and the mass exodus of Hungarians, prepared the population for the acceptance of any compromise. The demise of the Stalinist leadership in Hungary, the anti-Stalinist atmosphere of the post-20th Party congress and the exhaustion of the extensive phase of the economy, were conducive for the hand-picked Kádár to extend the economic olive branch after settling accounts with those who had a role in the revolution. Consequently, one must ask what is the basis of the so-called Kádár compromise. Could it rest on the mere fact of an attractive economic advantage for civil society — in private life? Hardly, since there might have been other arrangements which would have netted an even greater economic advantage by allowing the participation of the population in public decision making. But such possibilities were not available because the terms of the agreement were dictated.

"closed sections" store an immense number of prohibited publications comprising both foreign and domestic periodicals and books. Some bookstores selling foreign books (which lure a great number of East German tourists) price their goods practically out of reach of students and persons with an average income. The retail price of a Penguin pocket book might cost the equivalent of two days' salary.

7. The cooperation between state and church reached the point where they even have taken over each other's functions. Priests who threaten the cordial symbiosis of state and the Catholic church (the majority religion in Hungary) are demoted from their posts by the church: Cardinal László Lékai, Primate of the Catholic Church, has suspended Father László Kovács because his sermons were directed against compulsory military service (*Radio Free Europe*, v. 6., n. 73, Hungary/16 October 29, 1981, p. 11) (As to the minority church, see, e.g., the harmonious cooperation between the State Office for Churches and the Methodist Superintendent to purge uncooperative priests, and police harrassment of certain Methodist priests in *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe*, v. 1. n. 5, 1977). The church continues to keep a very low profile: priests do not wear cassocks in public places, social questions are not discussed during catechism, etc. The Catholic Seminary in Budapest does not affix a sign on the entrance of its own building, although this is a requirement by any institutions, imitating, ironically, the anonymity of buildings and villas housing highly placed party officials, the secret police, etc.

8. Mihály Vajda, "Is Kádárism an Alternative?" in *Telos*, 39 (Spring 1979).

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So much for the so-called Kádárist social contract. In spite of a lack of overt repression and the continuation of some economic reform,[9] the basis of the state in Hungary was and is terrorism. This is so because terrorism is not merely the unbridled exercise of violence with certain special features — it is also the *memory*[10] and the *threat*, even the implied threat, that under certain circumstances it could return.[11]

Terrorism and state terrorism need to be defined because there is a pronounced tendency to characterize state terrorism as somehow irrational and arbitrary, whereas it is rational, selective, educational, and aims at providing social control with maximum efficiency. Thus, Friedrich and Brzezinski's classic definition of state terrorism in totalitarian societies emphasizes this arbitrariness: "...System of terror, whether physical or psychic, effected through party and secret-police control, supporting but also supervising the party for its leaders, and charateristically directed not only against demonstrable 'enemies' of the regime but against more or less arbitrarily selected classes of the population; the terror whether of the secret police or of the party directed social pressure systematically exploits modern science, and more especially, scientific psychology."[12]

Rapoport also emphasizes the total helplessness of the victims, and makes it clear that they feel arbitrarily selected: "...in principle nothing the victims have done or can do reduces their culpability.[13] However, state terrorism is arbitrary only from the viewpoint of the victim. The victim cannot understand why he rather than another is selected, but that is what makes it educational and thereby rational from the viewpoint of the state, i.e., that one victim is the same as any other. In this fashion, everyone is subject to the same social control, and because it is unitary it is thereby the most democratic form of social control. State terrorism directed against society as a whole is neither arbitrary nor irrational on the part of the state, since any member of society may be in opposition or in potential opposition. Although speaking in a different his-

9. From the beginning of 1982, the scope of individual enterprise has been considerably broadened. In spite of some changes in tax regulations, the arbitrary tax assessment by local authorities has not been reformed which will, expectedly, caution some potential entrepreneurs since, as before, conspicuous consumption will not only make them the target of neighbors' envy, and possible reporting, but, more importantly, they will receive a visitor from the taxation office.

10. Lenin was far-sighted enough to know, in advance, the importance of the memory of terror: in 1922, in a top secret circular sent to the Politburo (published fifty years later) he enjoined Molotov to benefit from the famine by shooting as many priests as possible in order that people would *remember it for decades.* See Nikita Struve's introduction to the *Rapport Secret au Comite Central sur l'Etat de l'Eglise en URSS* (Paris, 1980), p.8.

11. The publication of occasional reminders in the Party press of the battle waged "on both fronts" serves a double purpose. They not only foster a feeling of political insecurity among the populace by their deliberate vagueness about the possible changes to come, but also conjure up the image that the relative tolerance of the present ought not to be compromised by any change which cannot bring about improvements but, on the contrary, would turn the clock back.

12. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarianism* (Cambridge, 1965), p. 22. See also Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer, *Political Terror in Communist Systems* (Stanford, 1970), p. 3.

13. David Rapoport (ed.), "Introduction" to *The Morality of Terrorism,* Forthcoming.

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torical context, Marx had already specified the rationality of terror: "The democratic proletariat not only needs the kind of centralization begun by the bourgeoisie but will have to extend it very much further. During the short time when the proletariat was at the helm of the state in the French Revolution, during the rule of the Mountain party, it used all means — including grape-shot and the guillotine — to effect centralization. When the democratic proletariat again comes to power, it will not only have to centralize every country separately but will have to centralize all civilised countries together as soon as possible."[14]

State terror, however, is first and foremost directed against the most immediate and active sources of opposition.[15] Since the struggle is regarded as — and in many instances is — a state of war in which the rules of martial efficiency and not civil justice apply, then no distinction is made between real and potential opposition. Khruschev typified this when he said that it would be better to try a thief in advance of his thievery. And Camus is correct in saying that totalitarian governments are in perennial war either against the outside or the inside...or both. One war creates the army and the other the secret police.

It will be told us, however, that while this characterization fit, e.g., the Soviet Union up to the death of Stalin, or Hungary until about 1958, it does not describe life in Hungary or even the Soviet Union today. But this objection relies upon too simple an understanding of state terrorism. State terrorism has an active phase and a passive phase. The liquidation of the political opposition, the war against the churches, the intelligentsia, the kulaks, etc., were part of what we call the active phase of terrorism. Its pattern has been faithfully repeated in most Soviet-type societies, regardless of local conditions. After the ascendance of the communist party in Hungary, state terror took its well rehearsed route via total annihilation of the opposition, the introduction of framed trials, the extraction of "confessions," the "unveiling of the Titoist conspirators," the internment of numerous members of the middle class,

14. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Civil War in Switzerland*, in *Collected Works*, v. 6. (New York, 1975-1977). Lenin made the further suggestion that it was necessary "to cleanse the land of Russia of all sorts of harmful insects, of crook fleas, of bedbugs...In one place half a score of rich, a dozen crooks, half a dozen workers who shirk their work (in the hooligan manner in which many compositors in Petrograd, particularly in the Party printing shops, shirk their work) will be put in prison. In another place they will be put to cleaning latrines. In a third place they will be provided with "yellow tickets" after they have served time, so that all the people shall have them under surveillance, as *harmful* persons, until they reform. In a fourth place one out of every ten idlers will be shot on the spot. In a fifth place mixed methods may be adopted . . . "*How to Organize Competition* drafted in January, 1981, in Robert C. Tucker (ed.), *The Lenin Anthology* (New York, 1975), pp. 431-2. As to the number of insects, crook fleas, bedbugs and printing shop workers, Conquest opines: "If Russia had fought on, perhaps losing another million in battle, that would still compare favorably with the death toll of the Civil War, the Terror and the famines and epidemics which resulted from Lenin's policies: an excess mortality, on Soviet statistics, of not less than 14 million up to 1922." Robert Conquest, "The Tactics of Terror," in *Times Literary Supplement*, n. 4, 1981, p. 1439.

15. "In all the Eastern European countries the first to be silenced and liquidated were the devoted members of the noncommunist political parties and all oppositional groups that tried to fight off the ascent of a communist dictatorship." Ota Sik, *The Communist Power System*, trans. M. G. Freidberg (New York, 1981).

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aristocracy, and intelligentsia, the torture of the Hungarian "kulaks,"[16] the imprisonment of the higher hierarchy of the church, and so on.

Active state terrorism is rational in two senses. First, because it aims at identifiable groups and this deprives the population at large of a potential opposition — i.e., an alternative source of legitimacy — with which to identify.[17] And even when active terrorism is directed against the population at large, after the identifiable sources of potential opposition have been eliminated, this is not irrationality — it is mere caution. Secondly, because the reason for engaging in terrorism in the first place is not simply social control but the radical transformation of society, the *raison d'etre* of state terror is not irrational since it promotes that end. Furthermore, it is the rational desire for efficiency which prompts the state to end the active phase of terrorism and engage in what can be called a passive phase.

Present Hungarian reality in which all the above forms of visible violence have subsided, and in which the population as a whole not only fails to offer opposition but, more or less, lauds the economic, political and social course of the party, considering Kádár's policy as the art of the possible, can be characterized as follows. Seemingly, coercion has ceased, the political police do not have much to do besides picking up a few malcontents in pubs, listening to phone conversations, perfunctorily opening mails, reprimanding intellectuals, guarding the borders, collecting information from the informant network, storing it in computers and using it only in the few cases of trials and the more frequent instances of recruiting new informants. Hungarian reality can be seen as passively terrorized not because the above actions are themselves so terrifying, but because they serve to remind the population that, if necessary, the regime can always return to the active phase. After all, what is terrorism? Violence, yes, a special kind of violence,[18] yes, but above all it is the *threat* of such violence. As Turchin put it: "The Great fear of the Stalin era no longer existed, but the *inertia* of fear was still at work. The founders of the new system had not labored in vain: terror had left its mark. It lurked in the nooks and crannies of consciousness. It mutilated souls. It altered notions of ethical values of good and evil."[19]

This passive phase of terrorism which owes its existence directly to violence and the threat of violence, must be distinquished from what some would call psychological or economic terrorism which does not carry with it the threat of physical violence. The marginalization of dissidents, their psychological repression and social isolation are certainly coercive measures, but they are not state terrorism in the strict sense. Terrorism in the sense used here is

16. Even the word "kulak" was borrowed from the Russian vocabulary — it seems that without this semantic servility of the Hungarian ruling clique the process could not be properly executed.

17. See Victor Zaslavsky's "The Problem of Legitimation in Soviet Society" in A. J. Vidich and R. M. Glassman (eds.), *Conflict and Control* (Beverly Hills, 1979).

18. Cf. Frederick J. Hacker, *Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in our Time*, (New York, 1977).

19. Valentin Turchin, *The Inertia of Fear and the Scientific Worldview* (New York, 1981), p. 19.

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intimately and necessarily bound with physical violence and the threat of violence.[20] The basis of the state in Hungary is terrorism not because the definition of terrorism is extended to cover all forms of repression and intimidation, but because the present institutions are predicated upon the potential for return to the active phase of terrorism. And this holds true even though the state has other sources of legitimacy, such as the relative economic security that the Kádár regime has provided, because the state still has a terrorist "bottom line" to enforce its claim to legitimacy — i.e., state monopoly on that violence called terrorism, which is hardly based on a voluntary social contract. The 'trump card', so to speak, is still state terrorism proper.

During the initial period of state-building, Soviet-type societies were forced to create the kind of economic structure that allowed the complete social transformation of society: the rise of a powerful military complex based on a highly developed heavy industry. Until all the internal labor resources were depleted and the state could raise production by relying on the inclusion of new manpower, the so-called extensive stage of the economy, the state was not interested in the qualitative motivation of individuals for the sake of increasing production and productivity since individuals were replaceable and the work force multipliable. Only after almost everyone in the working age bracket had been drawn into the labor force, there emerged an interest in more rational forms of motivating the individuals as the given and only human source of raising productivity. With the recognition of the inefficiency of slave labor, the state — if it wanted to prosper economically — had to look for other means of social control than outright violence and the threat of violence. In the interest of an efficiently functioning civil sphere, the state had to seek other forms of legitimacy. Only pyramids, but not rockets, can be built by slave labor.[21]

20. Some documented cases of the recent use of physical violence are known in the West. Sándor Kopácsi, the Budapest chief of police during 1956, was twice almost killed by a truck before his emigration to Canada in 1975. See Sándor Kopácsi, *Au nom de la Classe Ouvrière*, (Paris, 1979), pp. 16-17. Reporting on the content of a new Hungarian samizdat journal, *Beszélő, L'Alternative* March-April 1982, p. 26) tells the forced electroshocking of a retired agronomist, Károly Jakab, in the Clinic of Neuropathology in Balassagyarmat; Tibor Pákh, a Hungarian economist who served more than ten years in prison and longer spells in psychiatric clinics for his hunger strikes, has been frequently electroshocked (during his prison term as well as following his release) and force-fed (with a rubber tube and not with intravenous injection, which supports the suspicion of willful torture) for his "negativism towards eating" (in a letter written by Dr. Pal Harmat, an emigré psychiatrist living in Austria, to the *Bécsi Napló*, January-February, 1982). Torture was also used on a French woman as reported in the *Frankfurter Rundschau* (April 20, 1979). There is a difference, however, between mass exterminations and cases of individual abuse.

21 ."A systematic use of terror destroys or impairs human will to work productively. Secondly, there is always an obvious threat that a mass-scale terror machine will get out of hand (as happened in the last years of Stalinism) and start destroying its masters. Thirdly, and the most important point: mass-scale terror can be used when the labor resources are plentiful. When labor force was in abundance (and first-generation workers were easily replaceable) fear disciplined workers and served as an important means for reaising labor productivity. During a demographic crisis and tremendous lack of manpower, terror cannot be effectively used (workers are simply too valuable so destroy a noticeable percentage of them in concentration camps)...Terror will be the last resort in the case of mass disobendience (as in Poland)." Paul Piccone and Victor Zaslavsky, "The Socio-Economic Roots of Rearmament," in *Telos* n. 50 (Winter 1981-82) pp. 11-12.

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Of course, there is not a simple causal link between economic exigencies and changes from one phase of terrorism to the next. But there seems to be at least a correlation between the two. During the extensive phase of drawing the population into the labor force, the population is regarded as the enemy and active terror is the means of waging war on an internal enemy. Once the intensive phase of the economy comes about, the worker (the population) must be regarded more as a partner, and above all no longer so easily expendable unless it rebels. Hence Kádár's enticing formula in 1961, "Who is not against us is with us."[22] This is the first way in which passive terror is efficient: it is economically efficient. Terror adapts itself to the needs of production.[23]

The second way in which passive terror is efficient is in social control. After the active phase of terror in which potentially rebellious groups are eliminated, the secret police does not wither away; it only changes its name and actually rejuvenates itself by retiring or reassigning older, inefficient, and uneducated members who are too conspicuously engaged in dispensing the means of the active phase of terror — i.e., torture and murder. Social control is enhanced: the state maintains a sizable police force and vastly improves its technology of surveillance but as the number of dissidents goes down, the ratio of state resources aimed against dissenters grows ever more disproportionate.[24]

Passive terror is efficient in a third, cultural way, because the potential organs of state terror are incorporated into the infrastructure of society.The desire to avoid a return to overt, active terror on the part of the populace, the rewards in consumerism traded for cooperation, etc., result in a greater and greater amount of self-policing on the part of individuals. Every man his own thought police — the responsible citizen takes no active and public interest in politics because any such interest not prescribed by the bureaucracy is automatically a dissident interest, and he thereby endangers himself and the economic stability of his family.[25] But he would also draw rebuke from the

22. Saint-Juste, with his "Who is not with us is against us," introduced the 'active' stage of terror under the French Revolution. Presumably, he too would have reversed his formula with time had it not been for the Directory.

23. "Though the rationalization of Stalinist totalitarianism has included measures that appear to be steps toward political liberalization, in fact the thrust of rationalization policy and the intent of Stalin's successors have been to build not a more democratic order, but a more efficient totalitarian leviathan without the Stalinist excesses and aberrrations." See Paul Cocks, "The Rationalization of Party Control," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems*, (Stanford, 1970), p. 155. There are those who contend that active terror becomes too costly producing too much unpredictable behavior in the population. This side effect of terror, however, does not outweigh its advantages to the regime. Zaslavsky gives the following argument supporting the claim that terror becomes too costly only *during* the transition from the extensive to intensive economic phases: "Total terror...often tended to exceed its planned bounds, threatening the very existence of the social system. This situation emerged, however, only by the beginning of the 1950's during the decay of the dying dictator's regime." Zaslavsky, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

24. Or, as Turchin says: "The percentage of people upon whom force must be used is small; but that force is employed to its fullest." *op. cit.*, p. 94.

25. Life becomes secure — the choice between staying out of politics or becoming a victim of repression is a voluntary one, and once one choses the former option the rewards (both positive and negative, i.e., lack of repression) can be counted on as assuredly as a pension once beyond retirement age. Weber remarks on this rule-governed stability: "Bureaucratization offers above

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pragmatists who do not want to rupture the fabric of the social compromise, or the intelligentsia which "has been blinded by the havoc wreaked upon [it] by the ruling elite, a bloodbath so severe that it considers the mere opportunity to reflect a luxury and would rather extend its privileges than call them into question."[26] As in the past, every janitor or employer is the extension of the police; every phone conversation is consciously or unconsciously self-censored ("it is not a topic to be discussed over the phone"), every letter, written or received,[27] causes nervousness if the content touches politics; every public discussion or remarks at the inappropriate place or time might be recorded and filed, the stadium of soccer games played between the most popular team and the police team is surrounded by more than the usual number of police emergency vans. The status of Hungary's national 19th century hero-poet, Petofi, is also surrounded by police every March 15, the most revered national holiday, still an officially-noted holiday (in newspapers) yet is, since 1949, a regular workday. The Young Communist League lays a wreath at Petofi's feet on March 15; no-one else is allowed near — although, as compensation, the workforce gets April 4 off, the date of the Soviet liberation of Hungary.

As the population learns the rules of conduct by rote and internalizes them,[28] it becomes a most delicate choreography of two interlocked dancers

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all the optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specializing administrative functions according to purely objective considerations...The 'objective' discharge of business primarily means a discharge of business according to *calculable rules*, and 'without regard to persons.'...The peculiarity of modern culture, and specifically of its technical and economic basis, demands this very 'calculability' of results." (As quoted in Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 83).

26. George Konrád and Iván Szelényi, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (New York, 1979), p. 249.

27. "Liberal intellectuals" in Hungary who sometimes loudly applaud the Kádár regime for holding to the letter of its own laws, sometimes also reveal themselves by questioning the sanity of their correspondence partner in the West if the letter they receive touches upon some delicate subject. This is in spite of the fact that according to law a person cannot be incriminated for an act he did not commit, i.e., writing the letter. Apparently these intellectuals are aware that the "letter of the law" means that *receiving* certain mail is an incriminating act which might result in, for instance, a rejection of a future passport application. So much for the rule of law in Hungary.

28. The preparation of the population for the acceptance of the totalitarian rules starts early. Axiomatic truths, for instance, are mixed with ideological examples (word problems in mathematics); biological, chemical discoveries are passed off as achievement in Marxist science or Marxist truths that are just another proof of the official dogma: they all serve to convey the feeling that in case of doubt, the best thing to do is to rely on the official explanation. For many, all inquiries end here because of disinterestedness, lack of time, etc. For others, it results in complete rejection of everything emanating from official circles. (One of the authors of this paper was told, as a child, by a woman in a village that the *Sputnik* was a hoax, and its passanger, the dog Laika, was barking in the Moscow studio and not orbiting in space.) Another often overlooked mechanism of creating intellectual insecurity is the deliberate transposition of the nature of causation: political decisions are given as purely economic ones and vice versa. The shortage of certain books (e.g., the Bible) is due to a "shortage of paper" (while unsold volumes of Lenin are piled up in bookstores); the practical non-availability, although theoretical accessibility, of Western dailies to the "lack of hard currency" (while French cognac, Scotch whiskey, etc., are sold in unlimited quantities). Instead of recognizing the flight of millions of Afghans to refugee camps in Pakistan as flight from Soviet-style genocide, the Hungarian Party's daily claims it was to get the four dollars supposedly received per refugee (December 20, 1981, Népszabadság). The politically influenced and motivated decision of the Soviet-Hungarian aluminum agreement (under which

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of the social compromise, the populace and its rulers — and together they achieve the most marvellous efficiencies in social control. Looking from the auditorium it appears to be a freely improvised, harmonious *pas de deux*: the jumps seem to be truly jumps and not hoists, with not a beat missed. The prompters are internal or hidden behind the props: the passive phase of terrorism reaches the maximum of social control with the least energy expended. The point is that the outside observer will not necessarily see the coercion of the population; the population forestalls the terror by coercing itself. Terror is practically invisible unless one knows the *history* of the regime or lives within such a regime. Passive terrorism produces an enforced consensus especially once the terror has permeated the infrastructure of society. Since consensus figures so importantly among modern principles of legitimacy, passive terror which invisibly coerces thus becomes, perhaps, a source of legitimacy for the regime. But since this "consensus" is coerced, albeit passively, we may ask whether it does satisfy any principle of legitimacy.

The question of legitimacy is, after all, more than the simple question, "who rules?" or "who has the power to rule?" This critical point is frequently not recognized by those working from a Weberian model of legitimacy which seeks, at bottom, to be purely descriptive; a reduction which strips the question of legitimacy from one of *rights* to *facts*. Legitimacy, we suggest, is not fundamentally a question of the facts of power, but a question of who *morally* has a right to wield power and rule. The inadequacy of any non-moral account of legitimacy is that, after going through all the descriptions of how ruler X has power and on what basis his people Z think his rule is legitimate, we still find room to ask, "Yes, but does ruler X have the *right* to rule? and on what basis?" The point is that ruling is an activity which requires a moral principle to buttress it if it is to be called legitimate; legitimacy carries with it a certain moral content which cannot be analyzed away.

Consent of the populace is only one of several principles of legitimacy which also have an important role, whether they are coerced or not. One is simply and undeniably the passage of time itself. A regime which has been around a long time *does* acquire a certain legitimacy, and one would be hard-pressed, other things being equal, to say that it did not have some legitimacy. Another principle of legitimacy is the recognition of a regime by the international community. Once again, one is perhaps under difficulty in formulating precisely the source of that legitimacy; and yet there is little denying that the Yalta agreements, with time, did their part to give Eastern European governments a real legitimacy, a real right to rule, and not just the appearance

the Hungarians, instead of building their own foundry and importing electricity, were told to transport bauxite to the Soviet Union, adjusting the freight cars' carriage to accommodate the wider gauge Soviet railroad tracks, and retransport aluminum, going through the same adjusting process) had always been hailed as economically sound up to October 12, 1981 when an interview was published in *Hétfői Hírek* with the commercial director of Alutrust where he spoke of "local and national interests" within the CMEA in connection with the possible non-renewal of this (typically colonial) agreement and the new foundry to be built in Inota. (*RFE Hungary*, Situation Report, November 25, 1981)

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of one. Western governments contribute to East European governments' legitimacy, both apparent and real, but not challenging their right to rule because of specific political practices, such as terrorism. East European governments respond through their mass media by relentlessly challenging the legitimacy of Western governments, inflating ordinary economic strikes, the conditions of the poor, etc., into questions of real political stability and the right to rule the working class — thus communicating to their *own* populace that *no* government has any more legitimacy than they themselves, however little that might be. This is not meant as an exhaustive account of legitimacy. It simply means that, first, holding legitimacy as a not importantly *moral* question and, second, thinking it reducible to 'might makes right', places forever beyond one's grasp the explanations of, e.g., the public trials, the extracting effort by Soviet regimes to achieve legality, or at least the appearance of it, the inane voting rituals and, for that matter, certain features of state terrorism.

State terrorism is a structural part of Hungarian society. We can see why it is not going to wither away, once we recognize the difference between active and passive terrorism, and understand the efficiences especially yielded in the passive stage. The existence of the state and the legitimacy of the Kádárist ruling elite are predicated upon it and abetted by politico-historical events and geopolitical factors. Active terrorism will be held in abeyance until an unforeseen and rapid deterioration in the standard of living occurs (without a similar deterioration in the world economy or in the economies of other Western or socialist countries to which Hungarians might compare themselves) of such a magnitude that either a major rupture in the forced social harmony or a complete breakdown of the system can be anticipated. The Czech and the Polish cases are vivid examples of the reversability of the two types of terror. The tragedy of Solidarity was that it, at least its moderate mainstream, did not believe in and did not prepare for this reversability.

The Hungarian regime is in a predicament in its behavior towards dissent. If it tolerates it and the economy goes downhill, snowballing effects cannot be avoided since dissent will find a more fertile ground in the factories. Moreover, the population could relearn the rules of the game and push for more concessions. Memory needs constant positive reinforcement,[29] otherwise it fades. If, however, the rulers increase violence to a more internationally noticeable level, it can backfire in economics. Hungary's good credit rating, the annual renewal of its most favored nation status in the U.S., its application for joining the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are factors weighing against the upgrading of repression, considering the Hungarian economy's dependence on the West.

29. Dallin, *op.cit.*, p. 109, footnote 19: "An additional hypothesis regarding the effects of terror is suggested by the finding that after intense personal disaster, taboos on the public recall of the circumstances of traumatic experiences lead to prolonged emotional difficulties, and the fear of recurrences of the disaster is nourished by the memory of the original experience." (D. W. Chapman, "Dimensions of Models in Disaster Behavior," p. 324.) In this light, Khrushchev's 'secret' speech may be taken to have performed an unwittingly therapeutic role in breaking the taboo and facilitating the abandonment of diffuse anxiety about the recurrence of terror.

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MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND*

by Jadwiga Staniszkis

Jorge Luis Borges once wrote that Baroque is an example of style which exhausts its own possibilities and borders on becoming a caricature of itself.[1] The final stage of any art is baroque when it reveals and destroys its own means of expression. Poland is now living through just such a baroque phase of the system called "really existing socialism." This system's structural principles have been laid bare through their ostentatious and baroque use. Disguising formal measures and stylistic ornaments previously employed to tone down the obsessiveness of manner have been exhausted. Moreover, the barriers of imagination characterizing popular consciousness in the '70s, which involved the reification of power structures perceived as an unavoidable affliction, disappeared during the stormy period of Solidarity.

"Regulation through crisis,"[2] successfully employed during prior economic-political cycles, is also impossible. In the past, economic crises became the only means possible for objectifying the government's economic policy in a world of administrative categories — mere artifacts, since they only pretended to be economic. They also provided authorities with the only opportunity to temporarily suspend economic games and to overcome stalemated relations with their own executive apparatus. Extraordinary decisions could then be made, easing tensions and temporarily suspending the self-destructive logic of the system.

Also exhausted were the techniques which in the past maintained an unstable balance between authority and society such as the corporative structure of interest articulation, painstakingly erected by Gierek's group in the face of repeated attacks by the executive apparatus. Given present attitudes it is hardly possible now to employ segmentation techniques (following the adage of "divide and rule"). Nor can authorities undertake mass utilization of the "double bind" mechanism used in the past with regard to strategic social groups — particularly the power apparatus and managerial strata — when their increasing frustration was compensated by increases of gratification. This led to a twisted, schizoid attitude — a mixture of rebellion and docility.

When the smokescreen of stylistic variations was blown away, the system's

*Translated from Polish by Jerzy Warman

1. See his "Preface" to the 2nd edition of *Historia Universal de la Infamia,* (Emece Editores, 1954).

2. See my "Systemic Determination of the Functioning Industrial Enterprises" (in Polish), in *Przeglad Socjologiczny* n. 32 (1981), and the chapter on cycles in my *The Self-Limiting Revolution* (in French), (PUF: Paris, forthcoming). See also my "Ein Jahr nach dem August 1980. Die Anatomie einer Revolution," in R. Fenchel and A. Pietsch (eds.) *Polen 1980-1982. Gesellschaft gegen den Staat,* (Hannover, 1982).

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fundamental features were fully revealed. These features are characteristic of all social systems in which state property is dominant while private property is weak, dependent on the state, and administratively limited with regard to possibilities of accumulation and growth.[3] The systems in question have not undergone the development of political institutions from *feudalism*, through absolutism, to the *bourgeois revolution* with its instrumental outlook and emphasis on economic rationality. These social systems, including Poland, belong to a different category. In an institutional sense, they have remained "systems without history," merely stabilizing, or even strengthening, their constitutive principle of the domination of society by the state. They have not engendered instrumental rationality, geared toward problem-solving. Instead, they have perfected (i.e., reduced to the absurd) formal rationality, i.e., rationality oriented towards conventions and man-made organizational artifacts.[4]

For centuries history has cast Poland between East and West until, as a consequence of the "translocating revolution," it has found itself in an orbit of influences other than the post-Enlightment one. The first stage of this revolution had been carried out in 1944-1948. It was then that organizational struc-

3. Cf. Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism,* (New Haven, 1947), and Karl Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie,* (Berlin, 1953). In such systems, absolute predominance of state property is not necessary. It is sufficient if private property (e.g., of land) depends on one's place in the administrative hierarchy (e.g., the institution of *pomeshchiki* in Tsarist Russia), and its functioning and growth are regulated by legal and administrative, rather than economic means. For example, the administrative prohibition against enrichment of merchants above a certain ceiling in Tsarist Russia blocked the development of market relations. The prohibition of land sales and of employing hired labor, proclaimed in the wake of the 1918 land reform in Russia, caused grants of land to have consequences only for consumption rather than production. The tendency to confer property rights to functionaries in the political machine (so-called "service nobility") appeared in Russia also during the NEP period in the '20s. According to statistical data from that period, about 80% of "NEP-men" belonged to the Bolshevik party. One may hypothesize that trusted comrades were given appropriate means and appointed to play the role of carriers of the capitalistic mode of production (which — according to Lenin — was necessary to make the transition to the socialist phase of development possible), or that people who possessed the required capital were forced to join the party and thus to submit to its political control. Similar tendencies appeared in Poland in 1945-46 where there were cases of small industrial enterprises being entrusted to the hands of Polish Workers' Party [PPR, i.e., the communist party] members, despite protests of the workers and the Polish Socialist Party (cf. the memoirs of Osobka-Morawski from that period).

4. These systems are sometimes labelled "state capitalism" or "state feudalism." Such notions are mistaken because the state, while it owns the means of production, does not play the role of the capitalist since in its decisions concerning production and allocation of resources it is not guided by motives of accumulation or, in general, by economic rationality. Its goal is to reproduce power structures and the structures of dogma which legitimize them. After the revolution, the limitation or elimination of the centers of capital accumulation which were independent from the government (e.g., free land sales, freedom to hire labor), served this goal even though such policies eliminated rationality from the economic system, reducing it to the rationality of consumers. The observed immobility of capital (even in Hungary), which is unable to cross boundaries dividing sectors of the economy, points to the subordination of economic rationality to the particular interests of the state bureaucracy which is primarily interested in the preservation of its assets within a given sector. The use of the term "state feudalism" rests on a superficial analogy that emphasizes the role of non-economic factors in the expropriation of surplus labor, but ignores the deep differences in structure, dynamics and philosophy of government between feudalism and "really existing socialism."

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tures which eliminated the instrumental type of rationality in favor of a formal one were created. Types of property independent from the state were decapitalized. It was the beginning of the process of remaking the social and economic system along lines which have evolved in the East for centuries. We are now undergoing the second phase of the "translocating revolution." It consists in attempts to functionally link Polish and Soviet economies more consistently than ever before, and in the visible beginnings of sovietization in the cultural sphere.

Such clear demonstration that Poland belongs to the sphere of "oriental despotism" or the "Asiatic mode of production" is characteristic of the present, baroque phase of development of the socio-economic system. Three fundamental features of this formation, which were previously camouflaged by "Polish peculiarities", have now been revealed.

First, there is the use of violence as a *means of production* which directly determines conditions of economic reproduction. The militarization of the economy demonstrates that the ruling group has no qualms about using it as a *substitute* for other factors of production. Instead of the organization of work, technology and production, there is now ascription of workers to their enterprises,[5] prison terms for a few days absence, suspension of employee rights, prolongation of the work day, and subjection of employees to the arbitrary, legally unregulated administrative decisions of military commissars with no possibility of appeal. The ruling group seems to realize that violence is the only means of production it fully controls, and that its use does not antagonize the executive power apparatus as much as any attempts to reallocate capital, reform the economy or introduce different technologies would. This apparatus' interests are dominant in the system. While in the West the state plays an instrumental role in representing the interests of the economically dominant class, only in a "really existing socialist" system, where the state itself is the owner of the means of production, can it plan the use of violence and put it *directly* into the equation representing the conditions of economic reproduction.[6] This is not merely a quantitative difference — it is a new quality.

Secondly, there is a *specific type of rationality*. It makes no sense to employ Western criteria to understand the meaning of actions of individual actors in "really existing socialism" because the criteria of rationality are entirely different. In case of the ruling group which also owns the means of production, accumulation is not the purpose of economic decisions. Accumulation enters their reasoning only at the point of distribution of produced income. Besides, in the absence of market relations and with the prices of production factors set

5. An example of a sentence: three years for unexplained absence, meted out to a miner (*Trybuna Ludu*, March 24, 1982).

6. Deputy Prime Minister Madej, the Chairman of the Planning Committee, told the meeting of Central Committee instructors: "When we were drafting the plan for 1982 we assumed the introduction of martial law and the militarization of the economy." Deputy Minister of Finance, Karcz, declared in an interview for the *Soldier of Freedom* (February 1982), that "by introducing the martial law we have fulfilled the demands set by the International Monetary Fund to improve the conditions of economic activity."

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arbitrarily by the state, the ruling group cannot even judge which kind of production is profitable and which is not. The ruling group has as its goal the realization of certain utopia — what could be called a "totalitarian utopia." The criteria of rationality employed follow from this goal. Specifically, it is the stabilization and reproduction of the subjugation of individuals to the "community", i.e., to the state. If economic rationality conflicts with this goal it is always shoved aside. The very possibility of answering the question concerning what is economically rational has been destroyed in most branches of the economy through the elimination of self-regulating mechanisms and the substitution of economic categories invented by some administrators.[7]

Martial law in Poland has demonstrated the distinctiveness of the criteria of rationality, as well as the absence of groups guided by economic rationality.[8]

Two types of dynamics can be observed: First, there are the symptoms of *circular development. Tendencies to return to orthodox techniques of* exercising power, a neo-Stalinism in a purer form than the original, based on naked force and lacking a live ideology and mass social mobility, provides a kind of alternative to the military solution. Various interest groups in the ruling elite support either the Party-State, or the Army-State option. This is a surrealistic return to the choices already available to Poland in 1944-45.[9] Any-

7. In describing the Asiatic mode of production, Marx emphasized the distinctiveness of its criteria of rationality. In one of his most ideological text he wrote: "The purpose of the community is to reproduce its members in the objectively given conditions," and, further: "complete and free development of the individual or society is unthinkable there, because such development contradicts primary relations. We will not find anywhere among the Ancients any attempt to examine which form of land ownership is most productive, which one generates the greatest wealth. Wealth as a goal of production does not appear." Marx calls the Old World a "loftier" one, saying that "it was really loftier than the contemporary world in all matters where closed shapes, forms, and given limits were sought. It provided satisfaction from a limited standpoint; while the modern world leaves one unsatisfied..." This nostalgia for clarity and unequivocal meaning of the fully controlled, closed societies has not found a clearer expression anywhere else in Marx. Such nostalgia for pure form is a very dangerous type of radicalism. Moreover, Marx' description of the Asiatic social systems provides an analysis of "really existing socialism" (based, like the Asiatic form, on state ownership) more apt than his utopian vision of socialism.

8. It is sufficient to compare Polish military junta's economic policy with that of juntas in Latin America. While both tend to deviate from orthodox economic policies, and to undertake extensive social welfare policies they cannot afford, only in Latin America do juntas encounter the opposition of groups guided by economic rationality, i.e., the bourgeoisie. In Poland the situation is different: the junta's social policy resulting from its frantic efforts to gain legitimation and to build a new support coalition to replace the unstable coalition of the disintegrating party apparatus does not run into any obstacles. Moreover, it is carried out at the expense of the productive sector, e.g., by making up the 350 billion zloty budget deficit through very high taxes, and by burdening industry with obligatory stabilization loans at a 30% interest rate. Such measures clearly intensify the economic crisis, creating a vicious circle: the deepening crisis requires an even more intensive social policy, financed by the productive sector. It is interesting to note that the reaction of the managerial stratum was typical, indicating even more that no one in this system uses economic rationality as a guidepost: it welcomed the junta's moves with some relief because they reduced to the absurd the troublesome principle of enterprises' financial independence. There is talk of writing a requirement into the bank law that enterprises must apply for loans from the state banks whether they need them or not which, of course, nullifies the premises of economic reform.

9. Starting from the premise that the communist party in Poland was weak, in 1944 general Pravin proposed that a military regime be established there. In contrast, in the USSR Marshal

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way, the tendency to return to the orthodox methods of exercising power is typical of the Asiatic systems at times of stalemate between authorities and society (e.g., in the Late Byzantine Empire, where — under Western influences — there emerged a type of ownership uncontrolled by the state, which was however too weak to alter political structures). A similar stalemate emerged in Poland.

The second phase of the present "translocating revolution," reinforces the impression of circular development. Most likely, this phase has as its aim the elimination of Polish peculiarities, which in the past consisted in "experiments" that irritated the Russians so much, such as the "artificial negativity" of October 1956 (when public opinion was recreated and utilized in the ritual of changes controlled from above — changes that were necessary to stabilize the system and insure the power elite's survival) and Gierek's unorthodox stabilization techniques (including the mechanism of "repressive tolerance").

The circular development thesis seems to contradict the evolution which the Polish political system has apparently undergone: from totalitarianism to an authoritarian-bureaucratic regime in its extreme military embodiment there has been a shift from a phase in which mobilization and politicization of society were emphasized, to a phase where various demobilization techniques are being used. The communist party has been transformed from specific organization into a polymorphic party sprawled through state institutions. A live ideology has gradually become ritualized and presently authorities suspect and combat every live ideological current — including those inside the party. Similarly, the locus of decision-making has now shifted away from the party to the military and the state administration, and conflicts between the first two benefit the third, strengthening its dominant position — especially on the local level. Yet, this evolution has not significantly changed the situation of the individual *vis à vis* authorities. It has not eliminated the government's arbitrary actions. The government still determines by itself its status in relation to society and, while changing the institutional forms of exercising power, it preserves the fundamental system of domination.

The impression that there is circular development is strengthened by the surrealistic comeback of the rhetoric which earlier provided part of the justification of Stalinism. Such rhetoric has returned as if no intervening debate ever occurred during the period of de-stalinization (the debates of the so-called revisionists with the party apparatus, etc.). When the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee discussed the necessity of "introducing the dictatorship of the proletariat" against workers' Solidarity (a few weeks before the imposition of martial law), or when there was talk of the working class acting against its "objective interests"[10] (already after the imposition of martial law),

Zhukov was accused of "Bonapartism." Alfred Lampe, an activist of the Union of the Polish Patriots in the USSR, drew a different conclusion from the same premise: he proposed an unideological, "mild" revolution, which would slowly create the new rationality through a reorganization of structures.

10. M. Karwat in *Trybuna Ludu*, January 1982.

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one was reminded of the formulae used for decades in the communist movement to justify terror[11] and the need for a "vanguard" which "knows better..."

Secondly, another type of dynamics observed within oriental despotism, of which Polish events are a good example, is the characteristic tangle of spasmatic political cycles and palace revolutions with increasing stagnation, resulting from the exhaustion of the means to stimulate extensive growth such as foreign credits, internal colonization (i.e., collectivization), the militarization of the economy, administrative limitations of consumption and territorial expansion. The reason for this two-track course (stagnation of the "base" in spite of spasms in the "superstructure"), and for the "absence of history" in systems based on state ownership, is the lack of a mechanism which energized systems that have evolved from feudalism, through the Enlightenment, to the industrial revolution, and which have private property as the dominant form of ownership, i.e., the contradiction, analyzed by Marx, between the level of development of the means of production and the political sphere. Such a contradiction generated progress. In systems based on state ownership, the distinction between the relations of production and the political sphere makes no sense. This can be clearly seen in Poland by examining the economic functions of martial law.

"Really existing socialism" has its own peculiar contradictions. These, however, do not effect material processes, except by reinforcing the tendency toward stagnation. The dynamizing effect of this mechanism can be found in political cycles, in the self-destructive logic of the system resulting in the exhaustion of governing techniques (stabilization) and in the ironic dialectic where success of the ruling group means also its defeat. This is best seen in the fate of Gierek's group: the economic situation was defined as a crisis in consequence of the very effectiveness of its techniques of corporative interest articulation. When appropriate regulative actions were undertaken (the downward revision of economic plans) it was already too late to reach a more balanced phase of the cycle. The cycle halted at one point: that of permanent crisis. Tensions at the political level are even greater due to the fact that the "translocating revolution" has been carried out relatively recently, and not very consistently. The Polish drama consists in the fact that Poland has not forgotten the language and the criteria of rationality of that other, post-Enlightment developmental current in which it belonged not so long ago, although rather superficially. At the same time, the present institutional framework, with its formal rationality, makes it impossible to employ those increasingly forgotten criteria, thus rendering useless concepts that originated in another world.

The obsessive display of the constitutive features of baroque and observed in the present phase of "really existing socialism" in Poland, is related to the

11. György Lukács in his *Political Writings 1919-1929* (London 1968) wrote that it is necessary for the proletariat to force individual workers to act in accordance with their interests...

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exhaustion of forms typical of the previous phase (the so-called Gierek era). In that phase, the institutional structure seemed to take on a certain identity and ceased to be a loose aggregate of arbitrarily introduced features. It became a system capable of reproducing itself without the use of force. The most absurd solutions were abandoned (albeit informally), quasi-institutional forms of conflict regulation emerged, even though, once again, merely customary and not formalized, in the shape of corporative networks of relations between government and society. The ruling group learned to take advantage of its power of allocation in order to redistribute tensions in the system and to push them out to the periphery where they could not assume an aggregate form and become organized so as to threaten the power centers. A peculiar "adaptive superstructure" emerged, consisting of the network of secondary reinforcements around organizational solutions which generated the strongest tensions. For example, the so-called "nomenklatura" (filling of executive positions by members of the communist party) became a substitute for non-existent but necessary lateral connections. The fact that about 80% of enterprise directors are party members, and about 60% belong to party executive organs on various levels, allows local party committees to fulfill the necessary function of horizontal coordination in the system. Thus, a deeply undemocratic solution became, in a twisted way, a functional one. In general, the system's identity was acquired by utilizing its weaknesses. The possibility of functional benefits was sought in features which, from the Western viewpoint, were pathological. For example, the ruling group learned to use recurring crises to regulate the system. This peculiar philosophy of government became stuck with the adroit choices of place and time for successive explosions (with the help of provocations and symbolic actions), and the creation at the same time of safety devices protecting the power apparatus from palace revolutions unavoidably accompanying regulation through crisis.[12] It was also realized that the characteristic structuration and destructuration of conflicting interests attending the dynamics of the cycle is also conducive to stabilization: at any point in the cycle some win and some lose. Sometimes (symbolically, of course) even the ruling group finds itself on the losing side. The revitalizing effect of this phenomenon on political structure has been understood well.

Contrary to expectations, however, stabilizing techniques were exhausted very quickly. The social costs of corporatism, i.e., social differentiation, the corrosion of law, demoralization, and frustrations of the executive power apparatus, led to the explosion of August 1980. Regulation through crisis proved impossible because it was started too late. The consequent freezing of the cycle in its crisis stage put an end to the shifts on the map of conflicting interests. Continuous structuration and destructuration was supplanted by

12. In 1972 members of the power elite, who were potential victims of palace revolutions, were given protection in the form of guarantee that their privileges would be maintained. In the same year a principle was put in effect that officials of the executive apparatus would not fall from the ranks on the "nomenklatura" level in the course of the revolving "carousel of positions."

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permanent polarization. Moreover, during the sixteen months of Solidarity's existence, the conflict became politicized and generalized. In attempting to stabilize the system, Gierek's group employed a combination of two logically contradictory strategies: Unorthodox governing techniques ("repressive tolerance," corporatism, orientation toward the West), and formalization of the system's doctrinal features (writing of the "leading role of the party" formula into the constitution, formalization of elections with only one list of candidates). This discrepancy became an additional source of frustration for the apparatus.

In Gierek's time nothing was what it seemed to be: ostensible liberalization, sham modernization and economic rationalization in reality, represented only the abuse of extensive factors of growth (i.e., foreign loans), increase in consumption that ran into shortages of supplies, etc. The striking stability of organizational structures in the '70s resulted from the almost complete neglect of these structures and from disregard of administrative rules in favor of management on a case by case basis, through exceptions to the rules. Paradoxically, structures became fixed due to the fact that they did not exist. The ideological crisis seemed to be total; even the opposition's language utilized the very same symbols as the authorities' language. Proper interpretation of the symbols was debatable, and their perception depended on the situational context.

A transitional phase (the time of Solidarity) intervened between the moment of the system's crash (August 1980) and its baroque phase of development. During this period a wave of uncontrollable demands by various interests, and shaped for the first time by an institutional framework, clashed with the system of political institutions built on the myth of the authorities' and society's unanimity of interests. Such a structure could function only if interest articulation was blocked or demobilized, because there were no mechanisms of negotiation or conflict resolution.[13] The ruling group succeeded neither in demobilizing or co-opting Solidarity, nor in adapting its own structure and principles to the new situation. Attempts to alter the legitimation formula from the concept of "vanguard" to the idea of a quasi-legal "social contract," efforts to disentangle the party from the trap of the polymorphic model of organization, the endeavored re-formulation of the role of the party and attempts to democratize it — all failed. In fact, they even accelerated the counter-mobilization of the party apparatus whose interests were threatened. The discrepancy between the political system and the social situation, a peculiar stalemate between authorities and society, led to the paralysis of the power structure.

The imposition of martial law and the sudden change of regime (i.e., of the relations among political institutions) sought to break the stalemate by providing the ruling group with new means of action. The veil was torn and the

13. For example, there are no means of conflict regulation inside the Polish United Workers Party. While individuals may, theoretically, appeal to the higher level ("provided this does not threaten organizational unity"), party cells have no way of appealing in case of conflict with higher party organs.

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new, baroque phase of development commenced, with its own dynamics and particular dilemmas.

Such political solutions are well known. There is a rich literature devoted to authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes based on the armed forces, primarily concerning Latin America. It is therefore useful to consider the different dynamics of such regimes in conditions of private and state ownership of the means of production, and also when such regimes are introduced in a one-party system where the party cannot be abolished, in contrast with a multi-party system where parties are dissolved following the coup.

The political solution introduced in Poland on December 13, 1981, seems to contain dilemmas similar to other known military regimes. They are as follows: 1) fast, progressive disintegration fo the terror machine, and the collapse of the original coalition; 2) tension between the necessity to lead the country out of the economic crisis and the logic of a military junta, attenuated by the phenomenon of "functional", i.e., economically justified, terror; 3) the dilemma faced by every government that has carried out a *coup d'etat*, i.e., how to build mediating structures between government and society (which would play the role of a buffer by institutionalizing the conflict) and, at the same time, not lose the gains won in December (the desired demobilization of society).

The disintegration of the terror machine manifests itself on several levels. First, the original coalition of forces which engineered the *coup* is clearly collapsing: the conflict between the military and the party apparatus is growing. On December 18, 1981, at a meeting with the representatives of party "liberals," Jaruzelski still claimed that the apparatus (labelled "concrete" by the liberals) was the only group where he could find support. A month later he was personally attacked by that very group for "Gierek-ism." The matter concerned Jaruzelski's attempt to employ neo-corporative techniques (special privileges for certain professional groups), start of intensive negotiations with the Church, and employ "repressive tolerance" tactics. Jaruzelski was also criticized for having a non-ideological outlook, lacking a "class" language and of class-based model of terror. The apparatus resented the "internal" argument for state legitimation typical of military groups and of the authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes in general, i.e., that some actions were described as beneficial because they strengthened the state while the state's class nature went unmentioned. The junta's nationalistic rhetoric and its avoidance of the conflict theme, irritated the apparatus gathering noisily under the slogans of ideological mobilization and orthodox Marxism.

The fundamental conflict, however, concerned the place of the communist party in the political system. Jaruzelski's military group pursued the course of evolution toward a system in which the state remained as the decision-making center. The apparatus, on the other hand, especially on the provincial level, felt that its interests were in jeopardy. Unintentedly, the introduction of a military regime contributed to the corrosion of the "leading role of the party". In the past, this role had never been formalized, with the exception of a

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general and vague formulation in the constitution. When on December 13 the customary informal procedures of checking every administrative decision with a party secretary were violated, and only consultation with a military commissar was required, the myth that there were no alternative to the position of the party in the system collapsed. Despite the increasingly frequent attempts to keep the military away from the decision-making process, it was impossible to return to old customary forms. Something that was never formalized is very difficult to recreate. The looming danger of a new power vacuum points to the persistence of the self-destructive logic of the system which is now devouring its last trump card — military power. The conflict between the military and the party apparatus resembles Marx' description of the conflict between Louis Bonaparte and the bourgeoisie. Bonaparte considerably limited the bourgeoisie's power while defending its interests. In so doing, he displeased the so-called literary representatives of their class who were in turn mitigated by other members of the bourgeoisie afraid of a situation in which they would be left without the protective cover of the military to face the people's ire. Similarly twisted relations exist in Poland between the military, the party elite and rank-and-file party members.

In addition to the question of the role of the party in the political system, the other subject of conflict between the two groups concerns the difference between models of repression. Jaruzelski's group imagined that the 1956 Hungarian model of repression could be applied in Poland: a strong blow to eliminate or intimidate adversaries, quickly followed by attempts to introduce reforms. It was thought that neutralization of the politically active opposition would permit a relatively quick introduction of some ostensibly democratic rules, in the fashion of the Hungarian Patriotic People's Front which functioned as a democracy with pre-determined outcomes. The military were shocked when their plan failed. Organized social resistance is growing. In a way, the first blow missed. Attempts to demobilize society — a condition of pre-determined democracy — also failed. The model of repression proposed by the party apparatus follows the Czech solution of 1968: a "class" repression directed primarily against the intelligentsia, with elements of paternalistic policy toward workers[14]

The military plan aims at intimidation and employs primarily economic rather than police repression, i.e., dismissals from work and disciplinary transfers to worse jobs. This is sharply criticized by the apparatus. The peculiar bidding in which the military and the apparatus engage with respect to tutelary functions further weakens the ruling group's willingness to deploy orthodox economic measures necessary to overcome the crisis. Such bidding was especially visible when the issue of wage compensation for price increases was being discussed. Relatively high raises were awarded to working class groups while farmers found themselves at a disadvantage since they did not have a "class guardian."

14. For example, a director of an automobile factory and a representative of the party apparatus testified in defense of workers accused of organizing a strike. This defense forced the court to break the strictures of martial law and demonstrated the stand of the party apparatus.

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Both groups also differ in their conceptions of economic policy. These differences were greater during the first few weeks of martial law than now because the need to adjust to Western economic sanctions and pressures from Comecon countries pushed Jaruzelski's program closer to the reorientation of the economy from West to East proposed by the party apparatus. Were it not for a dogmatic faction of the apparatus, Jaruzelski's group would probably be amenable to a more pragmatic policy towards individual farmers and small private businesses. The party group is for the moment too weak to force through its own solutions (e.g., collectivization), but it has sufficient strength to block the Jaruzelski group. This can be clearly seen in the obstruction of the parliamentary project to permit joint capital investments with Polish ethnic groups abroad.

Another difference between the two groups concerns trade unions. The military are interested primarily in control and demobilization. The apparatus (or at least its ideological wing) entertains a more utopian dream of a working class union which would support it in the struggle with the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia. Finally, they differ in their attitude towards political opposition: while the military consider the Confederation of Independent Poland and the Independent Student Union (now officially dissolved) most threatening because of their reported contacts abroad, the apparatus sees the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR), with its social-democratic rhetoric, as the most dangerous enemy, following the principle that the most dangerous opponent is one operating within the same ideological realm.

It is difficult to determine which of these groups holds the upper hand. The situation is different on each level of the system and in various areas. For example, in propaganda the apparatus enjoys the advantage. Both groups also enjoy the support of different groups in the Soviet Union. The struggle is intensifying. Thus, the police provocations on May 3rd and May 13th seemed to have had as their purpose the discrediting of the military solution, questioning its effectiveness, and supplanting it with the Party-State (supported by the police) model in its superorthodox version. Something of an International of party apparatuses is emerging — party elites in all Eastern European countries feel threatened by the possibility of a military coup in their countries in an event of crisis.

Another dimension of disintegration of the terror machine concerns the negative impact of the military's political role on the armed forces. This can be seen on various levels. At the top, politicization and factional divisions are marked. The middle officer corps, from which military commissars are recruited, probably have felt the consequences of their new role most deeply —they have experienced the shock of leaving the garrisons, and of direct contact with the economy and the power structure. Corruption, inefficiency and poverty are repeatedly mentioned in reports of military operational field groups occasionally printed in *The Soldier of Freedom*. They find themselves in a predicament similar to that of military regimes in Africa where the army is also directly engaged in the management of the economy because the domes-

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tic bourgeoisie was too weak to take over administrative functions in the wake of decolonization. There, the officer corps were shocked and became rapidly radicalized. Frequently, a second wave of military coups took place, led by junior officers, this time with a large programmatic content. Such an outcome is not possible in Poland, but the frustration of military commissars is nevertheless significant. It is accompanied by a tendency toward particularization of military structures which — as they enter directly the economic sphere —begin to defend local interests and cover up shortcomings for which they are responsible. The lowest level of the military is least known. The costs of the army's new role, however, seems to have been felt there as well — psychological exhaustion above all. Someone said that the military does not cope well with a situation in which the enemy is invisible or difficult to identify. This is a basic difference in comparison with the police and the party apparatus: while the latter two operate freely in the world of meaningless labels (e.g., "counter-revolution"), and — depending on need — they pick particular groups to play the role of "political enemy," the military is not adapt in this kind of "politics."

The third dimension of disintegration concerns the tensions between the military on the one hand, and the police and security services on the other. They were especially visible in the first weeks of martial law. For example, the publication of the list of interned persons containing names of people who had been abroad for some time — information that could be easily corrected by the Ministry of Internal Affairs — was designed to ridicule the military which was then playing the leading role. This dimension of conflict is clearly influenced by society's attitude, which treats soldiers better.

Another expression of tensions in the power apparatus is shown by conflicts over projected legislation. The new, accelerated manner in issuing new laws, in which the executive apparatus, i.e., the cabinet, plays the leading role, visibly frustrates traditional legislative structures (the parliamentary committees). An analysis of the laws passed during martial law indicates that the administration, i.e., the state's executive organs, are engaged in an assiduous effort to secure its privileged status for the future, benefiting from the conflict between the military and the party

Lesser tensions appear in connection with the logic of behavior determined by professional training. The technocratic group connected with the Commission for Reform protested against excessive burdening of enterprises by the forced stabilization loans intended to cover budget deficits. Officials at the Ministry of Labor were against the (illegal) proposal to link payment of annual bonuses to the humiliating requirement that employees submit a statement declaring that their participation in strikes was coerced. The disintegrative impact of these tensions is unquestionable, but should not be overrated. If threatened, the ruling group can quickly re-integrate in a crisis situation.

Another dilemma facing the ruling elite involves the combination of mutually contradictory actions: attempts to create a tutelary state, pulling the economy out of the crisis, and adaptation to the expectations of neighboring

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countries — primarily the Soviet Union — which not only do not want to finance the Polish crisis, but even demand that their economies be sheltered from its impact. The dilemma is further complicated by the difficult decision concerning the amount of coercion that would still be functional as a factor of production, i.e., at what level will violence fuel society's resistance and accelerate its integration. Will the threat of widespread unemployment (there is talk of 850 thousand — 12% of the labor force) as a result of the proposed introduction of self-financing of economic enterprises frustrate and demobilize society or, conversely, will it frustrate and lead to an explosion caused by despair? What is society's tolerance for price increases designed to drain the market of excess of currency? Recent increases reduced the population's buying power by about 40%, to the level of the mid '50s. In 1956 average annual meat consumption was 41 kilograms per capita; today it is down to 30 kilograms. Moreover, according to information released by the ministry of trade, about 10% of ration cards are not being purchased because people cannot afford them.

The authorities' economic strategy reflecting the adaptation to Western sanctions and to Comecon countries' pressures will require constant readiness to use force since it contains several elements intensifying tensions. The maximizing of the export/import ratio is accompanied by the decrease in exports caused by the fall of production. It is therefore achieved through import cuts (and further drops in production), confiscatory price increases and export of the resulting food surpluses, and through the militarization of export industries (mining) carried out by a stick-and-carrot tactic of a draconian work regime, high wages and the privilege of buying in special shops. The last method demoralizes other hard working groups which are employed in industrial branches that do not produce for export, such as steelworkers. The purpose of such actions is to achieve a positive foreign trade balance and hence the possibility of short-term loans. All these measures rest on various forms of coercion functioning as factors of production. Genuinely economic measures, familiar from the Latin American experience (such as import-substitute production or deep structural changes), are absent.

Despite the crisis, the fulfillment of obligations to Comecon countries is another element of the economic strategy. This is the purpose of production on consignment introduced in about 400 industrial enterprises which use raw materials financed by other Comecon countries, or imported therefrom, in exchange for 90% of the produced output. The only advantage in this arrangement is the lessening of unemployment. The attendant costs, however, involve the close binding of a large portion of industrial capacity to foreign economies (the proportion reaches 60% in the textile industry) for an indefinite period. It also pre-empts the possibility of changing the structure of production that would involve a different way of using this capacity; conflicts with economic plans because consignment production ties up fuel, spare parts, transport facilities and part of imports from the Comecon which, in any case, are 20% lower this year. It also causes higher inflation because workers

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are paid while their output does not appear on the domestic market and the ruling group further loses control over the conditions of economic reproduction in the country. It is because of these costs that the economic strategy requires readiness to use force. Another aspect of this re-orientation towards the East which takes place in the framework of "translocating revolution", would also be emphasized. The Soviet Union itself encounters difficulties with the supply of raw materials, completing only one of every six industrial construction projects. It is not so much a problem of resources, as of technical abilities to utilize them. Hence it is possible that — after the re-orientation is achieved — in two or three years Poland will reach another, today unimaginable, crisis: the drying up of the flow of raw materials from the East.

The agricultural situation is an important indicator of the overall economic situation. The shortages of means of production for agriculture, and the inability to create the economic link with the countryside due to inadequate supply of consumer goods, make the farm economy progressively less oriented toward the market. This is clearly exemplified by the stagnation in grain purchases by the state. There are growing voices within the apparatus calling for administrative measures — requisitions, and possibly even collectivization. While this would lower agricultural production even further, it would permit savings of consumer goods which must now be sent to the countryside in exchange for agricultural products. Is another economic policy possible? For the time being no one has designed a different, global strategy.

Authorities are also confronted with the problem of structures mediating between them and society. It is indicative that a theme from president Vargas' speeches also appeared in general Jaruzelski's remarks: "the loneliness of power..." The creation of mediating structures is exceedingly difficult. Authorities seem to be afraid of genuine, lively union structures. They might be willing to negotiate a formula for self-limitation by Solidarity, but they can hardly afford it. Governments of neighboring countries are scared that a model of "social accord" and negotiation with genuine representatives of society will prove contagious. On the other hand, authorities know that the crisis is deepening, and they need unions as a buffer. Chances to recreate corporative structures are minimal. Such a model requires relative transparency of power structures to provide clues, within a merely customary and not formalized arrangement, as to who is the appropriate negotiator.

This element is absent in Poland, where a sudden change of regime has taken place. Using the Church as a mediating structure is difficult because of the apparatus' anti-clerical attitudes. If a neo-Stalinist model wins out in the end, the Church will be pushed back into the role of the "Silent Church" of the '50s. The only structures which at present have some chance to succeed consist in elements of organic democracy such as the consumers movement. Following the military *coup d'etat*, Poland has entered a baroque phase of development which exposes the fundamental features of the system: in the wake of a "translocating revolution," Poland entered the gravitational field of the formation known as the Asiatic mode of production.

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POLITICAL TRIALS OF THE STALINIST ERA

by Michal Reiman*

Although the USSR political show trials and Stalinist terror as a whole have been amply documented, their study is far from complete. Not only are primary sources — documents relating to the activity of the ruling party, government, and the USSR repressive apparatus — unavailable, but the very approach to the problem is flawed. The study of Soviet show trials was often affected by the issues of the day: in particular, show trials were often presented as an integral aspect of Stalinist terror — instances of its random, illogical, and perverse nature.

The show trials of the late Thirties attracted most attention. After all, many leading Soviet political figures went on trial at that time: Zinoviev, Kamenev, Piatakov, Radek, Rykov, Bukharin, Rakovsky, Krestinsky and Trotsky (the latter *in absentia*). This played a major role in the evaluation of Stalinism and its consequences. As Solzhenitsyn emphasized in his *Gulag Archipelago*, however, the notoriety of these trials did relegate earlier USSR political trials to relative obscurity. This was partly due to the fact that these early trials seemed out of touch with current politics. More importantly, however, they were ignored because many communist and left intellectuals only thought of the USSR "excesses" in relation to Stalin. The pre-Stalinist period, especially the years under Lenin, were presented as counterexamples to Stalinist atrocities. A lingering "class approach" to establishing guilt in the case of "hostile classes" also played a role, for it was thought essential to suppress and expropriate "hostile classes". Consequently, the early USSR show trials of individuals or political groups opposed to the regime were not seen as totally unjustified or, in any case, comparable to those of the late Thirties. Thus, discussion of the latter show trials ignored their essential historical background.

Also, pre-War show trials were not viewed in relation to post-War repressive policies. Although there were no trials at that time in the USSR comparable to those of the pre-War years,[1] new show trials were being staged in the countries of the newly-formed Soviet bloc: Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Rumania. Unlike the early USSR trials, those staged in these countries after the war did not escape public scrutiny. Not only did they generate heated political debates, but most were officially reviewed and their victims subsequently rehabilitated.[2] In some countries this review raised

*Translated from Russian by Alexander Zaslavsky.

1. Here one must mention the 1953 "Doctors' plot": the personal physicians of leading Soviet figures were accused of plotting to murder some of their patients. These "crimes" were allegedly motivated by "international intrigue" and "Zionism". The campaign connected with the "plot" and Stalin's plans to purge several party leaders and banish Jews to labor camps indicates that a show trial was in the making. The "Doctors' plot" was dropped after Stalin's death in March, 1953.

2. The 1949 trial of K. Drodze in Albania was an exception: it was never officially reviewed. In

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great public indignation and spawned reform movements.[3]

Clearly, these show trials and Soviet policy in general were connected. The groundwork for these trials was laid under the direct supervision of Soviet advisors, who planned their ideological and political content down to the smallest details. This phenomenon was only partially acknowledged in the study of such trials. Most of the attention was directed towards the internal politics of the countries in question: For their part, the particular countries' official policy was to disguise USSR involvement and to suppress any evidence of it since the publication of such materials could result in a serious deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union. Thus, trials in Eastern European countries were analyzed apart from earlier Soviet trials and USSR internal policy, but in connection with the Soviet Union's foreign policy. Thus, the continuity of show trial history was lost and the analysis of USSR political trials remained unfinished. What needs elaboration is that the Soviet leadership approached show trials in a different manner from repression in general. To this day it has not dared to review the trials officially, and this is because of the very nature of the trials themselves. In what follows political trials will be examined within this context.

The Show Trial Phenomenon

Public opinion views the USSR trials as part of the general pattern of repression. Their legal groundlessness is beyond doubt. Yet, although these trials dealt with cases of political transgression against the regime, their cardinal feature did not consist of the innocence of the accused (this was true for only some of the trials), but of the unique methods of investigation and court examination employed, and of the content and legal inadmissibility of the charges. Thus this includes not only the post-War trials in Soviet bloc countries, the "Trotskyite trials" of the late Thirties, and the preceeding trials of the Stalinist era (i.e., the major trials of 1928-31, such as the 1928 Shakhty case, the 1930 "Industrial party" trial, and the 1931 "All-Union Menshevik Bureau" trial, but also the show trials of the Twenties, such as the 1922 trial of the Social-Revolutionary Party, the 1924 Savinkov case, the 1924 trial of Georgian Nationalists, and so forth.[4]

Discussing Leninist and Stalinist trials in the same category runs counter to the well-established view of the two epochs as opposite or, at any rate, very different. No one will deny such a difference. After all, Leninist terror was rooted in the revolution and then in the extremely brutal Civil war. Stalinist terror, on the other hand, took place after a relatively protracted period of "peaceful developemnt": its only real cause was the colossal intrusion of bureaucratic power into the lives of millions of people to repair, through unrestrained

several countries, such as Czechoslovakia, the review of these trials dragged on for years and was excruciatingly painful.

3. This was especially true in 1956 Poland and Hungary. Also, the demand for an official review of the trials played a major role in Czechoslovakia during the Sixties.

4. See Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago. 1918-1956* Translated by T. P. Whitney (New York, 1974), where the trials of the Twenties are extensively discussed.

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industrialization, the crisis brought about by the October revolution. Yet, the difference of the two periods or, more precisely, the *raison d'etre* of repression does not mean that there are no essential similarities in things such as the show trials.

Neither terror nor its public justification can fully account for the political trials. There were times in Soviet history when terror, even against relatively well-known political figures, was accompanied by little, if any, juridical procedure. On the other hand, a number of major show trials did not lead directly to terror as such — especially during the NEP years. The key to understanding these trials is that the accused's guilt or innocence was of little importance. These trials were not intended to determine guilt or punish transgressors, even if, from the authorities' viewpoint, an actual crime had been committed. Thus, arbitrariness and miscarriage of justice, although they played a role, were not a necessary condition. The trials were a specific instrument of mass political action for mobilizing the masses in support of certain goals. Once this is established, several aspects common to all trials can be discerned.

A major feature of show trials was their extensive publicity: all trials were accompanied by massive political campaigns, which did not stop at publishing all legal materials pertaining to the case, but also included party meetings, rallies, resolutions calling for the condemnation of the accused — even an occasional public demonstration.[5] In order to enhance the political effect of a major trial, local political trials were often held concurrently. Such local trials, in turn, provided the basis for regional political campaigns.

A political decision by the Politburo, the Secretariat or even Stalin himself was necessary for show trials.[6] This does not imply, however, that legal cases which became show trials were always fabricated by the authorities. Occasionally, ordinary legal cases deemed particularly conducive to a political campaign or receiving unusually wide publicity were chosen to become show trials. Then the legal case would become political. A typical example of such a development was the so-called 1928 Shakhty case in which engineers and technicians of the Donbass coal-mining industry were accused of "industrial sabotage". In this case (which opened the way for a whole series of trials

5. The 1922 trial of the Social-Revolutionary Party is a prime example: in the summer of 1922 a "workers' demonstration" by many thousands was organized, replete with demands for the death penalty.

6. This was already true even in Lenin's days. Preparation for the Social-Revolutionary Party trial involved many leading party functionaries. When Radek and Bukharin in the Spring of 1922 promised that none of the defendants would be sentenced to death and that socialists from abroad would be allowed to serve as counsels for the defense, Lenin's reaction was summed up in his article "We Have Paid Too Much". There he chastised those promises as an error, a "political concession to the international bourgeoisie," (Lenin, *Collected Works,* v. 33 (Moscow, 1973), p. 332. Under Stalin the situation deteriorated.

One of the trials that took place without the formal consent of the Politburo was the one aimed at the "Trotsky-Zinoviev terrorist center" — the so-called "Trial of the Sixteen" (Zinoviev, Kamenev, I. Smirnov and others) in August 1936. See, for example, Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror, Stalin's Purge of the Thirties* (New York, 1968) pp. 90-103.

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in the late Twenties and early Thirties), the initiative of the local chapter of the police (OGPU) was supported by Stalin in the face of serious opposition within party ranks.[7]

When discussing show trials as the beginning of wide-ranging political campaigns, it is essential to envisage their role in the life of the political apparatus. The party leadership's decisions spelled out the activities of the lower party ranks. In the following years, even the lowest levels of govenment were incorporated into campaigns and thousands of people became involved. Since these trials were aimed at large groups, their results and concomitant mentality became firmly entrenched in society — a palpable influence in all subsequent events.

These trials were not legal trials as such, but political showpieces masquerading as legal procedures.[8] Yet, indifference towards the accused's guilt or innocence did not translate into a lenient verdict — itself an element of political action.[9] The show trials were faked insofar as they were not due to any concrete crime, but to the desire for some mass political action by the authorities. As a rule, both the investigators and the judges were aware of the groundlessness of the case or even the non-existence of the crimes attributed to the defendants.

In the beginning, staging show trials was far from easy. The early trials were aimed at the regime's genuine political opponents. Consequently, the trials were staged in such a way that the resistance of the accused became an integral part of the trial, the very factor that lent it an ear of propriety. A typical example of this was the Social-Revolutionary Party trial of 1922. The careful political staging of this trial included the participation of major communist figures such as Piatakov, Bukharin, Zetkin, Lunacharsky, Sadul and others as judges, prosecutors and counsels for the defense. Not only did they "employ" the court as a political mouthpiece, but their very presence was to testify to the trial's authenticity. The crimes attributed to the accused were either commit-

7. See Michal Reiman, *Die Geburt des Stalinismus. Die UdSSR am Vorabend der "zweiten Revolution"* (Frankfurt am Main, 1979) chapter 5; or "The Shakhty Case", in *Vremia i My*, (Tel-Aviv, 1979), n. 45. An earlier example was the inquest into the murder of a country correspondent, G. Malinovsky, in Dymovka — a village in the Odessa region. Originally a criminal matter, it turned into an investigation of the moral decay of the local party and Soviet activist corps resulting in a statewide political campaign lasting several months. Subsequently, "Dymovka" became part of the jargon of party functionaries in the Twenties. Although the true motives behind the murder of Malinovsky are still unclear, members of the Dymovka party organization were among the accused, despite the fact that both the regional party committee at Nikolaev and the district party committee at Odessa thought Malinovsky a shady figure and considered the whole case suspect. Special measures employed to overcome this reluctance of local authorities included the appointment of an inquiry board (June 2, 1925). The Malinovsky trial was the authorities' reaction to frequent attacks on rural correspondents and other activists by angry peasants. The names of rural correspondents were an official secret; penalties for divulging such information were also established.

8. This phenomenon is apparently rooted in Lenin's idea of the courts' mass educational role — an idea that was well assimilated by the party leadership.

9. In the "Trotskyist trials" of the late Thirties, the physical elimination of the accused was a condition *sine qua non* of the verdict. But even then the question of guilt or innocence never arose: the court simply did not concern itself with such matters.

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ted in the early stages of the Civil war and subsequently pardoned by a decree, or belonged to the category of unprovable assertions.[10] Thus, the accusations were absolutely arbitrary and politically motivated. To ensure the trial's success, authorities employed a tactic that subsequently became almost normal procedure: the co-operation of some of the accused was obtained in exchange for immunity. These people's "confessions" were used to substantiate charges against the rest.

The Social-Revolutionary Party trial was typical of the period when authorities were mainly interested in compromising and suppressing political opposition. This period came to an end with the trials of Savinkov and the Georgian Nationalists. In the following years, show trial practice developed in a different direction. At that point, open political oppostion was of no consequence and the people involved in the trials were either apolitical or even sympathizers of the regime. The staging of a trial became blatant: not only the accusations, but also the "enemies of the state" had to be fabricated. Now charges were solely concerned with the defendants' alleged "undercover activities" and since the latter were not opposed to the regime any need to manipulate their resistance was obviated. Only in the Shakhty case did the defendants resist, albeit on a personal, apolitical level (and even this was due to the lack of "preparation" on the part of authorities). Unconstrained in their choice of victims, the prosecution selected only those who were broken and certain to co-operate. This often culminated in absurdities: convinced of the defendants' loyalty to the regime, the prosecution appealed to their "conscience" and "sense of duty" to ensure the "success of the undertaking".[11]

There was no need to involve major political figures any longer. They were replaced first by Bolshevik functionaries of secondary importance, and then by professional jurists. The trials became more bureaucratic: The authenticity of the defendants' behavior ceased to concern authorities. Now, the accused would not only confess to trumped up charges, but also proffer political self-evaluations.[12]

10. The prosecution's favorite argument concerned the defendants' secret activities and their concealment of the truth. Terrorism was invariably mentioned as one of the secret activities: the main defendants were even accused of taking part in Kaplan's attempt on Lenin's life in 1918. This, however, meant to conceal lack of real evidence.

11. Yakubovich, one of the "All-Union Menshevik Bureau" defendants, recalls a conversation with his prosecutor Krylenko, a well-known Bolshevik: "After offering me a seat, Krylenko said: 'I do not doubt your personal innocence. We are both fulfilling our duty as party members — for I considered and will always consider you a communist — I will prosecute and you will confess. If anything unforseen happens at the trial I am counting on you; if necessary I will call on you and you will find what to say." I remained silent. "Agreed?" asked Krylenko. I mumbled something to the effect that I would do my duty; I think there were tears in my eyes. Krylenko waved his hand approvingly and I left." Roy A. Medvedev, *K sudu istorii* (New York, 1974), p. 265, (translated in English as *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism)* (New York, 1971).

12. When in 1953 Slansky and several others were on trial in Czechoslovakia, this practice became so exaggerated as to jar the uninformed public: "It's as if they are lecturing." See *Pervertierte Justiz. Bericht der Kommission des ZK der KPTsch über die politischen Morde und Verbrechen in der Tschechoslowakei 1949-1963.* Jiri Pelikan, ed., (Wien-Mürich, 1972), p. 120.

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These aspects of show trials were further developed in the late Thirties. Once again, the defendants were major political figures capable of resistance, yet the situation was altogether different from that of the 1922 Social-Revolutionary Party trial. This time the accused were from the ranks of the founders and active supporters of the regime (while it was true that some had opposed Stalin in the past, they had abandoned such activity long before the trial). Their resistance, unlike that of the Social-Revolutionaries, would expose the fraudulence of the accusations and the unlawful nature of the trial itself. Consequently, the prosecution had no choice but to coerce the defendants to admit to wholly fictitious wrongdoings. This, of course, was fully consistent with the previous "experience" and suited the growing bureaucratization of the political police (the NKVD), the judiciary, and the political apparatus as a whole.

The theatrical nature of the trials also determines their third main feature: they always involved a monstrous miscarriage of justice or, more precisely, total judicial arbitrariness. This arbitrariness was implicit in the procedural aspect of the trials, but also affected the definitions of crimes and the verdicts. What appears paradoxical is that arbitrariness reigned supreme even in cases where the defendants could conceivably have been guilty of some illegal activities. But, after all, the court was never interested in the crimes of the defendants in the first place. Authorities were only interested in the confirmation of the theses on which the particular trial was based.

Show trials fall into four main categories: the trials of the early Twenties aimed at the Bolsheviks' ideological and political opponents; trials of the late Twenties and early Thirties, aimed at economists, engineers and technicians, who were accused of "industrial sabotage"; the trials of the late Thirties, aimed at noted Bolsheviks (including those in the military); and, finally, the trials of major political figures in Soviet bloc countries after WWII.

The political reasoning behind each major trial was unique. In the very first trial, the 1922 trial of the Social-Revolutionary Party, authorities wanted to compromise and destroy the Social-Revolutionaries. This trial was truly an extension of the Leninist concept of NEP: social-economic concessions were not to be extended to the political scene.[13] Initially, the Bolsheviks considered NEP a concession to peasant demands. The Social-Revolutionaries, for their part, represented or attempted to represent the peasants, whose problems, even after the introduction of NEP in the Spring of 1921, could not be considered solved. Several successive harvests were exceedingly meagre and famine claimed several millions victims, mostly peasants, in the Volga region, Northern Caucasus, and parts of the Ukraine. Under these conditions an

13. Lenin formulated this view of NEP as early as the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1921. In his speech at the Eleventh Congress in March of 1922 he said: "And when a Menshevik says, 'You are now retreating; I have been advocating retreat all the time, I agree with you, I am your man, let us retreat together,' we say in reply, 'For the public manifestations of Menshevism, our revolutionary courts must pass the death sentence, otherwise they are not our courts but God knows what'." V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, v. 33 (Moscow 1973), p. 282.

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increase in the Social-Revolutionaries' seemed imminent.

As a political campaign, the Social-Revolutionary Party trial was the authorities' assault on the "multi-party" principle and a break with the practice of token participation by other socialist parties. The trial of Georgian Mensheviks after a suppressed revolt in Georgia of 1924 had a similar flavor. The revolt, partly provoked by the authorities (the OGPU was fully aware of the planned revolt, but did not seek to forestall it), was a belated effort to prevent the international recognition of the Soviet Union's annexation of Georgia. The subsequent trial, as well as the revolt itself, were then used to justify the brutal suppression of Georgian nationalism.[14]

The mid-Twenties saw a decline of political trials. This was the height of NEP and the campaign for "socialist legality". Authorities sought to dampen social conflict, overcome the legacy of "War Communism", and promote peacetime development thus rendering political trials and campaigns unsuitable.

A new phase of trials began at the end of the Twenties when economic difficulties led to the dismantling of NEP, increasingly harsh social oppression, and mass dissatisfaction. This new stage was ushered in when the political police tried to blame major breakdowns in production and the miserable situation of Donbass workers on "industrial sabotage" by technicians and engineers. Stalin subsequently added a political dimension: now intensified oppression and a marked deterioration of living conditions could be explained as a consequence of sabotage by owners and engineers rather than a direct result of state policy. Such tactics skillfully exploited the re-emerging antagonism between the poor and the well-off, the lumpen-proletariat and the NEP-men. Thus, the trials successfully deflected popular discontent from the vital centers of power. The regime would have to sacrifice some of its elements to gain the political means to defend its main positions.

The trials of the late Twenties and early Thirties were also crucial inasmuch as they defined a completely new function for political trials. Whereas in the past they relieved excess social tension, now show trials justified and created political and psychological premises for a reorientation of the Soviet power structure; for radical changes in the operating power structure's methods; for the top down replacement of its cadres and a wholesale shift in the composition, behavior and psychology of the ruling class withal.

Many features of the trials of the late Thirties remain unclear, e.g., what prompted Stalin and his cohorts to effect such far-reaching measures. These trials posed a real danger to the power structure itself: they could mobilize the ruling class against Stalin while they also threatened to severely hamper or even paralyze the activity of all government bodies because of the indiscriminate terror. These trials were also means of relieving social tension and

14. Soviet troops occupied Georgia in 1921. Prior to the occupation the Menshevik party enjoyed the population's support. The occupation and subsequent annexation of Georgia brought about intensified repression and a marked deterioration of economic and social conditions.

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quelling popular dissatisfaction with living and working conditions. What set them apart from the early trials was their target. They struck central institutions and not just secondary links in the power structure. Social management became secondary: the trials' main function was now a terror that disoriented and disorganized the ruling class, mobilized the masses, and created an atmosphere of suspicion and denunciation that made organized resistance impossible.

The trials of the late Thirties differed from their predecessors in another way: the actual punishment of the accused became important. The justification of the verdicts to the public became a main function of the trials. If in the past authorities unwillingly kept their promises and eased the fate of certain defendants, now these promises of clemency were simply a means of extracting the needed confessions. The severity of the verdicts indicates that the trials' political impact was not enough: authorities wished to destroy the defendants as well.

The trials of the late Thirties were the first to be directly connected to mass terror. This was hardly true of the early trials which were aimed against specific political and social groups. The trials of the late Twenties and early Thirties took place when terror against major social groups, and in particular the peasantry, was intensifying. Still, those trials were, for the most part, a means of social management rather than mass terror. The trials of the late Thirties, on the other hand, were directly connected with the justification and implementation of mass terror — especially terror against members of the ruling class. Furthermore, the persons and groups charged in these trials had been unseated from positions of power many years before their respective trials, and their return to power was unlikely. The selection of political figures such as Zinoviev, Kamenev, Piatakov, Radek, Rykov, and Bukharin guaranteed the trials wide publicity and mass public response, thus creating an atmosphere favorable to action against persons and groups still near the seat of power — Ordzhonikidze, Rudzutak, Chubaŕ, Kossior and others. More generally, the trials' aim was to incriminate any political or ideological deviation from the official course. The impact of these trials on public life in the Soviet Union was so profound as to lead to the widespread acceptance of the "hostile conspiracy" method of explaining social faults and contradictions.

Finally, it is necessary to discuss the trials in Soviet bloc countries. These can be subdivided into three groups. First came those aimed at anti-communists, analogous to the Soviet trials of the early Twenties. Depending on time and place, they served essentially two purposes: 1) to undermine the influence and stature of non-communist parties, and 2) to condemn political pluralism in principle. The Soviet experience was in evidence from the start: authorities invariably staged the trials to highlight political effects rather than actual circumstances. Consequently, trumped up charges (the charge of "fascism" or "collaboration with the fascists" proved especially useful), coerced confessions, and wanton disregard for legal norms were all prominently displayed. The situation was further aggravated by the coarsening of political

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norms and common brutality — consequences of the war and the preceeding reign of fascism.

This first wave of political trials graphically demonstrated to Soviet authorities that the danger was not restricted to non-communist groups and pluralist tendencies: the predilection of foreign communist parties for independent action also posed a threat. This threat became reality in 1947, when basic political disagreement surfaced between Soviet and Yugoslav communists, leading to the break between USSR and Yugoslavia in 1948. At this point the Stalinist leadership, displeased by the inadequate verbal denunciation of Yugoslavia by other Soviet bloc countries, resorted to actual incrimination of independent policy. This technique was first applied to Yugoslavia itself — it was branded an Imperialist ally — and then to other communist parties. Appropriate show trials were staged: the trials of Reik (Hungary), Kostov (Bulgaria), Koce Dzodze (Albania), as well as repression coupled with an intended trial of Gomulka in Poland. It is patently obvious that these trials were a direct extension of Soviet policy.

Soviet bloc countries were to suffer yet another wave of trials in the early Fifties, when terror against the previously ascendant communist strata heralded radical changes in the ideology, structure, and personnel of the government apparatus. In all countries, the conspiracy theory of social flaws and contradictions made its appearance. New trials were needed to disseminate and reinforce this theory: this time the accusations did not concern the independent policies pursued by Soviet bloc countries, but stressed connections with various Imperialist agencies and alleged "Zionism". The Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia was the catalyst for this third wave of political trials, which was all the more significant because of the concurrent Soviet campaign against "Zionism" and "Cosmopolitism", the subsequent "Doctors' Plot" of 1953, and Stalin's preparations for a purge of Soviet leadership — developments that were shelved with Stalin's death in March of 1953. Paradoxically, the last person to suffer the indignities of a Stalinist trial was Berya, whose trial spearheaded the first campaign to redress the crimes of the Stalinist era.

Political Trials and Communist Party Leadership

This discussion of political show trials raises the question of their effect on leading Soviet political figures. Some have tried to explain political trials in terms of Stalin and his henchmen, or even Stalin personally; others have claimed that the Bolshevik party as a whole was capable of any brutality and any crime for the sake of ideology. Neither of these extremes can be accepted.

The attitude of the Soviet Union's ruling party towards repression differed from that of an ordinary, European political party. This was due, in part, to the tribulations of revolution and civil war, as well as to the Czarist tradition of political persecution. Two considerations were of paramount importance. First, there was the ideology of class relations after the revolution, which postulated the "dictatorship of the proletariat" — in reality, the unhampered rule

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of the Communist party. This could only lead to the demise of juridical procedures, for now questions of guilt and punishment were governed by political expediency. The Bolsheviks' social prejudices also played a role: members of the propertied classes were viewed as enemies irrespective of their individual guilt or innocence. Such summary justice was especially prevalent during the civil war, but its consequences survive to this day. Secondly, there was the notion of the trials' educational value with the court as a stage for presenting certain political ideas. Thus, general political concepts such as the alleged link between the Russian and the "International" bourgeoisie became a matter of juridical inquiry, with the prosecution invariably attempting to establish it in the course of a trial.

With the advent of NEP the concept of justice began to change. Preventive terror became a thing of the past, the jurisdiciton of the secret police (OGPU) was severely curtailed, and 1924 witnessed an official campaign for "socialist legality" — the brainchild of Rykov and Kalinin. Up to and including the Shakhty trial or, more precisely, as long as non-Stalinist factions in the party leadership maintained some influence, the OGPU or the *Prokuratura* had to present their evidence to the party leadership before permission to stage a politically motivated trial was granted. But even then proper juridical procedures were compromised, because the final word remained with the party and related to the notions of political crimes and the legal system's political significance.

The "class" definition of politically criminal activity provided the OGPU with numerous possibilities of abuses of power. The party leadership did not place much faith in the OGPU and the investigative organs when it came to individual cases, but the OGPU did enjoy complete trust as an institution. As a result, even when the leadership judged some case suspect and decided to scrutinize the OGPU's investigative activities, such an inquiry would run its course in an atmosphere of trust towards the organization.[15] Also, the OGPU soon became an object of a struggle between the various Bolshevik factions: no Communist Party leader would risk a conflict with the OGPU because it would provide an opening for the other side.[16] Consequently, inquiries into the political content of a case were at best, superficial. Personal convictions of individual party leaders notwithstanding, the trials would continue in their tradition of careful staging and legal arbitrariness.

The role of Stalin in the development of political trials should be examined separately, for his behavior evolved along with the trial practices as a whole.

15. Individual party members were expressly forbidden from interferring in OGPU investigations. For such an inquiry a decision of the assembled party leadership was required, which usually resulted in the creation of a committee and so forth. The General Secretary of the Central Committee supervised the day to day activity of the OGPU and also instructed the OGPU Chairman in political matters. This set-up made it difficult for individual party leaders to assess the real circumstances of a given case or to understand the OGPU's investigative methods.

16. Typically, the moderates in the Communist Party leadership — Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky — until 1928 counted on the support of several OGPU leaders, such as Yagoda and Trilisser, in their struggle against Stalin.

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For a time he too was bound by the constraint of the party milieu, its behavioral norms, political concepts and ideology. At any rate, until 1927 Stalin co-operated with the moderate wing of the party (Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky) and defended NEP. This had to affect his use of the repressive apparatus. That Stalin was from the start predisposed towards abuse of power and imposition of force is undeniable. That, however, did not necessarily imply terror. For reasons of his own, Stalin tried to project a moderate image. Such a reputation was, of course, incompatible with political trials and their "hostile class" approach. Stalin's hand was forced by the deepening social and economic crisis, which compelled him to utilize trials to the fullest extent. As for the trials' specific political role, Stalin probably recognized it with the advent of the Shakhty trial. Yet, Stalin was able to realize the full power of the weapon only after the elimination of the moderates from the ruling circles of the Communist Party.[17]

The resistance of party rank and file to the intrusion of the state into party matters should not be ignored: the Bolsheviks had learned the lesson of the French Revolution and the fate of the Jacobins. The "hostile class" approach used to justify the early trials was not seen by party members as applicable to themselves. To accuse such one-time party leaders as Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, and Bukharin of counter-revolutionary activities was no small feat. Such accusations were made possible, in part, by factional resentment which intensified all through the Twenties — particularly between the leadership and the left-wing opposition. 1927 saw growing efforts to label the opposition "counter-revolutionary" and "in league with anti-Soviet elements". The deportation of Trotsky in 1929 lent further credence to charges of ties with foreign governments, political parties, or simply espionage circles.

The first instance of charges being levelled against well-known party members occurred in 1930: the OGPU report on the "technicians' and engineers' conspiracy" mentioned several noted communists (Riazanov and others). Still, trials of communists were not on the agenda at the time — which indicates the extent of the resistance to trials within party ranks — a plan that required political trials for legitimation — had been fully worked out. Stalin's plan was yet to undergo several revisions, and only in August 1936, more than a year after the assassination of Kirov in Leningrad, was Stalin able to set in motion the first of the "Trotskyist trials".[18]

17. This process did not end with the defeat of the moderate wing (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky) in 1929. The 1930-31 trials were preceeded by the "unmasking" of Syrzov and Lominadze (respectively the Chairman of RSFSR *Sovnarkom* and the leader of the trans-Caucasus wing of the Communist Party) and by the removal of Rykov from the chairmanship of the USSR *Sovnarkom*.

18. Further evidence was inadvertently furnished by Stalin himself in his oft-quoted statement to the effect that the purge of the party came four years too late. (see R. A. Medvedev, *op. cit.*, p. 339). Of course, the first trials of communists took place in late 1934 and early 1935, when Zinoviev and Kamenev, among others, were sentenced to long jail terms. These were political trials but, unlike the subsequent Trotskyist trials, they were not widely publicized and the charges had been toned down to reassure the moderates.

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The party rank and file could be expected to continue resisting the imposition of trials as an established practice. The Politburo itself was probably split: there were staunch Stalinists who fully supported his repressive policies and there were those who balked at the thought of mass terror. According to some sources, Stalin concealed the preparations for the "Trial of the Sixteen" — the trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev — from at least some party leaders.[19] Ordzhonikidze's protests with regard to the second "Trotskyists trial", the trial of Piatakov and Radek, are well-documented. They ended in his forced suicide. Quite possibly, there was also resistance when the fate of the others — Rudzutak, Chubaŕ, Kossior — was decided.

Not even all convinced Stalinists can be charged with full complicity. Only a few were fully in the know: Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Malenkov, Kaganovich.[20] They developed a kind of defensive reaction: ideological considerations supplanted the true circumstances of the trials in their minds. The younger leaders, on the other hand, were not fully informed and had no way of obtaining the whole story. Among them were a number of political figures in Soviet bloc countries who had fallen under Stalin's influence. They developed a peculiar psychological barrier, a new mode of thinking, whereby ideological and political theses, born of the struggle against illusory foes, superseded personal experience. The creation of such doublethink, in fact, was one of the initial goals of the trials.

Official Reviews of the Trials

The review of political trials after Stalin's death occupied a different place in the scheme of Soviet politics from the rehabilitation of the victims of terror and persecution. Whereas the victims of the terror were, for the most part, exonerated or amnestied, and wanton persecution was quietly and equivocally condemned by the authorities, political trials have yet to be reviewed.

There are good reasons for this. The experience of Soviet bloc countries was instructive: in Poland and Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia fully twelve years later the review of political trials led to a great public outcry, which was received in some Soviet circles as a convincing argument against such a review in the USSR. The review of political trials had such a great effect on society because it dissolved the anonymity of Stalinist terror and its victims and presented to millions of people the concrete actions of the authorities; the concrete perpetrators and the concrete victims of arbitrary terror.

There is yet another aspect to the matter. The persons tried in the USSR in the late Thirties and in Soviet bloc countries after the war were major communist politicians. The review of their trials would affect the internal politics of the various communist parties and become a factor in the struggle for

19. See Conquest, *The Great Terror, op. cit.*, p. 103.

20. In his secret report on Stalin's "personality cult" at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev cited a quote from the deposition of Rudzutak, one of the oldest Stalinist leaders, who told the court (which had sentenced him to death) of an "undercover 'center' within the NKVD" devoted to fabricating false cases.

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reforms and changes in the power structure. In this context three main schools of thought are discernible. The neo-Stalinists are certainly opposed to any review of the trials. The liberal faction favors such a review, which they would use against the Stalinists and neo-Stalinists, but would eschew publicity — especially after 1956 — and opt for a surreptitious dissemination of the results of the review among the public. Finally, a small radical faction, composed mainly of party intellectuals outside the power structure, clamors for a public review of the trials in the hope of mobilizing society and creating a socio-political base for the introduction of necessary reforms.

Needless to say, the Soviet power structure gained the upper hand in the ensuing clash of opinion and a compromise between the neo-Stalinists and the liberal elements within the power structure was struck: the review of the trials was postponed indefinitely. The heart of the matter is that the political trials are deeply imbedded in the structure of the Soviet state. The trials were a major factor in the development of political and economic ideas which govern Soviet policy to this day. A review of the political trials of the Thirties would undoubtedly lead to a reconsideration of internal party politics in the Twenties, which in turn would throw doubt on the victorious Stalinist theory and practice — the foundation of the current *status quo*. At the same time, the problem of internal dissent and clash of interests would get a new hearing, which would radically alter the party's preconceptions. Perhaps dissent would even become a positive feature, a means of mitigating the wholesale endorsement of bad policy. All of the above holds true for the review of the earlier trials as well, with the difference that, in this case, the official ideology of class distinction and class struggle would also be questioned. Consequently, the hypothetical review of political trials would endanger the entire set of political notions on which contemporary Soviet power structure is based.

The review of political trials should not be equated with the review and condemnation of Stalinist terror. Resistance to the review of the trials is vital to the perpetuation of the current Soviet regime: the consequences of such a review in Poland, Hungary and then Czechoslovakia cannot be considered accidental.

Today it is difficult to predict the future of the review of the political trials in the USSR. It will depend on the factional struggle within the party, but also on the development of society as a whole. Obviously, the passage of time lessens the mobilizing impact of a review. Possibly, at some future date, an unpublicized review will not lead to immediate social violence. Still, the review of political trials in the Soviet Union would indicate a revision of ideology and herald a new stage in the development of that society.

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

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STATE TERROR IN SOUTH AFRICA

by Frederick Johnstone

Among modern states, South Africa is and has been one of the most repressive. This has been most noticeable in the Sharpeville killings in 1960 and the more recent Soweto massacre. State repression is also implicated in the deaths, while in detention, of Steve Biko and of the white activist Neil Agget, as well as in continuing arrests, detentions, bannings, torture and executions.

As in most other cases of state repression, such direct terrorism is merely a symptom of a much larger, many-sided and ultimately more important process of indirect state terror. This process can only be understood in the particular context of the changing racial system. The South African ruling class is currently seeking to re-legitimize domination by de-emphasizing race and generating a consensus around its policies.

State repression in South Africa has always been mystified by the fact that it has taken the form of a system of racial domination (white supremacy). At first, in the 1950s and 60s, its explanation and opposition to it were formulated in terms of liberal "race relations": as a civil rights problem stemming from the irrational cultural forces of racism, prejudice and ethnic nationalism, in the process of being solved by modern economic forces, education and moral appeals. According to this view, the state had been taken over (in 1948) by fascist-racist-nationalist Afrikaners who, with their archaic ideology of apartheid, were intent on preserving and extending the traditional system of white supremacy. However, this aim was viewed as an impossibility in a highly industrialized modern society. The "archaic and irrational policy" with its various segregationist controls over labor allocation (such as restrictions on the urbanization and mobility of black workers and on the use of blacks in skilled labor), was seen to be incompatible with the economic efficiency of a "rational economy". At the same time the "rational economy" (i.e., industrial capitalism), was full of powerful integrative and meritocratic forces, which were subverting the racial system, "making nonsense of apartheid," and promising to end white supremacy. Economic growth thus meant political liberalization. State repression was seen as an archaic residue of irrational cultural forces, unable to survive its exposure to the imperatives of modern capitalism.

The popularity of the liberal view of state repression and racial domination reached its peak during the economic boom of the 1960s in South Africa. The paradox of the 60s, however, was that this economic growth was accompanied not by liberalization but by continued domination and intensified repression.[1] A new interpretation was developed seeing this domination as

1. See Frederick Johnstone, "White Prosperity and White Supremacy in South Africa Today," *African Affairs* 69:275 (1970). See also Martin Legassick, "South Africa: Capital Accumulation and

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actually highly "rational" and "functional" for South African capitalism. It was seen historically rooted not so much in irrational cultural forces as in the exploitative and predatory interests and structures of South African capitalism.

This approach to inequality, domination and state repression in South Africa gained increasing influence in the 1970s. For this new school of thought,[2] repression in South Africa was essentially a matter of class rather than race. The traditional liberal preoccupation with race relations, irrational racism and emancipatory market forces, was replaced by a concern with class relations and capitalism, and by a class explanation of racial domination. From this view, the basic reason for the subordination of blacks was that it facilitated the exploitation of black labor. What had emerged in South Africa in the early twentieth century was an exploitative capitalist system based on this racial discrimination. By giving whites a monopoly of state power and by denying basic civil, political and labor rights to blacks, this system made possible the exploitation of black workers. A battery of legal and state-enforced discrimination measures, enforced by the direct and terroristic state intervention in the economic, political and social spheres, kept blacks (black workers in particular) relatively powerless and regimented.

This subordination of blacks and regimentation of black workers was so elaborate and effective that, gradually, overt state terrorism was often unnecessary. Whites used their monopoly of state power (already before the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, but increasingly so thereafter) to enact land and tax laws which divided South Africa into 'white' and 'African' areas. Most of South Africa was declared a white area (although whites were a small minority of the total population) thus restricting black property rights in white areas and confining blacks to proletarian class positions, while increasing pressure on blacks to seek wage labor in white areas. This power was used to set up "pass laws", which controlled the movement and residence of blacks, and migratized black workers by restricting their rights in urban areas. Anti-desertion and anti-strike measures, along with various other control mechanisms, were instituted against black workers, e.g., controlled housing in the form of the closed compound and the native location.

The archetypal example of this was the gold mining industry in and around Johannesburg. A few large capitalist companies employed large numbers of cheap black labor. Migrant workers were "recruited" from Southern Africa, housed in prison-like compounds, and paid very little. Through various measures, the companies kept wages very low. When black resistance arose,

Violence," *Economy and Society* 3:3 (1974); Stanley Trapido, "South Africa in a Comparative Study of Industrialization," *Journal of Development Studies* No. 7 (1971); and Harold Wolpe, "Industrialism and Race in South Africa," in S. Zubaida, ed., *Race and Racialism*; and Harold Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: From Segragation to Apartheid," *Economy and Society*, 1:4 (1972).

2. For an overview of the "new school," see Frederick Johnstone, "Most Painful to Our Hearts: South Africa Through the Eyes of the New School," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 16:1 (1982).

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either individually such as desertion, or collectively through strikes, it was immediately dealt with by the state. Armed police or soldiers would invariably be called in to force striking black workers back to work and to arrest leaders, who would be jailed and/or deported. This was greatly facilitated by the compounds, which were physically so constructed as to be virtual prisons enclosed from the outside, so that police were able to bring them under control one at a time, to prevent communication between them.[3] The same principle applied to the "native locations" which were gradually developed in or near cities, as easily controlled ghettoes.[4]

State repression in South Africa was thus characterized by a combination of indirect repression (institutional-structural coercion) and directly terroristic repression (the use of force in conflict situations), with the success of the former minimizing the need for the latter. While the latter is certainly a major feature of South African labor history, the relative infrequency of violence testifies to the effective role of indirect repression. The elaborate system of racial discrimination, and its efficient administration and enforcement by the white-monopolized state, stabilized class domination and exploitation to a remarkable degree — more so perhaps than in any other modern society.[5]

The post-World War II period in South Africa falls roughly into two phases: the consolidation of domination and repression by hardline apartheid policies in the 1950s and 1960s, and a phase of conflict, hegemony crisis and neo-apartheid in the 1970s and 1980s.

Although much was made of the 1948 election victory of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party and its "new" hardline policy of apartheid, the two decades that followed it were notable for continuity rather than change in the basic pattern of class exploitation, racial domination and state repression. The liberal preoccupation with the "great watershed" of 1948 is thus deceptive since it obscures this continuity. After 1948, the racial system was pragmatically modernized and rationalized, by a whole arsenal of new discriminatory and repressive laws, which built on and extended earlier ones. The exploitative labor system was reinforced and rationalized in various ways, such as the more systematic exclusion of black workers from trade union and the more effective regulation of black residence and movement in "white areas."[6] Sweeping new state security laws were introduced, beginning with the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act which criminalized most forms of oppositional activity and gave the state wide powers of detention.

The reasons for the re-invigoration of the status quo by hardline policies at

3. For a detailed analysis of the gold mining industry, and of the class conflict arising out of this, see Frederick Johnstone, *Class, Race and Gold: A Study of Class Relations and Racial Discrimination in South Africa* (London: 1976).

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39. Also see H.J. and R.E. Simons, *Class and Color in South Africa, 1850-1950* (London, 1969).

5. The Simons' book, which is still probably the best general history of labor, the left, resistance and repression in South Africa up to the 1950s.

6. The best systematic and detailed account of all this is to be found in the annual reports of the International Labor Organization on Labor and Apartheid in South Africa (Geneva: I.L.O., 1964 onwards).

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this time are still debated. Some important factors, however, were growing urbanization, industrialization and class struggle in the 1940s; white farmers' and white workers' class fears; and the mobilizing activities of the Afrikaner nationalist movement in the 1930s and 40s, with its ethnic and racial solutions.[7] These policies, of course, did take new directions to deal with changing conditions. Especially under Verwoerd, apartheid ideology sought to legitimate the system in a de-colonizing world by justifying the denial of black rights in white areas in reformulated terms. Black rights and "ethnic self-determination" were to be realized in the old Reserves, now re-designated as "homelands" and "bantustans".

Any doubts about essential continuities of earlier racial policies should have been dispelled by the political repression of the 1950s and 60s. The stage had already been set by the brutal suppression of the 1946 black mine workers' strike — South Africa's "biggest strike and one of the most shameful episodes in South Africa's long record of repression."[8] Along with the "Suppression of Communism Act" which followed it, this weakened what existed of a leftist opposition. Hardline apartheid policies provoked united black and white resistance in the form of demonstrations and passive resistance campaigns. These were met with force, and it was one such demonstration that ended in the Sharpeville massacre of 1960. Following this, the African National Congress (the main black opposition movement), the Communist Party and other such groups began underground resistance. But during the 1960s they were successfully infiltrated and disbanded by state security forces. Leaders such as Nelson Mandela were tried and sentenced to life imprisonment on Robben Island (South Africa's equivalent to the Siberian Gulag), and groups such as ANC began a phase of ineffectual opposition from exile. Thus, there were no major black strikes or political protests for most of the 1960s.

Thus, the prevailing liberal wisdom concerning the incompatibility of archaic racial domination and modern market forces was contradicted by the continuing coexistence of an economic boom and hardline racial domination. This coexistence is not inexplicable once the functional connection between white supremacy and white prosperity is analyzed. By the end of the 1960s, white supremacy in South Africa seemed to have acquired an indestructible character. This image was shattered in the 1970s, beginning with extensive black labor strikes early in the decade and continuing through the massive student uprising and worker strikes of 1976 (including the Soweto massacre). Along with growing pressures from the liberation movements elsewhere in Southern Africa and from international sources, this created the

7. On this, see in particular seminal articles by Dan O'Meara, "The Afrikaner Broederbond 1927-48: Class Vanguard of Afrikaner Nationalism," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 3:2 (1977); and "Analysing Afrikaner Nationalism: The 'Christian-National' Assault on White Trade Unionism in South Africa, 1934-48," *African Affairs,* 77:306 (1978). See also the historical chapters in Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* (New Haven, 1979).

8. Simons and Simons, *op. cit.*, p. 574.

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first real political crisis for white supremacy.[9]

The response of the South African government to this crisis has been a combination of limited reform and continued repression. A purely hardline solution was less possible, in terms of power, as well as less vital to key white interests. The new grassroots and "leaderless" opposition of the 1970s was not easy to wipe out, especially once the initial strikes had focused unprecedented international attention on South African labor practices.[10] Furthermore, white South Africa was now less united around the preservation of old style domination. For urban-industrial capital (e.g., multinational manufacturing interests), which was faced with more acute capital accumulation and labor shortage problems than in the 1960s, as well as by a much more militant black underclass, economic stabilization seemed to require some softening and de-racialization of domination. White (and Afrikaner) disunity and uncertainty in the face of growing black unity and militancy generated a kind of "hegemony crisis" in South Africa.[11]

The reform strategy has been explicitly co-optive in aim and design. The basic idea of "neo-apartheid" has been to preserve as much as possible of the status quo by making concessions to some blacks and by re-legitimizing the system in class and not merely ethnic terms. To this end, state terror, far from being abandoned, has been merely re-deployed more selectively.

The focus of these developments has been labor policy. After the black labor unrest of the early and mid 1970s, two commissions of inquiry were appointed to recommend changes in trade union and occupational rights for black workers (Wiehahn Commission) and migrant labor, and black residence and mobility controls (Riekert Commission). The basic result of the Wiehahn reforms has been to permit the incorporation of black workers into the legal industrial relations system, thus defusing the power of existing but legally unrecognized black unions and neutralizing international criticism of South Africa's labor policies. The Riekert reforms were intended to foster the development of a two class system for blacks: a relatively privileged urban black middle class with increased rights in urban areas, and a migrant/rural black underclass based on the "homelands" and with even more restricted access to urban areas.

While labor policy has been the main focus of neo-apartheid reformism, the government has also moved to reduce "petty apartheid" (segregation in public places, sporting events, etc.), and has announced plans to make some

9. Some of the better accounts of the events of the early and mid 1970s, include John Kane-Berman, *South Africa: The Method in the Madness* (London, 1979); Baruch Hirson, *Year of Fire, Year of Ash; The Soweto Revolt: Roots of a Revolution?* (London, 1979); and Institute of Industrial Education, *The Durban Strikes* (Durban, 1974).

10. Examples of this are the growing pressure in Europe and the U.S. for "corporate disinvestment" from South Africa following the labor unrest of the early 70s and in the 1976 events, and the operationalization of this in various new "codes of conduct" for international companies in South Africa (e.g. the "Sullivan principles" and the European Economic Community guidelines).

11. For this Gramscian analysis see Stanley Greenberg, *Race and State in Capitalist Development: Comparative Perspectives* (New Haven, 1980). On change and disunity among the Afrikaners, see Adam and Giliomee, *op. cit.*

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very limited reforms in the overall political system (increasing the political rights of Indians and Coloreds — but not Africans — who make up only a small proportion of South Africa's blacks).

That the basic strategy of neo-apartheid is to follow cooptive reform and continued repression is clear from recent developments. In the first place, legislative changes have not meant much net gain for black workers as a whole, and certainly not the elimination of labor apartheid. The nominal liberalization of black trade union rights (Wiehahn) has been offset by the further restriction of black mobility rights (Riekert).[12]

More significant, however, is that in spite of whatever liberalization of black trade union legal rights there may have been, in actual practice black trade unionism is still being severely harassed by the state under South Africa's sweeping and still widening state security laws. Trade unionists and striking workers have been persecuted and, through police activity, the state has enforced security and influx control laws, and intervened constantly in strikes and disputes involving black workers (on an average, in 1980 and 1981, of once every three days, according to a statement by the Minister of Police in Parliament).[13] Thus, despite the facade of reformism, South Africa is currently undergoing a renewed crackdown on unionism.[14]

12. Thus, the International Labor Organization's report on labor and apartheid in South Africa concluded in 1981 that despite "adjustments . . . to certain legislative and administrative practices . . . fundamental obstacles to the achievement of equality of opportunity and treatment in labor matters, resulting from apartheid, remain entrenched in law and practice in South Africa." See *Seventeenth Special Report of the Director General Concerning the Application of the Declaration Concerning the Policy of Apartheid of the Republic of South Africa* (Geneva, 1981), p. 78. The declaration referred to here is the I.L.O.'s 1964 condemnation of apartheid in South Africa and its program for the elimination of apartheid in labor matters. Each year since then, the I.L.O.has monitored and reported on labor and apartheid. South Africa was expelled from the I.L.O. in 1964. The I.L.O.'s 1982 report concluded that more recent trade union reforms have been neutralized by the further tightening up of the influx control system "which is based on constitutional law and administrative practice and regarded as outside the scope of trade unions." *Eighteenth Special Report of the Director General Concerning the Application of the Declaration Concerning the Policy of Apartheid of the Republic of South Africa* (Geneva, 1982), p. 32.

13. International Defense and Aid Fund, *Focus on Political Repression in Southern Africa*, 37 (Nov.-Dec. 1981) p. 6. On post-Weihahn labor policy see *South African Labour Bulletin,* 5(2): 1979, "Focus on Wiehahn," 5(4), "Focus on Riekert," and 7(1/2) 1981, "State and Capital — Response to Labor."

14. Current and previous state repression has involved: political trials and convictions of those defined as political subversives (under the various state security laws — the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act, the 1960 Unlawful Organizations Act, the 1962 General Law Amendment Act, the 1967 Terrorism Act, and the 1976 Internal Security Act), with a total of about 4,500 convictions between 1961 and 1981, and a total of about 500 "political prisoners" in detention today; mass arrests of demonstrators and strikers, under such acts as the Riotous Assemblies Act; detention without trial; and mounting evidence of torture of detainees. South Africa has the highest rate (and half the total) of state executions in the world: (129 blacks in 1980) and the highest per capita prison population in the world. Perhaps, most significant are the massive number of pass law arrests and forced removals. Between 1961 and 1981, about eight million Africans were arrested or prosecuted under the pass laws (i.e., the migrant labor laws or "influx control system"), and about one million were "endorsed out" of white areas. All told, including various other kinds of forced resettlement, between 1948 and 1981 about three and a half million Africans have been forcibly removed out of white areas. See the International Defense and Aid Fund publication *Focus* nos. 35, 37, 39 and 40. *Focus* provides a regular review of ongoing political repression in South Africa.

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In all of this, direct state terror has been less important than indirect state terror — the intimidating and punitive effects of police harrassment, arrests and pass law deportations. This continues to be the main means whereby the South African state represses and terrorizes its black underclass.

The extent to which the neo-apartheid strategy will succeed is an open question. Like neo-Stalinism, neo-apartheid is a pragmatic attempt to adapt domination to new historical conditions in which the mass of people can less easily be subordinated by hardline methods. But, like neo-Stalinism, it is faced with the problem that cooptive reform may be inadequate, and may even have quite unintended and uncontrollable radical effects. Resistance in South Africa today is growing as never before.[15] The reform strategy, even if cooptive, limited and accompanied by heavy-handed solutions, does provide a little more leeway for resistance. The most likely prospect is a process of heightened resistance, spurred on by continued state terror and facilitated by further reform.

The dramatic events of the 1970s and 80s, following so quickly and unexpectedly the relative quiet of the 60s, also have other implications for terror and resistance, domination and liberation. They warn, on the one hand, that the dominant group may reproduce indefinitely its domination because of its virtual monopoly, terroristic use, and pragmatic adaptation of state power. On the other hand, there has always been black resistance to white domination and black worker resistance to exploitation, although for a long time this could be and was fairly easily contained by combinations of indirect and direct state terror. It is the coming about of a new set of conditions that explains why this resistance became much more widespread and successful in the 1970s. The question of state terror is thus ultimately an historical one. The structural apparatus of state terror and the state's actual terroristic capability are different things, and the latter is more determined by historical conditions than by the size and scope of the former. Thus, in South Africa in the 1970s and 80s, there has been an extension of the state's terroristic capability, because of a heightened, qualitatively different resistance. The South African case thus illustrates the growing importance of indirect rather than direct state terror. The pragmatic reconstitution of domination into less hardline forms is necessitated generally by increasing constraints on state terror despite its undiminished use.

15. See John Saul and Stephen Gelb, *The Crisis in South Africa: Class Defense and Class Revolution* (New York, 1982).

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ITALY'S PERMANENT CRISIS*

by Norberto Bobbio

For some time now in Italy there has been talk of an "institutional crisis." It is one of those few things on which the powers that be and public opinion, left and right, agree. The term refers to a crisis of democratic institutions, in short, of democracy. When did it begin, what is its nature, when and if will it end?

1968 should be considered as the starting point of this so-called institutional crisis: it was the culminating point of challenges by the younger generation. One of the most characteristic aspects of these challenges, and likewise the most deleterious in terms of the political miseducation of youth, was a contempt for the democratic rules of the game: the exaltation of violence — even if initially this was simply ideological — as a means of political action; the refusal to converse with those who thought differently; the holding of meetings where one applauded but did not debate; the brutal and systematic invasion by minorities of arenas where free debate was taking place. In Italy 1968 was also the year when workers' struggles reached an hitherto unknown intensity and extent (the "hot autumn"). Certain yet unidentified tendencies of the reactionary right (despite a trial which lasted 12 years and eventually ended in a general acquittal) had been secretly preparing, if not with the direct aid, at least with the connivance of the State's security forces, the subversion of the democratic regime. The first such act was the Piazza Fontana massacre in Milan in 1969. The connection between the fear of Left subversion and the birth of Right terrorism is so evident that any further comment is superfluous. The Piazza Fontana massacre marks a decisive turning point in the history of the First Republic, for with it the terrorist makes his first appearance as a political actor — an actor who has yet to disappear from our country's political scene. It may be assumed that there would not have been Left-wing terrorism had it not been preceded by Right-wing terrorism. The first cells of those who later would be called the armed party were formed when part of the Left (and even the democratic Left, or one which accepted the democratic regime) became convinced that the fate of Italian democracy was in question.

From the viewpoint of the political system, 1968 was the year in which the election for the fifth legislature took place (May 13), an election where the Socialist Party, finally unified after many vain attempts, suffered the most severe defeat in its history. The Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party, which ran together after a hurried unification, obtained 15.5% of the vote, while in the preceding election of 1963, the first obtained 13.8% by itself and the second 6.1%. As a result of the election, the two parties separated once again in a decision which today appears as hurried and improvised as that of the unification (after the first split of 1946). But the most serious consequence

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for the future of the Republic was the end of the Center-Left experiment (the coalition between the Socialist and Christian Decmocratic parties) which, like it or not, represented the most fortunate moment of Italian political development. Although in succeeding years there were government coalitions with the participation of the Socialist Party, these have been interpreted by the Socialists themselves as a lesser evil, as a make-shift solution in the absence of something better, rather than as the result of an historical encounter meant to last.

A Dozen Combinations

In the first decade of the period from 1948 to 1968, it was Center governments which prevailed, while in the second decade it was the Center-Left. After 1968, there has no longer been any continuity. For apparently fortuitous reasons Centrist and Center-left governments alternated. As if the pilot had lost the compass, the ship of State did not succeed in following a preset route and it became impossible to understand at which port it would arrive. Of the two coalition models proposed up to now, the historical compromise of the Communists and the Left alternative of the Socialists (or, rather, of the Left wing of the Socialist Party), the first, to continue the metaphor, suffered a shipwreck, while the second never succeeded in getting under way. How could it be otherwise when the Communist Party and the Socialist Party together totalled only approximately 40% of the vote? Needless to say, a political system like that of Italy, split into a dozen parties, some of which are small and even minescule, makes possible a variety of coalitions. In the 35 years of the Republican Constitution there have been at least a dozen. Taking the DC (Christian Democrats) as the kern around which the entire system turns — indeed, it has been in power uninterruptedly since 1945 — there have been governments made up of four, three or two parties, in addition to the numerous homogeneous [*monocolori*] Christian Democratic governments, differing from each other in that they were sustained from time to time by different parties. For those who are amused by games of combinations it may be worthwhile to mention the details. Up to the present, there have been four parties which have entered into coalitions with the Christian Democrats (DC): the Liberal Party (PLI), the Republican Party (PRI), the Social Democratic Party (PSDI) and the Socialist Party (PSI). There never has been a coalition made up of the five parties at one time, but such a combination has already been envisaged; it is desired by some and is perhaps imminent. Up to now there have been two four-way coalitions: if the DC, the PRI and the PSDI, who are the most frequent allies of the majority party, are followed by the PLI, we get the Center-Right (certain of the De Gasperi governments in the early years). If instead of the PLI one substitutes the PSI, we get the Center-Left (the Moro governments from 1964 to 1968). Till now the presence of the PSI has excluded the PLI and vice versa. The novelty of the five parties coalition would be that for the first time the two parties which have until now been initially exclusive of one another would become part of the same coalition. Of the five

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types of three-way coalitions, it being understood that the DC must be present and that the PSI and PLI eliminate one another, four have already seen the light of day: DC, PRI, PSDI (the seventh De Gasperi government); DC, PSDI, PLI (Scelba's government); DC, PSI, PSDI (the fifth Rumor government); DC, PSI, PRI (the second Cossiga government). Of the four types of possible two-way coalitions, only two have thus far been attempted: DC and PSDI (the Fanfani government), DC and PRI (the De Gasperi and next-to-the-last Moro governments). The two other ones still await a daring alchemist. However, the number of actual coalitions has increased by the fact that the coalitions which alone do not attain an absolute majority in parliament are maintained by the abstention of one or the other of the non-member parties, either by all or by only one party, etc. The most interesting case has been that of homogeneous Christian Democratic governments. To this day there have been fourteen and almost all of them differed in terms of the role played by the parties maintaining them by abstentions. Indeed, one may compare a "seasonal" homogeneous government such as that of Leone (lasting from June to December 1968, simply to make it possible for the parties of the "democratic range" to mend the cloth torn after the 1968 election) with the two Andreotti governments (from 1976 to 1979) of the so-called "national solidarity", aided by the PCI which would have opened the way for the entry of the Communists into the government — an entry which ultimately did not take place.

The fragmentation of Italy into multiple parties encourages a variety of possible combination; this, in turn, favors the rapid passage from one coalition to another and is surely one of the causes of governmental instability. Considering that forty governments have succeeded one another in thirty-five years, each of these years has seen at least one crisis and some have had several. Governmental crises have thus become so commonplace that each government is already in crisis when it is being formed — even when it is formed after a long gestation. The state of crisis is the normal state of affairs. The constitutional history of our Republic has gone through a continual alternation of governemntal crises, often very long, and of crisis governments, frequently very brief. So, then, as happened in the case of the two Cossiga governments and the first Fanfani government, the government is in crisis even before coming into being. It is still-born, so-to-speak. Instead of Permanent Revolution, Italy's political class has invented the permanent crisis.

Exception and Rule

With the multiplication of crises what should be exceptional has become the rule. It has been said in jest that in Italy there is nothing more definitive than the provisional. In order to complete the picture of these Italian "peculiarities" — a term used in the positive sense — it should be added that in Italy there is nothing more normal than the exception. Consider the following three examples.

Clearly, the early dissolution of parliament and the closing of the legislature before the term provided for by the constitution (five years in Italy) should be

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considered as exceptional events. And, yet, after the first four legislatures were brought to their natural term, from 1948 to 1968, these were succeeded by three others interrupted before their term: the fifth from 1968 to 1972, the sixth from 1972 to 1976, and the seventh from 1976 to 1979. It is no mere chance that the beginning of unfinished legislatures occurred in 1968, the year which can be taken as marking the beginning of the institutional crisis. One must not pretend being blind to the connection between the absence of a new coalition plan, of a new "government formula," to use the political jargon, following the exhaustion of the two preceding "formulas" (center-right and center-left) and the premature end of the legislatures. In the absence of a new, agreed upon formula, all formulas appear of equal merit, but all of them are provisional and insufficient remedies for overcoming governmental crises. The dissolution of parliament thus ends up by becoming a perverse substitute for finding a lasting agreement among the constitutional parties on a method of governing, perverse because it is an agreement limited by the recognition of disagreement, deferring a solution to the uncertain result of an electoral response.

Second example: the proliferation of decree-laws. The second paragraph of Article 77 of the Constitution provides that the government may adopt "under its responsibility" provisional measures having the force of law "in extraordinary cases of need and emergency." Such measures are called "provisional" because the government must present them within sixty days to the two Chambers for adoption. It is unnecessary to draw the reader's attention to the extraordinary character of such measures. Nevertheless, in one legislature after another, the number of decree-laws, both in absolute figures as well as in proportion to the number of regular laws, has progressively increased, with an impressive acceleration during the last two legislatures. As Cazzola and Morisi show,[1] Whereas in the first twenty-four years of parliamentary life, comprising the first five legislatures, from 1948 to 1972, 321 decree-laws had been adopted of which 280 were converted into laws with or without amendment, during the next eight years, corresponding to the sixth and seventh legislatures and the first year of the eighth, 360 such decree-laws have been adopted of which 285 were converted into laws. The quantitative ratio between legislation by decree and ordinary legislation yields the following eloquent figures: 1.2% (1st legislature), 3.2% (II), 1.6% (III), 5.3% (IV), 2.2% (V), 11.1% (VI). During the seventh legislature the figure is 26%; between June 1979 and September 1980 the legislature produced 303 laws of which decree-laws were 90; i.e., 30%.

A third example: the plethora of referendums. In a system of representative democracy, such as provided for the Italian Constitution, the referendum is a complementary institution. Article 70 states that "the legislative function is carried out by the two Chambers." The referendum has only a repealing func-

1. Franco Cazzola and Massimo Morisi, "La decretazione d'urgenza continua; da Andreotti a Cassiga"; in *Laboratorie Politico*, n. 1 (January-February, 1981), pp. 123-141. See also F. Cazzola, A. Predieri and G. Pruilla, *Il decreto-legge fra governo e parlamento* (Milan, 1975).

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tion. After a long period of abstinence — the law instituting the referendum applying to Article 75 of the Constitution was not adopted until 1970, and it was only four years later that the first referendum was initiated for the repeal of the law which had granted divorce — a new party, the Radicals, has become the indefatigable promoter of more and more referendums. In 1978 it proposed eight of them, only two of which were approved by the Constitutional Court. This year they proposed ten, four of which were voted on in May, while a fifth has been proposed by a movement of Catholics for the repeal of the law depenalizing and liberalizing abortion. In all of these eight votes the result was the same: the "nays" won over the "ayes", and none of the laws submitted to a popular vote has been abrogated. Of these referendums only one, that proposed by the Catholics, obtained a fair approval percentage (32%). Those proposed by the Radical Party received respectively 11, 13, 14 and 22% of the votes. This is indeed a piddling few to justify the enormous outlays to enable the electors to cast their votes. The request for a referendum can only be justified in the case of a serious problem dividing the country into two parts having presumably the same clout. When the request to abrogate a law is rejected by 80% or 90% of the voters, it is a sign that the request never had any real support. So precious a good as popular participation in referendums should not be squandered if one does not wish to see it dissipated. The squandering of popular participation is a crime of democratic abuse which some day will be paid for.

It should be recognized that these three examples of exceptional institutions which gradually become the rule are manifestations of the same tendency: parliament's loss of power. The dissolution of parliament is an exceptional prerogative of the President of the Republic; emergency decrees an exceptional prerogative of the Government, the power to repeal a law through referendums an exceptional prerogative of the citizens *uti singuli*. These are the prerogatives by different organs of parliament and they are compatible with the parliamentary system such as is provided for by the Constitution only if they remain within the limits of their exceptional status. The more they overextend themselves beyond such limits, the less is Parliament the center of the system. It is a fact that the Italian political system no longer has a center. This does not mean that it is decentralized, for that would be something valuable. It means that it is decentered. The center is no longer in its place and no one knows exactly where it might be. In the language of political commentary, there are two terms which are frequently employed: "vacancy" and "substitution." By "vacancy" one means that where there ought to be an organ of decision there is none; by "substitution" one means that an organ of decision has been created where none should be, the purpose being to fill a void that has been left by vacant organs. Our present regime has been called in jest "the Republic of Substitutes." The President of the Republic substitutes for the Government; and judges substitute for Parliament. Where a unifying center is absent, centers of power multiply and by multiplying they help create that state of confusion between the various powers which is the opposite of

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that rational system of the division and balance of powers provided for by the Italian constitutional charter. To obtain a true picture of the real regime and not the legal one, it is necessary to throw away that yellowed map which is the Italian constitutional charter. In the Constitution — i.e., on paper — each element is in its proper place and all of them together constitute a system in perfect equilibrium. In the real world, independently of the map which has become useless, it is ever more difficult to find one's bearings: the system falls into pieces bit-by-bit, like a dismantled watch. One day, when I was in a particularly bad mood, I wrote: "The State is in tatters. In the meantime our weavers — the simile of rulers and weavers goes back at least to Plato — continue to weave wefts ever more inconsistent on fabrics ever more fragile and worn out."

The Constitutional Crisis And Its Lessons

Yet, one must acknowledge that the fabric has held up. After having said all the bad things possible and imaginable about the Italian political system, even the most pessimistic observer must recognize that all the catastrophic predictions have hitherto failed. Rather than a crisis of institutions, one is tempted to state — if a word play is permitted — we are dealing with an institutionalization of the crisis, with an institutionalized crisis.

The first observation to be made is that one need not trust historical precedents. It is said that history teaches us nothing, but at times the opposite is true: it teaches us too much. One of the main lessons taught by the masters of political thought is that democracy has a natural tendency to degenerate into tyranny. Already with Plato this lesson is firm: the tyrant necessarily appears to set in order the democratic disorder. The Trilateral Commission has discovered nothing new in holding that democracies are ungovernable and that such ungovernability can be remedied only by authoritarian regimes. As if this were not enough, the old lesson has shown its basic truth in recent history and, indeed, in the history of Italy. Inevitably, one compares the present crisis of democratic institutions with the advent of fascism (1922) or the end of the Weimar Republic (1933). For the less catastrophic, the history of the last few years may be likened to the end of the Fourth French Republic. Nevertheless, up to the present, such comparisons have proven to be more academic exercises than realistic analyses capable of explaining what is happening and of anticipating what might happen. In truth, the comparison with historical fascism has always been made not so much with conviction but rather in the guise of a warning, except, perhaps, in 1972 when the party of the National Right reached its maximum vote (about 9%) and after the fascists let loose the revolt of Reggio Calabria during the summer of 1970 and the winter of 1971.[2] A comparison with the German crisis of the 1930s is more frequent and even more justified. For years an interpretation had circulated which saw the Italian political system as an exemplary form of a polarized, multi-party system (Giovanni Sartori) whose principal historical precedent was the Weimar

2. In November 1972 even I wrote an article entitled "Today Like Yesterday" where I argued that fascism had become once again a political problem.

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Republic which in short time succumbed to the Nazi regime. This interpretation, however, was rivalled by a more realistic one that considered Italy an imperfect two-party system (G. Galli). Another more recent interpretation has underscored the tendency toward centripetal pluralism destined to reverse the tendency toward polarization (Paolo Farneti). Comparison with the crisis that determined the passage from the Fourth to the Fifth French Republic not only remained at the level of historical-political analysis, but also prompted proposals for constitutional reform which have been promoted by the Socialist Party. However, although the secretary of the PSI, Bettino Craxi, stated in preparation for the 41st Congress of the PSI that the party would fight for the "Grand Reform" of the institutions, constitutional reform will not go very far. It is hardly likely that a parliament which with its slow and confused responses fails to resolve the contingent problems that beset it can succeed in approving a constitutional reform requiring a qualified majority — a constitutional reform regarded with diffidence by the Commmunist Party and with indifference by the Christian Democrats.

Setting aside historical precedents which till now have been more misleading than illuminating, let us try to understand how things stand, acknowledging that despite its fragility, the Italian political system has not broken down and that thus far it has repudiated the fixed historical law according to which a democracy which is badly governed, or not governed at all, must inevitably end as an authoritarian State. There has been no lack of attempts at analysis and explanation.[3] More optimistic is a small work which has almost escaped notice, although its author is a well-known constitutional expert, G. Guarino's *Quale costituzione?* (1980), subtitled "Saggio sulla classe politica," which takes up a classical theme in Italian political science (Mosca and Pareto): every political system is directed by an oligarchy — the political class, to be precise — and is characterized by the type of oligarchy that governs it. According to Guarino, Italy is governed by a class of political professionals which has rendered itself completely autonomous from traditional centers of power such as the Church, business and trade unions. However, it respects the conditions flowing from periodic electoral public expressions, for which reason the system may be designated a "democratic oligarchy in parliamentary form." To be more precise, it is an oligopolistic oligarchy because, while composed of a dominant group (Christian Democrats), dominant but not exclusive, it is divided into a plurality of organizations that wield power together, even though they are separate and rival groups.

Among the attempts at explanation, one to be rejected because of its weakness is, in fact, the most wide-spread: the system holds out because there is no alternative. It is weak because it inevitably turns back upon itself. If, by chance, one asks those who hold it why there has been no alternative, they can give no response other than the fact that until now, against all predictions, the system has held out, and that it has held out because the principal source of

3. Let me cite two books whose very titles are self-explanatory: Giuseppe Di Palma's *Sopravivere senza governare* (1978) and Serpio Cassese's *Esiste un governo in Italia?* (1980).

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legitimation in a democracy — the body of voters — has not, during the course of the last decades, become either dried-up or polluted. Not dried-up in the sense that despite some decline in recent elections, voting participation has always been extremely high; not polluted because the great majority of votes (more than 90%) is given to sustaining parties in the constitutional span (from the Communist Party to the Liberal Party) — parties which have a joint and reciprocal interest in maintaining the democratic system.[4] If one examines the relation between citizens and parties, the outcome of this test is rather ambiguous. On the one hand, the fact that none of the requests for repeal was approved — and, except for one, by a crushing majority (up to 80%) — might be presumed as confirmation (and the parties ever ready to bring grist to their own mill have so interpreted it) that the citizens *uti singuli* confirmed the deliberations of Parliament and, indirectly, of the parties. On the other hand, so far as the referendum on abortion is concerned, the negative votes were much lower than the Christian Democrats, who were against it, usually receive. So far as the abolition of life imprisonment is concerned, the favorable votes were far lower than that of the two parties of the left which supported it. These results certainly indicate, contrary to the argument, that the citizens are far more independent from party directives than national and local elections indicate. Nevertheless, beyond such ambiguity, the fact remains that there was a flocking to the voting booths that no observer had anticipated: 80% of the citizens of voting age, despite the fact that public opinion was opposed to voting on more than one referendum at a time, and was even basically opposed to the institution of the referendum. All this took place also despite newspapers dwelling on the difficulty of the questions to such a degree that it almost seemed meant to discourage voters.

Governing Complex Societies

There remain other attempts at explanation which proceed from analyses at different levels of the political system in its relation to the society that supports it. I will indicate three such explanations which, although of different orientation, are not incompatible.

Let me begin by referring to some advanced studies, particularly those carried out in the last ten years in Germany, and followed attentively in Italy, on the nature of government in complex societies. Although Italy might be a borderline case, its general syndrome is not all that different from the present one in advanced capitalist countries. Regarding these, one might well say that they are not so much ungovernable, as they are — and can not help but be — *weakly* governed, given the growing gap between the multiplication of social claims and the ability of government to give adequate responses. This is a matter of congenital weakness and, as such, is irremediable, except by way of global projects and theoretical models which have no chance of being enacted. It is a congenital or intrinsic weakness because in a complex society, characterized by the presence of several centers of organized power — political parties,

4. This was written a few days after the five referendum votes of May 17, 1981.

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trade unions, business and powerful pressure groups (open or hidden) — frequently in conflict or at least competing with each other for the use of available economic resources or for the instruments of power, the central government does not have sufficient strength to impose itself on these parties in accordance with the traditional image of the sovereign State, holder of *summa potestas*. It only has sufficient power to *interpose* itself between the parties as a mediator or at most as a guarantor of a negotiated compromise. Frequently the State, or in fact the party or parties in power, or perhaps this or that administrative apparatus of the State, is nothing but itself one of the parties subject to the standards governing any compromise among the organizations which consider themselves mutually independent. It thus becomes ever more clear that the principal means of resolving conflicts in a pluralist society — perhaps it would be better to call it polyarchic or polycratic — is neither the *sic volo sic iubeo* of the absolute sovereign nor the correct application of the majority principle where the sovereign is not a single person but an assembly. It is agreement achieved through usually long and difficult negotiations, the result of which is almost always transitory as are international treaties subjected to the clause *rebus sic stantibus*. In a recent book entitled *Il governo debole,* and opportunely subtitled *Forme e limiti della razionalitá politica* (Bari, De Donato, 1981), the authors, C. Donolo and F. Fichera, summarizing the contemporary German Doctrine on the government of complex societies, describe the latter as the interlocking of partial governments and emphasize the precarious, unstable and easily reversible equilibrium brought about by the presence of such partial powers. Examining the various aspects of the difficult task to which the central government is subjected, they define a weak government as one which, though unable to resolve problems, does not automatically fall into open crisis, even though it is continuously exposed to it.

Weak government, however, is only part of the story. As far as Italy is concerned — I am coming to the second attempt at explanation — it is true that the Government is weak, but it is also true that the "sub-government" (*sottogoverno*) is strong. Elsewhere I have argued that one cannot understand our political system if one fails to acknowledge that under the visible government there is a government that acts in the shadow, and still lower one that works in the most absolute darkness.[5] The first of these already has a name, used only by journalists, which should take its rightful place in the technical discourse of political scientists: sub-government [*sottogoverno*]. The second does not as yet bear a name, but one might call it cripto-government [*criptogoverno*]. I will not say much about the latter term because we do not as yet know much about it. Yet from the time of the Piazza Fontana massacre (1969) to the discovery of a secret masonic lodge whose leader was indicted and who is politically suspect, we know that an occult power exists although, because it is occult, no one is as yet in a position to state exactly what might be the nature, the goals and the effects of its machinations.

5. Cf., Noberto Bobbio, "Democracy and Invisible Government," *Telos*, n. 52 (Summer, 1982), pp. 41-55.

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I will briefly discuss the first term. By *sub-government* I understand that area of political power occupied by public bodies or public interest groups through which a large part of the country's economic policies is carried out, an area that has been slowly but immeasurably enlarged during the last decades as the State has assumed ever new functions that were foreign to the classical liberal State. The fact that the term *sub-government* has been chosen to designate this area and its related actions — the term quickly caught on — is meaningful in itself. It means that the actions undertaken there are directly connected to those of the government proper. The connection is a dual one because it involves both the personnel directing these bodies who are designated or named directly by the political parties, particularly the governmental parties, as well as the latent function which has been attributed to these directing personnel: secretly funding political parties; that is, procuring for the parties, always famished and always voracious, the financial resources they need for their own sustenance and to buy support (even support is something purchasable like other merchandise). The designation or nomination of the personnel directing the public or parapublic bodies (*enti pubblici o para-pubblici*) has given rise to the practice of a negotiated distribution of posts among the political parties, based on the criterion of each party's respective clout. This, in turn, depends either on its electoral strength or its position within the alliance system. Such practice has received the very appropriate name of *lottizzazione* (allotment) and by now has become a permanent feature of the system. The financial advantages derived by the political parties from such allotment are a modern form or, if you will, the functional equivalent of the sale of offices by absolute monarchies, with this difference: in the latter case, offices are bought *because they pay;* in the former case, they are assigned *in order that they might pay*. In other words, through the sale of offices the prince draws direct advantage from the exchange, while in the case of the present allotment, the parties, the modern princes, draw an indirect advantage from the assignment to one of their faithful of a profitable position from which they expect "gratuitous" payment (a lawyer might call this a gift, rather than a sale).

I will cite here some figures taken from a research concerning the personnel of alloted public bodies and their respective party affiliation (*Anatomia del potere DC*, edited by F. Cazzola, 1979). I shall limit myself to welfare and assistance agencies, noting that the figures refer to annual positions, meaning positions occupied by a single individual in a single organization for one year. Of a number of more than 8,000 annual positions about which it was possible to establish party affiliation, approximately 5,000 belong to the DC, followed at quite a distance by the PSDI, its stout ally, with 784 posts, and by the PSI with 763. As for *presidents*, the most coveted posts, of 853 whose party affiliation has been established, 603 belong to the CD, followed by the PSDI (113) and the PLI (69). As could be foreseen, the big jump took place during the period 1948-54 (from 105 to 170), with a slight decrease during the center-left era (from 170 to 166), and a more notable one during 1970-75 (from 166 to 134).

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The meaning of these figures is clear for evaluating the true power of political parties. Yet, it is necessary to go beyond these figures to see one of the reasons why, in spite of tottering governments, the Italian political system endures beyond reasonable predictions. That reason is none other than the progressive consolidation of a system of subsidiary powers which the inefficient government, rather than weaken, renders indeed more robust, unreasonable and influential. Paradoxically, one could claim that the country has no need of being governed because it is being "sub-governed" (*sottogovernato*), because it is being governed from underneath, because there exists a government under the apparent Government, a solid infra-structure holding up a fragile structure subject to frequent and apparently capricious changes. Up to the present, governmental crises have not killed the system because the *sottogoverno* is never in crisis. On the contrary, crises make it ever-stronger. The *sottogoverno* constitutes a structure of stable and permanent power; its personnel is less fluctuating and less subject to variations in alliances; it is less controllable and also less controlled. As such, it represents the continuity of power by Christian Democrats and of their allies far more than the series of governments which, from 1945 to the present, the Christian Democrats have led, substituting its allies according to circumstances.

Lastly I shall briefly mention the third way of explaining the unforeseeable survival of a regime in permanent crisis. It may be summarized by the slogan which one hears more and more: "Not everything is politics." The full politicization of human life is a process through which the totalitarian State comes about. In a democratic society, however, civil society blossoms through a development which is only partly conditioned — more often restrained than propelled forward — by the political system ("political" referring to the exercise of power).

This is a problem which requires a re-examination of many views on the subject which today are no longer tenable. This widespread phenomenon of political apathy that is generally interpreted as the citizen's detachment from the State, may also be interpreted as a decreased relevance of politics. The total citizen does not exist and is not even desirable. Only subjects of the totalitarian State are totalized. Where the government is weak, society is stronger but also freer.

Of course, the government is weak out of necessity, not out of virtue. Yet, it is a necessity that ends up by becoming a virtue, to what degree it is difficult to say. There is a breaking point and it is useless to hide it. But it is a breaking point which, probably, without our realizing it, continually moved forward, making possible a toleration of social conflict and public disorder which belies that ancient forecast, regularly confirmed, concerning catastrophic crises besetting licentious democracies.

I cannot say more. The thesis of permanent crisis seems to be confirmed, but it will depend on the manner in which the crisis will be resolved whether it will be simply confirmed along with the thesis of tolerance through democracy of a State in which the crisis is not the exception but the rule.

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CIVILIZATION AND VIOLENCE: ON THE STATE MONOPOLY OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AND ITS INFRINGEMENTS[1]

by Norbert Elias

Civilization is never finished and always endangered. It is endangered, for the maintenance of civilized standards of behavior depends on certain conditions such as a relatively stable level of individual self-discipline. This in turn is linked to specific social structures. The supplying of goods, the preservation of the accustomed standard of living are among them, and especially social pacification, i.e., the non-violent settling of conflicts within the state. But the internal pacification of society is always endangered by social and personal conflicts which are among the normal phenomena of social life — precisely the conflicts which the pacifying institutions serve to settle. Because of undeclared presuppositions, when studying the problem of physical violence in social life, the question is often posed in such a way that the answer cannot do justice to the observable contexts. Consider the following two examples.

One of the false ways of posing the problem is connected with the currently widespread tendency to ascribe social conflicts and the resulting psychological conflicts to people's innate aggressiveness. The idea that persons have an aggression drive to attack other persons, resembling in its structure other innate drives such as, for instance, the sexual drive, is unfounded. People do have an innate potential to automatically shift their whole physical apparatus to a different gear if they feel endangered. The body reacts to the experience of danger by an automatic adjustment which prepares the way for intensive movement of the skeletal muscles, such as for combat or flight. Human impulses that correspond to the model of a drive are released physiologically or, as is often said, "from within," relatively independently of the respective situation. The shifting of the body's economy to combat- or flight-readiness is to a far greater extent conditioned by a specific situation, whether present here and now, or remembered. The aggressiveness-potential can be activated by natural and social situations of a certain kind, i.e., mainly by conflict situation. In conscious contraposition to Lorenz and others who ascribe an aggression-drive to people on the model of the sexual drive, it is not aggressiveness that triggers conflicts but conflicts that trigger aggressiveness. Our habits of thought generate the expectation that everything we seek to explain about people can be explained in terms of isolated individuals. It is evidently hard to adjust thinking and thus also the explanatory expectation on

1. Originally published in Joachim Matthes, editor, *Lebenswelt und Soziale Probleme* (Campus Verlag, Frankfurt, 1981), pp. 98-122. Translated by David J. Parent. This paper is a somewhat revised text of a tape-recorded lecture. The spoken style has not always been revised to a more suitable written style.

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the basis of how people are interconnected in groups, i.e., on the basis of social structures. Conflicts are an aspect of social structures. They are, furthermore, an aspect of human life together with animals, plants, moon and sun, i.e., with non-human nature. People are by nature attuned to this life together with other people and nature and the conflicts it entails.

The changed formulation of the question suggested by this is manifested in yet another more significant respect. When one studies the problem of physical violence, the question is often how it is possible that people often strike or kill others, that they become, for example, male or female terrorists. It would be more accurate, and hence also more productive, if the question were posed differently. It should go: how is it possible that so many people normally can live together peacefully without fear of being struck or killed by stronger ones — as peacefully as is generally the case in the great state-societies of Europe, America, China or Russia in our day. It is all too often overlooked today that never before in the development of mankind have so many people, millions of them, lived together so peacefully, i.e., with considerable elimination of physical violence, as in the big states and cities of our time. It is perhaps seen only when one realizes how much more violent, how much higher the danger-level of physical attacks was in earlier epochs of human development.

The primary behavior, when one runs into conflict, when one gets angry at someone, when one hates — the primary behavior in cases of conflict is for people to attack each other and to strike or murder each other, as the case may be. The problem is how we can live together although all this — fury at one another, hatred, enmity, rivalry. All this is still there, but attacks or even murder have generally fallen to the background. At present, the question generally focuses on acts of violence. It asks how they can be explained. Instead, first we ought to ask how it can be explained that we normally live together so peacefully within a state-society. Only then is it really possible to explain and to understand how people cannot submit to the standard of a normally quite peaceful social life, the civilized standard of our days.

Now, the question of how it came about that we live together relatively peacefully in very large social groups is not especially hard to answer. It is a particular form of organization that has made it possible. One aspect of the problem was first seen by Max Weber. He pointed out that states are characterized by the respective rulers' claiming a monopoly on physical violence. This means that we live in an organization where rulers have at their disposal groups of specialists authorized to use physical violence, if necessary, to prevent all other citizens from using violence. This monopolization of violence, for whose development I have presented an explanatory model in the second part of my book of civilization, is a socio-technical invention. For there are inventions not only in the natural but also in the social field — precisely socio-technical inventions, which generally develop without planning in the course of many generations. The monopolization of physical violence is an invention of this sort; it took shape very gradually over centuries until it reached the pre-

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sent state, which is not the last stage. Clearly, this monopoly of physical violence within any one state cannot be said to function without problems.

Such monopolies of physical violence, which at present are usually controlled and managed by national governments and represented by the military and police as their executive organs are, like so many human inventions, very ambiguous. Just as the taming of fire favored the civilizing progress of cooking food as well as the barbarian burning down of huts and houses, just as atomic energy is both a plentiful source of energy and a terrible weapon, the social invention of the monopoly of physical violence is equally ambiguous. It is a dangerous instrument. From the old Pharaos down to present dictatorships, the disposal over the monopoly of violence is used for the benefit of some small groups. But the function for its controllers is not the only function of the state monopoly of power. It also has a highly significant function for people bound together in a state. Our pacification, the relatively collective peaceful life of large masses of people is in good part based on this institution, which is closely connected with fiscal monopoly.[2] The most important thing is the balance between the two functions of the monopoly of violence: the function for its controllers and for the members of the state or society, i.e., internal pacification. In former times the power-balance was so unevenly distributed that the controllers of the monopoly of power could in its exercize give unrestricted priority to its function for themselves over its function for those they ruled. Louis XIV is reported to have said: "I am the State." He in fact felt himself to be an owner. Since then the balance of power has shifted in a few states in favor of the function of the monopoly of power for the whole state-society.

Individual pacification, the fact that for most of us in a conflict the idea never even enters our heads to rush at our opponent and begin a brawl, however angry we may be, testifies to a far-reaching civilizing transformation of the whole structure of personality. Babies, to whatever society they may belong, protect themselves spontaneously hand and foot. Children like to wrestle and box. That the taboo against acts of violence is so deeply impressed upon adolescents in developed state-societies, is in good part connected with the growing effectiveness of the state monopoly of power. In the course of time the personality structures of individuals adjust to this. They develop a certain reluctance or even deep repulsion — a kind of disgust for the use of physical violence. The progress of this process can be oulined. In former times, as recently as the 19th century, it was in many strata quite acceptable for men to strike women in order to have their way. Today, the imperative that men may under no circumstances strike women — nor one another, even when they are stronger — or that even children may not be struck, is far more deeply anchored in individuals' feelings than in earlier centuries. Only when this generally self-activated restraint of spontaneous impulses to acts of violence in civilized state-societies becomes conscious is the problem of intentional and reflected acts of violence cast in the right light.

2. Cf. Norbert Elias *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation*, Vol. II.

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There are within states violent legal groups and violent illegal groups. The situation is further complicated by the fact that there is no monopoly of power on the international level. On the international level, today we are living just as our forefathers did. As tribes were earlier a danger to other tribes, so states today are still a constant danger to other states. Their members and representatives must always be on guard, must always reckon with the possibility of being invaded by a stronger state and brought into dependency, perhaps even subjection to it. On the international level there is no higher-ranking power to prevent the stronger state from invading a weaker state to demand taxes and obedience from its citizens and so *de facto* annexing the weaker state. No one can prevent one mighty state from doing so except another mighty state. And if there are such states, then they live in constant fear of one another, in the fear that the other state could become stronger and mightier. Their rivalry spurs each to become stronger than the other. Often, the inevitability of the entanglement is not seen clearly enough, because one usually stands on one side. At any rate, it is one of the normal cases of international relations for the respectively strongest states to be involved in hegemonial struggles with one another, in part, precisely because they live in constant fear of one another. On this level, there is no central monopoly of physical violence to restrain any one of the participants from an act of violence if they believe themselves stronger and hope for advantages from it. That is how it often was in former times even within states. The stronger neighbor had to be feared. The one who was physically stronger could use his strength to threaten, extort, rob and enslave others.

The pacification and civilization of people within a state has progressed. In this regard, a strange crevice divides our civilization. When the word "civilization" is used, it is often assumed that it refers to a homogeneous entity. That is not the case. There is a very sharp distinction between the standard of civilized behavior and feeling in domestic as contraposed to international relations. In domestic relations, violence among people is taboo and, if possible, punished; in international relations a different standard prevails. Every larger state continuously prepares for acts of violence against other states; and when such acts of violence are carried out, those who carry them out stand in especially high esteem; they are often praised and rewarded. If the lessening of physical dangers, i.e., the diminished mutual threat or increased pacification, is taken as one of the decisive criteria for the graduated stages of civilization, then mankind can be said to have reached a higher state of civilization within domestic affairs than on the international level. In the case of more developed industrial states, which domestically they are often almost totally pacified, the difference between domestic pacification and international threat is especially great. In international relations, people are still on a relatively low level of the process of civilization, not because they are evil by nature nor because they all have innate aggressive desires, but because they have developed certain social institutions within the state which can more or less effectively stop every act of violence not authorized by that state, while

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such institutions are still completely missing in international relations. Domestically, there is a monopoly of violence with whose help it is normally possible to restrict violent conflicts. On the international level, the monopolization of violence is still a long way off. The early steps toward such a development, the efforts of the United Nations or of the International Court at The Hague for a non-violent settlement of conflicts on the international plane, show these weaknesses all too clearly. An army stronger than the states preparing for a violent conflict or engaged in violent activities would be needed to prevent them from settling their conflicts militarily. If such an army existed, then the United Nations and other international institutions would possess a global monopoly of physical violence. Since such a monopoly does not exist, international relations in many ways do not match the relations of simpler groups of people in the jungle. All larger and many smaller states constantly keep ready specialists in violence, who can be used when violent invasion by another state threatens or, as the case may be, when one's own state threatens to invade another.[3]

While on the international level the formation of a monopoly of physical violence, i.e., the process of a state-formation, is quite rudimentary, the development of such a monopoly-institution on the domestic level has progressed much further, but not everywhere at the same pace. Even where it is relatively effective, it remains vulnerable. In the crisis-situations of a society the state-authorized specialists in violence, the representatives of the state monopoly on violence, become involved in a violent struggle with groups not authorized by the state. Consider a few examples from recent German history.

It would be a beautiful task to write the biography of a state-society such as Germany. For just as in an individual's development experiences from earlier times continue to effect the present, the same is true of nations. Thus, the experience that the German *Reich* was for a long time a weak state and occupied a relatively low position in the hierarchy of European states is still alive today in Germany's present development. When the *Reich* was weak, the self-respect of the member nations suffered. Their sense of self-value was damaged. One can still see in the documents of 17th and 18th century Germany how often people then felt and experienced that Germany was weak, e.g., compared with France, England, Sweden, or Russia, because it was fragmentated.

A biography of Germany would have to describe how this feeling of weakness and inferiority turned suddenly into its opposite, when the formerly loose confederation was finally consolidated into an integrated state as the result of a victorious war. The feeling of weakness turned into a boundless feeling of power and the inferiority complex into an unparalled self-esteem. Now, the pendulum swung too much in the opposite direction. Germany, entering the magic circle of the European great powers, now became involved

3. But they can also be used in domestic conflicts to support one social stratum or a certain party in the struggle with others. The monopoly of power has two faces.

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in their hegemonial struggles. In accord with the dynamics of the European configuration of states, now in Germany too — already under the second *Kaiser* and in an especially radical form because this development came later — the idea spread that it was not enough for this country by its unification to have won a place as one of the European great powers; beyond that it had to become the main power in Europe and a world power. In accord with this swing of the pendulum from extreme humiliation to extreme exaltation, more and more people in the leading groups felt that Germany had to prepare for a struggle to dominate Europe, if not the whole world.

Of course, few great powers on this earth have ever resisted the temptation to gain hegemony over their neighbors or over the whole known world if their leading elite saw even the slightest chance of winning. Whether nowadays the U.S. and the USSR will resist the temptation remains to be seen. In Germany this situation was accompanied by a peculiar occurrence: a change in the relation between the privileged nobility, especially in Prussia, and the upper middle classes — particularly high officials and academicians. This change has not been fully clarified yet. Of course, in Germany under the *Kaisers* the nobility, with its strong military tradition, was still the leading stratum. The German bourgeoisie had to see that its own ideal, the unification of Germany, had been realized not through its own achievements and successes, but from above, through the successes of the military nobility. In this situation a strange thing happened. Parts of the bourgeoisie became assimilated into the higher stratum and internalized its ethos. In the course of this appropriation, however, the military ethos changed. It became bourgeoisified. Traditional, matter-of-course, and mostly uncritically accepted by the nobility, the military ethos was critically appropriated and consciously advocated with a convert's zeal by the upper strata of the bourgeoisie. Seldom before had so much been spoken and written in praise of power, including violence. Since the sought national unification had been achieved by winning wars under the nobility's military leadership, the upper bourgeoisie drew the conclusion that war and violence were now good and beautiful as policy instruments. Not the whole German bourgeoisie, but very important parts of it developed this line of thinking into the cornerstone of their ideology.

While for many nobles wars and diplomatic intrigues were a customary trade, some parts of the peaceful bourgeoisie who were now assimilated to the military standards, displayed a kind of romanticism of power and produced a literature which glorified power and violence. Nietzsche, who had once served in the German army, provided a philosophical formulation for this ideology of the Wilhelminian bourgeoisie in his *Will to Power* — though most certainly without realizing it. The books of the time, especially Wilhelminian novels, depict bourgeois students dueling according to the unified honor-code of noble and bourgeois student associations; it also shows the special status of bourgeois reserve officers in court uniform; and the process of adaption of the higher bourgeois strata to nobility and court is easily recognized. At the same time, one sees the peculiarly paradoxical social and psychological

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situation of this high bourgeoisie of academicians and officials. Despite their mainly peaceful professional tradition and their relatively unmilitary cultural tradition, its members sought to legitimate themselves as a second-rank, honorable profession and at the same time to adopt the outlook — often Macchiavellian, especially in foreign policy — of the nobility, which still remained more powerful and held the socially higher rank.

But this aristocratic tradition changed when it was adopted by the bourgeoisie. This effort at assimilation by considerable circles of the Wilhelminian bourgeoisie reflected a hidden longing to be something they never could become — or, at any rate, not in one generation, i.e., nobility.

Thus, in 1912, Walter Bloem, a popular bourgeois novelist, published a novel titled *Nation against Nation*, in which he once again narrated the wonderful experience of the victorious war of 1870-71. Consider the following description of an episode indicative of this explicitly high evaluation of violence. It deals with the encounter of German troops with French resistance-fighters of 1870-71, who were then called "snipers." "The snipers were running for dear life: then one stumbled . . . a second later Georg's black horse shot past the prostrated man — only a brief stroke of his sword struck the upraised arm behind which peered a staring grimace filled with rage and mortal fear — it was a woman . . . Now all three were strapped together, the woman and the two peasants, and then off the squadron galloped, the prisoners had to run till their tongues hung out, unless they wanted to be dragged to death . . . and the lancers did not spare their kicks and blows to the neck with lance-shafts . . . even the woman got her share . . . They had long since forgotten to distinguish between man and woman . . . a captured enemy was nothing but a wild, treacherous beast."[4] Feelings such as these and corresponding acts are certainly spontaneous everyday occurences during wars. What can be regarded as typical for the German bourgeois situation of 1912 is the fact that here this kind of brutality is portrayed in an entertaining novel quite expressly and with a certain emphasis as a sign of an approved and praiseworthy standard of behavior.

Such documents, and there are many of them, clearly indicate that since the time of the great German idealist, whose books in their time enjoyed great resonance among the educated German bourgeoisie, a fundamental transformation had taken place. The ultimate identification of human beings, which was perhaps excessively idealistic, is here denied with intentional emphasis in favor of an exclusively national identification. In war the common people on the enemy side need no longer be treated as people. These people are nothing but "wild, treacherous beasts." These popular authors obviously expected their readers to share and approve this attitude.

Then in the year 1914 men went to war in a mood of certainty of victory. I myself, barely 17 years of age, experienced it as something strange and not quite comprehensible. But I had fellow students and acquaintances who

4. W. Bloem, *Volk wider Volk* (1912), p. 252 f.

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shared the war mood. A typical quotation from the letter of a young law-student who died on the Marne one month later exemplifies this mood: "Hurrah," he wrote home, "finally we're going to the field. Of course, we will win. Nothing else is possible for a people who are so determined to win the war. My dear ones, be proud of living in such a time and in such a nation. And that you too have the privilege of sending those you love into such a glorious battle (*Schlacht*)."

The war, as it actually developed, was murderous. The unplanned fighting ran contrary to the generals' pre-conceived plans. The military leaders on both sides had planned a bold offensive war, as short as possible: the French generals, especially yesterday's losers, expected a "desperate offensive," and battles "at a mad-cap pace." The Germans followed the modified Schlieffen-plan according to which the unexpected German invasion into Belgium and from there to France would be such a decisive blow against the French enemy that could free German troops in the West for the war in the East. The planned offensives on both sides cancelled each other out. After tremendous losses, they seeped into a gray trench warfare. This had been foreseen by a few outsiders who had recognized that the development of weapons-technology at that time favored the defensive over the offensive. H.G. Wells, among others, had seen the stationary war coming. When the U.S. (which, along with England, feared a continent ruled by Germany) entered the war, Germany's chances of winning disappeared completely. The inconceivable became a fact: Germany exhausted its forces and lost the war. The *Kaiser* and the princes lost their thrones. The courts, centers of Germany's good society, vanished. This society, from those capable of rendering satisfaction from the high nobility to the bourgeois student associations, from the field marshall to the bourgeois reserve-officer, united by a single distinctive honor code, had been suddenly stopped in its race for European hegemony, like someone running with full force against a wall. A traumatic shock resulted.

Moreover, the international defeat of the Wilhelminian establishment went hand in hand with at least a partial defeat on the domestic scene. The end of the old regime and the country's resulting disarray magnified opportunities for those who were previously outsiders, especially organized labor. For the first time in German history, their representatives took over the government. As usual in such cases, this rise of outsiders which had held a lower standing — a former saddler-master became the successor to the *Kaiser* — was felt by many members of German good society to be an unbearable humiliation. Here, paradigmatically we have the reaction of an establishment accustomed to ruling to a development resulting in a power shift unfavorable to them. Not only revolutions, but also wars produce structural changes in power relations that were silently being prepared under the cover of the traditional institutional hull. Had the war been won, the masses of people would probably have fallen back into subordination to the victorious ruling strate. The lost war, however, revealed the power shift that had been taking place in the course of Germany's rapid industrialization. In great masses, soldiers and workers

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renounced their allegiance to the defeated leadership

The development of terrorism in Germany during the first German republic can be better understood if one considers domestic and international power structures, as they were, and as they were perceived. The Wilhelminian establishment, now expended by formerly excluded merchant and entrepreneurial strata, had suffered a defeat. Clearly they were not willing to accept international and domestic defeats. At first, they did not know exactly how to undo the two defeats. But these objectives became clear very soon.

As far back as antiquity there are documents clearly showing that established power groups perceive their power as evidence of their higher human worth. Already the unknown writer of a letter ascribed to Xenophon (probably from the later fifth century), who today is usually called "the old oligarch," considered weaker groups as people with less human worth. The writer of the letter was probably an Athenian aristocrat who had been expelled from Athens along with other fellow-members of his class by the revolt of broader popular strata and the introduction of a democratic constitution. He speaks with considerable contempt of the democratic mob. Everyone knows, he writes, that these are persons of bad character.[5] An analogous attitude is found in the report of a Lieutenant Mayer, dated Jan. 2, 1920, who had been sent to Würzburg as recruiter for a Free Corps, to his superior Captain Berchthold: "After not having neglected a single day . . . to direct my attention to the people's present mood, my view was confirmed that everyone who stands above the mob longs for liberation from the pig-stye, especially the Jewish yoke that is a burden on the people, and, what is of eminently progressive significiance, is willing to lend a hand in the coming work of liberation. The call 'Down with the Jews!' 'Down with the traitors of our people!' resounds from the beer-bench; posters and slogans everywhere say the same thing. Erzberger is hanged repeatedly every evening . . . Two gentlemen of the local *Reichswehr* are joining us with their men. I hope to win over two more."[6]

This quote accurately describes the mood in the better circles of Würzburg at the beginning of 1920. At the same time, it also describes the mentality of the Free Corps, who at that time were the main agents of the non-governmental political violence. Their recruitment prepared a *putsch* against the hated parliamentary republic. As is well known, the first attempt at such a *Putsch* — the Kapp *Putsch* — failed. One of the Free Corps, the Marine Brigade Erhard, was directly involved in this *putsch*. Later it gave rise to the undercover terrorist organization "Consul" which, among other things, sought to systematically murder undesirable prominent politicians. Among the members of this organization were the murderers of the delegate Erzberger, who was attacked and shot to death August 26, 1921 while walking in the Black Forest. His companion, the delegate Dietz, got away with a gunshot wound. The mur-

5. Quoted in new introduction: "A Theoretical Essay in Established-Outsiders Relations," in a Dutch translation, in *De Gevestigden en de buitenstaanders* (Utrecht and Antwerp, 1976).

6. E.J. Gumbel, *Verschwörer* (Vienna, 1924), p. 69.

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derers, Heinrich Schulz and Heinrich Tillessen, were former officers, belonged to the staff of Marine Brigade Erhard, and were in the employ of a leading Bavarian politician, Privy-Councillor Heim. They were members of the German Folk Protective League and other nationalist associations. After the assassination the two men traveled to Munich, where the assassination had been prepared. From there they fled with false passports issued by the Bavarian police to Hungary where they were temporarily arrested but released after a telephone conversation with a Bavarian authority. Their superior in the terrorist secret organization "Consul," Captain-Lieutenant von Killinger, a former officer who had fought against the Bavarian Council Republic and then taken part in the Kapp-*Putsch*, were accused of complicity in Erzberger's murder but were exonerated by the court in Offenburg.[7]

It is hard to estimate how many people were murdered as political undesirables in the first years of the Weimar Republic by members of the Free Corps and student associations close to them: probably several hundred persons, perhaps as many as a thousand. Among them were prominent Communists such as Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, who after a futile labor uprising were dragged out of a besieged house and, as far as can be determined, were beaten to death with clubs outside the house on the way to prison. Among those killed there were less known persons such as my school-mate who with his thick eyeglasses in the first year of school already looked like a young scholar. After reading Marx, he leaned toward Communism, and his body, if I remember correctly, was pulled out of the Breslau moat wrapped in barbed wire. Among them were liberal politicians such as Rathenau and many whose name is forgotten. Like most terrorists in today's West Germany, the terrorists of the Weimar Republic came mostly from bourgeois homes, with a minority coming from the nobility — mostly younger people. The younger cadre of Wilhelminian good society were either officers or students: the two groups from which the terrorists of the Weimer Republic were recruited. Thus, a Bavarian pamphlet on the preparation of dictatorship contains a special section: "Mobilization of the *Reichwehr* and the Student Body."[8] Another pamphlet, also from the time of the Kapp-*Putsch*, says under "Student Body:" "The mobilization committee must immediately establish contact with the spokesmen of the student body, to see to what extent students are organized and what parts are still uncommitted. Here it is especially important to establish whether they will be opponents since they are fanatics who must be eliminated. The principle must remain that the student body is organized in some campaigns or march groups, as main reserve. For our main strength is in the student body."[9]

At that time, the bulk of the students stood on the side of those who, together with the Free Corps and other military organizations, sought to put an end, if necessary a violent one, to the young parliamentary Republic in

7. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

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favor of a strongly military-oriented dictatorship. Of course, there were exceptions, i.e., students who did not support a "Fatherland revolt" against the existing republic and also were against a military-bourgeois dictatorship. But then those were, as the terrorists at that time saw it, fanatics that had to be killed. The idea that the murder of political opponents as acceptable seemed to be taken for granted.

But it was not limited to one side. The war had left considerable unrest and much bitterness in working class circles. Perhaps they would have put up with the often arrogant subordination if the *Kaiser* and his generals had won, but the defeat proved that they had been misled, that their leaders' promises had been empty, that the war hardship had been in vain. The failed Kapp-*Putsch* also stirred up bitterness in the workers. The hatred was mutual. When the Brigade Erhard withdrew from Berlin after the failure of the *Putsch*, it was jeered by the crowd shortly before the Brandenberger Gate. Some of the retreating troops simply turned around and fired into the crowd. About a dozen dead and many wounded were left on Pariser Square.[10]

As always, mutual hatred and violence escalated on both sides. Thus, in Schöneberg on the day after the withdrawal of the Brigade Erhard there was a clash between local inhabitants and the little military surveillance groups stationed there. Already at the time of the Kapp-*Putsch* north and east of Berlin as well as in parts of the suburbs, officers could not appear in uniform without running the danger of being attacked and mistreated by the inhabitants. The military leaders of the Kapp-*Putsch* did organize troops made up mostly of former officers to keep order. But at the end of the *Putsch* these troops, which patrolled in relatively small groups, found themselves in the greatest danger from the mass of the local population. In Schöneberg, the officers stationed there received instructions to move out without weapons in order not to irritate the populace. They were supposed to be taken to Lichterfelds in two waiting trucks. But after a few yards, the trucks were stopped by the pressing crowd. The excited mob threw stones and beer-bottles at the officers in the trucks. One of the trucks attemped to drive on. The crowd attacked the officers. In the ensuing brawl, nine officers were trampled to the ground and killed. The rest were pulled out, beaten and wounded and taken to safety by the police, who had been called.[11] Similar scenes took place during the workers' uprising in the Ruhr region.

These events exemplify the previously mentioned double-bind process of violence. But compared with the Russian events, and especially with the organization of their predominantly agrarian masses for violent revolution, German industrial workers turned out to be at a disadvantage in mobilizing for the use of violence. Apparently, the Communist Party tried to channel workers' spontaneous excitement and local clashes with the Free Corps or *Reichswehr* into an organized military action. But the setting up of a high command in Mühlheim-Ruhr by a proclamation of the military leadership on

10. Friedrich Wilhelm von Oertzen, *Kamerad, reich mir die Hände* (Berlin, 1933), p. 156.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 158-159.

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March 28, 1920 did not have the desired effect. It failed to subordinate the local workers to the military central command. Repeatedly, subordinate local leaders acted on their own. It was easier at that time, to change on short notice peasants accustomed to obedience into battle-ready troops than independent and self-confident industrial workers. At any rate, this seems to have been one of the experiences of the Ruhr uprising.

This experience, however, also casts light on the peculiar course of the double-bind process between the young bourgeois officers and students and the workers. Both sought political goals through military force. It is unclear how intact the Russian officers' corps remained after the Czar's abdication. As for the German officers' corps, they remained fully operational as a unified cadre after the *Kaiser*'s abdication. Its *esprit de corps* also remained intact. The army's supreme command was even partly responsible for the integration of the state. The Allies, however, imposed severe restrictions on the German Army. They had had enough of German militarism, yet they also feared the rise of Russian Communism in Germany. As a compromise they allowed Germany an army of 100,000 men instead of 400,000. This also meant limitation of the officers' corps. Many of the officers returning home from the field were relatively young. Most had no other ambition than to remain officers. They considered military service the only profession they understood and enjoyed. What were they to do? The Free Corps' voluntary units were the answer. There were many of them. They always formed around former officers with certain leadership qualities, and for these, for the most part young bourgeois groups, there was a spectrum of clear enemies, which they sought to fight with all available means when the opportunity presented itself.

On top of the list among these enemies were all groups which were called "Bolsheviks," i.e., mainly those parts of the working class who, whether under communist influence leadership or spontaneously, took part in revolts and, consciously or not, sought to overthrow the parliamentary German Republic in favor of a council republic. Secondly, there was this parliamentary republic itself — especially those members of government or parliament who supported the signing of a peace treaty (the "shameful peace") and the fulfilment of its conditions. The Free Corpsmen's disdain for the republic (the "pig-stye"), parliament ("chatter-salons") and especially the representatives of Social Democracy (the "Bonzes") who now occupied influential government posss, was only slightly less than for the Bolsheviks.

But the balance of power between the two groups was uneven. Despite all unruliness the Free Corps had the military tradition in their bones and were disciplined fighting troops as long as the sometimes charismatic leaders had their confidence. They were opposed by comparatively few undisciplined workers who on brief notice and spontaneously were often to fight, but felt uneasy with the long-term military discipline necessary to carry out strategic struggles. Thus, the Free Corps were able to gain the upper hand with relative ease — especially since they often received support from the *Reichswehr*. They were not only better trained, but also better armed than the fighting workers.

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Consequently, during the first years of the Weimar Republic chances for successful workers' revolts were very slight because the old officers' corps had remained essentially intact and because of the Allies' hostility to any spreading of the Russian revolution. But the Bolshevik danger was extremely important for the Free Corps and the Army since it legitimated their very existence. By alluding to the Russian revolution and the danger of its spreading, not only the Free Corps and the Army but also many other "fatherland" groups formed at the time (including the terrorist organizations) could count on the support of a broad circle of bourgeois and noble sympathizers. Hitler's subsequent success can also be understood only as a consequence of the Russian revolution — as the expression of the universal distaste of broad bourgeois circles and even of considerable parts of the working class for the "specter of Bolshevism" and spreading of the Russian model of revolution to other countries.

At first, immediately after the war this late realization of many dreams and wishes of the Free Corps were still far off. Thousands of officers were at the end of their careers because of the defeat. Many of them had been fighting at the front for years. It was rarely possible to find a civilian position that matched their knowledge and expectations. Many hoped to continue their officers' careers in the regular Army when Germany could again muster a larger *Wehrmacht*. This was reason enough for them to hate this republic, whose "fulfilment-politics" seemed to prevent this. Others saw a new future in the Baltic Provinces where a German upper class had lived off the fat of the land. German Baltic large land-owners and a few leaders of the Latvian national movement promised German free-booters land to settle on, if they helped them away from Russian hegemony. So a whole group of Free Corps moved to the Baltic. There they could help fight against their most hated opponent, the Bolsheviks. Perhaps, they hoped they could make up for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine by the annexation of the Baltic provinces to Germany. At they same time, by acquiring land they could expect a new livelihood proper to their class.

The slide of some of these groups into political terrorism against the new German state cannot be completely understood independently of this Baltic campaign. Again, a few quotations from Ernst von Salomon's more or less autobiographical novel *The Despised*, can clarify the way people moved toward the systematic organization of murder and other violence as a way to weaken and perhaps destroy a hated regime.

Von Salomon, who was part of the circle of the murderers of Rathenau, indicated the direction of this development by the chapter headings of his novel: I. The Exploded; II. The Conjurers; and III. The Criminals. The stages individuals passed through in the twenties where as follows: I. Officers in the Wilhelminian war army (or, if too young, cadets in the Prussian Cadet Corps). II. Members of one of the Free Corps, often participating in their unsuccessful Baltic campaign. III. Members of a conspiratorial terrorist secret society.

As the IV th stage, one could add entrance into the Nazi party, which for

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many of the scattered former members of the Free Corps meant at last the chance for a secure career and the ultimately deceptive fulfillment of their political hopes. It has been claimed not without justification, that Hitler's rise would have been hardly possible without the organizational and military contribution of former Free Corps members.

As a young man just out of the cadet corps, Salomon had ended up in a Hamburg Free Corps under the leadership of a Lieutenant Wuth. There he found himself in company with somewhat wild and romantic adventurers with trooper-like customs. This is what the memory of a military advance seemed to him: "For those of us who went to the Baltic, the word 'advance' had a mysterious, happy, dangerous sound . . . the sound of a new togetherness . . . the dissolving of all ties to a sinking, rotten world, with which the real soldier no longer had anything in common."[12]

This clearly shows a characteristic stage of the process toward terrorism. One feels like a detached outsider in relation to a society that appears to be totally corrupt. This society seems to be dying and one wishes for it to die — although it is not clear what will happen after it dies. Here the irony is that instead of the young and fragile German republic which seemed to them to be a rotten dying world, it was precisely the old society, in which they had grown up, that was defeated and dying. Imperial Germany had perished, but countless of its representatives survived it. The mission in life that seemed meaningful to these people also disappeared with the *Kaiserreich*. Education at the military academy had prepared Salomon for an officer's career in the Prussian army. The old army had disintegrated, while a new, much smaller one was just being formed. The top military leader had moved to Holland. Where in this republic which arose out of defeat, was there still a place for men like him?

The Baltic campaign provided new hope. If the Baltic provinces, where German big land-owners had played a leading role for centuries, could be detached from Russia by fighting the Red Army and annexed to Germany, then — that was the dream — the defeat and the loss of territory in the West could be compensated for in the East. Moreover, one could acquire a new position adequate to one's class — perhaps even a land-holding. At least, that was the promise made to those who went to the Baltic. No one asked what the victorious enemies or the German government in Berlin would say to a settlement of the Russian Baltic provinces. World politics was far, and the dream was beautiful. However much this dream appeared as the new and better future which they contrasted with a shabby republican Germany, hated for its peace-policy, what these men were really dreaming of was a restoration of the old world: the restoration of a German *Reich* with its mighty army, in whose class-hierarchy officers and military values could again occupy the high position which was their due. Military discipline, hardness, and sharpness would again find the high esteem they deserved. Bourgeois indolence and moral scruples deserved contempt, along with civilians now ruling in Berlin, and the

12. Ernst von Salomon, *Die Geächteten* (Berlin, 1931), p. 69.

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parliamentarians who talked a lot and did little.

For the Free Corps in the Baltic this parliamentary republic was an alien world. Unlike the old army, their cohesion was no longer sanctioned by a bureaucratically elaborated set of military regulations or by an officer-hierarchy whose symbolic summit was the august figure of the *Kaiser*. Basically, the men of the Free Corps felt obligated to no one other than their own group. Just about every Free Corps had its own charismatic leader. His personal authority, his personal engagement in battle, his implicit promise of victory, booty and a better future held them together and was decisive for their solidarity and combat-readiness.

Lieutenant Wuth, leader of the Hamburg Free Corps, was one of these. As Salomon describes him, he was a tall, tanned, rugged man. He used to sharpen a boar's tooth that stuck out of his mouth on the bristly hairs of his beard and before every battle he exchanged his field cap for a velvet baret worn by hikers. The Baltic battles were hard, the losses high, but hope persisted. And life was loose and free, an alternative to the staid, stiff bourgeois life with its restrictions.

Then came the blow that destroyed their hopes. The unthinkable happened: the government representatives signed the terrible peace treaty that sealed the humiliating defeat. Salomon describes this traumatic experience; "One day, at the beginning of the truce, we were sitting in Lieutenant Wuth's house. Schlageter had come to visit, we were discussing the possibility of a settlement in this country. Wuth wanted to buy a farm and a saw-mill . . . Then Lieutenant Kay entered the room and said hastily into the tobacco smoke: 'Germany has signed the peace treaty!' For a moment everyone was quiet, so quiet that the room almost droned, when Schlageter got up . . . , he paused, stared into space, and then said, with an angry tone in his voice: 'I mean, what concern is that of ours?' And he slammed the door . . . We were startled. We heard this and were astonished at how little all this really concerned us . . . "[13]

For a moment they could actually believe that this faraway event did not concern them. But the invisible threads with the faraway homeland were quickly felt. In reality, they were nothing but scattered German troops in remote Russian territories. The signing of the peace treaty by these new-comers who now represented Germany sealed their destiny and they felt betrayed: "We looked at one another, shivering. We suddenly felt the coldness of an unspeakable loneliness. We had believed that the country never dismissed us, that it linked us with an indestructible stream, that it fed our secret wishes and justified our actions. Now all that was over. The signature released us."[14]

This shows the far-reaching emotional significance of the Berlin government's failure to say loud and clear in public: "On the advice of the army's supreme command, our representatives have signed the peace treaty, just as it was presented to us." Hindenberg's oft-praised peasant's slyness had man-

13. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

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aged to shift the odium of signing the peace treaty and hence the military defeat unto the representatives of the parliamentary republic. This allowed all those who felt slighted by this republic to reject it. The shock of signing so humiliating and burdensome a treaty may in other cases have had a somewhat different psychological effect. But the traumatic effect on the free-booters had exemplary significance. They knew nothing of the compelling circumstances that had caused the government to sign such a treaty. Perhaps they would have accepted it if the *Kaiser* or Hindenberg and Ludendorff had signed. But now men considered upstarts and *parvenus* by the tradition of the old honorable society (and especially by those trained for the officer corps) seemed solely responsible for signing this peace treaty. Under *Entente* pressure and in accord with the peace treaty, the Berlin government finally ordered the withdrawal of German Free Corps out of the Baltic area. Many free-booters at that point renounced their allegiance to the German government. They stayed and fought on not against the Red Army which had already retreated, but against reorganized Latvian and Estonian troops supported by English warships.

Step by step the Free Corps were pushed back. That was their second traumatic experience. Men who could not accept that Germany had been defeated in the West, now personally experienced defeat in the East. Gradually, the Free Corps' position in the Baltic region became untenable. When the first sharp frosts of the Russian fall came, lack of clothing supplies from the homeland was slowly felt. Many men lacked coats. Field-jackets and pants were tattered. Their boots had holes in them. And the natives constantly pressured the retreating troops as the Russians had done with Napoleon's retreating troops. Finally, rage erupted among the hard-pressed free-booters with their destroyed hopes. Salomon and others[15] have described what happened then. They struck back in rage and despair, and their last remnants of humanity were lost: We made the last sorties. Yes, we got up one again and charged on a wide front. Once again, we drew the last man along out of cover and charged into the woods. We shot into surprised swarms, and raged and shot and struck and chased. We drove the Latvians across the fields like rabbits and set fire to every house and blasted every bridge to dust and cut every telegraph pole. We threw the corpses into the wells and threw in hand-grenades. We killed whoever we captured, we burned whatever would burn. We saw red, we no longer had any human feelings in our hearts. Where we had stayed, the ground groaned under the destruction. Where we had stormed, where formerly houses had stood, there now lay rubble, ashes, and glimmering beams, like ulcers in the bare fields. A hugh trail of smoke marked our paths. We had ignited a huge pile of wood, which burned more than dead material, on it burned our hopes, our desires: the bourgeois tablets, the laws and values of the civilized world, everything that we had dragged with us as dusty rubbish in the values and faith in the things and ideas of the time that dismissed us. We pulled back, boasting, exhilarated, loaded with booty. The Latvians had never stood their ground, but the next day they were back."[16]

15. E.G. Oertzen, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
16. Salomon, *op. cit.*, p. 144 f.

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This exemplifies a path of barbarity and dehumanization which always takes considerable time in relatively civilized countries. Terror and horror hardly appear in such societies without a long social process of disintegration. All too often the naked act of violence as a group goal, with or without governmental legitimation, are analyzed with the help of short-term static explanations. That may make sense, if one is not really seeking explanations but only attempting to establish guilt. For it is easy to see barbarity and de-civilization as the expression of a personal decision.

If the deterioration of the Free Corps is seen as one of the routes to non-governmental violent acts of terrorism during Weimar as well as to state violence during Hitler's time, then one can understand the long lead-time which, less visibly, precedes the more striking great acts of barbarity that otherwise seem to spring up out of nothing.

The men involved in the annihilation and destruction in the Baltic — a few of whom, like Salomon himself, later sought to destroy the hated republic through terror, had gone out with great expectations. Adventure attracted them. They dreamed of great successes. When signs of failure and defeat multiplied, they resisted. They wrapped themselves in their dream like in a protective garment. But when the grim reality finally caught up with them, they went completely out of control. Their dream broke down under the pressure of a frustrating reality. In rage and despair they killed everyone who crossed their path. They undertook a course which some of them would then continue in secret organizations after their return to their homeland. They set out to destroy a world which refused them fulfilment and purpose and which therefore seemed senseless.

In the preparations to destroy the Weimar government and to set up a dictatorship their hopes revived. When the Kapp-*Putsch* destroyed this hope, some members of the Free Corps saw no other way to undermine and crush the hated regime, other than through terror.

At this time, a group of former officers, mostly members of the Brigade Erhard, formed a secret organization. The murder of prominent politicians was to be a fanfare. The rotten regime was supposed to become so undermined from within that it would collapse. Hitler then succeeded at what the Free Corps leaders failed: the actual destruction of the Weimar regime. He succeeded because he concentrated on mobilizing the masses through extra-parliamentary means of power and extra-party means of propaganda. The Free Corps were among his most important forerunners. Their goals were in many ways identical with his. But despite all savageness in their attitude they remained loyal to the officer tradition — the tradition of the old noble-bourgeois honorable society. Hitler, the corporal, broke through the elitist barriers of the officers-and-students' movement and changed it into a broad populist movement without elitist restrictions to stand in the way of mass expansion. Membership in the Germanic race opened access to far more people than did membership in the good noble-bourgeois society and, for youth, in the officers' corps or student associations.

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As in the Wiemar Republic, also young bourgeois in the Bonn republic developed illegal organizations to carry out political assassinations to bring about change, the fall of existing order, and the opening of previously closed opportunities only after a series of serious disappointments and failures. Like the Weimar terrorists before them most of the Bonn terrorists come from bourgeois homes. Many of them were students or former students. But officers were almost totally absent. But they had women among them, while women had been completely absent among Weimar terrorists. Here is the problem. In the Bonn republic the extraparliamentary opposition, which also consisted mainly of young bourgeois, had the opposite outlook. They sympathized with workers — sometimes also with one or another variety of Communism. Their enmity was directed against established bourgeois society which they saw as built only on selfishness. They also found the pressures of existing social conditions unbearable. Here, too, the root of the distress is the search of a younger generation for a meaningful life whose realization was blocked. What was felt to be meaningful was very different in the two cases. But the basic motive — the feeling of being locked within a system that made a meaningful future very difficult for them — was the same. This basic motive is constantly heard in the statements of extraparliamentary movements from the sixties to the present. But it generally appears peripheral, and disappears behind a Marxist garb.

Yet, it is central. To ignore this is to overlook a very serious problem today. There is an implicit assumption in multi-party industrial societies that occlude this problem. It is the assumption that in these societies everyone can find a meaningful and satisfying task if only one tries. This is misleading. In these societies there are phases during which channels for advancement are relatively open, and others in which they are limited. This does not apply only to professional opportunities but refers just as much to non-professional opportunies for a meaningful existence — especially opportunities for political struggles. In many ways, today political struggles have taken over the functions of earlier religious struggles. The pre-given political spectrum, which today extends between the two poles of Communism and Fascism, increasingly constitutes the available options for many people. Because of this situation, younger people today frequently find the way to any meaningful activity limited to the institutional parties' framework. Many of them are sufficiently alert to recognize the weaknesses of existing societies. Older people often accept the necessity of compromises. Younger people are less tolerant. Many of the most alert young people do not want to compromise. When they seek self-expression within institutional channels of political parties they often find the path to meaningful activity blocked.

The formation of an extraparliamentary opposition in the sixties was a typical example of this situation. The same is true of the student movement connected with it. Here young people found something no longer provided by established political institutions. The common campaigns, the tenants' associations, the big demonstrations gave participants not only a feeling of

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togetherness, but also of a meaningful task. They also provided a sense of power, along with that of a blissful and joyous excitement.

The relatively long way by which the initially peaceful movements gradually became violent, e.g., attacks on department stores or on American institutions, which were planned as protests against the Vietnam War, need not be rehashed. But it is perhaps not unimportant. In retrospect, however, it may be said that it involved a typical double-bind process with a strong tendency to self-escalation. Initially, the demonstrations of the extraparliamentary movement were directed against existing institutions such as the existing authorities in universities. Of course, the authorities struck back. Errors were made, and the slaying of the student Ohnesorg was probably the most consequential.

In such a situation this kind of error becomes a provocation. If the state uses violence — that was a widespread feeling at the time — then we must also use violence. In such double-bind processes there is really no beginning. The police certainly felt challenged and threatened by the demonstrators. Violence generated counter-violence, counter-violence increased the violence of the other side, and so on. If one looks at power relations, the balance of power between the state and extra-parliamentary movements (and later the terrorists) were too uneven to give the latter a serious chance. Yet, many leaders of the student movement and the extra-parliamentary opposition at that time felt that they precipitate the collapse of this social order of selfishness in favor of a more unselfish, less repressive and more meaningful social order. After the successes of 1968, they suddenly realized that they were getting nowhere and the exhilarated feeling of successes gradually gave way to one of disappointment, the awakening from the dream, the knowledge that the hated social edifice, despite a few scars, was still intact. Many of the participants once more faced the question of a closed future: Where are we going? What should we do? Moreover, in the same year some of the participants faced another disappointment when the USSR sent its troops into Czechoslovakia.

Through a few intermediate steps such as the freeing of an emprisoned leader from jail, part of the extra-parliamentary opposition came to the conviction that the superiority of state organizations could not be shaken by legal means. In the same way as some of the embittered and disappointed younger bourgeois of the Weimar antigovernment groups, now a few of the embittered and disappointed young bourgeois of the Bonn republic became convinced that this social edifice could be undermined only conspiratorially, by forming secret organizations and through systematic terror-campaigns against prominent representatives, thus perhaps awakening the lethargic populace.

One of the central fears of those who joined urban guerilla movements, was the return of a dictatorship. They often saw West Germany as a semi-fascist regime. They apparently believed that it was better to bring the hidden fascism, as it seemed to come through in the government's violence, out into the open by counterviolence and to remove its mask. In certain respects, the

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coercive measures of West Germany were intensified under the pressure of terrorist acts.

Today, when one looks back and draws the balance, one can hardly escape a feeling of sadness for the victims of this struggle, the sufferings it caused, and at the general futility. It is thus all the more urgent to become conscious of the social problems which gave rise to these conflicts which are still largely unsolved.

As already emphasized, the people who played a leading role in non-violent extra-parliamentary organizations were predominantly young bourgeois. They often employed a working class ideology. But, as someone has written: "The mythical working class is the club to smash to father's world."[17]

As in other cases, here the driving force behind the ideological use of class conflicts is a generational conflict. Certainly terrorist organizations also included people who came from the working class and continued to be employed as workers. But they were a minority. The difference between their attitude and their ability to use physical violence to achieve political goals and that of the bourgeois terrorists was striking. But that is another chapter.

One of the working-class people who for a time played an active, though apparently never a leading role in one of the terrorist organizations was Michael Baumann, whose book *How it all Began*[18] in many respects contributes to a better understanding of the human side of terrorists — especially to an understanding of the difference between the relation of young workers and young bourgeois to the use of violence as a political weapon. Both he and Hans-Joachim Klein,[19] another former terrorist from working class origins who wrote an autobiography, became intellectuals through contact with the student-movement and their own efforts. They never lost the stamp of their origin, but both, different as they were, remained loners. Baumann especially, was more of an anarchist than a communist. He consciously left the career that he was destined for, just as later he left the terrorist movement. He was, to use his own word, a "flipped out" worker. Characteristically, relatively early in life he asked the question: what meaning did his activity really have? "You cannot see any meaning in the work you do, let us say running errands or some such nonsense. Then you no longer have a desire to go on learning in your trade. It just increases your displeasure. That is just one more thing you are tearing down."[20]

He imagined he had to do what he was learning there for the next fifty years. He was frightened and finally he succeeded in getting out. He describes it very vividly: "For example, on the first day when all the apprentices have gone to the construction office and then were driven out to the construction site by car, and on the trip to this site I suddenly realized, you'll be doing this for 50

17. Jochen Steffen, "Afterword" to K.R. Röhl, *Fünf Finger sind keine Faust* (Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1977), p. 452.

18. *Wie alles anfing*, (Trikont Verlag, Munich, 1980).

19. *Rückkehr in die Menschlichkeit*, (Reinbek, 1979).

20. Baumann, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

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years. There is no escape. I was horrified through and through, so I always sought a way of getting out."[21]

If one asks why the extra-parliamentary opposition movements in the sixties and seventies, and most certainly beyond that, consisted mainly of people of bourgeois origin, then it seems useful to start with this. Among young workers, the experience Baumann describes was apparently very rare. One can assume that the transition from school to apprenticeship and from there to the workplace takes place in the traditional manner and relatively unreflectedly. Everyone we know does it that way, so we do it too. One adjusts to coercions, but apparently with increasing lethargy. People like Baumann who do not do so, who suddenly have their whole future before their eyes and say to themselves with horror. "Is that supposed to be my whole life?" are apparently still an exception among young workers.

For young people of bourgeois origin, particularly for young students, the question of the future, "What is to become of me? How is my life to be shaped?" is generally a very urgent and central concern. The wish for a meaningful and satisfying future is stronger. The quest for meaning is accordingly more conscious.

Whatever the expressed objectives of young bourgeois movements, their demonstrations, occupations of buildings, their concern for the oppressed and downtrodden, this question of meaning is the driving force in the background. When meaningful opportunities for a considerable number of younger people are choked off, then there is an emergency situation: an explosive potential that under suitable circumstances must find expression in movements opposing established political institutions. I have discussed the Weimar terrorists because it seemed useful to show that extra-parliamentary movements, whether peaceful or violent, are not isolated pheonomena. Under certain circumstances they are, as it were, part of the structure of non-dictatorial and perhaps also dictatorial industrial societies. Moreover, in West Germany the difference between the moral ideas of the older generation and the ethics of the younger generation is especially sharp. In reaction to the traumatic memory of the inhumanity of the Hitler period, the younger generations have at times endorsed a very emphatic ethic of engagement against inequality, repression, exploitation, war, and for a kind of human decency. It is unclear whether this ethic, which at times may still have a Utopian character, will be preserved when people become older. Yet, the problem of meaning raised by the younger generation, and expressed, among other things, in the terrorist movement, will make itself felt recurrently, even by violent activities, as long as a more conscious and intensive effort for improvement is not being made. It is really not hard to see that this blockage of meaning [*Sinnsperre*] for a not inconsiderable part of the younger generation, whether through laws, through unemployment, or whatever, creates a wide recruitment field not only for today's drug-dealers, but also for future urban guerillas, and for future radical movements in general.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

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Notes and Commentary:
THESES ON TECHNOCRACY

by Joel Kovel

The nuclear war towards which we appear to be uncontrollably lurching will be the failure of diplomacy but the triumph of technocracy, indeed, its Gotter-dammerung. Diplomacy seeks state power through rational means; technocracy, domination through the logos of science. For a long time the two ran together in the same trace, facilitated by the identification of science with rationality. Nuclear weapons objectively broke this identity — there being no rational goal worth a thermonuclear exchange. Subjectively, however, the power of technology to excite fear and awe has kept technocracy in business. Hence deterrence as an instrument of state policy, and the collective psychosis of the arms race. The product and agent of this transformation is the nuclear state, the last stage of technocracy and its ultimate development in the political sphere. From the pinnacle of technical mastery, the nuclear state rules by fear.

Being technocratic, the nuclear state projects force through technological violence. Yet the moment of its triumph — the bomb — is also the moment of its breakdown: the bomb is worthless except as a threat. This is the central contradiction defining the nuclear state. It is forced into deterrence but cannot live by deterrence. Its aggressively imperial nature rebels against the passive constraints of deterrence; while the military and foreign policy bureaucracies demand a more flexible and graduated response. Technocracy is irreversible however; and the only direction in which relief from the fetters of deterrence is sought is that of an ever greater technological advantage in weaponry. The nuclear state begins to skid towards first-strike, the plotting of limited nuclear war scenarios, and looming armageddon. This tendency arises independently of any vicissitudes of relations between states. Although conditioned by great-power politics, it is intrinsic to the nuclear state: the very topography of the nuclear path. The state's penchant for nuclear monstrosities is not, however, a "technological imperative," in which the weapon leads the policy-maker around. Nor is it separable from imperial interests. It is merely the form such interests take under the order of technocracy, i.e., where the machine, as extension and reduction of human power, becomes the means of domination.

Technocracy is totalizing, hence irreversible. It commands the means of social reproduction and is installed in the psyche. The dictionary defines it as the empowerment of expertise. But this is only the window-dressing, technocracy's official image of itself. The rule of experts is undoubtedly technocratic, but secondary, a way of tidying up the debris produced by technocratic violence and domination. The expert is the colonial administrator dispatched to take charge of obstreporous natives riled up by imperialist penetration. Technocracy is first of all the point of dissection which makes that penetration possible. It is the splitting of value from the sensuous unity of life through an expropriation of science. Thus the essence of technocracy is not the use of the machine but the exchange of sensuous reality for mechanized reality, and the delegation of self to others or the Other of the machine. The moment of violence, bureaucratic homicide, manifests the true face of technocracy. Guernica, Auschwitz, Dresden, Hiroshima, My Lai, Sabra and Shatila, have been its logical consequences.

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From the standpoint of its victims, technocracy represents a new order of terror. Its cherubic, clean-shaven domination is carried forward through the denial of domination — "Welcome to Auschwitz, and have a nice day," The efficient, highly cultured mass killer drives panic deep into the soul. A high civilization brandishing the threat of omnicide goes deeper yet. In this way, the nuclear state has made us into its collective victim. It has wrung acquiescence to its indefensible policies through a systematic reign of terror. One might call it internal deterrence. The principle means have been twofold: demonization of the Other; and reassurance by the state that it has matters in hand — so long as we obey orders and show proper deference to the bomb. The spectacular triumph of this species of technocratic denial has recently become undone owing to the pace of the arms race and the decay of state legitimacy. Thus state terror has yeilded to an apocalyptic fear repressed since science banished religion to the margins of history. And this signals the final crisis of technocracy.

Technocracy is coeval with capitalism, and transfers its embrace to those socialisms which are state-capitalistic. Capitalism, however, is its pure form in the economic sphere. Production for the sake of production, the economization of reality: these are the trademarks of technocracy. The critique of political economy is also a critique of technocracy. Domination as qualification defines technocracy and capitalism alike; and the transformation of praxis into labor-power, wages, surplus-value and capital represents the superimposition of the two. So, of course, does the ascendancy of machinery at the point of production. The fetishization of technology matches that of the commodity, and accounts for the automatism with which the atomic bomb has been used as the ultimate enforcer of capitalist hegemony. To the extent that the crises of capital accumulation have been managed by state intervention, the dynamism of capitalist society has shifted to the state sector. When the capitalist state also became a nuclear state, however, it ignited another, technocratic crisis to succeed, if not supplant, the crises of accumulation.

Economic systems define practical relations with nature. Thus they are also statements about nature, and about the self in its relation to nature. Along with its qualification of praxis, capitalism dedifferentiates nature into passive clay awaiting the active hand of the master. Nature ceases to be the transcendant source of life, and turns into raw materials. Technocracy is the final metamorphosis of the *logos* which has driven western civilization: its emergence as pure power. All power rests with the pure, knowing, initiating subject: Descartes' *Cogito cum* capitalist enterpeneur *cum* technocrat. This party was necessarily a white male. His psychology is that of the Ego: mental technocracy.

The unearthing of nature, its deadening, is the necessary condition for the ascendancy of the exchange principle, i.e., of capitalist-technocratic relations as such. Once the human and the natural world are split, then value can be quatified for the aggrandizement of the master. Everything else is exchangeable, even the bomb, which was put onto the diplomatic table as being worth so much in Soviet concessions, and is still factored into various Realpolitical equations, bringing us ever closer to the unquantifiable end of the human species.

The transformation of nature into inert resources was applied to human nature as well, which became defined as conditions for the reproduction of labor power. After late capitalism automated production and began incubating the moment of consumption, human nature ripened into *id*, the repository of desire. Throughout, human

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nature has been conceived as alienated, the province of the powerless (such as women or dark-skinned raced), and a dangerous, though essential Other to the Ego of calculating *cogito*. Thus inner as well as outer nature had to be pacified, and the mission of technocracy has been domination of nature, hence, the Faustian logic of the atomic bomb. How could the masters have recognized its Frankenstein-like character? To do so would have meant abandoning the entire civilization which brought them to power.

The stench of a bad deal hangs over technocracy. The *cogito*, split from nature inside and out, and facing the revenge of billions of subjects, inevitably turns paranoid. Surveillance replaces sensuousness. The technocrat peers out of his tower, sends killer-satellites into orbit, arms his CIA, monitors the Other, and waits to get before he is gotten. The split with nature grows behind the mask of denial. Ahab returns.

Horkheimer postulated the revolt of a dominated nature; history has borne him out. What else could have been expected? The bomb is only the point of apocalyptic incandescence. Even without it, a nature under the paranoid assault of capitalism-technocracy would have long-since served notice that it was finding history intolerable. There is, however, no revenge in nature; its revolt is akin to the desperation of an animal caught within a trap. We project revenge into nature, forcing it to revolt because we cannot take responsibility for history: we make the animal into Ahab's Whale. The bomb is the insensate revolt of a nature caught up in the dialectics of revenge. But so is acid rain, or the destruction of topsoil. The search for gold or profits, the imperative of capital to grow or die, the hunger for energy — these are the weapons, the mediations of revenge; technocracy is its deployment under the aegis of instrumental, positive reason. The ecological crisis and the nuclear crisis have an identical inner structure. Both are products of the scission of self from nature in the course of domination. To stave off rebellion, the attack on nature was intensified. This had two major effects: more wealth was squeezed out of the earth, some of which trickled down to pacify the dominated; and nature was harnessed for the purposes of augmenting the master's control, whether through the technologies of production or destruction. Narcissism, deprived of projection into nature, accumulated in the machine; while care, ultimately a matter of self-recognition, was withdrawn from the objects wrought or destroyed by the machine. The end-result: eco-catastrophe, where technology is employed for purposes of technocratic production; and nuclear war, where it is used for the violent projections of state power.

The crisis of technocracy is revealed as the disintegration of society. Not on the surface, where people line up, drive on the same side of the road, dutifully watch the same evening news, and can be periodically roused to spasms of jingoism. In the depths, however, where the individual experiences the collectivity as a living part of the self and one's existence is experienced as part of the whole, where the personal past and future are woven together with the history of the society — here the rupture has been irreversible. Only the constant accession of that technocracy which has itself destroyed communal unity, namely, the heteronomous influence of the industries of culture, of mass education, of the psychotherapy rackets, can patch things up at the level of daily life. And only the infusion of the technocratic mystique at the level of the whole, in the form of the arms race and the justification for it comprised by the cold war, can sustain that whole as an entity. The point is not whether the whole is illusory; all social formations proceed on the basis of myth. The crux is whether the myth and its material emanations can integrate a historical manifold; or, whether, by contrast, the terms of

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the myth dissolve its own linkages, and so violate nature and human nature alike, that the only form of perpetuation is annihilation. Such was the case for early twentieth century versions of totalitarianism. Now, in the later years of the century, the most highly rationalized and progressive forms of technocracy drive to the same conslusion: the only form of universality toward which the whole can aspire is universal destruction, either nuclear or ecological. Yet, without any movement toward universality, the society crumbles outright. Thus, the technocratic trap. One can read it on the faces of the young, as they play their video games.

The inexorable crisis of technocracy is the framework within which the most significant social movements of this epoch arise. Significant, because in principle the antitechnocratic movements — ecological, antinuclear, antimilitary, anti-imperial and pacifist — are closest to the bone of crisis and the least subject to co-optation. Workers' movements can — and have — been bought off by militarization and the recuperation of the economy; women's and antiracist movements by passing around morsels of the bourgeois pie. But an antitechnocratic movement is defined by the overcoming of technocratic relations themselves — the domination of nature by the white, masculinized Cartesian Ego; the domination of praxis through its conversion to labor power and the managerial control exercised therein; the domination of desire by the cultures of consumerism; and above all, the domination of peoples through the technologies of imperialism, down to the CIA and the Trident submarine. The challenge is to make the new social movements antitechnocratic in fact as well as principle, which is to say, to give them an affirmative and universalizing meaning, grounded in praxis. Until then, the ecological movement will remain bourgeois and merely environmental, i.e., technocratic; while the antinuclear and peace movements will, by confining themselves to cries of anguish over the horrors of strategic weapons, succeed only in rationalizing the arms race. It is not enough to postualte survival; the question is, of what?

A first precondition for an emancipatory antitechnocracy is the deconstruction of the cold war. This murderous swindle, by means of which the ruling elites of empire have divided the globe, bamboozled their populations and kept a generation and more of intellectuals in tow, must be detached and set adrift. How do we tell when the spectre of the cold war has infested the mind of a Western intellectual? When he regards the Soviet bloc not as the setting of a repression made more bitter by being the failure of a revolutionary ideal, but as Other. For the Other is the negative emanation of the self. Therefore he who falls victim to the spell of the Other is forced to affirm the value and, indeed, protection of the side he happens to inhabit. And so the critical voice becomes stifled in the throat. One begins to respect NATO, to think approvingly of nuclear deferrence, to hypostatize "democracy" of the bourgeois kind into an abstract universal instead of seeing it as an unfulfilled promise — in short, one remains within technocracy. We may turn this around: because one has not escaped technocracy, nor been able to see through the *logos* of the West and find a universal value outside its reason and "way of life," one submits to the power of the West, finds the Soviet as Other and proceeds to rationalize the status quo, including the arms race. The cold war discloses an essential characteristic of technocracy — its paranoid nature. This is the underside of its one unique achievement — domination by means of instrumental rationality. Ours is a clean form of domination. Yet a domination that denies it dominates because of the "value-free" quality of its rationality, and has lost any sense of the sacred to boot, is prey to projections of its own badness. Technocracy would be

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driven mad did it not have the Other to act as repository for its projections — thus the yeoman duty fulfilled by the Soviets. This justifies any and all atrocities on the part of the West, superficially, at least. In the depths, the problem is that each round of atrociousness forces a new cycle of projection and so breeds new, and worse generations of its kind. This dynamic can be neutralized here and there, but always remains at least latent, and in the sphere of nuclear weapons, it finds an apotheosis.

The alternative to the cold way in the geopolitical arena is not an evenhanded denunciation of all sides. This continues the cold war without having to declare oneself as part of it. And it is technocratic in its bland scission of value from the facts of the matter. To evenhandedly denounce all sides is no better than focussing on the evils of communism, since it ignores the one truth which gives us a chance to reclaim praxis for ourselves — that we inhabit *this* side and reproduce it by what we do. Value, after all, arises from the actual life we live. Therefore the technocracy of the West is the only one we can overcome, just as the imperialism of the West is the imperialism we sustain

Antitechnocratic praxis is non-violent resistance to Western imperialism and militarism, indeed to all dominative forms of nationalism. And the primary strategy in the antinuclear sphere is unilateral disarmament. Two clarifications: unilateral disarmament does not mean an immediate and total scrapping of all nuclear weapons on the part of the West. That would be both utopian and irrational, i.e., self-defeating. It does mean, however, *initiatives*, such as no cruise and Pershing in Europe, no first use as an explicit policy, a pressing for a complete test ban treaty, the scrapping of new systems such as Trident and even a voluntary dismantlement of, say, a quarter of the strategic arsenal. And more basically, it means such alterations in the relation of society to the nuclear state as would be necessary for these rational yet drastic steps to be taken: it means getting out from under the technocracy of the cold war. The second clarification concerns non-violence. This should not be confused with an abstract universal such as absolute pacifism. Instead, it is a dynamic goal to be sought through praxis, through a detachment from the rationalized violence which constitutes participation in technocracy. Non-violence consists of a change in direction. This is radical in itself, yet cannot be measured in any technocratic terms. Rather non-violence inheres in the concrete response to one's situation. Specifically, the violence of the oppressed is non-violent relative to that of the oppressor, or, indeed, to inert submission to the latter's violent oppression. Hence the need to support such wars of liberation as have arisen when all peaceful means to redress oppression have been exhausted — with, however, the condition that fuller degrees of non-violence, which is here definable as justice without retaliation, be consistently espoused as the goal of the struggle. Finally, it should be noted that non-violent struggle has nothing in common with the mere postulation of biological survival as a principle of action. On the contrary, it is well-known, but sometimes overlooked, that the main proponents of non-violent struggle — Gandhi, King, A. J. Muste — were, for all their problematic positions, quite definitely willing to die, and certainly to sacrifice, for their beliefs. They had found in the non-violent way a universalizing principle that transcended the established, technocratic order.

Antitechnocratic praxis must materialize non-violence in productive relationships. This raises the prospect of an ecological, as against an economic, society in the industrialized nations. And it is the decisive mediation, without which the new movements must eventually collapse into the old order. The fact that the economy seems to have

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exhausted its recuperative bag of tricks opens the way for this transformation, but does no more. What is demanded is the building of a new order parallel with, or between the cracks of, the old. As society decomposes, these cracks appear continually. The question is the recomposition of the fragments. Rising legions of structurally unemployed youth, the steady growth of an underground economy "off the books," dispersal to the countryside where people are less ensnared by technocratic culture and nature must be confronted — the preconditions are there. The new society will not appear in any one place or through any mastermind or central party, but from the bottom up, as the coalescence of ecological and antitechnocratic praxes. To the extent these are spontaneous, decentralized and unco-optable by the culture industries, we will be relatively unaware of the ecological society as it happens. Some of it will occur through workers' movements, as control is taken of runaway shops, or defense industries are converted to nonmilitary use, or as autonomous collectives of workers arise, for example, in the health or culture industries. Others will appear as quasi-liberated zones through the democratization of small communities. Still others will emerge as productive communes, or through the grounding of single-issue political groups in productive activity. In no instance will the break be clean or without pain; the economy does not let its grip go. Yet, the conditions for the growth of such communities are given by the fundamental contradictions in technocracy itself, and cannot be reversed. What is open and remains to be seen is whether a universal interest can become associated with them. This will be determined in part by the relation to the host society, in particular, to its class conflicts and their manifestations in the struggle for distributive justice. Most critically, the future of an ecological society depends on its capacity to posit transcendance for itself.

The antitechnocratic movement cannot drop entirely out of the host society, else there will be no field to bring in new participants or to provide for the coalescence of spontaneously emerging praxis into a universal ecological interest. Schools and organs of communication will be required, and it would seem, "greentype" parties as well, to articulate the new consciousness and make demands upon the system. These should always take such forms as move the state to hasten its own dissolution. All disarmament initiatives come under this heading, as do those defend democratic liberties. Economic demands should be those that promote the development of an ecological society while addressing distributive injustices. For example, the U.S. could use another WPA to deal with its unemployment, or at least an expanded CETA program, i.e., decentralized support for jobs that would allow new praxes to grow.

Programmatic changes cannot make an ecological society. Values themselves need to be transformed. The materialization of antitechnocracy prefigures a society that is no longer materialistic. Creative technology can be directed to human needs. But needs that have been artificially swollen by consumer society, and represent, in sum, the infusion of imperialism into the self — these will have to go, along with the imperial plunder that fed them. The dignity of physical labor will rise, as will reliance on self and the immediate community. In sum, the return of the use-value, and quality, over exchange-value and quantity. There will be an end to productivism and the technocratic — Faustian — Cartesian, delusion of material growth. People will be leaner; and it will be the challenge of the new consciousness and its culture to demonstrate by example that this is the better way.

Technocracy is the domination of nature. An ecological society, by contrast, is rooted in non-violence toward nature, and will actively employ non-dominative

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technologies. A transformed science will arise to articulate this relationship. Blake called it "sweet science," a science stemming from an erotic appropriation of nature. In an ecological society, the self recognizes itself in nature: differentiated from the cosmos instead of being split from it in Cartesian dualism. All creative science is based upon this differentiation, which it brings to consciousness in a social project. Under the conditions of technocratic splitting, the estranged self, unable to recognize itself in nature, makes nature Other and possesses it desperately at the same time. The eco-social self, able to recognize itself in a nature, is also capable of detachment: it can let go, yield, move with, and let nature be. And it recognizes itself in the Other across the differentiations of male-female, white-black. This does not imply a life without conflict or tension, either between humans or with nature. We are that part of nature constituted by our difference from it. We feed off nature and live in interdependancy with it, yet consciousness and the self arise through object loss and separateness, and are hedged about with the omnipresence of death. There is an irreducible mystery in existence; the goal of an ecological society is to undo historical splits and bring us up against it. By appropriating sweet science, it also undoes the splits between science and faith, and science and poetics. It sets as its impossible goal the reunion of word and thing.

The project suggested here is unreasonable, and it would be a simple matter to demonstrate how far it is from realization. But then, technocracy has staked out most of the claims to reasonableness. To assert rationality under the reign of technocracy, a degree of unreasonableness is essential — just as the only rational response to a Trident submarine is outraged rejection. Indeed, the present crisis of technocracy, signalled by the fatal accumulation of nuclear arms, provides critical thought with its true historical moment. Never did the critique of instrumental reason, of pragmatism, of positivism — all masks of techocracy — have greater urgency. Never has the established form of rationality hung so disasterously over the earth. Never have emancipation and survival been so convergent.

THE EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENTS, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE AMERICAN LEFT*

by Klaus Segbers

For more than a year *Telos* has been having a lively debate on the European and especially the West German peace movement. To follow this discussion from a German vantagepoint is interesting in several respects. First, the question arises whether the so-called "peace movement" can be perceived from a distance. Which aspects are stressed, which are neglected? Most *Telos*-articles discussed the contents and forms of expression of these movements from the left and from the right, in distanced and at times polemical form. What are the aims of this criticism? Since *Telos* is an organ of internal Left debates or at least of a spectrum thereof: from what standpoints is the critique undertaken, and to what extent is it "Leftist" in the West-European sense? What assumptions concerning Soviet foreign and defense policy play a role in the critics' argumentation? Finally, does the broader discussion of "new social

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movements" also have a dimension internal to the journal? Editorial disagreements seem to be carried out in part under the standard of a discussion of these movements, and the question is raised whether "a shift in *Telos*' position" has taken place.[1] What is most interesting, however, are the authors' basic theoretical positions.

The articles, especially those who do not seem to draw their data just from the *New York Times*, often contain interesting historical, cultural and political allusions. But, on the whole, descriptions and interpretations of the social and peace movements deviate too far from reality. Some observations are too selective, some analogies are inaccurate. This applies even more to the often arbitrary, misinformed and not seldom false statements about Eastern Europe and especially the Soviet Union. No far-reaching theories can be built on a distorted perception.

From the arguments of some of the authors it becomes clear that they are only secondarily interested in a discussion of the peace movement. At issue is a change of paradigm in ever larger portions of the American, French and (less well articulated) also German Leftists who want to break away from the Marxist analysis as a whole (and not only from Marxist-Leninist distortions) and who no longer want to be understood as a fundamental opposition to their respective states. This change of position and paradigms is framed within a whole complex of new, but actually mostly old concepts: "civil society," "totalitarianism," "reformism," etc. All these concepts have their explanatory potential, but now they are being extended beyond their limits. At any rate, they make sense only from a bourgeois standpoint.

The following main objections are made against the West European and especially the West German peace movement: Its analysis of the origins of American, or respectively, Soviet militarism is false; one-sided disarmament measures, as demanded by the peace movement, are disastrous; there is widespread confusion on values in the movement and, consequently, a neglect of solidarity with democratic movements in Eastern Europe;[2] the movement is marked by an anti-rational, anti-enlightenment rhetoric;[3] finally, the peace movement is the expression of export and trade interests of West German capital.[4]

Certainly, it is very important to subject these movements to critical analysis and evaluation. That is the intellectuals' task. But one must insist that it must also be possible on a practical political level to take a stand of solidarity within the framework of these social movements. Indeed, it is absolutely necessary to separate these two things — analysis and reflection on the one hand, and intervention for a practical goal on the other — and not to play off these two legitimate sides against one another.

The above-listed points of critique have by no means been leveled just against *parts* of the movement, although in this area precision is ineluctible. For there is no *single* peace movement. It is a media construct. In reality, it is still far *too heterogeneous* to be comprehensible as a whole. Thus, critique must be limited either to particular groups or parts of the peace movement, or else it must show that it applies to the whole movement. Thus, in principle, all attempts to characterize the peace movement in general as

1. Paul Breines, "On Berman and Social Movements," in *Telos*, No. 51, p. 172; Russell A. Berman, "The Peace Movement and its Critics' Critics: Reply to Breines and Benhabib," in *Telos*, No. 52, p. 106; Orville Lee III, "Metacritique of Non-Criticism: A Reply to Breines et al.," in *Telos*, No. 52, p. 109.

2. Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, "The Peace Movement and Western European Sovereignty," in *Telos*, No. 51, p. 160.

Russell A. Berman, "Opposition to Rearmament and West German Culture," in *Telos*, No. 51, p. 147.

4. Berman, in *Telos*, No. 51, p. 148; and in *Telos*, No. 52, pp. 99 ff; cf. also Lee in *Telos*, 52.

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naive, irrationalistic or subserviant to the experts must fail. The term "peace movement" must be understood as a label used to designate activities that are actually prompted by a great variety of motives and very different participating groups. When 400,000 people meet in Bonn for a demonstration convoked by several hundred groups and organizations, this shows how variegated this movement must be. While it is hard enough to identify the various main components of the peace movement, it is practically fool-hardy to want to reduce it to one or two of its elements — say, theological influence or the cult of immediacy and spontaneity, or even the marginal role of the German Communist Party.

At least the following main currents can be recognized in the peace movement: citizen initiatives working for concrete particular goals (for instance, the prevention of the construction of missile-launching ramps in their neighborhood); old leftists who as early as the 50s and 60s protested against rearmament and atomic war (Easter marches); critical peace research which opposes traditional armaments-and defense-experts and their monopoly of political implications and value dimension of prevailing defense philosophy and seek alternatives; orthodox Communists, whose relation to the peace movement is primarily tactical (at least on the part of the party leadership); 'street fighters,' often uprooted youths who feel the urge for physical activism; large sectors of labor-unions, Social and Free Democratic youth organizations; remnants of the student movement who are now jumping on a new band-wagon; relatively apolitical teenagers motivated mostly by vague fears — all this is just a selection.

Naturally, some of these groups and currents overlap. But, clearly, because of its very complex morphology and unstructured character, the so-called peace movement tends to escape sharp definitions. And, likewise, *the* peace movement has not developed unified analyses. Such a movement can reach a majority consensus on its own least common denominator (against the NATO double-decision) and for short-term mobilizations (focal demonstrations), but on little more.

Not even the much-invoked (and successfully marketed) *fear* is suited as a common denominator. For it is very doubtful whether x-thousands can fear of atomic war, which is concretely unimaginable, in the same sense as an individual is overcome by fear when a car comes towards him. In good part, the peace movement is a media event. But one should not oversimplify. This movement is neither so concretely comprehensible that it can be denounced without further ado; nor is it so vague that any study of it would be superfluous. Actually, the rise of new social movements, their publicity and the nervous reactions of established policy, of the court-scribes in the media, and the confusion of the observing and concerned intelligentsia can be reduced to a single concept even for West Germany. It is *Modell Deutschland*. To clarify this it is necessary to digress and deal with the conditions that determine West Germany politics.[5]

In 1976 the German Social Democratic Party entered the Bundestag election campaign with the slogan *Modell Deutschland* (it won the election together with the Free Democratic Party). This *Modell Deutschland* is actually the result of a strategy to mitigate and overcome the structural and cyclical crises that have threatened the West German reproduction formula since the early 70s — a strategy which the Social Democrats had a decisive part in shaping.

The West German economy is especially strong in exports — and dependent on

5. The following follows closely Josef Esser and Wolfgang Fach, *Internationale Konkurrenz und selektiver Korporatismus* (Neuss, 1979); as well as on another work by the same authors: "Grenzprobleme des 'Modells Deutschland,' " in *Prokla*, No. 40 (1980), pp. 40-63.

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them.[6] West Germany is the second strongest trading nation in the world (in a few sectors the strongest). Until the beginning of the 1980s, which will probably mark the end of the fourth long wave of capitalism since the French Revolution, exports repeatedly pulled the West German economy out of its economic lows. This is, among other things, a result of West German's headstart in modernizing its industry after WWII and reflects the high international competitiveness of high-value investment-goods and key-technologies. At the same time, standardized mass commodities (for instance, textile products) are mainly imported.

In order to be able to maintain this leading position of an economic great power and a political medium-sized power, the German government (*any* German government) must pursue three aims in its foreign policy: expansion of free world-trade, the prevention of protectionist measures, and the broadening of the international division of labor. Its firm anchoring in the Western military alliance, its influential role in the European Community, the policy of detente toward the East and its moderating role in the North-South conflict are based on this. No possible government coalition in the foreseeable future will be able to change these constants.

In the framework of this *Modell Deutschland*, the West German domestic economy must, to a great extent, specialize in certain products and technologies — chemistry, automobiles, electronics, weapons systems, machine-building, nuclear equipment, data-processing, and the like. Specialization in internationally competitive products and designs requires the reduction, adaptation, discontinuance, and possibly also the displacement of branches of production that are no longer competitive because not profitably exploitable. To preserve these endangered branches (simple steels, textiles, as well as the construction industry) from annihilation, common adaptation-strategies are being developed which are to contribute to the modernization, specialization, or the less painful discontinuation of imperiled branches of production.

As is well-known, these adaptation strategies are being designed, negotiated and realized conjointly by the state, the affected enterprises, and the responsible unions and factory councils with the support of public opinion, which offers little resistence because of the overwhelming preponderance of this coalition. The result seems to be beneficial to all. Thus, 1) the state mediates the divergent interests of individual enterprises, as well as between them and the unions, and settles conflicts "for the benefit of the whole." It distributes subsidies to the economy and thus also unburdens the "social net," which it moreover guarantees independently of the economic situation. Social transfer-payments (unemployment compensation, welfare, health insurance, and rent subsidies) assure a minimum of social consensus (read: pacification). 2) Enterprises are, as far as possible, saved during crises even contrary to market laws. They receive government assistance for new and rationalization investments, but also for social plans affecting "laid-off" workers. The economy as a whole is directly and indirectly unburdened of the costs of "Research and Development" by the Federal Research Ministry, without at the same time losing its monopoly of disposition over prices and investments. The resistance of those affected by adaptations and "healthy shrinkages" is mostly kept within bounds. 3) The unions see to this, since they have set

6. In 1982 West Germany had the world's highest positive trade balance (over 12.2 billion dollars). It accounted in 1981/82 for 10.1% of world-exports and 8.9% of world-imports. In 1976 the export and import portion of the nominal social product amounted to 28% and 25% respectively. As Esser points out, "West Germany in the late 1970's had the highest exports, foreign trade surpluses, and currency reserves of the Western world to show." See Josef Esser, *Gewerkschaften in der Krise* (Frankfurt, 1982), p. 63; in 1978 West German direct foreign investments came to 58 billion DM (ca. 17% of the gross social product).

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themselves the task of playing their role within the prevailing reproduction formula and securing as much as possible of the comparatively high wages and social benefits for their members and limiting cuts in the social security system. Confrontations with enterprises and the state that go beyond rhetorical showmanship are generally avoided. the unions also have the common good in mind, and they react accordingly.

On the whole, this coalition for crisis-control (which for a time found its organizational expression in "concerted action") must be regarded as successful. Internationally, the West German social system is still considered exemplary; mass resistance by labor unchannelled by the union leadership is almost unknown. The representatives of this modern German model (Social Democracy, the unions, and parts of the Christian Democratic Union) are committed to a state-interventionist and anti-cyclical economic policy (limited now by the economic crisis) and to a social-partnership settlement of outstanding conflicts of interests between capital and labor unions.

In recent years of economic stagnation and incipient real wage diminution the line of this huge coalition has shifted somewhat toward a supply-oriented economic policy (mainly under pressure from the Free Democratic Party) but without coming anywhere near British or US voodoo-economy. Labor union rhetoric has also become somewhat sharper, but without questioning the consensus. Chancellor Schmidt was the guarantor of this "policy of the center," and the new administration will also follow this course. Important for us here is that the reproduction formula of *Modell Deutschland* builds on the "healthy core" of producers and on the mediating state and social apparatuses. This core also comprises most skilled workers, the new middle class in the service sector, and the parties representing these groups in the Bundestag.

But there are also those who stand on the margin or outside this "healthy core" because they cannot or do not want to participate. These are the many unemployed, the physically or psychologically handicapped, youths without any visible prospects, and many intellectuals. This sector began to grow strongly in the 70s, while the "healthy core" shrank. This development has intensified in recent years and will continue to do so in the future because of the crisis in economic growth, in government financing, and in social values. Here the post-war identity, which was based on an apparently normal rate of growth, an expanding social state, an increasing range of choice in foreign policy, and a broad, mostly silent social consensus, is gradually being lost. The Germans' so eloquently described "fear" is rooted in this.

The rise of the so-called new social movements, including the peace-movement and the organizational solidification of large parts of these movements into a parliamentary arm, the "Green" Party, is an expression (not at all the cause) of this crisis. Traditional parties and the unions, often also the media, are hardly accepted any longer as discussion partners by these new currents. Many peculiarities of West German opposition movements can be understood only on this basis.

This does not mean that there are no other influences having to do with German history and the "German question," the belated national state, the weak bourgeoisie. But the general influences of modern capitalist systems — intensive division of labor, dependence on positive growth rates, and the fixation on high technologies — also exert a determining influence. Besides the historical peculiarities of German history and the general tendencies of modern industrial societies, a particular form of creating the social synthesis has developed in West Germany after WWII to reproduce this

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system — *Modell Deutschland*. The new movements can be understood only against this background.

Within this framework, the peace movement, which is mostly on the "outside," is primarily a reactive and not a positively active phenomenon. If we now examine the reproaches and accusations that have been aimed at the peace movement, there is at least one surprising result: the peace movement is, among other things, also the result of the export and trade interests of (modern) West German capital.[7] But it is so as a conscious *and* unconscious counter-movement of resistance, and not as a blindly supportive and tolerant substructure. It is the result of a consolidation of victims rather than a naive (or knowing) epiphenomenon of West German trade with the East.

The peace movement should not be equated with the public statements of a few of its prominent representatives such as the lady-theologians (Ranke-Heinemann, Sölle) whom Berman likes to quote, and those few who share the Social Democratic understanding of detente. Most of those who study this theme see at least the ambivalence in it.[8] Whereas detente from above stabilizes the blocs and is meant to guarantee the post-Yalta order in Europe — and these are also the interests of the "modern" export-oriented capitalist factions — from below, as it were, it also creates preconditions for free spaces within which the erosion of the two blocs can be (and has been) generated.[9] For we are experiencing a gradual disintegration of the so-called bipolarity — a process which also makes the two "super-powers" scenario ever more questionable.[10] Thus, detente in the traditional sense has both a stabilizing and a

7. Certainly, important sectors of German capital (and also American ones) have an interest in consolidating and expanding foreign trade with East European states, so long as it can be financed. But two facts must be remembered in connection with the statement of a "growing dependence of West German capital on the Soviet economy" (Berman, in *Telos*, No. 51, p. 141): in 1981 only 2.5% of West German imports (9.22 billion DM) and 1.9% of West German exports (7.62 billion DM) consisted of trade with the Soviet Union. This does not indicate a remarkable dependence. Unlike almost all other Western countries, West Germany grants no favorable interest credits for trade with the East.

8. Cf. on this topic: *Sozialistische Friedenspolitik. Thesen des Sozialistischen Büros* (Frankfurt a.M., 1982) pp. 20 ff.

9. Clearly, without detente there would have been no Charter '77, nor the Soviet Helsinki-Committee. "Solidarity" in Poland was not least of all a result of Gierek's so eager and hollow modernization strategy, which in turn was made possible only through detente and by the short-sighted penetration and successes of Western (not just West German!) capital. To what an extent the great variety of leftist movements, experiements and discussions in Western Europe, all the way from Eurocommunism to terrorist activities, were related to detente, would be worth investigating.

10. The "super powers" scenario is imprecise and misleading. Although the U.S. and the USSR are still decisive crystalization centers in the web of international relations, it does not follow that they are structurally or actually similar to one another in their foreign policy so that one can speak of an identity of systems. The category "super powers" absolutizes the strategic dominance of two great powers and disregards their structural socio-economic differences and the correspondingly different situation of their interests. It also neglects the increasing competition between capitalist states. The West German corporatist restructuring policy (*Modell Deutschland*) is still much more "modern" than the U.S. economic policy which vacillates between monetarism and "supply side" economics. West German foreign policy is increasingly more independent. But for the West German Left, it makes a difference whether West German policy is understood in terms of American interests of a medium-sized power.

The "super power" scenario also encourages the instrumentalization of medium-, threshold-, and "non"- powers (similarly to the old Chinese "Three-Worlds Theory") and imputes identities of interest where there are none. Finally, the image of "super powers" asks neither about the domestically controlled reasons for the modernization of weapons systems and armaments production as a whole, nor about the diverse external factors which make armament seem necessary to the respectively ruling groups.

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destabilizing effect, and the two cannot be played off against each other.

While much of the peace movement see (or feels) this ambivalence, it is also true that many of those actively involved tend to be unfamiliar with and indifferent to far-reaching theoretical considerations — at times they are even hostile to them. It is the task of intellectuals to criticize, but an excessively self-righteous approach must be avoided. The unqualified reproach that this young movement is as a whole too spontaneous, antitheoretical and antirational tends to hide a knowledgeable but uncomprehending and pedantic attitude. These youths, who tried, often at tremendous risk and with great sacrifices, to throw sand into the gears of the "mega-machine," fail too easily and too quickly for our wise view — they renounce an often far too esoteric theoretical work and they fail to meet our criteria. We cannot be innocent in this matter. Our example, that of reasoning intellectuals who can explain everything and know everything, and who pretend to intervene here and there and otherwise are engaged in private undertakings[11] because the times happen to be so — all this does not seem too attractive to younger people, who do not want to submit and be resigned. Are they wrong? This entails neither condescension nor silence, but a critique that includes a hermeneutic dimension and does not leave itself out.

Only a critique of this type can meaningfully capture the peace movement's uncertainty and unclarity toward the East European conditions. It must recognize that, as a rule, it is not a question of blindness toward repressions there, nor of naiveté or capitulation. Rather, it is one of deep uncertainty toward these systems, and of fear of being driven into an alternative "for" the West or "for" the East. This uncertainty is neither dishonorable nor immoral. It is better to be uncertain and to show it than to reel off quick and often false answers. Yet it is important to deal with this uncertainty. And on this point older Left intellectuals can hardly expect of the new movements something they themselves have not achieved. After all, there is still no viable and satisfactory theoretical evaluation of East European systems. The helplessness of some of these old leftists goes so far that some are revitalizing the theory of totalitarianism — a theory formulated by Hannah Arendt and C.J. Friedrich over 30 years ago.

The totalitarianism approach can, if clearly defined, bring into focus similar *forms* of exercising domination. But it fails when it groups together essentially different socio-economic systems (such as Italian Fascism, German National Socialism, the Stalinist Soviet Union, and Poland with its military council, or even "Kadarism"). That this concept is being rehabilitated (interestingly from the Left rather than from the Right) points not to the inability to satisfactorily understand East European conditions,[12] but to shift of position of those who today speak once again of totalitarianism. For the concept of totalitarianism makes sense only in terms of a bourgeois or liberal-democratic-capitalist framework by focusing on the forms of movement and domination that could threaten (and historically have threatened) this specific ("pluralistic") brand of capitalist reproduction.

This shift of standpoint toward a pluralistic-liberal democratic basis (which, of course, remains capitalist) corresponds to a departure from the former oppositional position. This is especially clear in Arato and Cohen's essay[13] which, during the most severe economic crisis in 50 years and in view of a growing gap between mounting armaments expenditures and declining social achievements toward the end of the

11. Cf. the important essay "Ueber die siebziger Jahre" by Michael Rutschky, *Erfahrungshunger* (Cologne, 1980).

12. The many attempts at an explanation were well depicted by Gerd Meyer, *Sozialistische Systeme: Theorie- und Strukturanalyse* (Opladen, 1979).

13. in *Telos*, No. 51.

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fourth long wave of capitalism, point to the "better sides" of the American system and simultaneously polemicize against the West European left's inability to reform.[14]

They suggest — and this accords perfectly with the bloc mentality prevalent on both sides — that we are in a situation in which the only permissible and possible decision is: for the really existing West *or* for the really existing East. Behind these Manichean pseudo-alternatives vanish not only the fundamental conflicts of interests in Western industrial societies, but also the fact that it was precisely these societies that generated Fascism in Europe. Much of the European non-reformist Left does not accept this pseudo-alternative. Neither does dissent from capitalism automatically mean sympathy with the authoritarian systems of Eastern-Europe, nor does criticism of the latter's repressive forms of domination and their structurally bad economics necessarily imply proximity to variants of bourgeois rule.

This position of equidistance does not, in turn, imply equidistance in all questions. For example, for historical and objective technical reasons, liberal democratic societies leave more room for opposition (including disagreement on principles) than do East European bureaucracies. But if social security criteria are applied, the result turns out to be different. And if we judge the systems in terms of their potential for external menace, there is little reason to doubt that the U.S. and "the West" as a whole, when *all* decisive aspects are considered, down to this day, has a military lead over the Warsaw Pact, and that they are especially to blame for the spiraling armaments race. And this leads to one of the most interesting questions of the debate: the rationale for Soviet foreign and defense policy, and the aim of the Soviet military build-up.

The amount of errors and prejudices that can be found even in some contributions to the *Telos*-debate on the peace movement cannot be explained by lack of information available. For there is considerable material available from which Leftist as well as conservative scholars draw a critical and differentiated picture of Soviet foreign and defense policy.[15] Yet, a growing number of non-experts base themselves on a few works whose quality and compentence is highly dubious,[16] and on this extremely

14. This paradigm change has already appeared in Andrew Arato's otherwise excellent essays on Poland, in which he does not raise the idea of "civil society" as a mirror just to the Eastern European countries, but also seems to understand it as the *ultima ratio* of Western capitalism, even as its typical aspect (cf. "Civil Society Against the State: Poland 1980-81" in *Telos*, No. 47, and "Empire vs. Civil Society: Poland 1981-82" in *Telos*, No. 50. Cf. also Susan Sontag's statements. (*The New York Times*, Feb. 27, 1982).

15. Cf. Dieter S. Lutz, *Die Rüstung der Sowjetunion. Rüstungsdynamik und bürokratische Strukturen*, (Baden-Baden, 1979); William Odom, "The Riddle of Soviet Military Spending," in *Russia*, No. 2, (1981); Gabor Rittersporn, "Facing War Psychosis," in *Telos*, No. 51; Karl-Peter Stratmann, *NATO-Strategie in der Krise?* (Baden-Baden, 1981); Stefan Tiedtke, *Rüstungskontrolle aus sowjetischer Sicht*, (Frankfurt-New York, 1981); Bogdan Denitch, "Towards a Sane Defense Policy," in *Dissent* (Summer 1982) pp. 273-281; Thomas W. Wolfe, "Concluding Reflections on the SALT-Experience," in Hoffmann-Fleron, *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York, 1980). On Soviet foreign policy and its defense aspects, see Roy and Zhores Medvedev, "The USSR and the Arms Race," in *New Left Review*, No. 130. See also Astrid von Borcke, *Wie expansionistisch ist die Sowjetunion?, Bericht des Bundesinstituts für internationale und ostwissenschaftliche Studien*, Nr. 6 - 1982; and especially, Fred Halliday, *Soviet Policy in the Age of Crisis* (Institute for Policy Studies: Washington, D.C., 1981). See also Antonio Carlo, "Afghanistan, Poland and Peaceful Coexistence," in *Telos*, No. 47. On the development of the American perception of Soviet policy, cf. Alan Wolfe, *The Rise and Fall of the 'Soviet Threat': Domestic Sources of the Cold War Consensus* (Washington, D.C.: IPS, 1979).

16. E.g., Arato and Cohen, (in *Telos*, No. 51, p. 165). On the question "Are the Russians coming?" they refer to Castoriadis and astonishingly call his most recent work on Soviet arms "extremely persuasive." Castoriadis' earlier works on Soviet society (for instance in *Socialisme ou Barbarie*) are still well-remembered. Today, however, his views on the Soviet arms policy unfor-

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shaky foundation they come to far-reaching statements on Soviet policy and strange recommendations for European peace movements.

A few constants of these views and assumptions are, for example, that: 1) though it had a late start, the USSR has military superiority over the U.S.; 2) Without nuclear medium-range missiles Western Europe is vulnerable to invasion by the USSR; 3) The Soviet military determines Soviet policy to a considerable extent; 4) Ideological components, such as the striving for a "world revolution," are as virulent as ever. All these assumptions can be discussed, but they can hardly be supported by solid evidence and turn out to be mostly false.

All serious investigations indicate that the Soviet Union is following a broad concept of defense and, within *this* framework, pursues a cautious and even defensive policy. In view of the economic, military and political strength of the West it hardly has any other choice. At this point cries of "Afghanistan!" and "Poland!" can be expected, but the events do not contradict the above estimate. That the Western Left must condemn Soviet behavior in these two cases (and occasionally could have done so more clearly) does not change the fact that the Soviet Union in both instances was reacting to a change of the *status quo*. From its viewpoint, this was a perilous change. In Poland it meant a supposed threat to the post-Yalta status, whose onesided termination by the West would actually have meant war in Europe; and in Afghanistan to the events in Iran, in the Gulf-region, to the foreseeable non-ratification of SALT II by the US Senate and the inability of the Polish Communist Party cliques to manage their own affairs.[17] To recognize this does not amount to a justification, but only an explanation of Soviet behavior. A naked aggression, at any rate, is not recognizable in either case. The Western Left does not have to, indeed it must not, accept this very broadly conceived Soviet defense concept. But it must begin to take it seriously.

The Afghan and Polish problems obviously exceed the Soviet Union's economic and political potential and its problem-solving capacity. The economic crisis in the USSR is worsening. Its client-states in Cuba, Viet-Nam and Angola cost the Soviet Union millions of dollars per day. The policy of détente has entered a critical phase; the transfer of technology from the West, which is so important to the Soviet Union, as well as capital assistance for extracting raw materials, have both been reduced. If one does not assume that the Soviet leadership will suddenly follow irrational and adventurous paths — and there are really no signs or historical examples of this, at least not in foreign policy — it is difficult to see why "the Russians" should take over so socially and politically complex a structure as Western Europe, on top of all their other problems. They could neither rule nor exploit it; they could not even conquer it (most likely their empire would collapse). They would instead be interrupting the transfusion on which they partly depend.

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tunately stand qualitatively in an inverse ratio to their resonance. Whoever seriously claims that it is an "obvious fact" that "the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has, comprehensively and completely while *sacrificing all other goals* [italics by C. C.] committed itself to a policy of international military domination;" and whoever declares "that the Russians know that they have a considerable superiority in the balance of power, and that they know that the Americans also know this" as he does in his essay "Im Angesicht des Krieges," in *Befreiung*, Nr. 21, (1981); and whoever describes the Soviet MIG-25 as an airplane that "is superior to the corresponding American machines" (*Ibid.*, p. 90), runs the risk of not being taken seriously by the whole of international (not just liberal) East Europe scholarship (except Richard Pipes). Even defense experts can just shrug their shoulders at this. Since Castoriadis' views can hardly be discussed seriously, it is all the more astonishing what a resonance they have evoked in parts of the Left.

17. On this subject, see Halliday, *Soviet Policy...op. cit.*, pp. 84-90.

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No more rational is the assertion that the Soviet Union is militarily superior. No one except NATO officers (lobbying for higher military expenditures), conservative politicians (projecting pictures of an enemy in order to draw attention away from their own interests) and Cornelius Castoriadis, asserts this. If the numerical power-ratio is qualified, i.e., put in relation to the respective deployment doctrines, the geopolitical constellations, the respective technological level and the alliance-policy cohesion of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, then the West has quite a clear advantage. This is not the place to discuss this at length, but it should be pointed out that in the last 33 years the U.S. (with one exception) has been the first to develop and introduce new weapons technology,[18] that the U.S. has clear lead in the arms-related basic technologies and a somewhat lesser one in applied technologies,[19] that the USSR in case of a conflict would be exposed to considerable strategic disadvantage in view of a probable coalition of the U.S., Western Europe, Japan and possibly China (in addition to local police forces such as Israel and South Africa), that the value of individual national armies in the Warsaw Pact differs greatly (e.g., Poland), etc.

No doubt, the Soviet Union has built a mighty military force which should be neither ignored nor minimized. If the Soviet Union felt too threatened *and* found no other solution, it would certainly use its military means, even outside its narrow "defensive zone." But there is also no reason to overdramatize. The USSR and its allies are not superior to the "West," with which so many intellectuals recently seem to identify. This is also true of Europe, even if the 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles are not deployed there.[20]

Although the military-industrial sector does occupy a special position in the USSR and Soviet society is highly militarized (at least in its intention), the Soviet military do not play a policy-determining role in the Soviet bureaucracy — either personally or structurally. In the Party and state apparatus, up to just below the highest leadership level, they are represented just about proportionally, while at the very top (Politburo, Central Committee Secretariat, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Union Council of Ministers) they are systematically excluded. There is not one career officer in the 80-man Council of Ministers of the USSR. The defense minister is a munitions expert (of civilian origin). Brezhnev's title of Marshall had the function of a military decoration.

The representatives of the Soviet Army's interests, certain sectors of heavy industry and parts of the ideological apparatus persistently lobby for the modernization and strengthening of Soviet military power — but they are in constant competition with the representatives of other interests for the allotment of scarce resources and labor. They do represent a strong (but not always stable) coalition of interests. Yet, they do not define Soviet policy.[21]

Finally everyone who has ever been there and spoken with the people knows how lifeless the ideological phraseology is today in Eastern Europe (on both the macro and

18. D.S. Lutz, *Weltkrieg wider Willen?* (Reinbek, 1981), p. 31; *Stern*, No. 44 (1981), p. 82.

19. See *Challenges for U.S. National Security. A Preliminary Report,* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington, D.C., 1981), Vol. 1. p. 43f.

20. Direct numerical comparisons are always questionable. But one should not forget the already deployed British and French nuclear medium-range weapons and the U.S. air-and sea-supported Forward Based Systems (FBS). On this, see Dieter S. Lutz, "Wieviel an Vernichtung (skapazität) ist genug? Ein Worst-Case-Szenario gegen West-Europa," in, *Aufrüsten um Abzurüsten?* (Reinbek, 1980).

21. Cf. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Gibt es einen Militärisch-industriellen Komplex in der Sowjetunion?, in *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 1 (1972); as well as William Hyland, "Kto kogo in the Kremlin?" in *Problems of Communism*, Jan./Feb. 1982.

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micro levels). Even within the Party, hardly anyone takes the petrified rhetoric seriously. Official discourse is conducted in a specialized language with a specialized grammar, in which the syntax is more important than the lexicology. In either bloc, ideological phraseology renders good service only for cold war advocates. It has no connection with the contents of Soviet policy, which is determined to a considerable extent by group interests and technical necessities.

To make the discussion of Soviet foreign and defense policy more objective, two things are especially necessary. First, it is necessary to provide a precise amount of presuppositions and suspicions, in order to avoid unwarranted assumptions and declarations. Second, one must abandon the attempt to mislead with incorrect details or half-true references. While the first point is an *aporia* possible of authors who are not specialists on Eastern Europe, the second error committed by "experts" is more serious.[22] For the misunderstandings and errors they cause are hard to correct.

The European peace movements do not entail only a longing for peace as well as the rejection of the deterrence-spiral and the madness of the arms race. They also contain many different opinions about the right course. They include different analyses of the situation, a great number of proposed remedies to provide "alternative defense policies" which are mutually incompatible. So it is not possible to single out one or two views, or even just isolated statements, and attack this as the policy of *the* peace movement.

It would certainly be important to provide a more detailed portrayal of the often conflicting European contributions to "alternative" defense policies to the liberal and leftist public in the U.S. (and to others) — but this cannot be done here. It would, however, make clear something that is often hard to recognize from the U.S.: in the event of a military conflict waged with the weapons systems now present in Europe, and specifically in Germany, little would be left of what the use of weapons was supposed to defend. People here need to be told less and less that the short and medium range nuclear weapons stationed in France, Great Britain and West Germany (along the Rhine) would be detonated over *their* heads. We can speak of lofty values only as long as we are alive. Most people here feel no urge to die a courageous atomic death in order to be judged positively in future history books.

The recognition that a nuclear war, probably even a conventional war in Central Europe, would be fatal and senseless for the people who live here; the realization that

22. This point would require an article of its own. But consider a typical example. When Castoriadis ascribes qualities to the MIG-25 which it demonstrably does not have (a specimen was hijacked to Japan in 1976), or when Herf calls the Soviet ICBM SS-18 "rearmament" (in *Telos*, No. 52, p. 118), it is really almost incomprehensible. To remain with the last example: there are three variants of the SS-18 which were introduced in 1976 and 1977 (!) and which, depending on performance, have an accuracy (CEP) of between 300 and 2500 meters. The SS-18 (Models 1 and 3) carries one warhead with 10 to 20 megatons, the SS-18 (Model 2) is mirved for 8 times 500 kilotons. In contrast, the American Minuteman already had an accuracy of 400 meters in 1966, and Minuteman III (introduced in 1970!) was mirved with three times 170 kilotons. Moreover, different system indicators can reflect three things: a different technological level, different operative tasks of the systems, or a different mixture-ratio of the weapons systems to one another. Thus, it is almost always misleading to single out a particular weapons systems without pointing to these connections. The strategic potentials of the U.S. and the USSR are quite differently structured — the U.S. has a relatively balanced triad, the center of gravity in Soviet arms still is located in the land-based heavy ICBM. This diversification has historical, geopolitical, technological and operative reasons. Before Herf reproaches the peace movement *in toto* that "not only the politics of the peace movements (are) dangerous," but that "their understanding of nuclear weapons is superficial and wrong" (p. 115), he should first try to understand and describe these connections correctly.

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the supposedly stable deterrence system (MAD) is a psychological construct based on highly dubious assumptions; the experience that huge destructive potentials are used sooner or later and are not in the long run controllable by men; the the knowledge that the armaments race in West and East serves the interests of just a small minority — all this makes it probable that the peace movement will be more than an transitory phenomenon. All this could lead to resignation or appeasement (of East or West). But there is a better way, and there is a good chance that it will be chosen. This way presupposes an understanding of the causes of conflict and the unmasking of the motives behind the arms madness. The arms race in East and West is internally and externally controlled.

In the West, exploitatory needs of capital groups, the competition of national states (such as in the Falkland conflict), the emancipation of the Third World (the Carter doctrine), destabilization by the exclusion of growing segments of the population, and the fact that there are any other social-economic formations at all on earth (such as in Eastern Europe) ensure the intensification of the armaments race. In Eastern European countries, munitions production stabilizes the rule of the bureaucrats; it is also a reaction to the assumed (and historically occasionally confirmed) threat by capitalist states. It is, finally, also the area in which the Soveit Union wants to demonstrate its achievements and is supposed to guarantee it a certain ability to act on a world-wide scale.

Structural social and international conflicts are behind the arms race. Only if we deal with these conflicts (and not the symptoms), do we have a chance — though not a great one — to foresee and mitigate emerging contradictions and to prevent, or at least limit, attempts at a military solution. Only a limitation of the *causes of conflict* can, in the last analysis, lessen the urge to produce and to use military power. We should quarrel about the best way toward that goal — understanding, appraising and criticizing but not denouncing one another.

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POLAND: AUGUST 1980 — DECEMBER 1982 A CONFERENCE REPORT

by Halina M. Charwat

"The Poles are fighting not only for themselves, but for us as well" declared Le Goff. All through the two day conference[1] on the Polish situation, the question of the exemplary nature of Solidarity kept cropping up. "A revolution which could help us to liberate ourselves from the Revolution" said Domenach, former editor of *Esprit*, as if invoking some definitive vaccine against an omnipresent virus. In an impassioned address, Pierre Emmanuel saw Solidarity as somehow redemptive of a French Left guilty of "eternal compromise" — a Left by now so hackneyed that "to the normalized man of the East corresponds the trivialized man of the West." If his emotional condemnation of the Soviet Empire, and of the French Socialists' ecumenical fervor, was not considered useful by the Polish participants and was perceived as outrageously inappropriate by others such as Mary McCarthy, it exemplified the tone of moral outrage and self-righteousness (accompanied, it must be added, by immense and constant generosity) which has characterized French reaction to the Polish events. Generally speaking, part of the Western Left has seen in Solidarity's aspirations a moral image of what it itself no longer is. So its eyes tend to become misty with a nostalgia which occasionally clouds its vision.

Reflecting the self-critical stance of Solidarity's leaders, both within and without Poland, Polish participants were far more focused on the movement's specificity and national roots. For Pomian, "pluridimensionality" is the central, irreducibly original feature of Solidarity. Rejecting both the Marxist explanation of a historically evolving working class movement and the view of Solidarity as an emanation of Polish catholicism, i.e., the expression of a spiritual revolution, Pomian characterizes it as that created social space, that reconstituted public sphere in which all hitherto disfranchised and homeless groups could identify and participate. In addition to workers, this included former members of the Home Army, families of officers murdered at Katyn, Catholics, dissident and marginalized intellectuals, all kinds of second class citizens and persons who could find no place in official Polish life. For a comparable instance of spontaneous, unanticipated social cohesion of such divergent elements, Pomain could only refer to the British Chartists of 1838-50 and, in a more local reference, to the Home Army after 1944. The diversity of the forces which made up Solidarity accounts for the extra-economic dimension of its demands and partly explains its democratic thrust. The emergence from non-existence of so many of its parts is at the heart of Solidarity's insistence on retrieving the national past, recovering dates, erecting monuments — of its becoming what Kolakowski called "a revolution against the Lie."

Having become a representation of Society, with all the conflicts of interest that such

1. The conference, "Poland: August 1980 - December 1982, Originality and Dynamism of a Society," (Paris, December 10-11, 1982) was conceived and sponsored by Francois-Regis Hutin, publisher of *Ouest France*, a large circulation regional newspaper which had been very active in raising money for the Polish people. It was meant to facilitate discussion between French and Polish intellectuals on the events of the past two years. For each Polish speaker there was a French respondent.

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an organism presupposes, could Solidarity have remained a labor union? Pomian does not think so. Various currents were developing within the movement and already in Fall 1981 some feared Solidarity's break-up. Workers-intellectuals, city-countryside, radicals-moderates — all the familiar cleavages were present. In a recent interview[2], Walesa recalls that before the imposition of martial law, Solidarity was "beginning to suffocate, because we had different concepts, different people in one pot." In the speech he intended to give at the December 16, 1982 commemorative rally at the Gdansk monument to slain workers, he proposed that the social movement represented by Solidarity be split into separate "streams." Those would include independent trade unions, factory and local self-government, struggle against censorship and a greater voice for Poland's youth in solving their problems. He characterized such independent movements as "sub-Solidarities."

This view of Solidarity as a multi-dimensional total movement — national, social and democratic — is shared by Touraine and the team which conducted an *in situ* investigation in 1981.[3] They, however, reduce the conflicts Pomian sees as fatal to an internal debate; to the movement's "work upon itself." In tune with the French participants' tendency to locate the exemplary character of this admittedly unique social movement, Wieworka elaborated on Pomian's remarks. According to him, although the Polish popular movement has been defeated, it is the communist society which has died. And so has its central principle: the control and direction of social life by a Party which considers itself the expression of the working class and the agent of modernization. The Party has remained frozen in its self-definition as a totalitarian power. It never accepted — or, it now seems clear, never even entertained — Solidarity's demands that it evacuate civil society. All along it had refused this separation between society and the State: it could not renounce the historical foundation of its legitimacy. The past year's obsessive efforts by the junta to discredit Solidarity with charges of treason, ridicule or whatever means, support the claim that "a totalitarian power cannot conceive itself without public adherence, even if that adherence is forced or manipulated, of a large part of the population."[4] At the same time, it is no longer possible for a communist regime, at least in Central Europe, to speak in the name of Society and History.

Today, totalitarianism is dying in Central Europe. This conclusion, only apparently paradoxical in view of the tactical victory of the Jaruzelski regime, was reiterated by Kolakowski who spoke on "the Specificity of the Polish Revolution." For Kolakowski, Solidarity was a revolutionary process and the military coup a classical counterrevolution. A revolutionary situation is one in which various conditions push at a given moment in the same direction. Thus, while every situation is unique, there are certain common features, which were all present in Poland in 1980-81: a corrupt and incompetent government alternating between repression and concessions; a discredited Party isolated from civil society; the explosion of diverse sentiments into a unique movement. It is this last element which constitutes the specificity of the Polish phenomenon. "The first working class revolution rose up against a socialist state under the sign of the cross and with the blessing of the Pope. So much for the historical laws scientifically discovered by Marxism," declared Kolakowski. As for those diverse sentiments, those cultural forces which came together in Solidarity, their origin reaches back to two traditional currents — Catholic and rationalist — which have coexisted in

2. *Los Angeles Times*, Dec. 23, 1982.
3. A. Touraine, F. Dubet, M. Wieworka, J. Strzelecki, *Solidarité* (Fayard, 1982).
4. *Ibid.*, p. 280.

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Poland since the eighteenth century under the weight of foreign oppression to safeguard national consciousness. To be a patriot has meant to be liberal *and* Catholic. The song "Let Poland be Poland," adopted by Solidarity, expresses in a shorthand understood by all Poles this revolt against an alien civilization (a revolt which is thus historical and traditional rather than purely anti-Soviet). As unique, unprecedented features of the Polish revolutionary movement, Kolakowski cited its non-violence, its self-limiting character, and its *preserving* thrust to recover national, social and cultural roots. Not even under Stalinism, was the break between State and Society as total. Never before has the Soviet Empire had to wage war against itself in its own name. In its progressive decomposition, Kolakowski asserted cautiously, the Polish events *could* prove decisive.[5]

The Role of the Church

Cywinski's discussion of the role of the Polish Church proved disturbing. Throughout Poland's history, he recalled, the Church has had to confront both the question of individual and of national freedom. It answered the second better than the first. Since the advent of the communist regime, it has never — contrary to common understanding — been a unique force in society. It did not give birth to an opposition movement. Such a movement developed outside the Church. Under Cardinal Wyszynski, the Church became more active than before, but it was the election of a Polish Pope which immeasurably increased the importance of the Church in Polish life. In 1980-81, the expectation was that the Church would stand with the people and Solidarity because their goals were the same. But were they and should they be? Such an identification, Cywinski declared, can go beyond what is desirable. What if, for instance, Solidarity had resorted to violence? Political advocacy represents a grave and constant danger to the Church which must be an unwavering guardian of truth, human dignity and non-violence.

For the French Catholic Left, such an unequivocal stand against "liberation theology" is not easy to accept. The Church must *witness*, said Robert Masson of *La France Catholique*, it must remain the house of all its children. It should not reduce itself to its own ends. Domenach pointed out that the Church has profited from the political situation and significantly increased its influence. Would it now conclude a pact with the regime? There appears to be a government plan to manufacture a Christian-Democrat party and it is feared that the Church might give it its blessing. The Church must indeed forgive its oppressors, but without failing to identify them as such, was Kolakowski's caustic summation.[6]

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5. In responding to Kolakowski, Le Goff defined Solidarity's originality as residing in a new concept of resistance to totalitarianism, which is *society*. (In Russia, according to Le Goff, there is only a *people* — an interesting parallel to Sartre's distinction between *group* and *series*). In an astounding ethnocentric gesture, he went on to compare Polish society under Jaruzelski to France under Vichy — the main issues in both cases being truth versus the lie, honor versus dishonor. The French predilection for viewing Solidarity in primarily moral terms can also be found in Touraine's more cogent discussion of Solidarity as an "ethic of conviction," *op. cit.*, pp. 272-76.

6. From Poland itself, reports indicate a growing disillusionment with the official position of the Episcopate, as opposed to the many daily forms of concrete support for their activities that the people find in their churches. There is widespread bitterness about Glemp exhorting people against violence while remaining silent about the savagery of the regime's repression, about his admonitions against the August 31 demonstrations and the November 10 strike of 1982, his appeal to actors to stop their boycott of government television but, above all, his failing to speak up against the outlawing of Solidarity. See Stanislaw Warecki, "The Landscape after the Battle," in this issue of *Telos*.

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The Role of Intellectuals

Of particular importance to the Western Left has been the Polish intellectuals; unprecented penetration into the working class movement. Smolar's presentation ("Intellectual Dissent and Popular Movement") undermined some dearly held assumptions by spotlighting the many ambiguities of the intellectuals' participation in the mass movement. While the role of KOR in the birth and evolution of Solidarity is well recognized, it is equally true that by the time the second Solidarity Congress opened at the end of September 1981 and KOR announced its dissolution, a boisterous debate around a vote of thanks revealed the strong antagonisms and mistrusts which by then divided workers and their advisers.

Smolar distinguishes between "the intellectuals," among whom he counts those who, like Tadeusz Maxowiecki and Bronislaw Geremem, on August 22, 1980 offered their support to the striking workers of Gdansk and were recruited as "experts," and "the militants" who were primarily members of KOR. The first group consists of people who around 1968 left or were eliminated from official circles. Coalescing into an internal opposition, they remained part of the system, their efforts being toward liberalization from within. The second group, arising around 1968, was marginalized from the beginning. Without any possibility of practicing their professions, they became first a militant circle and, after 1976, an organized group. Their political philosophy was radically different. No more illusions about the regime; the only interlocutor was society; the watchword, self-organization; the motto: "in the open, without fear." The numerous committees, flying universities, publishing ventures, groups of all sorts which they created, provided a model to which Solidarity is clearly indebted. It has been said that KOR was, above all, a school of courage.

Between the two groups, according to Smolar, coexistence was difficult, painful and ambiguous. The "intellectuals" held that nothing must jeopardize the unprecedented negotiations between the totalitarian system and society; the "militants," with their anti-political prejudices, ill at ease and somewhat drowned in legalized Solidarity, insisted that nothing must stop the movement. Even linguistically, there were differences. For Kuron and his friends, one had to speak *clearly*; for the others, words like totalitarianism" were better avoided. Even now, they maintain their different styles; the "intellectuals" remain involved in underground unions, they organize and remain silent, so as to leave a chance to the future. The others speak out whenever and wherever they can.

More important still were the ambiguities in relations between both groups and the working class base of Solidarity. Invisible, behind the lines, the experts were, when all was said and done, part of the elite, of the ruling class, in the eyes of the workers as well as in those of the regime. Even in their own perception, they were (only) intermediaries. KOR members, although wrapped in the myth of Zorro, were *still* privleged compared to workers; they were not beaten or arrested. They were unaccountable because unacknowledge by the government.

The bitter irony is that while they were indubitably responsible for the tie-in between union and democratic themes within Solidarity, intellectuals of all persuasions also constituted a threat to the movement's internal democracy. Starting with the Bydgoszcz crisis[7] and ending with the compromise between Parliament and a handful of leaders effected before the second phase of the Solidarity Congress had begun, the

7. In response to the beating of union militants at a congress of rural Solidarity in March 1981, a retaliatory strike was averted by intellectuals, Kuron in particular, imposing their conciliatory solutions.

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intellectuals were increasingly perceived by workers as manipulative, unrepresentative and attempting to divert or usurp their movement.[8] The inescapable question remains: both when they were successful *and* when they failed to stem the headlong rush toward disaster, what is the intellectuals' responsibility in what happened?

In contrast to the malaise created by Smolar's presentation, an address by Skalmowski on contemporary Polish literature — both normal and "normalized" (that is, official) — proved uncontroversial. One more sensitive subject, however, remained. Jelenski spoke on the familiar troublesome issue of nationalism. Its latent, and finally overt, role in the evolution of Solidarity was crucial, its historical ambiguity once again evident. Having served to radicalize Solidarity, it then justified the authoritarian response, making possible the exploitation by Jaruzelski of traditional fears and hopes for the nation's survival. In the huge Richelieu amphitheatre of the Sorbonne, the conference culminated in a flamboyantly anti-communist speech by Emmanuel, followed by a somber, Olympian reflection by Milosz on Man's humanity endangered equally by totalitarian tanks and ever multiplying electronic device.

It did not seem as if this Franco-Polish enterprise had led to a confluence of concerns and views that went beyond initially existing sympathys. On the French side, there had been an evident preoccupation with the significance of the Polish events and a millenarist clinging to the myth of the pure revolution, of the moral transformation — the Revolution to cleanse all revolutions. On the side of the Poles, there had been an obvious effort to explain themselves honestly, to those who have shown them true friendship and to demystify where necessary. There was little effort to answer the question "what went wrong?" Instead, there was a clear implication that each day of Solidarity's legal and triumphant existence had been a miracle. As the conference came to its inconclusive end, it was as if the exhilarating and finally tragic events of the past two years were themselves receding from the world stage, once more to disappear into the tortuous labyrinths of a tortured national history.

Solidarity and the West

"We are Europeans" is a declaration which was heard often during the first Solidarity Congress in September 1981 and indeed, Solidarity's vision of the "good society" — free unions, freedom of opinion, economic reform — was a vision rooted in Western conceptions of pluralism, democratically elected leaders, social and national sovereignty. For all its acknowledgement of geopolitical realities, Solidarity was the inheritor of a traditional Polish view which, since the Renaissance at least, had seen Europe (i.e., Italy, then France and England, finally the U.S.) as the symbol of Christianity, freedom, human rights, as well as social development and economic efficiency — all the while perceiving the East as a perpetual peril. All through 1981-82, irrationally, hope of some miracle, whether from Rome or from Washington, persisted in Poland and, to this day, Western sanctions are perceived as having the power to force a compromise on the regime that the underground leadership admittedly lacks. A recent clandestine analysis points out the negative effects of this historical differentiation between East and West grounded in purely moral, but perhaps also aesthetic, impulses and emphasizes the importance for the future of the elaboration of a non-moralistic, pragmatic political worldview. That is Solidarity's admonition to itself.[9]

8. See Touraine et al., *op. cit.*, 168-70, for an instance of these tensions as exemplified in a confrontative meeting between a Gdansk group of militants and Adam Michnik.

9. Andrzej Kowalski, "Poland and the West: Feelings and Realities," *Solidarnosc* no. 47/48, Dec. 1982, Paris.

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For those in the West, who in the last two years have heard all kinds of categorical statements: "Solidarity is a revolutionary movement," "Solidarity is counterrevolutionary," and nearly everything in between, comes a reminder that, in a situation which excludes the possibility of competing political programs and social values, the basic political conflict becomes a struggle for the very *existence* of a Right and a Left.[10] For all its ambiguities — a labor union which fought a political system proclaiming the goals and concepts of socialism in the name of national and religious values — Solidarity arose as, and remained primarily and unequivocally, a movement of the working class. The Western Left has much to lose by a long-term victory of the junta: such a definitive discredit to socialism would decimate its ranks. A Solidarity victory, on the other hand, would revive the theory and practice of the labor movement and lay the groundwork for a peace-orientated, internationally cooperative working class. Apppealing to the Western Left not to allow Solidarity to fall into oblivion and indifference, in favor of the victims of the Turkish or Salvadoran juntas, the clandestine author signs off by describing himself as a sympathizer whose great hope it is some day to be on the Left.

10. Dawid Warszawski, "The Left and We," produced by KOS, reprinted in *Solidarnosc* no. 35, Oct. 1982, Paris.

THE LANDSCAPE AFTER THE BATTLE*

by Stanislaw Warecki

"They've sure fixed us, brother" says Jacek. He looks at me sadly over the rim of his half-full tea cup and repeats: "they've sure fixed us good."

Jacek is twenty-five years old, he is an electrician at the Ursus tractor factory in Warsaw. When martial law was imposed, he miraculously escaped internment and up to now he has taken part in all the actions organized by the Union. I met him on the May 3 barricades. Since, then, we have exchanged "blotters" (clandestine bulletins) and we have often argued furiously over strategy and tactics. After November 10 Jacek stopped arguing. He still takes the "blotters," but no longer seems interested in the question concerning how to continue struggling. "On one side the ZOMO, armed to the teeth, on the other Glemp cozying up to Jaruzelski. There isn't a chance in hell, we can win. They'll throw us a crumb, there's still Lech, but it's no use now. People are tired, they don't see a way out. Bread does not even last till the 25th. If you move, they throw you out on the pavement and there is no one to defend you. Yeah, they have sure fixed us good."

Jacek's mood is typical of many Solidarity activisits in the factories. The failure of the strike, the understanding between the Church and WRON (Jaruzelski's Military Council of National Salvation) that everyone is already talking about, the unexpected freeing of Walesa and his ambiguous behavior — all this has destroyed the belief in the

*This article appeared in *Solidarnosc*, n. 47/48, (Paris: December 13, 1982,). Translated by Halina M. Charwat.

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possibility of victory any time soon or even of an honorable capitulation of the society as represented by Solidarity. It does not, however, mean a passive acceptance of the *status quo*. The new government-sponsored unions are not getting off the ground. Often, they dissolve themselves faced, as their creators put it, with the "enmity and lack of interest of the crews." Subscriptions to clandestine publications remain high. Kids producing home-made miniature Solidarity badges cannot make enough of them. Yet, the atmosphere in the country is different from a few months ago. There is no more talk of a general strike in the Spring, people no longer wait impatiently for the directives issued by the TKK (Provisional Coordination Committee of Solidarity — the clandestine leadership of the Union), whose authority has been seriously weakened. Instead, one looks with fear and hope toward the Church.

Father Stefan is full of vigor and optimism. This forty year old priest in a Warsaw area parish can hardly find time to talk to me. Besides his pastoral duties, "you have no idea how much work I now have — confessions, christenings — many more than, let's say, a year ago." He takes care of distributing the gifts, less plentiful than before but still arriving from the West, and he organizes different actions for "spreading God's word" — memorial services for various groups of believers, work with young people, and, as he gives me to understand, important tasks "about which we will not talk now." He summarizes for me his forecast for the future: "Communism, you see, is in decline. Look at Russia. They chose a policeman, they're so afraid of their own people. Here, they also had to come to an understanding with the Primate. The people are steadfast behind the Church because they know that in the Church there is power. What Solidarity did was good and noble but they had no political instinct at all. They wanted everything at once and that's impossible. One must do like the Church, patiently, step by step, but never giving up ground already gained. The people have become very wise over this past year. The churches are full, they keep building new ones. Say what you will, the Pole is Catholic. And the Church will always defend Poland. You will see how everything will now start moving forward."

Not all priests and Catholic activists share this optimism. "The Church in Poland enjoys unquestioned authority precisely because it was always opposed by the regime. Government sponsored Catholic movements — even thoroughly honest ones like ZNAK — have never been trusted in the same way." A Catholic intellectual explains: "In the emerging compromise with the regime, the Church has much to gain, but it can also lose this unconditional trust. The regime has dirty hands; one wonders about the hands of whoever shakes them."

The military overseer of a Warsaw agency is overheard expressing an astoundingly similar opinion: "The Church does not want relaxation and anarchy," he says. "It will have to say: enough fuss, now let's get to work! Then they will see how easy it is to demand, rather than just to have to deliver. The people will no longer love them so much and they will understand that we had no other way out." This commissar is, of course, also not expressing the official view. The civilian Party apparatus in particular is against any agreements with the Church. That should surprise no one since that apparatus sustained such a sorry defeat in its competition with the Church for the soul of the nation. Any concessions would only strengthen the opponent and further weaken the leading role of the Party, already so severely reduced in practice by the Army. The Party makes known its reservations not just within the country. Grabski's famous letter to the Central Committee found eager recipients in Moscow, where the turmoil of Brezhnev's succession does not prevent the top leadership from anxiously monitoring events beyond their Western border.

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And the so-called average citizen? The average citizen does not tend to think in terms of political strategy and tactics, but rather to see Polish reality through the prism of his individual experience, finding confirmation in the experience of family, friends and acquaintances. He organizes this experience around several basic facts: the quantity of goods in the stores is clearly greater than a year ago but the improvement does not reach as far as the family table; cheese costs more now than meat did before the price hikes; to buy out meat rations means standing in line for hours, but many families cannot afford to buy out all that is allotted them. Clothes are practically nonexistent, especially such items as coats and sheepskins, and when they can be found, they are horrendously expensive and of poor quality. The shoe situation is outright dramatic: the introduction of coupons only reinforced demand, but it turned out that the entire production of the Polish shoe industry, including summer sandals and so-called dress shoes, cannot satisfy even 80% of it, and the difference can hardly be made up by imports since there is nothing with which to pay for these imports. Given this situation, the population was divided into several groups which will receive coupons in turn. In the first group are, besides the army and the militia, the health professions and teachers. Among the workers in the other groups, there will be drawings — one coupon for three workers. As for persons not holding government jobs, they will probably receive their coupons for Winter shoes in March...

It would however be simplistic to say that the scope of that experience is limited to consumption. During the past year Polish society has experienced repression on a scale for which it was not prepared. Street arrests and beatings, organized by the ZOMO on the occasion of demonstrations or for no reason at all, proved to all that anybody can be a victim — regardless of what they do or think. An example of this is the brutal "pacification" of a party meeting in one of Warsaw's factories at the beginning of martial law. The ZOMO thought it was a gathering of Solidarnosc and out came the sticks. Or a better example might be the fate of passengers in a trolley which on November 10 was going through Dzierzynski square, where a demonstration was due to take place. The ZOMO stopped the trolley, the passengers were taken to secret police headquarters in Mostowski Palace where they were all "processed". People were falling under the blows, trampling one another. The ZOMO spared no one, neither women nor old people. They were let out the next morning, after paying a penalty of 20,000 zloty per person for "disturbing the peace."

Economic terror broke many people, police terror filled them with hatred. The inconsistent and often fallacious strategy of the TKK has caused people to stop expecting the underground Union leadership to provide a solution to the crisis. In this situation, many people will accept a compromise which would lead to a lessening of terror, but they will not believe in any signatures and agreements, at the same time refraining from engaging in active organized rebellion. Social loyalties will not change, but they will now be fed not by hope, as in the days of Solidarity, but by hatred for the "red one" and his flunkeys.

On the level of political analysis, the situation seems to be getting clearer. It appears that a Great Compromise between the army-police-economic apparatus on one side and the Episcopate on the other is in the works. The remaining possible negotiating partners have been eliminated from the contest, at least for the time being. The Party, in the period immediately preceding the war, was already in the throes of political agony and the events that followed gave it the decisive blow. That does not mean that the Party apparatus no longer counts, but only that it no longer represents anyone but itself — not even the rank and file members since they never accepted the decision to

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introduce martial law, let alone the broader social repression. The fatal political blow to the Party was the moment when it appeared that not only is it no longer able to move people to any actions, but it cannot even restrain them from those actions harmful to the system. In other words, not only can it not persuade, it cannot even frighten. The year of martial law has shown that Solidarity has undergone a similar crisis in terms of *its* persuasive efforts as directed toward the government. It did not "persuade" the regime to embark on the path of political reforms and it was not able to force it to stop or even moderate its repressive measures. On the political scene, then, only the apparatus is left, i.e., the Army and the Church.

In this sense, one can look at the period between August 1980 and December 1982 as a single series of events, in which the declaration of martial law is only one significant element. It is a period of profound changes within society, but in the governing elite as well, started off by Solidarity's challenge to the Party's monopoly on power, followed by the political annihilation of the latter and the inverse strengthening of the Union, with the Union in turn becoming neutralized, this time by the army. Throughout this process, the role of the Church never stopped growing until its present key position. The elimination of the Party and of the Union frees the hands of the remaining partners — they can now start dividing the landscape after the battle.

Ideally, the further development of this scenario would look as follows: First it must be noted that both sides have areas of interest and means of action which are not in competition. The army can inspire fear, and has done so successfully, but it cannot motivate. The Church cannot inspire fear, since it does not dispose of an apparatus of terror, but it exerts a powerful influence on the spiritual stance and the attitudes of society and it can act so as to strengthen social resistance or to incline society toward acceptance of the *status quo*. The Church — unlike Solidarity — will not fight for power, the Army — unlike the Party — will not fight for the people's souls. Secondly, both sides have much to offer each other. The army can facilitate the discharging by the Church of its pastoral mission by lifting many existing constraints on the activity of the parish, permitting the teaching of religion in schools, enlarging the field of action of Catholic organizations (such as the Club of Catholic Intellectuals) and creating new ones. The Church in turn can pacify the atmosphere so that the regime need not fear another social explosion (as Glemp did before November 10).

The realization of this scenario requires no significant political concessions from either side. The political line of the Church with regard to Solidarity, laid out in Primate Wyszynski's famous sermon at Jasna Gora in August of 1980, has never undergone significant changes. Passionate accusations coming from underground leaders that the Church is guilty of betrayal are proof of political wishful thinking. On the other hand, the army will not conduct an anti-religious or anti-Church campaign because it has no ideological reasons to do so.

All this, however, does not mean that the above-described compromise will be carried out, even though an additional factor in its favor is the almost certain lifting of Western economic sanctions equally condemned by both sides. A first obstacle is of a psychological nature: both these institutions are deeply conservative and the scenario demands of them not just intellectual courage but some political risks. It is probable that the practical realization of the accepted postulates may run up against the organizational inertia of both institutions and the success of the scenario requires its enactment in all details. Secondly, both sides still must deal with the politically neutralized but not totally liquidated partners who retain some means of pressure. And the effective realization of the Great Compromise represents for both Solidarity

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and the Party a mortal danger. Thirdly, the respective strengths of both sides are not given once and for all: an unused apparatus of repression gets weaker, while social support is a function of the fulfillment of social aspirations. Fourthly, both sides' "credibility as an ally", particularly the regime's, is problematic. Probably, there will be attempts to press advantages, despite agreements, and that will weaken the Compromise's stability. Fifthly, and most importantly, neither side is fully autonomous. While the degree of subservience of Jaruzelski to Moscow is considerably greater than that of Glemp to the Vatican, one cannot exclude surprises connected with the global policies of both centers. In particular, this "alliance of the cross and the stick", as one of Solidarity's militants has called it, could prove indigestible to Moscow on ideological grounds.

And so, the still unannounced Compromise faces many traps and dangers. It seems, however, that the basic decisions on both sides have been made and remaining problems have less to do with "whether" than with "how" and "when". The prelude, clearly, will be the lifting of martial law. What happens after that will depend on the social consequences of that event.

What, in this situation, should the opposition do? Above all, to become fully aware of the extent, the nature and the reasons of the defeat. Heretofore, our political thinking, as concerns diagnosis, has not extended much beyond hypotheses as naive as they are false. "The government must reach a compromise with us, it is only a question of pushing it to the wall", "The Church does not have its own political line, it only articulates the aspirations of society". As for prognosis, it has not reached beyond the immediate future. The reasons for this are to be found in the crucial circumstance that we have consistently denied our action any political character (so as to avoid angering the regime by trespassing on its territory) and thus have refused to formulate any political analysis or program of political action. We limited ourselves to articulating often unrealistic and contradictory social goals instead of shaping them and, above all, *ranking* them. Of course, this evaluation is unfair to many persons and groups who, long before and much more clearly than this author, defined the field of action and reflection for Polish thought (and I am here thinking primarily about the KOR militants), but their existence does not change the overall picture. Our naiveté and shortsightedness contributed in large measure to two successive December defeats, separated by the desperate turmoil of the 12 months of martial law. Neither as a legal movement nor as an underground, did we create a far reaching political program capable of organizing the efforts of society toward freedom and independence into an effective and coordinated whole. It is still time to rectify this mistake and first steps in this direction have already been taken.

In the shorter run, we must learn to act under these conditions of a diminished social will to fight, supported by a limited social base (for, fundamentally, the people are still with us, nothing has changed), having against us a newly emerging false consciousness through which religious and patriotic symbols and concepts, and the emotions they engender, will be used against us. We may not in this situation lose sight of the fundamental issues. The basis of the Polish crisis — the contradiction between an anachronistic and ineffectual totalitarian system and the social aspirations to freedom — is still intact. It will not be eliminated by compromises made in our name and over our heads, nor by sudden explosions of determination and despair. We must transform this system, gradually, before it is too late. There will not be another August, there can only be Decembers. And this nation may not survive another December.

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*AN OPEN LETTER TO INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINIONS**

by Adam Michnik

On August 31, of this year massive demonstrations took place in many Polish cities. They were summoned by the Provisional Committee of the Self-Governing Labor Union "Solidarity" (NSZZ Solidarity). The aim of these demonstrations was to support demands for the revocation of martial law and for negotiation between the government and the representatives of the working class assembled in NSZZ Solidarity. On September 1, of this year there was a meeting of the Military Council of National Redemption (WRON) under the leadership of General Wojciech Jaruzelski. In the WRON communique we read: "Extremist Agents and ideologues of the anti-socialist opposition, above all from the Committee for Social Self-Defense (KOR) organize and direct these acts [the August 31, 1982 protests]. There is concrete evidence of this. The Military Council of National Redemption (WRON) turns to the Prosecutor General of the Polish People's Republic and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to undertake steps aiming at a quick termination of the ongoing investigation against the leaders of KSS-KOR and to charge them with crimes against the nation and society." (quoted from the newspaper *Trybuna Ludu,* September 2, 1982.) On September 2, of the current year Jacek Kuron, interned in Bialoleka, was brought before the military prosecutor. His status was changed; he was put under arrest. This is a step towards the quick execution of a political trial. From this it follows that this will not be a normal criminal trial. In normal trials the generals do not concern themselves with the evaluation of evidence material and do not decide what can only be an object of the verdict of an independent court. All this allows us to expect that this will be a juridical criminal farce similar to the trial of the murderers of Kirov, or the trial of Dimitrov for setting fire to the *Reichstag.*

WRON's proposition, that the members of KOR (which dissolved itself over a year ago), interned since December 13, 1981, organized the street demonstrations of August 31, 1982 is too large a homage to the abilities of KOR's leaders. I state this notwithstanding my unquestionable sympathy with KOR. The absurdity of this charge allows no doubt about the meaning of this entire enterprise. Nobody can have confidence in the organs of the administration of justice, which act subject to the dictates of the ruling generals. I do not write these words simply because Jacek Kuron is my friend, nor from fear that I shall soon share his fate. I write this motivated by the conviction that there is a single truth and we, imprisoned by General Jaruzelski, also have a right to this. To the chancellors of Austria and West Germany who find so much forbearance for our generals, I take the liberty to remind them that even the Communist Dimitrov was tried by the Hitlerite justice administration in the presence of international observers.

I want to be properly understood. I am in complete solidarity with the leaders of Solidarity who called the peaceful demonstrations on August 31, 1982; I am in complete solidarity with the workers who went out into the streets this day to proclaim themselves for social understanding. By their sacrifice of force — this I deeply believe — monuments will be built in my country and their names will be given to the streets of Polish cities.

I return to you, because I cannot and do not want to consent to a complete trampling of rights, truth and the right to truth. For this reason I ask: Do what is in your power so that this trial is public, and that observers and jurists from democratic countries will be admitted to it. I appeal to your consciences. At present Jacek Kuron and Zbigniew Romaszewski wait for trial. Who will be next?[1]

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1. When this letter was written Adam Michnik did not know that he had also been placed under arrest.

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

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Joachim Hirsch, *Der Sicherheitsstaat: Das 'Modell Deutschland', seine Krise und die neuen sozialen Bewegungen*. Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1980.

During 1980 it seemed as if the end of West Germany's Social Democratic-led government had already come. The SPD had not recovered from the acrimonious internal debates on the NATO double decision, the effects of the economic crisis were growing increasingly evident, and the conservative cultural milieu of the *Tendenzwende* had led to a widespread skepticism, if not outright hostility, toward social reformist programs. Simultaneously the emergence of a fourth electoral party, the "Greens", threatened to sap off disaffected voters from both the coalition parties, while the Conservative opposition was doing battle with remarkable ferocity. In the end, however, it was probably the figure most identified with that ferocity, Franz-Josef Strauss, the 1980 leader of the Conservatives, who guaranteed the re-election of the social-liberal government: the strident tones of his personal style and the radicalness of his brand of conservatism could not compete successfully with the moderation of the SPD leadership. Of course in the meantime, the transfer of power has taken place (not in a general election but due to the maneuverings of the Liberal party which has changed its partners in midstream), apparently putting an end to the period of Social Democratic ascendancy which had begun in 1966 when the SPD formed the Grand Coalition with the Conservatives and which came into its own after 1969 in the coalition with the Liberals. The Social-Liberal government lasted until 1982; if the radical conservatives around Strauss had not seized the opposition in 1980, the change of government might have taken place two years earlier.

Hirsch's discussion of West German society, completed in the Spring of 1980, is still overshadowed by the then imminent national elections. It does not dwell on the gloomy ramifications of a conservative victory but attempts to present a comprehensive analysis of the SPD's *Modell Deutschland* in terms of economic development, political formations and oppositional strategies. The analysis retains its relevance, even though the SPD state lasted for two more years. The new Conservative government in fact promises to display a remarkable degree of continuity with its predecssor, while the new opposition — the Greens and the "alternative" tendencies of the new social movement — which Hirsch treats extensively have gained increasing prominence in the West German political scene.

Unlike Günter Grass, for example, whose novel-essay *Head Births* (1980) represented a plea to support the SPD as a viable democratic reformist agent, Hirsch analyzes *Modell Deutschland* as a program of capitalist rationalization which emerged as a response to the economic crises of 1966/67 under the auspices of the technologically advanced capital block tied to the international market. The economic neo-liberalism of the Christian Democratic period gave way to a modified Keynesianism based on directed incentives and state planning designed to modernize specific productive sectors as well as to manage increasingly large dimensions of the social environment in order to insure the reproduction of capitalist relations. This total capitalization (*Durchkapitalisierung*) of West German society leads to the total erosion of anachronistic, traditionalist relationships and to a mobilization of population ripped out of traditionalist contexts by this "Fordist transformation."[1] This constant crisis in turn necessitates ever greater state intervention, particularly in terms of reproduction (welfare, education, family policies), ultimately the total state penetration of society

1. Cf. Joachim Hirsch, "The New Leviathan," *Telos* n. 48 (Fall 1981), p.79.

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(*Durchstaatlichung*) as a corollary to the total capitalization.

The above contrast of Hirsch with Grass is not at all gratuitous, since the two figures present antithetical reactions to the era of Social Democratic government. For many German intellectuals, the SPD's entry into the government, particularly after 1969, seemed to promise significant and democratic changes in the structure of West German society, i.e. the traditional revisionist strategy appeared to have come true: the working class party (which however since the Godesberg Program of 1959 no longer considered itself a specifically working class party) gained power by democratic means and would institute its program with a parliamentary majority. As that program grew increasingly conservative, especially after Helmut Schmidt replaced Willi Brandt in 1974, and hopes for reform began to fade, more and more of the politicized intellectuals of 1968/69 became disillusioned with the SPD (Grass did not) and/or wandered off into the depoliticized fields of the "new subjectivity." However, the success of the SPD in the late sixties led to other responses as well. In Marxist circles, the SPD-sponsored interventionism after 1966, the promises of reform, and the reformist sympathies of the working class (which was therefore skeptical toward student movement radicalism) generated new discussions of the character of the capitalist state.[2] The orthodox Marxists around the German Communist Party (DKP) put forward the theory of "state-monopoly capitalism" in order to address the new interventionism and the predominance of the technologically advanced sector. The state appeared as a neutral instrument of whichever class or fraction of a class had the power to rule.[3] On the other hand, a competing discussion emerged which attempted to explain the state, i.e. the appearance of an autonomous political dimension purportedly separate from the economy, as the consequence of the basic logic of capitalist relations. In this "state-derivation" debate, the goal was "to 'derive' the state as a political form from the nature of the capitalist relations of production, as a first step towards constructing a materialist theory of the bourgeois state and its development."[4] While reformists presented the state as the neutral agent of the parliamentary majority and the advocates of "state-monopoly capitalism" equally insisted on the state as the tool of the ruling economic group, the "state-derivation" debate suggested a more intimate relationship between the bourgeois state and capitalist relationships. "Instead of simply reiterating the connection between capital and state, however, the contributors to the debate have accepted the separation of the economic and the political and have tried to establish, logically and historically, the foundation of that separation in the nature of capitalist production. In other words, the aim has been to derive the state (or the separation of

2. John Holloway and Sol Picciotto, *State and Capital: A Marxist Debate* (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), p. 15.

3. On the debates around "state-monopoly capitalism", cf. Werner Goldschmidt, "Krise der Theorie oder Theorie der Krise? Überlegungen zum Problem der Krise in der gegenwärtigen Diskussion um die Theorie des staatsmonopolistischen Kapitalismus," *Das Argument* 112 (November-December 1978), pp. 814-22; Werner Goldschmidt, " 'Grundzug' oder 'Entwicklungsphase'? Anmerkungen zur marxistischen Debatte um die methodologischen Grundlagen einer Theorie des staatsmonopolistischen Kapitalismus," *Argument-Sonderband* 36: *Staat und Monopole III;* Heinz Jung und Josef Schleifstein, *Die Theorie des staatsmonopolistischen Kapitalismus und ihre Kritiker in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Eine allgemeinverständliche Antwort* (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Marxistische Blätter, 1979).

4. Holloway and Picciotto, p. 2. On the "state-derivation" debate, refer to the initial important statement: Wolfgang Müller and Christel Neusüss, "The Illusion of State Socialism and the Contradiction between Wage Labor and Capital," *Telos* n. 25 (Fall, 1975), pp. 13-90. Cf. Ruth Heydebrand and Patricia Tummons, "Introduction to the Müller and Neusüss Discussion," *Ibid.*, pp. 2-5.

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economics and politics) from the category of capital."[5]

Hirsch played an important role in the "state-derivation" debate.[6] It is therefore significant that he locates the analysis of *Der Sicherheitsstaat* between the "state-derivation" and "state-monopoly" positions. From the former he took not only the considerably higher degree of theoretical sophistication but also the principle of the genetic deduction of state-form from the exigency of valorization, i.e. the bourgeois state is never neutral because its very forms are based on the capitalist process. Yet a structuralist bias in the state-derivation discussion had generally prohibited the discussion of diachronic patterns, and therefore a single fundamental relationship between state and capital was postulated. The reference to the state-monopoly position permitted Hirsch to develop a model for a qualitatively new capitalist state formation in the period of Social Democratic ascendency.[7] A new historical stage of capitalist competition engenders a new type of state characterized by massive interventionism in economic and social dimensions: the security state, a model for the political structure of late capitalism as exemplified in West Germany.

Hirsch criticizes Habermas and Offe for arguing that the crisis of valorization, i.e. the falling rate of profit, is displaced in contemporary interventionist capitalism by the legitimation crisis. [8] Implicitly holding onto a neo-orthodox position, he denies the validity of the contrast between an earlier capitalism, in which the law of value operated purely, without state activity, and the Keynesian state of the mid-twentieth century. Capitalist economies always relied on state support; now however intervention takes on an undeniable priority, at least within the national economy, while competition still predominates in the world market. The state does not replace valorization; it assumes a new expansionist form solely as a mechanism to insure the reproduction of capitalist relations and consequently the production of surplus value. Despite this critique of Habermas, Hirsch's description of the politicization of society does share much with Habermas' accounts: "(...) the process of economic-social restructuring and its consequences becomes considerably politicized in the wake of thorough state penetration — the state appears as the cause of consequential social changes, even though it was really only their mediator."[9] Because Hirsch presents the social crisis as the result of a constant economic crisis, his account has the advantage of placing considerable importance on the dynamics of international competition. Conversely, the administration of *Modell Deutschland* turns out to be the national response to the exigencies of the international market.

As another account of the administrative state in post-liberal capitalism, the model of the security state has many other competitors as well. Not only Habermas' discussions, the classical treatments of the Frankfurt School and even Weber's descriptions of a bureaucratic-rationalized society displacing "natural" conditions elaborate similar issues. Of course the security state concretizes the argument in terms of specific West German conditions; nevertheless the continuity of a basic argument since the beginning of the century casts a doubt on the contention that the West German interventionist policies after 1966 might still find traditionalist social relationships to dis-

5. Holloway and Picciotto, p. 15.

6. Cf. Joachim Hirsch, "The State Apparatus and Social Reproduction: Elements of a Theory of the Bourgeois State," in Holloway and Picciotto, pp. 57-107.

7. Hirsch, *Der Sicherheitsstaat*, pp. 54-57.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64. For responses to the "state-derivation" position, cf. Jürgen Habermas, "A Reply to Müller and Neusüss," *Telos* n. 25 (Fall 1975), pp. 91-98 and Claus Offe, "Further Comments on Müller and Neusüss," *Ibid.*, pp. 99-112.

9. Hirsch, *Der Sicherheitsstaat*, pp. 99-100.

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place. How much of traditionalism escaped National Socialism? — in other words, how much of the foundation of the security state was inherited from earlier phases of capitalist rationalization, how much is a specific product of Social Democratic policy? The issue is to a certain extent a matter of degree: the spread of capitalist relations and a concomitant expansion of the state are gradual processes; the case has yet to be made that 1966/69 was a key turning point, except perhaps against an anachronistically "liberal" post-war situation.

Yet this problem of the starting point of the security state in *Modell Deutschland* is not Hirsch's prime concern. On the contrary, he was interested much more in its crisis and possible decline, as the Conservative's political fortunes appeared to be on the rise. The Fordist transformation of society brought about a destabilization of social relations which in turn involved the state increasingly in the reproduction of society; resistance to these changes consequently became politicized as the new social movements — ecology, anti-nuclear power, feminism, the "alternative" tendencies. Hirsch's description of the new state formation thus serves to explain the origin of new forms of political activity and their relationship to traditional leftist politics; the key third section of the book is entitled "Socialism — but how? The alternative movement and alternative politics." As evidenced in recent discussion in *Telos*, the response to these new social movements — especially in West Germany — has been by no means uniform among older leftist intellectuals whose formative political experiences occurred during the 1968 movement. This generation gap took on a specific coloration in West Germany. In the mid-seventies, as the old new left found itself on the defensive and retreated to an essentially liberal defense of civil rights against the repressive policies associated with the *Berufsverbot* issue, even parts of the establishment press bemoaned the absence of political activity and creative engagement in the younger generation; the new students appeared to be reluctant to participate in any activities which might jeopardize their careers under the watchful gaze of the political police. The left-wing response to this phenomenon was the theorem of the "new socialization type", a model of a late capitalist personality formation characterized by an inability to engage in other-directed confrontation and a heightened concern with the isolated self.[10] Consequently, abstract, theoretical or long-term perspectives gave way to a privileging of the immediate and the practical; the analysis shares a good deal with Christopher Lasch's thematization of narcissism in American culture. The "new socialization type" represented an attempt by the 1968 leftists on their march through the institutions, especially the educational system, to explain the quietism of the new generation. In the last years of the Seventies, that quietism turned out to be the calm before the storm of the new youth movement and related alternative phenomena, all of which have fed into the massive West German peace movement.[11] While these movements have put forward apparently leftist positions — anti-war, anti-authoritarian, anti-industrial capitalism — and many leftists have rallied behind their banners, in fact some of the motifs of the "new socialization type" discussion have been carried over into a leftist critique of the new social movements.[12] Although the accusation of quietism can obviously not be upheld, it recurs implicitly in the complaint that

10. Cf. Thomas Ziehe, *Pubertät und Narzissmus: sind Juggendliche entpolitisiert?* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1975).

11. Joachim Hirsch, "The West German Peace Movement," *Telos* n. 51 (Spring 1982), p. 137.

12. Cf. Wolfgang Kraushaar, *Autonomie oder Getto? Kontroversen über die Alternativbewegung* (Frankfurt: Verlag Neue Kritik, 1978).

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the new movements refuse to envision a total social change and define politics instead in terms of personal experience, leading therefore to a preference of escapist alternatives to capitalist society — not to a program for a general transformation. Leftist critics look with skepticism, for example, at the "efforts to replace abstract and generalizing theories, based both on historical and contemporary experience and on rational understanding, with 'alternative' concepts, founded ultimately on individual experience and valid only in terms of individual usefulness."[13] The results include a turn to a do-it-yourself preference for artisanship and the development of practical projects; in a parallel manner, the ecology movement is marked by a plentitude of practical-scientistic programs, i.e. the movement most emphatically opposed to technocratic rationality reproduces that same rationality within itself: "Harmony and non-partisanship, maximalist generalizations of subjective impressions, hostility to theory, empiricist pragmatism and finally, blindness toward historical experiences lead to depoliticization and a loss of democracy and further that which ought to be resisted at all costs: the nuclear state."[14] This dynamic within the alternative movements — the reproduction of the same social ills within the purported alternative — lends credibility to the leftist critique and has even won the new social movements the label of "conservative." Their attempts to establish themselves outside of the mainstream while refusing to articulate a radical critique of the social whole means that "a decisive criterion of *left-wing* politics and identity disappears."[15]

Just as Hirsch's account of the genesis of the security state internalized the state-derivation debate and augmented it with a diachronic component, his treatment of the new social movements incorporates the leftist critique but moves beyond the level of political debate or ideology criticism. Instead he speaks to the ambivalent character of the new movements and attempts to explain them in terms of the dynamic of the security state itself, i.e. the apparent deviation from the traditional leftist discourse is seen less as a subjective failing than as a necessary product *and* an appropriate response to the total state penetration of social reproduction. The new social movements appear as the response to the new form of the capitalist state — the security state. While the new left's struggle for the state led to failure and, frequently, to the integration of the former radicals into the state bureaucracy, the struggle against the state promises to work out the practical possibilities of oppositional politics vis-á-vis a new state formation: "instead of the 'long march through the institutions' of bourgeois society, the principled step outside of them."[16] The subsequent refusal to articulate a program for total social change is seen as a result of capitalist social transformation; the destruction of traditional working class identity and communities, the rationalization of occupational structures and the politicization of social dimensions outside of the productive sphere undermines the validity of a program based on the classical proletariat as a universal class. The disintegration of society, caused by the ubiquity of capitalist relations, makes a decentralization of social conflicts necessary. Hirsch's defense of the non-totalizing aspects of the movement responds to the leftist critique of the escapism of alternative "enclaves." Simultaneously, however, he recognizes the potentials for cooptation and resignation implicit in the "return-to-nature" vision of

13. Richard Stöss, "Konservative Aspekte der Ökologie-bzw. Alternativbewegung," *Ästhetik und Kommunikation* 36 (June 1979), p. 14.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Monica Deutz, et. al., "Alternativ oder konservativ? Zur Jüngeren Geschichte der Alternativbewegung," *Ästhetik und Kommunikation* 36 (June 1979), pp. 39f.

16. Hirsch, *Der Sicherheitsstaat,* p. 134.

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harmony characteristic of alternative ideologies. His own final program — "radical reformism"[17] — preserves the antinomies: the claim to radical opposition coupled with a program of "mere" reforms, based on the alliance of activists in the "second culture" of the alternative society with sympathizers in the "first culture" of established professions.

Hirsch's account of the new social movements does not hedge: neither is the leftist critique accepted prematurely nor are the movements' own claims to a privileged radicalism left unquestioned. Instead a "movement derivation" is provided, parallel to the "state derivation" that approaches the political dimension and its transmutations as a result of the motion of capital. The advantage to such a structural-genetic presentation remains its logical coherence; the disadvantage is a tendency to de-emphasize empirical, historical differences as merely variations of a central logic. An example of this tendency involves the option of the "security state" in its limited sense, i.e. the development of a security network of domestic surveillance, police technology, computerized data banks as well as corresponding restrictions on civil liberties. These issues came into focus in West Germany in the campaign against *Berufsverbot* and the opposition to the anti-terrorist legislation of the Seventies.[18] In contrast to analyses which emphasize the cultural dimension and point toward the weakness of civil libertarian elements in the German political tradition,[19] Hirsch derives the expansion of the repressive security complex from the dynamic of capitalist accumulation in the context of international competition; therefore the security state should apply as a model to other capitalist states. Yet even proponents of a general "national security state" paradigm recognize the relative underdevelopment of similar police measures in the United States.[20] Perhaps this difference could be explained in terms of the specific constellation of capitalist fractions; however, the underdevelopment of overtly repressive mechanisms might be part of an alternative political-social model in which a higher level of relative disorder (crime, non-restricted travel, alternative projects in social interstices) is tolerated or even encouraged as an element to insure overall stability. The security state response to social experimentation in West Germany, i.e. the apparent state hostility to alternative projects in health care, education, etc., may be objectively necessary, as Hirsch argues, in terms of capitalist rationalization; it may, however, also be a result of a subjective, culturally determined understanding of the relationship between state and society. While the traditional civic virtues and liberties of bourgeois society dwindle in all capitalist countries, it is not necessarily the case that they give way everywhere to violently repressive systems. An Americanist model of integrated oppositional enclaves and the symbolic identification of the culture industry may present an alternative to the repressive state opposition to projects in the "second society."[21] In fact, the predominance of the security state model in West Germany may be in part due to the underdevelopment of a domestic culture industry, despite the recent growth of the new German cinema.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 174.

18. Cf. my "The Germans and their Terrorists," *Cornell Review* 4 (Fall 1978), pp. 28-42.

19. A more "cultural" analysis is presented in Peter Brückner, *Versuch, uns und anderen die Bundesrepublik zu erklären* (Berlin: Wagenbach, 1978). Cf. Hirsch, *Der Sicherheitsstaat*, pp. 86-87, p. 119.

20. Martin Oppenheimer and Jane C. Canning, "The National Security State: Repression within Capitalism," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* XXIII (1978-79), p. 23.

21. On the German reception of the "two societies" discussion, see the collection of documents in: *Zwei Gesellschaften? Tunix, Mescalero und die Folgen* (Berlin: Ästhetik und Kommunikation, 1980).

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A second sort of difference between contemporary American and West German cultural structures, overlooked by an exclusively "derivative" approach, is suggested more implicitly by Hirsch's discussion. The ideological topography of political debate seems to shine through his account. Aside from the conservatives and reformists of the established parties, two significant positions appear locked in confrontation: the socialist leftists, accused of academic bourgeoisification and accusing their opponents of quietism or tacit conservatism, while these opponents — at least in Hirsch's narrative — express their position with repeated reference to Foucault. Thus, integrated Marxists, tied to the state ideologically and professionally, are counterposed to the decentered groupings where political analyses foreground the positivism of power. Clearly the West German Foucault reception is considerably more political than the American, while German academic Marxism is probably much less structuralist than here. "French theory" plays a different role in the American scholarly (especially literary critical) establishment then it does in the European social movements. Hirsch's account does not address ideological issues extensively, although the competition between Marxism and a post-structuralist tendency functions as a hidden agenda to his discussion of new political conflicts.

Russell A. Berman

Ira H. Cohen, *Ideology and Unconsciousness: Reich, Freud and Marx*. New York: New York University Press, 1982.

Wilhelm Reich needs little introduction. Many of his books remain in print; biographies and memoirs of him regularly appear. Nevertheless few serious studies of his thought have emerged. There are several reasons for this; his post-Marxist post-psychoanalytic, almost mystical, theorizing in the United States blocks access to his earlier, more salient efforts. The full study of Reich must evaluate not only his contributions to a radical psychoanalysis but to cloud-busting. The enthusiasm of outsiders wanes, and only his devoted followers maintain the flow of literature.

In addition, the very simplicity of Reich repells commentators. Reich was not only an audacious theoretician but a popularizer and propagandist. The force of his work derived from his spare formulations. But his simplicity — not simplemindedness — illserved him. Academics need opaque and confused texts to exploit; the plainness of Reich's writings rendered a secondary literature superfluous. He presented his own ideas too clearly. This should be a lesson to future cultural heroes: be confused and opaque.

Ira Cohen should be congratulated for rescuing Reich from this inattention; Reich is familiar and unstudied. The book jacket calls this "the first work in English to deal in any depth with Reich's efforts" to merge Marxism and psychoanalysis. To be sure, an exaggeration but the field is not crowded. Cohen is concerned exclusively with the early Reich (through 1936). According to Cohen in this period Reich "uses the Freudian theory of the unconscious to develop a psychological supplement to the Marxian theory of ideology: his theory of character structure" (p. 2-3).

Cohen organized his book in accord with Reich's theory. The first part surveys Marx and Marxists on class consciousness; the second part outlines Freud's theory of the unconscious. He saves the bulk of the Reich discussion for the third part, although he introduces earlier Reich's organization "Sex-Pol." For Cohen in the approach to class

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consciousness Sex-Pol offered a viable alternative to Marxism-Leninism. He concludes by extolling Reich's Sex-Pol and his theory of character structure; they are advances essential for all radical theorists and activists.

It would be nice to close the review here; and simply note that Cohen's study is a modest contribution; that he makes several interesting points; that partisans of Reich will probably respond to his occasional criticism of their teacher; and that a long overdue reconsideration of Reich's oeuvre might commence. Goodnight.

However, too much backslapping and politeness corrode thought. The deceit has lately become so thick that it is no longer clear which books are of any value. There is no doubt that Cohen deserves commendation; he is a colleague, a comrade and a compatriot in a thankless project: critical theorizing. This should not be forgotten or slighted. There is also little doubt that he has written a sloppy and pedestrian book. Neither research nor reading appear to be his forte. What he does not know, he fudges. Should this be overlooked?

Anyone with a limited familiarity with Marx, Freud or Reich will learn little from Cohen. Perhaps this is the point: many do not possess this minimal familiarity. Fine. But Cohen's book bears the unmistakable brand of the academy: it is clumsily written and organized. Cohen cannot tell us often enough what he is about to demonstrate, what he is demonstrating and what he has just demonstrated. He also manages to turn an instrinsically fascinating story of Wilhelm Reich into crunchy granola. Only monograph junkies will read this book.

For academics Cohen does provide a mini-lesson on how not to write books: he begins at scratch. Apparently nowadays it is *de rigueur* to "reconstruct" a couple of traditions before getting down to meat and potatoes. "In this chapter," he reminds us, "I have attempted to reconstruct Marx's method as an attempt to explain social patterns. Marx considers social relationships within a particular social structure," etc., etc., (p. 24). A problem dogs this reconstruction fetish; it belabors the obvious. Cohen's reconstruction of Marx relies heavily on Bertell Ollman (and Engels), to which he adds several of his own questionable propositions. His reconstruction of psychoanalysis is better but, in a short book, unnecessary.

His scholarship does not inspire confidence: indeed it is the shoddy scholarship that ultimately sinks this little boat. He cites Hegel. One checks the reference. It is not Hegel; rather it is Hegel as cited by Lenin in his *Philosophical Notebooks*; and it is not even Lenin; it is Lenin as anthologized in the *Reader in Marxist Philosophy*, a venerable Communist collection. This is not an isolated occurence. Cohen is apparently allergic to original and reliable texts. He likes things in anthologies; he gets Marx from an anthology by Robert Tucker (*Marx-Engels Reader*) and *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* from a truncated edition by Fromm *(Marx's Concept of Man)*; he gets Lenin from the *Reader* and a Bantam paperback *(Essential Works)*. It is amazing he found some books of Reich.

Not too many. He never uses a crucial, and easily available, text, *People in Trouble*. This would not matter if Cohen was offering a brightly written popular exposition. He is not, and it does matter. He is offering a closely argued evaluation of Reich. One wades through the reconstructions of Marx and Freud, expecting at the end the heart and soul of the book; but the incisive and original perspective on Reich never happens. It flies by. In an instant we are reading phrases about Reich such as "as I have argued" or "as I have shown," as if something had been established. Where?

In Chapter 3 we have the first, and in many ways only, sally. "In this chapter I will compare the Leninist and Sex-Pol programs for the development of class conscious-

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ness" (p. 54). In Leninism "an elite group of workers and intellectuals" constituted themselves a vanguard. "The Sex-Pol strategy" adopted another approach; it located "the sources of class consciousness in the life experience of workers, rather than in a scientific theory of leadership" (p. 54). Cohen provides a conventional summary of the "Marxist-Leninist Party," and then outlines the contribution of Sex-Pol, "a movement of workers and intellectuals in Weimar Germany," led by Reich.

Cohen's discussion of Sex-Pol suffers from two deadly ailments. Cohen knows next to nothing about Sex-Pol; and the two "programs" of Marxism-Leninism and Sex-Pol were originally one. During the heroic period of Sex-Pol Reich was a member of the Communist Party, and conceived of his work as contributions to orthodox Marxism and Leninism.

It would be fine, indeed, to learn something about Sex-Pol, but there seems to be little information. Reich set up some clinics in Vienna, and then a group inside the German Communist Party in Berlin; it issued many programs, pamphlets and so on under the "Sex-Pol" name. In one of the few references to its activities, Reich noted that in a year and a half some 700 people applied for treatment in their clinics, of which 30% could be helped of their "neuroses and sexual disturbances."[1]

That there is so little information about the activities of Sex-Pol does not necessarily cripple Cohen's argument; only he is not forthright. In fact his talk gets looser and looser until the end of the book the Sex-Pol "movement" is elevated into a major political formation of the same order as the Turin factory councils; in 1919-20 as Italy came close to revolution, these councils encompassed hundreds of thousands; Cohen huffs and puffs. "The Sex-Pol leaders were concerned with preparing people for the long and difficult struggle...By involving large numbers of workers, the Sex-Pol organizations, no less than the councils, helped to establish practical relationship between revolutionary leadership and the mass of unorganized workers...The Sex-Pol movement remains one of the best examples of a serious and systematic attempt to organize and coordinate worker's social struggles..." etc., etc. (p. 218).

This is 100% unadulterated hype. Cohen does not present a single shred of evidence; he has no sources, no information. He is apparently tripping. He only utilizes a brief "History of Sex-Pol" by Reich, which was translated some years ago by an English libertarian group; but this history only contains a program, and some charges and counter-charges. It seems very likely that there was no real Sex-Pol "movement," only clinics, and the many activities of Reich himself.

This does not deprive either Sex-Pol or Reich himself of theoretical importance, but on this score also Cohen flubs it; his sloppiness here is less excusable since much of the information is readily available; Cohen is uninterested. Reich originally presented his own work within the terms of conventional Marxism; he did view Sex-Pol as an alternative to Leninism, but a formation inside it.

Reich was disabused of this idea. Within a two year period, 1932-34, the Communist Party's hostility and Reich's disenchantment fed each other, resulting in Reich's exclusion from the Party. This was not only a personal and political drama, but a theoretical clash that Cohen does not even mention: the evolution of Reich's thought out of and finally against orthodoxy. An account of Sex-Pol as an alternative to conventional Marxism and Leninism which does not discuss its roots in the orthodoxy is fundamentally misleading.

Although the spine of this book, an incisive discussion of Reich and Sex-Pol, turns

1. W. Reich, "The Sexual Misery of the Working Masses," *New German Critique*, 1 (Winter, 1973), p. 103.

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out to be a wet noodle, Cohen's work still retains value. In his most original insight Cohen separates the Reich, theoretician of libido, from the Reich, theoretician of character structure. In the former Reich tends towards a dubious sexual reductionism; in the latter he is irreplaceable for a left strategy. However, Cohen undermines his own argument by trying to score points against Herbert Marcuse; he does not fare too well. One chapter defends Reich from Marcuse's charge of a sexual primitivism. Marcuse "distorts Reich's meaning. By 'sexual liberation' Reich meant something quite different than Marcuse's interpretation...for Reich progress in freedom was the development of the capacity for self-regulation in work and pleasure" (pp. 166-167).

Unfortunately by the next chapter Cohen has completely forgotten his argument, and reverses it. Now Reich is guilty of sexual reductionism, and Cohen cites Marcuse for support. "In contrast to Reich, who spoke of sexual liberation as the ability to satisfy genital instincts, Marcuse spoke of it as the transformation of libido. Marcuse stressed a qualitative distinction in sexual activity which Reich neglected...Marcuse went beyond Reich in arguing that real instinctual liberation is not the mere release of libidinal strivings" (pp. 191, 194). Well said, but someone should have reminded Cohen to reread his previous chapter.

Ira Cohen is a colleague and comrade; let us not forget that. His book, however, is sadly defective. Its research is deplorable; the book almost drowns in "reconstructions." His argument, where it is not contradictory, happily misses critical issues. Earlier books that deal with Reich — Reimut Reiche, *Sexuality and Class Struggle*, Michael Schneider, *Neurosis and Civilization*, Gad Horowitz, *Repression* — are more substantial and provocative. We still await a fundamental encounter with the contribution of Wilhelm Reich.

Russell Jacoby

Wini Breines, *Community and Organization in the New Left (The Great Refusal)*, J.F. Bergin, South Hadley, Mass. (Praeger, New York, 1982).

The problem with most writings about the New Left is their failure to integrate the actual lived experience of that movement. Mostly, there has been a long parade of denunciations, rejections, and reaction-formations which amount to little more than claiming that the New Left did not fit nearly into this or that Marxist or liberal model of what a political movement should be. Breines has finally written a book which takes seriously the New Left's attempt to change the meaning of politics and refutes orthodox Marxists' and liberals' efforts to see it through their particular theoretical biases.

"Prefigurative politics" is the category Breines uses to describe New Left politics: "The crux of prefigurative politics imposed substantial tasks, the central one being to create and sustain within the living practice of the movement, relationships and political forms that 'prefigured' and embodied the desired society." Against critics, both liberal and Leninist, whose "instrumental, or, paraphrasing Lipset, instrumental political biases" make it impossible for them to grasp the real political nature of the New Left, she argues "that the utopian and 'anti-organizational' characteristics of the New Left were among its most vital aspects." Democracy and community, the political and the personal, were central to the New Left's visionary practice. Citing the destruction by developing capitalism of those institutions, relationships, and experiences which constitute communities as the backdrop for the communitarian needs and

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struggles of the New Left, Breines clearly is on the side of those who believe that the search for community is a central political concern. "The desire for connectedness, meaningful personal relationships and direct participation and control over economic, political and social institutions on the basis of the needs of the individual and community, takes on a radical meaning in a period such as ours."

The prefigurative politics of the New Left is not Breines' sole concern. The New Left *was* "new" despite all attempts to dismiss it or reduce it to the categories of the old. It was neither simply a product of the Old Left nor just a reaction against it, and it had roots of its own in the civil rights and radical pacifist movement which were very different from the traditional Marxist Left. In describing the differences between the Old Left and the New, Breines points out that: "The old left was preoccupied with 'objective conditions' of revolution, while the new left highlighted the importance of 'subjective conditions.'"

Failure to recognize this has led to the reactive misunderstandings. Liberals and Marxists have attempted to explain away the New Left in order to protect and perpetuate their own definition of politics, be it the traditional liberal model of electoral representative politics or some version of "class struggle" led by a Marxist party. The New Left did not fit either of these paradigms. On the question whether the New Left was "really socialist," Breines claims that: "The old left was more socialist than the new. On balance, the early new left and the student movement were not traditionally socialist . . . Existentialism and not Marxism was relevant to them and captured their moods."

The relation of the New Left to socialism and Marxism is crucial for understanding the later religious conversion of important segments of SDS to various forms of Marxist, Marxist-Leninist, and Stalinist dogmatism. Faced with the fact that socialist orthodoxy had little to offer the New Left in the way of making its experience, insights, and vision more comprehensible, some of its members found alternative sources of inspiration in the unorthodox leftism "which included a critique of bureaucracy, the centrality of everyday life and which incorporated the thought of Lukács, Gramsci, Luxemburg, the Frankfurt School and the council communists." The older traditions which were hostile to "centralization and the bureaucratic conception of the workers' party" and which had "faith in the spontaneity of the masses and support for the (workers') councils" were very similar to the New Left's "prefigurative politics," with its commitment to nurturing the seedbeds of the new society in the rubble of the old.[1]

Herself a product of the New Left, and later, the feminist movement, Breines argues that traditional social science has failed to grasp the import of the 1960s student movement because of the limitations of their quantitative methodologies, their tendency "to reduce student rebellions to quantifiable or at least highly specific factors" which lose or ignore "the radical hopes, experiments and vision of the students." This reductive approach takes the heart out of the movement. Thus, "the cultural, personal and social implications, the deeper subjective political meaning has often gone unnoticed or unrecorded, and has been excluded from an analysis of the political significance of the movement." Here, again, she signals the failure of liberal and Marxist analyses.

Breines sees the students' desire for community as prior to their critique of

1. Breines fails to mention the inspiration some New Leftists drew from the American anarcho-syndicalist tradition which had been embodied in the IWW's emphasis on direct workers' democracy. In the period 1965-68 there were many SDSers, at least in the Mid-West and the West, who identified strongly with the Wobblies. In my own case, for example, there was a direct link since I was the grandchild of Finnish-American IWW activists.

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American society which flows out of that desire; the passion for building community infused the movement's political struggles and informed its strategizing rather than the other (traditional) way round. It was almost a "rebirth" in the midst of a deadening world. "The process was one of energetically, even joyfully, creating and experiencing connectedness and meaning which often dissipated quickly, only to be recreated and dreamed of long after, shaping an alternative vision of society."

The attempt "to create a more meaningful, free and moral existence" flew in the face of traditional definitions of political action. And nothing embodied this break with traditional politics more profoundly than the New Left's practice and ideals of nonviolence. It was through a commitment to nonviolence that the movement proved its determination to implement a radically new definition of the relation of morality and politics, a new definition of means and ends. The New Left sought to turn the political world upside down, and Breines places herself squarely on the side of those who were doing the turning: "It is my conviction that the attempt to seek the 'salvation of the soul' in politics, to forge a new definition of politics, in which violence, authority and hierarchy did not reign supreme is the most unique and powerful legacy of the new left." It is this powerful truth which the government and the media spent so much effort trying to deny, pervert, and destroy.

But how did the sixties' movement and SDS in particular, go from being the bearers of a new libertarian politics of a participatory democracy and prefigurative communitarianism to a bunch of sectarian Marxist-Leninists, Mao-spouting dogmatists, or adventuristic Guervarists in a relatively short period of time? How did the New Left lose its way and its identity and succumb to the old orthodoxy in 1967-68?

I want to deal here with one main theme and my own contribution to the propagation of "new working class theory." I was a student in Paris during the early 1960s and when I returned to the U.S. in the fall of 1963, I was very moved by this new generation of young Americans who were making a break with the dominant culture. Some of them were my students at Iowa State University where I taught from 1964 to 1966. *They*, in fact, organized *me* into the American New Left.

Because I was convinced of the genuineness of their (our) movement, I was ready to nourish and defend it with whatever means available. But I also had a hidden agenda. I was a gay male radical who had come out in France in the years 1961-63 where I was part of the Parisian gay community. Because of my sexual orientation, I had a particularly strong fear of Stalinist and other authoritarian forms of both the political Left and the Right which I saw using homophobia as an instrument of fear and regimentation. In addition to the instinctive faith in participatory democracy which moved most New Leftists, I had a gay person's antagonism to authoritarian socialism and puritanical leftism, and though the New Left of the mid-1960s was no more an overt supporter of gay liberation than it was of feminism, I saw in it the kind of libertarian values which I thought would eventually challenge sexism and homophobia.[2] I looked therefore to the *New* Left as a preserve of libertarian values and was alert to any signs of puritanism or authoritarianism which carried the potential of homophobia. This situation led to an enormous amount of personal agony because, even at its best, the New Left was sexist *and* staunchly hetero-sexist. In the end, I was trashed for my gayness and suffered a lot of emotional damage as a result.

As Breines makes clear, new working class theorists like myself developed that par-

2. I was also from a working-class background and, having grown up poor, I was not very vulnerable to the guilt-tripping about privilege that the Marxist-Leninists used to manipulate middle-class students.

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ticular analysis in order to legitimate the student movement. Unfortunately, by adopting the terms of class analysis, we opened the door to the wholesale adoption of orthodox Marxist rhetoric and, within a year, the New Left was wallowing in a religious orgy of Marxification and Leninization with the vultures of the Old Left sects and cults moving in for the kill or the carcass, and the Weathermen preparing for salvation through self-immolation.

"My gawd! What have we done?" I used to mutter to myself as I was driven out of SDS into political exile and viewed the wreckage from afar. At that time, I thought we could take some of the most intelligent parts of the Marxist tradition, graft it onto the libertarian mainstream of the movement, legitimize the New Left in terms of the socialist revolutionary tradition, and leave the orthodox Marxists, Marxist-Leninists and Maoists in the dustbin of history.

At the December 1967 SDS National Council meeting in Bloomington, Indiana, the wave of anti-student workerism was reaching its crest and a group of community activists from JOIN Community Union (formerly an SDS RAP project) had come both to denounce students and to proclaim the revolutionary nature of *the* working class. I happened to walk through the auditorium while a JOIN organizer was haranguing a group of fifty or so students. As I was walking down the aisle, he said: "You've got to realize that poor people and working people aren't ever going to take students seriously. If you came down and tried to organize in our community, folks would think you're nothing but a bunch of faggots." I stopped dead in my tracks in the middle of the auditorium. The group fell silent except for some nervous giggles. I stared at the speaker for a few moments and then walked out of the room. I knew it was all over for my kind of people in SDS. Within a few weeeks I left the national scene and exiled myself to Texas.

Because I still feel guilty about all of this, it is appropriate that I confess what I think was my real sin in the sitation: my failure to come out.[3] Coming out would have been just the kind of action which would have blown the minds of the rigid Marxist sectarians and exposed the deep roots of puritanism and authoritarianism which motivated them. Then we might have had a lively debate about issues of culture and consciousness which would have strengthened the movement's libertarian impulses.

I can best illustrate just how explosive the gay issue was in the New Left by recounting what did happen when I experimented with coming out in that context. There was always a number of close American friends who knew I was gay. Some of these people eventually used this knowledge to launch a gay-baiting campaign against me. This gay issue was used effectively to destroy my political credibility. I cite this because it reveals some of the dynamics of those strange "reversals" which Wini Breines recounts at the end of her discussion of new working class theory.

Reversals of this nature reveal deep questions of cultural-political repression and point to the political significance of issues such as sexism and homophobia. Those were issues which found no support in *Capital* or *State and Revolution*. They did find some support, however, in such works as *Eros and Civilization* and *One-dimensional Man* — books which had influenced me greatly at Cornell in the early 1960s. As the Stalinization of the New Left progressed, Lenin was revived while Marcuse was denounced.

Clearly, one of my errors was to believe that these otherwise life-affirming young people could easily be talked out of their guilt with a few trenchant quotations from

3. I discussed this at some length in a long interview published at Tolstoy College, SUNY Buffalo, in 1972 called, somewhat pretentiously, "Revolutionary Males."

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Marcuse and some sociological chatter about "new strata of the working class." Their guilt was deeply felt. They were the product of the conflict between affluence and puritan ideology — between the economic reality of advanced capitalism and the ideology of primitive accumulation. Most amazing to me, their guilt turned out to be more powerful than their self-interest, and the supposed scientific socialist ideology which they adopted proved to be little more than Judeo-Protestant moralism for assuaging their self-hatred and compensating their lack of a sense of authentic selfhood. But, most tragic of all, it blinded them to the deep sources of compassion, love and solidarity which had brought them into the movement in the first place. It denied rather than affirmed all that was most precious about their lives and their political motivations.

As Breines points out, not all of the New Left got stuck in the ruts of socialist orthodoxy. The New Left's "revolt against hierarchy, authoritarianism, centralization and bureaucracy embodied in the radical experiments, the praxis, could not find a theory 'audacious' enough to encompass them." Paradoxically, it was not the new working class theorists (with the exception of Carl Davidson) who embraced Marxist orthodoxy; rather, Breines argues, they "were the ones left defending a version of radical transformation peculiarly adapted to America . . . a revolutionary theory based on post-scarcity values, on individual liberation, participation and cooperation, on participatory and small group political autonomy."

It has been remarked that Marxism is more like religious ideology than most political theory preceding it in that it exhalts the downtrodden, the proletariat, with its own version of the New Testament promise that "the last shall be first." And although it is not the poor who have come to power wherever organizations calling themselves "Marxist" have seized control or manipulated them, still the claim to represent proletarian interests is basic to the legitimation of these movements or regimes. Libertarian New Leftism and new working class theory were an affront to the basic ethos of that moralistic tradition with all its contradictions and falsifications. What if revolution could be made not out of poverty but in rejection of material consumerism? What if some of the most radical were among the least oppressed rather than from the wretched of the earth? It was too much for the Judeo-Christian-Marxist mind to bear. It was too much like being able to taste the forbidden fruit while remaining in the garden of abundance. I still do not believe that the New Left's attempt to develop a theory adequate to its time was elitist, or the result of an impulse of selfishness. To authenticate ourselves does not necessarily imply that we deny authenticity to others, and to make a revolution "for ourselves" does not mean that we make it "for ourselves alone."

It will still take time for people in the advanced industrial world to face honestly and without guilt the really radical political questions raised by the potential for a post-scarcity world. It requires a break with the puritan moralities and political practices of the past and the development of an ecological ethos beyond older definitions of good and evil. It also requires finding ways of touching those deep wellsprings of human caring which made the New Left such a life-giving and breath-taking experience. The New Left was both a break with the past and the harbinger of a new radicalism to come. We have had a dozen years to winnow out the chaff and now new political life is emerging again. Wini Breines has written an honest, courageous and important book. Contrary to her pessimism, however, its appearance has made me more optimistic than I've been in a long time.

Gregory Calvert

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Rudolph Hilferding. *Finance Capital. A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development.* Edited with an Introduction by Tom Bottomore. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981. $60.

Of a book that has been as famous as this one since its publication in 1910, one must ask both why it has taken 70 years for it to be translated into English and what is its relevance today. Along with Luxemburg's *The Accumulation of Capital* (1913) and Grossmann's *Das Akkumulations- und Zusammensbruchsgesetz des kapitalistischen Systems* (1929), *Finance Capital* is one of the major works on economics in the Marxist tradition. The early weakness of Marxism as a political force in the English-speaking countries did nothing to encourage translation of such books, and the victory of fascism, Stalinism, and 20th-century Americanism blocked later development of this tradition. Since World War II, it has been revived in a curious form: not as the intellectual expression of a workers' movement but, confined within the academic world, in attempts to find substitutes for the disintegrating bourgeois ideology.

The rebirth of Marxism within the student movement of the late 1960s brought German reprints of all three books. *The Accumulation of Capital* had already been published in English in 1951, with an introduction by Joan Robinson. A translation of Hilferding's critique of Böhm-Bawerk had come out two years earlier. Translations of *Finance Capital* have been under preparation for decades, until Tom Bottomore finally took on the task of combining two of them into the present English version. While there are rumors of a translation of Grossmann's book, it is easy to see it as no accident that the other two were issued first. Grossmann alone among the three attempted to develop a critique of the capitalist economy within the framework of Marx's theory of accumulation and crisis. Although Luxemburg saw capitalism as doomed to catastrophe, while Hilferding predicted a rosier future for the system, they shared an analytical focus not on the production of surplus value but on the circulation process. Both centered their attention not, as did Grossmann, on the dynamic of the rate of profit, but on the equilibrium conditions for reproduction supposedly studied by Marx in the second volume of *Capital*. Both, therefore, worked in a vein closer to that of modern bourgeois economics, in particular to the analysis of imperfect competition and the growth theories associated with the "Cambridge school."

Finance Capital is certainly of great interest on its own account, both as an attempt to apply Marxist categories to the analysis of a concrete object, the financial system, and as an attempt to draw political consequences from this analysis. The level of discussion is often quite high, especially when compared to the work of present-day mediocrities such as Mandel and Sweezy. In addition, it is of interest as precursor and model for the version of Marxian theory which is still the dominant one today, and in particular for this version's difficulty in breaking with bourgeois economics and politics.[1]

Hilferding's thesis, in a nutshell, is this: "Finance capital signifies the unification of capital. The previously separate spheres of industrial, commercial, and bank capital are now brought under the common direction of high finance, in which the masters of industry and of the banks are united in a close personal association. The basis of this association is the elimination of free competition among individual capitalists by the large monopolistic combines. This naturally involves at the same time a change in the

1. Bottomore is owed a debt of gratitude for his production of this book. The translation is accurate and clear. While Bottomore's introduction betrays no great comprehension of the theoretical issues evoked, it sets the historical context of the book well enough. Bottomore's bibliography, however, does not mention Minoru Kurata's *Bibliographie über Rudolph Hilferding* (Tokyo, 1972), the most complete listing to date of Hilferding's publications and letters.

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relation of the capitalist class to state power" (p. 301). Finance capital, dominating the state, imposes on it its imperialist aims, the extension of the monopoly form into the international sphere. At the same time, however, "the socializing function of finance capital facilitates enormously the task of overcoming capitalism" (p. 367).

Thanks to its reheating by Lenin, Hilferding's theory of imperialism has been at the center of most recent discussions of his work. In fact, however, this represents only one area of capitalist reality which Hilferding wished to illuminate. Shortly after its publication, Hilferding's study was described (by Kautsky) as the "fourth volume of *Capital*." In its detailed description of the forms of credit, the workings of the stock and futures markets, and the financial system generally, it may be taken as an expansion of Part V of the third volume of Marx's work which, according to Engels, studies "the most important subject in the entire book."[2] In his analysis of the political implications of finance capital, moreover, "Hilferding obviously goes beyond Marx's critique of political economy in the direction of the concrete."[3] It is Hilferding's claim, however, that the concept of finance capital provides a bridge between abstract and concrete, between Marx's analysis of "capital" apart from competition, the world market, and the state, as well as the strategic and tactical problems of (for instance) German Social Democracy. Finance capital is not merely "the latest phase of capitalist development" but also "the supreme and most abstract expression" of capital (p. 21).[4]

Finance capital, that is, tends in Hilferding's eyes to make a concrete reality of Marx's abstract concept of "capital in general" — the total capital which exists in the form of the "many capitals" represented by individual, competing firms. To the extent that competition gives way to monopoly and ultimately to a system-wide "organized capitalism," as Hilferding called it, the many capitals are consolidated into a social capital now *für* as well as *an sich*. "The ultimate outcome of this process would be the formation of a general cartel. The whole of capitalist production would then be consciously regulated by a single body which would determine the volume of production in all branches of industry. . . . Capital now appears as a unitary power which exercises sovereign sway over the life process of society" (pp. 234-235). This identification of finance capital as a form "in which all the partial forms of capital" — banking, productive, and commercial, and all the individual branches of production — "are brought together into a totality" (pp. 234-235) is what permits Hilferding's argument to reach from empirical description of a particular phase of capitalist development to the most abstract foundations of Marxian theory: the theory of money and its basis, the labor theory of value.

What differentiates a market society, in Hilferding's eyes, from a consciously regulated one (whether pre- or post-capitalist) is the necessity of exchange transactions to unite the productive activity of its constituent individuals into social production. "The outcome of completing all possible acts of exchange in such a society is what would have been accomplished in a communist, consciously planned society by the central authorities, namely what is produced, how much, where, and by whom" (p. 28). Sale of a product, its exchange for money, demonstrates that the labor that produced it was socially necessary. It is the social relation between producers that is represented by the reciprocal exchange-values of their products. In such a system, finally, money — a

2. Engels, Preface to Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III (Penguin, 1981), p. 94.

3. Cora Stephan, "Geld- und Staatstheorie in Hilferding's 'Finanzkapital,' " pp. 111-154 in H.G. Backhaus *et al.*, *Gesellschaft, Beiträge zur Marxschen Theorie* 2 (Frankfurt, 1974), p. 13.

4. See also p. 176: "Abstractly considered, all social capital could also be bank capital. For bank capital, after all, is only capital which is at the disposal of the banks and there is no inherent reason why all capital should not pass through the banks."

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commodity serving to represent the exchange values of all other commodities relative to it — comes to provide a physical form for value — social labor — as such. Thus, "money is a social relation expressed in the form of an object" (p. 37).

Hilferding reminds us that, as Marx pointed out, the elaboration of the exchange process by the mediation of money (so that a commodity is exchanged for money in turn exchanged for a second commodity) makes possible a separation in time between sale and purchase. Goods may be delivered before the price is paid; alternatively, their price may be advanced in anticipation of delivery. With this credit is born, specifically, the commercial credit extended by capitalist sellers to their customers, wholesale or retail. Another source of credit lies in the circulation of productive capital itself. Capital is money used to make money. To do so it must be transformed into means of production and labor power, which can, combined, create a product of greater value than those ingredients, provided that the value of labor power is less than the value created by the labor in which this power is realized. When the product is sold, the original sum advanced is recovered (if all goes well), along with the surplus value, known to the capitalist as profit. Some of the capital invested in means of production may not be recovered for years, and may not be needed for years — for instance, the sums invested in buildings and heavy machinery. Meanwhile, the value of this capital accumulates in the form of money. "Since idle money can yield no profit, the attempt is constantly being made to prevent such idleness, and this task can be accomplished only by credit, which thereby acquires a new function" (p. 70). The money is lent to capitalists who can use it to produce new surplus value. This must then be divided between profit for the borrowing entrepreneur and interest for the money-lender. The collection of money from those who are not using it and the loan of it to those who can use it becomes a function of the banks, along with the handling of the various forms of credit instruments for payment. The joint-stock system, another means for the consolidation of various sums of idle money into an amount usable for productive investment, also comes under the influence if not the control of the banks, who both lend money to stock-market speculators and arrange the flotation of shares.

In this description of the forms of credit Hilferding largely echoes Marx's discussion in Volume III of *Capital*. What is new here is Hilferding's claim that in the study of "the role which money plays in the circulation of industrial capital. . . we can discern the secret of how the processes of circulation themselves endow capitalist credit with the power eventually to dominate the whole social process" (p. 67). And, in fact, *Finance Capital* differs strikingly from its Marxian ancestor in focusing entirely on phenomena within the process of circulation — the money-mediated transfer of claims to property — and its total lack of interest in the process of production. The central thought of the book is that since money is the representation of the social relations constituting the system, control of money, achieved by the banks through control of credit, means control of the system itself. "Once the credit system has attained a certain degree of development, the utilization of credit by the capitalist enterprise becomes a necessity imposed upon it by the competitive struggle" (p. 93). Gradually firms become tied to the banks. The concentration and centralization of capital both accelerates and is accelerated by this tendency, as the banks become organizers and channels of these processes. And as it leads to the formation of monopolies and cartels, "the relation between the banks and industry becomes still closer, and at the same time the banks acquire an increasing control over capital invested in industry" (p. 224). This bank capital transformed into industrial capital is finance capital.

In this theory, as Rosa Luxemburg incisively put it, Hilferding "has copied Marx;

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where he goes beyond Marx, everything is wrong."[5] Hilferding is commonly criticized for overvaluing the role of the banks in the formation and control of capital. The German case was not in this regard as typical as he took it to be and the period after World War II saw a rise in the importance of corporate self-financing. Such points are damaging, because of the concrete level of much of the argumentation. But they do not in themselves refute the core of Hilferding's theory for, as Bottomore points out, the central role played by the banks in industrial development did lead to an integration of industrial and bank capital in which financiers came to play a central role. From this viewpoint, this core is really the vision of a cartellized capitalism in which the state plays a central economic role — a vision which lives today in the conceptions of "monopoly capital" and "state monopoly capitalism."[6]

Hilferding spelled out this vision and its political implications in a speech on "the Tasks of Social Democracy in the Republic," delivered 15 years after the publication of *Finance Capital*, to the Kiel congress of the Social-Democratic Party. This speech shows that Hilferding's faith in the ability of capitalism to organize and regulate itself had survived World War I and the social, political, and economic changes it brought with it. Hilferding argued for participation in the democratic process, in opposition to views urging the German Left to prepare for economic and political crisis and extra-parliamentary struggle against the Nazis. His argument was based on the idea that the capitalist system not only has no inherent tendency to economic or political crisis, but had transformed itself into an "organized economy" consciously maintained in equilibrium through state regulation. Indeed, "organized capitalism thus in reality means the replacement in principle of *the capitalist principle of free competition* by *the socialist principle of planned production*. This planned, consciously directed economy greatly strengthens the possibility of a conscious *development of the economy*, which means nothing but intervention in it by the only organization possessed both of consciousness and the power of compulsion, intervention by the state."[7]

This new state of affairs manifested itself even technologically in the development of synthetics, which made laughable the idea of a world war fought for raw materials such as oil. In any case, the internationalization of cartels eliminated competition between national economies. In *Finance Capital*, Hilferding had already argued that with this development of capitalism "the longer are the periods of prosperity and the more short-lived the crises" (p. 343); monetary crisis is a thing of the past, so that downturns bring "no run on the banks and mass withdrawal of deposits" (p. 291). In Kiel, he asserted that "for the first time since the war we have entered a general economic upswing, in particular in regard to Germany."[8] This speech was delivered in 1927: two years before the crash that issued into the Great Depression and the new world war.

How did Hilferding manage to be so *very* wrong?[9] One answer lies close to the surface

5. Cited in *Internationale* 7:5 (1924), p. 379.

6. In fact, Hilferding's theory is the direct ancestor of the theory of state monopoly capital. Baran's and Sweezy's theory of monopoly capital is strikingly anticipated in Hilferding's book: "Cartellization brings exceptionally large extra profits.... But at the same time cartels tend to slow down capital investment.... This contradiction demands a solution, which it finds in the export of capital" (pp. 33-234).

7. *Sozialdemokratischer Parteitag 1927 in Kiel. Protokoll* (Berlin, 1927), p. 168.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 165 ff.

9. In Bottomore's opinion, "if we take a longer view, and consider the whole period from the 1920s to the 1970s, it seems to me that Hilferding's general theory should be regarded as substantially correct," since "the principal result of the crisis" of the 1930s "was to promote a further growth of state intervention which, as in the case of Roosevelt's New Deal, helped to 'save

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of his book: Hilferding's conclusions simply do not follow from his argument and the evidence he presents for it. What he actually demonstrates, following Marx, is that credit is essential to the functioning of the capitalist economy; that social capital, with its intertwining of banking, industrial, and commercial capital, tends to concentration and centralization, on an international as well as a national scale, and that competition produces a drive for monopoly positions and the formation of trusts and cartels. From this, however, the conclusion that there is an ongoing process of formation of a "general cartel" and a centrally regulated economy does not follow.

A key step in the argument is the claim that "there is a growing tendency to eliminate competition between the banks themselves, and on the other side, to concentrate all capital in the form of money capital. . . . If this trend were to continue, it would finally result in a single bank or group of banks establishing control over the entire money capital (and so) over social production as a whole" (p. 180).[10]

But no evidence is given to support this claim. Indeed, Hilferding says elsewhere that "cartels are powerless to alter the competition among capitals for spheres of investment" (p. 296). He argues that the "professional banking principle of maximum security makes the banks inherently averse to competition" (p. 179). But he also points out that a will to eliminate competition, if such there really be, is not sufficient to do so: "Thus a contradiction arises: the restriction of competition can be accomplished most easily when it is least necessary, namely, in a period of prosperity, because the agreement among producers then only sanctions an accomplished fact. Conversely, during a depression, when the restriction of competition is most essential, it becomes extremely difficult to conclude any agreement. This accounts for the fact that cartels are most easily organized in periods of prosperity. . . but frequently collapse during a depression, unless they are very strictly organized" (p. 193).

This "contradiction" can be stated in a more general way: the tendency to an "organized capitalism" and the overcoming of the anarchy of the competitive market is limited to the degree to which the tendency to crisis is overcome. With respect to this question Hilferding seems to turn on his own argument, claiming that "The anarchy of production is not abolished by reducing the number of individual units while simultaneously increasing their strength and effectiveness. . . . Planned production and anarchic production are not quantitative opposites such that by tacking on more and more 'planning' conscious organization will emerge out of anarchy. . . . [T]o expect the abolition of crises from individual cartels simply shows a lack of insight into the causes of crises and the structure of the capitalist system" (pp. 286-287).

Here Hilferding's argument is stated in very curious terms, which are not, however, amplified by explanation. A general cartel such as would abolish crises, he says, is

capitalism,' to create the conditions in which it was able to resume its rapid growth after 1945, and to make possible the development of 'welfare states' and 'mixed economies' " (p. 15). A 50-year period including 20 years of depression asnd world war can hardly be described as an era of "organized capitalism." Roosevelt's New Deal did not succeed in overcoming the crisis, which gave way only to the restructuring of capital accomplished by the war. The Keynesians' claims to responsibility for "saving capitalism" are no longer convincing, as the hastening return to crisis brings with it worldwide stagnation, inflation, harsh international economic competition, and the dismantling of the welfare state. The mixed economy is now revealed to be not a means of overcoming the anarchy of capitalism but a sign of the degree to which the market system no longer functions, without giving birth to a new form of economy. Cf. for example, Paul Mattick *Economic Crisis and Crisis Theory* (White Plains, 1981), chapter 4. (Chapter 3 contains an enlightening critique of *Finance Capital*.)

10. In fact, Hilferding seems to have believed that this had already occurred, at least in Germany, since he states that "even today, taking possession of six large Berlin banks would mean taking possession of the most important spheres of large-scale industry" (p. 368).

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"economically conceivable," but impossible "in social and political terms" because it would intensify the class conflict of interest posed in these terms to an extreme point (p. 297).

What the second part of this idea expresses is to be seen in the passage in which Hilferding describes the tendency to the formation of a general cartel. One result of this outcome would be that property so concentrated would show itself "in direct opposition to the mass of those who possess no capital." The problem of property relations would thus attain "its clearest, most unequivocal, and sharpest expression at the same time as the development of finance capital itself is resolving more successfully the problem of the organization of the social economy" (p. 235). As he makes clear in the last chapter of the book, even the tendency towards this situation can be expected to lead to the political organization of the working class and the seizure of state power by their political representatives. The general cartel, in other words, will be prevented by revolution before its formation would allow the complete organization of the world economy and the abolition of crises. This idea is expressed also in the famous formula that the collapse leading to socialist victory "will be political and social, not economic, for the idea of a purely economic collapse makes no sense" (p. 366).

Economic crisis, then, is a necessity for the system only so long as its remaining degree of anarchy is not overcome, and the limit here is set by the political struggle of the proletariat to take control, by the seizure of the state, of the very mechanism of planning designed by finance capital for its own purpose of social regulation.[11] Economic crisis is ultimately a political and social problem, and not an *economic* one. To understand this idea, we must go into Hilferding's theory of crisis, expounded in a long section of *Finance Capital.*

This brings us to a deeper level of Hilferding's theoretical difficulty, for his analysis of crisis turns out to consist of two different and ultimately incompatible theories. Hilferding is generally considered a "disproportionality" theorist of crisis, and this is in fact the approach on which his analysis rests. In this, Hilferding followed Tugan-Baranowsky's argument on the basis of the reproduction schemata of Volume II of *Capital.* Marx uses these schemata — "from the standpoint of pure economic reasoning, the most brilliant (analyses) in that whole remarkable work" (p. 243), in Hilferding's opinion — to demonstrate that the reproduction of the system requires the maintenance of certain proportions between the part of the economy producing consumer goods and that producing producer goods, so that the former supplies the workers, and the latter the capitalists, of both sectors. Since this is a commodity-producing system, the amounts of each kind of good must be right not only with respect to the use values concerned — means of production and of consumption — but also with respect to their values. Thus, the "complicated relations of proportionality which must exist in production" depend for their maintenance on the price structure which links these sectors and firms together into one system. Since Marx's schemata, according to Hilferding, show "that in capitalist production, both simple reproduction and expanded reproduction can proceed without interruption as long as (the necessary) proportions are maintained," the causes of crisis are to be sought in "distortion(s) of the price structure which (prevent) prices from giving a proper indication of the needs of production" (pp. 256-257).

11. In the words of the 1927 speech: "This means exactly that our generation is set the task of transforming, with the help of the state, with the help of the conscious social regulator, this economy organized and managed by the *capitalists* into an economy managed by the *democratic state.* It follows from this that the problem set for our generation is, can be, nothing but socialism" (*Sozialdemokratischer Parteitag,* p. 169).

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It is in the explanation of such distortions of the price structure that Hilferding invokes a quite different explanation of crisis, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, in Marx's theory due to the decreasing contribution of living labor to the production process "A crisis involves a slump in sales. In capitalist society this presupposes a cessation of new capital investment, which in turn presupposes a fall in the rate of profit. This decline in the rate of profit is entailed by the change in the organic composition of capital, which has taken place as a result of the investment of new capital. A crisis is simply the point at which the rate of profit begins to fall" (p. 256). During a period of prosperity, firms raise their prices, without regard for the value relations between them, as they can, given their conditions of production and control of the market; in the slump they lower or maintain them as they must or can. It is this change in the price structure that disrupts the necessary proportional relations among the branches of production. "Such disturbances. . . eventually lead to a slump in sales" (p. 266), and the breakdown of the reproduction process.

Thus, in Hilferding's eyes, these are not two different theories but complementary parts of one explanation. A falling rate of profit is on his account a "cause" of crisis, while the disproportionalities due to the anarchic character of the market relations provide a "general condition" within which this cause operates. Without the general condition, the effect of the rising organic composition would be a business cycle, but one that would proceed without the disruption of market relations which we call a "crisis." This is why the elimination of crisis by a general cartel is "economically conceivable."

This position has strange implications. One the one hand, we are told that there is a tendency for the rate of profit to fall, and with it for accumulation to grind to a halt. On the other hand, this is described as merely the mechanism whereby tendencies to the disruption of proportional relations between branches of production "assert themselves through competition" and that prices are set so that "if production is carried on in proper proportions," as Marx's reproduction schemata are supposed to have shown they may be, "these relations need not change and no disruption need occur" (p. 261). With this the difficulty in Hilferding's position becomes clear. According to the theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall expounded in *Capital*, accumulation must periodically break down, every recovery serving as prelude to a future collapse. On the other hand, on Hilferding's interpretation of the reproduction schemata, they demonstrate that expanded reproduction, or accumulation, "can proceed without interruption" as long as the requisite proportions between branches of production are maintained. If the first theory is right, the second must be wrong: accumulation *cannot* proceed smoothly if the profit rate falls. Indeed, according to Marx, it is the basic economic process of accumulation itself, and not the anarchy of the market, which produces a tendency to disequilibrium in the relations between firms constituting the social economy.[12]

This theoretical self-contradiction is not Marx's. Marx makes it quite clear that his Volume II schemata have no bearing on the question of the possibility of equilibrated accumulation. They cannot picture equilibrium conditions, e.g., in the sense of modern growth theory, since for Marx there *is no* tendency to equilibrium in capitalism. Their role is, rather, to demonstrate that market (or circulation) phenomena are theoretically subsumable by the phenomena of production: that the expansion of demand and its

12. "The periodical devaluation of the existing capital, which is a means, immanent to the capitalist mode of production, for delaying the fall in the profit rate and accelerating the accumulation of capital value by the formation of new capital, disturbs the given conditions in which the circulation and reproduction process of capital takes place, and is therefore accompanied by sudden stoppages and crises in the production process" (Marx, *op.cit.*, p. 358).

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division between demand for consumer goods and for producer goods is determined by the developmental pattern of accumulation.

Hilferding is, of course, not alone in his misunderstanding of the reproduction schemata. Rosa Luxemburg's is only a particularly distinguished name in a long list. Almost all of the discussion of Marx's solution to the "transformation problem," following the work of Bortkiewicz, is based on this error.[13] It is alive and well today, despite the fact that Grossman had already exposed the mistake in 1932.[14] It lies ultimately in the assimilation of the theory presented in *Capital* to the equilibrium theories of post-classical economics. Thus, the schemata are taken to express something for Marx a *contradictio in terminis*: "equilibrium conditions in the capitalist process of accumulation" (p. 248). Similarly, Marx's theory of value is taken as an equilibrium theory of price — although Marx likens the working of the law of value to that of the law of gravity "when a person's house collapses on top of him."[15] And in fact the problems of Hilferding's crisis theory have their roots in his misunderstanding of the theory of value.

Hilferding's departure from Marx's approach can be seen in his analysis of the turn from prosperity to depression. "Every industrial cycle begins with an expansion of production...which in general can be attributed to the opening of new markets, the establishment of new branches of production, the introduction of new technology, and the expansion of needs resulting from population growth. As demand increases, prices and profits rise...the process becomes general as the expansion of each branch of industry creates a demand for the output of other industries" (p. 258).

However, this expansionary movement is counteracted by the tendency of the profit rate to fall, intensified by rises in the price of labor power, as the labor market tightens, and in the rate of interest. "A crisis begins at the moment when the tendencies toward a falling rate of profit...prevail over the tendencies which have brought about increases in prices and profits, as a result of the rising demand" (p. 261). Similarly, "two conditions are necessary for prosperity to return: first, the restoration of proportionality, which is required in order to bring the depression to an end; and... second, an expansion of production, without which there can be no prosperity" (p. 297). Lest the second of these be taken as a simple tautology, Hilferding expands upon it: once disproportionality is overcome, prosperity can "get under way as soon as technical innovations or new markets generate increased demand" (p. 298).

Taking the (otherwise implausible) distinction between "end of depression" and "prosperity" as corresponding to the distinction between conditions and causes of crisis (or recovery), we have here an image of an expansion of production fueled by an increase of profits due to an expansion of demand. But what is the source of this demand?

As Marx demonstrates in those schemata of Volume II, an increase of demand means exactly an increase in investment — either in labor power, thus providing a market for consumer goods, or in means of production, thus providing a market for new technology, as well as for replacement of the old.[16] But this is nothing but expanded reproduction or accumulation itself. If the crisis ending the previous prosperity was brought on by an insufficiency of profit for accumulation, the new cycle cannot commence until a sufficient level of profitability has been re-established.

13. See my "Some Comments on the Value-Price Problem," pp. 725-781 in *Economies et Sociétés* (Cahiers de l'ISMEA), 15:6-7 (1981).

14. See H. Grossman, "Die Wert-Preis-Transformation bei Marx und das Krisenproblem," pp. 55-84 in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, 1:1 (1932).

15. *Capital*, Vol. I (Penguin, 1976), p. 168.

16. I leave out increased consumption by capitalists. This in any case is dependent on profits.

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That is, the rate of profit must already have increased for the phenomena to which Hilferding ascribes this increase to exist! The "tendencies toward a falling rate of profit" and the "tendencies" bringing about "increases in prices and profits, as a result of rising demand" which Hilferding saw as in conflict with each other, can only be identical. They are not, in Hilferding's eyes, because he treats the expansion of demand, the introduction of new technology, and even the "expansion of needs resulting from population growth" (as if the needs of the existing population had been met during the period of depression) as factors *independent of and alongside the determination of the rate of profit by the law of value*.[17]

For Marx, the same mechanism, the movement of the rate of profit along with the changing composition of capital, explains depression and prosperity. In the form of bankruptcies and forces sales of assets, of the collapse of financial prices and bank failures, capital is devalued. With this, the organic composition falls and profitability rises to a point where accumulation becomes possible. Thus, the crisis is itself a solution to the problem of diminishing profitability. But just as the value relations between commodities are visible only in the form of their prices (which in Marx's conception *must* differ from the values), the movements of the profit rate are visible only in the form of the contraction and expansion of the markets for goods at profit-making prices. What Hilferding has done, in fact, is to confound two levels of description of the process of the business cycle: the theoretical level of value and the empirical level of price phenomena. The former, if it is meaningful at all, must *explain* the latter; phenomena of value and price cannot *interact*. If the rate of profit has been depressed due to a high organic composition, it cannot be raised by an "expansion of production" which itself requires a lowering of the composition.

The problem with Hilferding's crisis theory, therefore, is not so much its divergence from Marx's views, to which in principle one cannot object. It is that Hilferding attempts to combine the Marxian analysis in terms of the labor theory of value with an analysis in terms of the bourgeois categories of "demand," "innovation," etc. It represents — and with this we reach the deepest level of Hilferding's theoretical confusion — an attempt to combine political economy with its critique, a first great effort to produce today's common though oxymoronic hybrid, "Marxist economics." Indeed, Hilferding

17. In this, Hilferding anticipated Ernest Mandel's recent attempt to combine *three* incompatible crisis theories — including Hilferding's — what he terms "mono-causal" explanations of crisis by reference to disproportionalities, to under-consumption, and to the falling rate of profit. His combination of these three explanations into "a correct theory of the capitalist crisis," however, amounts to no more than recognition that the economy, in its cyclical course, displays both disproportionality in investment between the two departments of production and overproduction of consumer goods relative to effective demand, while "the law of the tendency for the average rate of profit to decline is. . . a revelation of the basic mechanism of the industrial cycle as such." Of course, only one of these three explanations can be "basic," but then it is nonsense to describe this as a "multi-causal explanation of capitalist crisis." Committing the same error as Hilferding, violation of the distinction between levels of explanation, Mandel is apparently unaware that he is aiming at an even higher level of eclecticism: since he wants to combine with the falling profit rate theory a theory, Hilferding's, which already includes it! But Mandel is not such a pedant as to worry about accuracy in representing others' theories or in logical reasoning. Having attacked the falling-profit-rate theory for being "an ideological weapon designed to impose the burden of the crisis on the working class" by implying that a lowering of wages, contributing to an improvement in profitability, will help to overcome a crisis — as though the political unpleasantness of a theory implied its falsehood — he accepts the same conclusion himself a few pages later, along with the falling rate of profit argument itself ("a cut in real wages. . . leads to a further rise in the rate of profit"). Of course, denying this would force him to choose between the Scylla of contradicting the text he is introducing (cf. *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 305) and the Charybdis of naming Marx also among the "reformist proponents of class collaboration" (Introduction to *Capital*, Vol. III, pp. 38-53).

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begins *Finance Capital* by claiming a place for it "within the theoretical system of classical political economy which begins with William Petty and finds its supreme expression in Marx" (p. 21). In his critique of Böhm-Bawerk, Hilferding had attacked the new marginalist theory for its abandonment of the classical tradition, and located in the Marxian labor theory of value the long-sought general theory of economics, applicable in principle to any social system, though developed by Marx for the special case of capitalism.

Marx's own view of the matter was quite the opposite of this. Just as he believed in the impossibility of a general theory of history, such as Hilferding also wishes to ascribe to him (p. 23), Marx also believed in the meaninglessness of economic theory in the classical sense beyond the bounds of capitalism. It is for this reason that *Capital* was written as a contribution not to political economy but to its critique. It was precisely the illusion of classical political economy (maintained in post-classical economics), that categories peculiar to modern society — labor, capital, value — could be used to formulate general laws valid for all social systems, that Marx wished to explode.

For Hilferding, however, what is peculiar to capitalism is not the laws of economics, but their *indirect* expression in the exchange relations between goods on the market. (His position is thus similar to those of present-day neo-Marxists who see economic relations as one among many sets of relations that together constitute social relations as a whole.) Hilferding's conception becomes clear if we recall his comparison of the outcome of exchange acts in a market society with the decisions of the central authorities in a consciously planned system. In the second case, the relations of production linking members of society, as producers and as consumers, "are directly manifest as social relations, and the economic relations between individuals can be seen as being determined . . . by social arrangements" (p. 27). In the first case, in contrast, the social relations uniting members of society are "indirect": established through the money-mediated exchange of commodities. It is this which gives economic theory its specific task in the study of capitalism: "to discover the law which governs this type of exchange and regulates the course of production in a commodity producing society, just as the laws, decrees, and directives of the authorities regulate production in a socialist society" (p. 28). This does not mean that economics is limited to the study of the market system and has no meaning for socialism, for the difference between the two systems is only "that in a commodity producing society economic law is not directly imposed on production by the deliverations of human intelligence, but operates in the manner of a natural law" (pp. 366-367). The economic problem, defined by Hilferding as by bourgeois economics generally — "namely, to reveal the functional interdependence of economic actions which makes social life possible" (p. 406, note 18) — must be solved in every system.[18] In socialism it will be solved consciously and directly; in capitalism it is solved mechanically and indirectly, by the exchange of goods in the market.

If market mechanisms therefore represent the domain of *economics* in modern society, its specific *social* character as a *capitalist* system is identified by Hilferding in the institutional separation of production from consumption, that orients production to profits rather than to the satisfaction of needs. The search for profit, that is, is treated as a *non-economic* element. For in "the necessity for existing capital . . . to achieve a certain rate of profit," the "expansion of production encounters a *purely social* barrier, which originates in and is specific to this social structure" (p. 241, emphasis added). It is to this feature of capitalism's social structure rather than to the operation of economic laws

18. Cf. p. 421, note 4, where Hilferding criticizes Tugan-Baranowsky for "taking account only of the economic categories of capitalist production" while overlooking "the natural conditions of production which are common to all systems of production."

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that Hilferding ascribes the crisis tendency of capitalism. "The possibility of crises is implicit in unregulated production, that is to say, in commodity production generally, but it only becomes a real possibility in a system of unregulated production which eliminates the direct relationship between production and consumption characterizing other social formations, and interposes between production and consumption . . . the requirement that capital shall be valorized at a particular rate" (p. 241).

This view explains the conception of crisis as economically unnecessary, though imposed by capitalism's social structure, and also Hilferding's vision of the relation of finance capital to the socialist future.

The growth of cartellization, involving the subordination of market relations to conscious planning, represents a tendency towards the replacement of indirect by direct social relations. This tendency is discovered by Hilferding within the social character of credit transactions, the basis of finance capital itself: "here the material business relationship is always accompanied by a personal relationship, which appears as a direct relationship between members of society. . . namely, what is commonly called 'trust.' In this sense a fully developed credit system is the antithesis to capitalism and represents organization and control as opposed to anarchy" (p. 180).

No doubt, the directors of the Banco Ambrosiano would smile at the naiveté of the young socialist doctor who wrote these words; in any case the principle of honor among thieves is hardly to be elevated to the status of socialist planning in embryo. The same idea, however, is to be discovered in Hilferding's conception of money, on which the theory of credit and finance is constructed, as a "social relationship expressed in the form of an object."[19]

The reason, in Marx's view, for the impossibility of a general theory of economics is that economic categories are not merely representations of social relations in capitalism, but are *required* for the functioning of the system. While the critic of political economy can explain that money serves as a representation of social labor in the abstract, this abstract labor only takes on real existence by the actual exchange of goods and services via money. Of course, individual labor can be integrated into social labor in other ways — "directly," as Hilferding puts it. But then social labor no longer has the specific character that it has under capitalism: the differentia of capitalist production is lost. The "abstract labor" that is the substance of value is not constructed conceptually by abstracting from the properties of concrete labors, but in actuality by the exchange of products on the market.

For Hilferding, in contrast, there is in principle no reason why the social relation represented by money cannot be expressed directly. The social aspect of money — its quality of being the value equivalent of a commodity — finds its palpable expression in the substance used as money, for example, gold. But it can also be expressed, directly, through conscious social regulation, and in particular, since the state is the conscious organ of commodity producing society, by state regulation. Hence, the state can designate any token — for example, a piece of paper appropriately labelled — as a representative of money, a money token (p. 38). With paper money, that is, "a consciously regulated social relationship can take the place of a relationship which is expressed through an object" (p. 38).

This potential becomes realized, Hilferding argues, with the development of finance capital. As the banks come to control the supply of credit essential for the functioning of large-scale industry, all capital tends to be concentrated in the form of money capital, made available to producers only through the banks. "If this trend were to continue, it would finally result in a single bank or group of banks establishing control over the

19. I owe this insight to Cora Stephan, *op.cit.*

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entire money capital" and so "over social production as a whole" (p. 180). This would be the system of the general cartel in which "the whole of capitalist production would... be consciously regulated by a single body which would determine the volume of production in all branches of industry." In this system, since the regulation of production would be carried on directly and consciously, rather than indirectly through the market-price system, "the illusion of the objective value of the commodity would disappear along with the anarchy of production, and money would cease to exist" (p. 234). In fact, the impossibility of this apotheosis of finance capital derives exactly from the transparency of social relations, no longer obscured by their material embodiment in money: in the general cartel "property, concentrated and centralized in the hands of a few giant capitalist groups, manifests itself in direct opposition to the mass of those who possess no capital. The problem of property relations thus attains its clearest, most unequivocal and sharpest expression at the same time as the development of finance capital itself is resolving more successfully the problem of the organization of the social economy" (p. 235).

The barrier to the realization of the general cartel is thus a *political* one; just as there is no economic necessity for crisis, and "the idea of a purely economic collapse makes no sense" (p. 366), so there is a transformation of form but not of economic content involved in the transition from competitive to organized capitalism. It is only that the *indirect* regulation of production by the market is replaced by its *direct* regulation by finance capital. This overcomes the anarchy of production; what remains, however, is the property relation of the owners of capital to the workers they exploit, and it is to the abolition of the relation, embodied in the search for profit, that the socialist movement must direct itself.

Hilferding makes this distinction between socio-political and economic features in different terms in a discussion of national banking legislation. The management of money and credit circulation, he says, affects society as a whole, hence, "there arises a demand to assign this task to the state." This threatens private interests, centered on the profitability of individual firms. Nonetheless, "the social character of the task makes absolutely indispensable the elimination or vigorous curtailment of the profit motive" (p. 387, note 7). Here the profit motive is seen as extraneous to the functioning of the social system, as elsewhere it is identified as a problem of "distribution" rather than of production (p. 234). It is for this reason that Hilferding describes the society ruled by the law of value in Smithian terms as one whose "members are individual proprietors who are compelled by the development of the division of labor to do business with one another" (p. 27). For Marx, in contrast, generalized commodity production and the laws peculiar to it appear only with the development of capitalism. It is the separation of the producers of social wealth from the means of production that transforms their labors into the abstract social labor that is the substance of value. The generalization of the commodity form of the product of labor and the transformation of labor into wage-labor are the same process. Hilferding does recognize that "only capitalist production generalizes commodity production" (p. 240), but he does not draw from this the consequence that the commodity form can be fully understood only in terms of the capital-labor relation. This makes it possible for him to visualize the transformation of capitalism into socialism as involving no more than the abolition of the social and political domination of the capitalists, without the abolition of the economic system proper. The laws of the economy will remain in force, just as the continued validity of the laws of nature makes scientific technology possible: "society as a whole... will then at last subordinate the economy to itself as it has been able to subordinate nature ever since it discovered the laws of motion of the natural world" (p. 367). What once was

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accomplished indirectly, by the play of market forces, is now determined directly, by the socialist state. It is this conception of *political* change, rather than the abolition of economic relations and their laws, as the heart of socialism that lies behind Hilferding's failure to see the necessity of the money form. The unsatisfactory nature of his theory of money is due, in Stephan's words, to the fact that he is really aiming "not at a theory of money but at a theory of the state, that he writes state theory as money theory."[20]

What is this theory of the state? In brief, it is the idea, basic to the bourgeois conception of state and civil society, that the state is an agency or structure of "social control" which may be conceptualized independently of other determinants of social life. Since, for Marx, the modern "state" and "economy" can themselves exist as distinct forms of social relations only on the basis of the classs relation specific to capitalism, the goal of the proletarian struggle, the abolition of wage labor, implies the abolition of the state.[21] For Hilferding, however, "the ultimate political goal" of his movement is "the conquest of state power" (p. 368). The principle of socialism, as he expanded on this at the 1927 Congress, "is exactly to consider the running of plants and the economy as the business of society, and society has no other organ for their conscious control than the state." This is clear, also, because "the essential element of the modern state is the *parties*" which represent the only medium through which individuals can act on the social level.[22]

Given this, it is finance capital itself, by its organization of the circulation process, that brings socialism within reach: "Once finance capital has brought the most important branches of production under its control, it is enough for society, through its conscious executive organ — the state conquered by the working class — to seize finance capital in order to gain immediate control of these branches of production.... Even today, taking possession of six large Berlin banks would mean taking possession of the most important spheres of large-scale industry, and would greatly facilitate the initial phases of socialist policy during the transition period, when capitalist accounting might still prove useful" (pp. 367-368).

It is easy to understand the appeal of this vision to such as Lenin, who imagined socialism on the model of the German postal service. In fact, Hilferding's description of the general cartel is a striking anticipation of party-state run systems that today claim to be the embodiment of socialism. At the end of his life, Hilferding drew back in horror from the "totalitarian state economy" of the Soviet Union and National Socialist Germany. But the fact that he had nowhere to draw back to but the free market without which there is no freedom at all demonstrates cruelly the extent to which Stalin's and Hitler's regimes represented realizations — however caricatured — of Hilferding's concept of socialism.[23]

20. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

21. "The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labor is pumped out of the direct producers determines the relationship of domination and servitude, as this grows directly out of production itself and reacts back on it in turn as a determinant. On this is based the entire configuration of the economic community arising from the actual relations of production, and hence also its specific political form. It is in each case the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the immediate producers... in which we find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social edifice, and hence also the political form of the relationship of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the specific form of state in each case" (Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 927).

22. *Sozialdemokratischer Parteitag*, pp. 170-171.

23. Cf. Hilferding, "State Capitalism or Totalitarian State Economy," in *Modern Review*, 1:1 (1947). It is quite striking that leftist intellectuals in opposition to the party dictatorships of the East can generally imagine no alternative to them in the economic sphere other than the re-introduction of the market — even at a time, like the present, when the market system is visibly entering into a

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It is the last decades' revival of social-democratic ideology and activity, as much as its inherent interest as a work of theory, that gives *Finance Capital* particular relevance to socialists in today's "late capitalism." The Leninist mummies raised from the dead by the New Left of the sixties seem by and large to have returned to their tombs. Aside from those who are temporarily inactive and the large numbers of non-party, anti-parliamentary direct activists visible all over Europe, leftists seem to be increasingly orienting themselves to various versions of social democracy, from the European ecologist parties and left factions within the official Second International parties — Eurocommunism represents another aspect of the same phenomenon — to the DSA and its ilk in the United States.

It is striking how many of the ideas of these currents were anticipated by Hilferding. In his speech to the Kiel Congress, for instance, he defended electoral democracy as, along with trade unionism, the main arena of social struggle; spoke of the centrality of "economic and workplace democracy" as socialist goals, part and parcel of the fight to use the state "as means to the control and mastery of the economy in the general interest" against the special interests of the monopolies and big business; attacked pacifism for its "unrealistic" goals and called for a socialist defense policy; proclaimed the need to build alliances with the non-socialist center. Only the concluding phrases of this speech would be unlikely today: "We know the way, we know the goal. When we fight under the slogan: *true* to the socialist principle, *unmoveable* from the goal of the seizure of state power, but with *freedom of movement* for our tactics, then the possibility of victory will become the reality of victory."[24]

It would be unlikely because social democracy no longer even appears as the representative of an international movement of the working class in struggle for the transformation of society. Marxism, in particular, has become a specialization of intellectuals, not the ideology of a mass movement. Were such words to be spoken today, however, they would be even more pathetic than Hilferding's claims in the body of the speech appear to our hindsight. The ever-increasing rationalization of capitalism by finance capital led to the Great Depression and World War II, the victory over fascism due to social-democratic participation in the Prussian government was followed by the destruction of the party, including Hilferding, at the hands of the Nazis. A repetition of this scenario, *mutatis mutandis*, today might be farce from the viewpoint of the world spirit, and the revival of social-democratic ideology in the absence of a working-class movement is certainly farcical enough, but the tragedy promised by the coming depression and the threat of a world war fought with nuclear weapons far outshadows the debacle in which Hilferding lost his life. To the struggle to avert this tragedy, abstract theory no doubt has little to contribute. What we can learn, however, even from a study of this 70-year-old book, is the inner connection of wage labor, commodity production, and the bourgeois state, which must be destroyed together if we are to escape the consequences of any of them.

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crisis on a world scale. A counterpart to this is the inability of the totalitarian systems to abandon, as Hilferding thought the general cartel would, commodity relations as mediator between rulers and exploited.

24. *Sozialdemokratischer Parteitag*, p. 184. It is worth noting that this conclusion of a speech devoted in large part to an attack on Bolshevism could well have been uttered by Lenin himself.

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Miklás Haraszti, *A Worker in a Workers' State*, Penguin, (New York, 1977).
György Moldova, *A Szent Tehén*, Magvetö Könyvkiadó (Budapest, 1980).

As a young Hungarian economist noted, "Were you to compare the samizdat work with what appears in the regular journals, often you would have trouble noticing a difference." And certainly in Hungary today, the line between criticism and dissent is a thin one — so thin, in fact, that an author can frequently write more piercing social commentary remaining within "permissible" bounds than going beyond them.

The works of Miklós Haraszti and György Moldova are illustrative in this regard. Both write within a well-established Hungarian tradition of sociography, a genre that shades off into realistic fiction while also broaching empirical sociology. Its early, nineteenth-century contributors include not only anthropologists like Ferenc Erdei, Sándor Fényes, and Béla Bosnyák, but also some of Hungary's major poets and novelists, such as Gyula Krúdy, Zsigmond Móricz, and Endre Ady.[1] Contemporaries run from Gyula Illyés,[2] the "grand old man" of Hungarian letters, to younger writers of the 1970s like Zsolt Csalog, Sándor László-Bencsik, Gábor Csako, and György Berkovits.[3] The writers appearing in the current "Discover Hungary" series (Aliz Mátyús, Miklós Miskolczi, and Ferenc Halmos, to name but a few)[4] put out by Szépirodalmi Press are thus merely the most recent additions to a long and well-respected sociographical tradition.

Animating Hungarian sociography is a commitment to recording the details and events of everyday life — in the workplace, the home, the village, the city — as they are experienced by ordinary people. Insofar as sociography necessarily involves comparing the reality of the world with the aspirations and hopes of the actors within it (not to mention the ideological claims made on its behalf), it is implicitly a critical literature as well. Not surprisingly, it is a popular genre in both samizdat and published Hungarian literature, of which Haraszti and Moldova respectively are archetypical cases.

Both authors chose modern industry as their subject, and each has written a popularized and highly critical account of factory life in contemporary Hungary. Haraszti's 1972 work, *Darabbér (translated into English under the title A Worker in a Workers' State)*, is told in the first person and describes the author's experiences in the ill-fated Vörös Scillag tractor plant. Moldova's most recent book, *A Szent Tehén (The Sacred Cow)*, examines day-to-day life in the Hungarian textile industry, based on interviews and plant visits; earlier Moldova works covered similar themes in the railroad and mining industries.[5] Both writers judge the practices they witnessed harshly, and both paint particularly damning pictures of industrial life and working conditions among manual workers.

1. See the collection, *A Válóság vonzásában*, intro. by Erno Gondos (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadö, 1963).

2. See his widely translated *People of the Puszta* (Budapest: Corvina, 1966).

3. See Csalog's *Kilenc cigany* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1976) and *Parasztregény* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1977) on rural life in Hungary; László-Bencsik's *Történelem alulnézethöl* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1974) treats the life of a workers' brigade in the 50s and 60s; Czako's *Idulatos jelentések* (Budapest: Szepirodalmi, 1973) deals with the problems of adolescents and Berkovits' *Világváros határában* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1976) describes life in the suburbs of Budapest.

4. The Mátyús volume, *Holnapon innen, Tegnapon túl* (1981), portrays the work and life-styles of female textile workers. Miskoczi's *Város lesz, azért is* is an account of Dunaújváros, the city created in the 1950s to house Hungary's largest steel mill, while the Halmos work, *Illó alázattal* (1981), recounts the work experiences of a self-taught machinist.

5. See *Akit a mozdony füstje megcsapott* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1977) on the railroads; *Tisztelet Komlónak* (Budapest: Magvetö, 1971) describes life in a mining community.

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Haraszti, however, never saw *A Workers' State* published in Hungary; in fact, he was brought to trial in 1973 and awarded a stiff if suspended sentence for simply circulating the book in manuscript form. The effect of the trial was to raise Haraszti from relative obscurity to the ranks of the most prominent Hungarian dissidents while making *A Workers' State* one of the most celebrated unpublished manuscripts in the country.

Moldova, in contrast, is currently one of Hungary's leading writers, and his work is in great demand among publishers and public alike; indeed, the entire 100,000 copy edition of *Sacred Cow* was sold out within a few days of its appearance in bookstores. Moreover, it is precisely the exceptional sharpness of Moldova's satire and the muckraking quality of his reportage that account for his extraordinary popularity. In this sense, his writing is perhaps more indicative of what "can" be published than of what often is published as sociography today. Yet Moldova is as "legitimate" as he is popular: for example, his early, loosely autobiographical novel, *Sötét angyal (Dark Angel)*,[6] focussing on the experiences of a young participant in the '56 revolt who refuses to accept the regime and the society created in its aftermath, is one of a handful of postwar novels put out by Hungary's Corvina Press in foreign translation — despite its rather dubious literary value and politically sensitive theme.

Clearly, shifts in the political climate and the authors' respective personal associations and previous activities are important in explaining the contrasting fates of Haraszti and Moldova. Cultural policy hardened in Hungary in 1972, and Haraszti fell victim to the changed line. Nor was the selection of Haraszti as a test case arbitrary: in Hungary, as elsewhere in East Europe, who says what is typically as important as what is said. Haraszti himself was a relatively minor figure in the Hungarian new left and student movement that emerged in the late 1960s. Hence he was young and of insufficient prominence for his prosecution to provoke too widespread a domestic or international outcry. Prior to writing *A Workers' State*, he had published poetry of a Maoist tinge; one of his poems, "The Errors of Ché," was singled out for criticism in 1969 by the party press as an example of the "leftism . . . fashionable among a (narrow) circle of our young intellectuals..., and which is in danger of spreading its influence...Its supporters demand 'democracy without compromise' and preach 'revolutionary asceticism.' "[7]

Haraszti's trial was in large part a symbolic one: hence the suspended sentence. It was the only trial of its sort to take place in the last decade and was intended as a warning to the wider, loosely-knit group of left-wing intellectuals clustered around the Lukács school of Hungarian sociology and philosophy with whom Haraszti was associated. To make its point absolutely clear in this respect, the government called some of the group's most illustrious members as witnesses for the prosecution (!); among them were György Konrad,[8] András Hegedüs,[9] and Iván Szelényi.[10]

6. (Budapest: Corvina Press, 1969).

7. The French edition of Haraszti's book, *Salaire aux pieces*, (Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1976) contains both the poem and the criticism as well as an abridged transcript of the trial.

8. Author of *The Case Worker* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1974) and *The City Builder* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1977). Both volumes were published in Hungary prior to their appearance in the West.

9. Hegedüs was an important political leader prior to 1956, and even served a brief term as prime minister in 1955. Later, he headed the Hungarian Sociological Institute, and in that capacity, wrote *The Structure of Socialist Society* (London: Constable, 1977) and other studies of social stratification.

10. Szelényi was a leading sociologist at the time. He subsequently co-authored *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1979) with Konrad. The book was never published in Hungary.

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Although, prior to 1973, all these intellectuals were publishing in Hungary itself, one of the trial's consequences was to make it literally impossible for their work to continue to appear in established Hungarian literary and social science journals. In addition, the Sociological Institute, an institutional outpost of new left sociology, was dissolved in 1974. Ironically, however, and perhaps indicative of the continuing "thinness" of the line between criticism and dissent in Hungary, several of its members subsequently found employment in the party's very own institute of sociology.

As for Moldova, if *Dark Angel* is any indication, his political background is hardly lily-white (or flaming red, to be more correct) either: the protagonist of the novel spent two years in reform school for distributing "counter-revolutionary" leaflets in 1957. Nowadays, however, Moldova cultivates the image of the solitary writer; unlike dissidents, he shies away from publicity and is not openly associated with any explicitly political currents within the Hungarian intelligentsia. He attributes his appearance in print to the sponsorship of György Kardos, the general director of Magvetö Press, willing to defend the publication of controversial work he judges to be of sufficient quality.[11].

Nevertheless, changing political winds, personal associations, and individual political histories are not the sole factors distinguishing criticism from dissent in Hungary. However more rigorous cultural policy became in the 1970s, Hungarian literature, film, and social science scarcely became a mouthpiece of the regime. If some of those active in the new left and/or associated with the Lukács school emigrated abroad, many remained in Hungary and continue to write and publish. As for previous political activities, between the scope of the '56 events and the breadth of the 1960s student movement, there are few intellectuals in Hungary today with an unscathed past. Without denying the importance of ad hoc and ad hominem factors, then, one must turn to the contents of critical and dissenting works themselves to find the real key to what differentiates one from the other, as a comparison of Moldova's *Sacred Cow* and Haraszti's *A Workers' State* demonstrates all too clearly.

Significantly, the difference is not that dissident literature necessarily presents a more negative picture of Hungarian life. If anything, Moldova's description of the textile industry is bleaker than Haraszti's account of conditions at Vörös Csillag. Where Haraszti merely poses the worker's central question, "How to earn a living wage?" for Moldova the answer is a foregone conclusion; *Sacred Cow* opens with the line, "Where the textile industry develops, there poverty remains." Moreover, Haraszti hardly "revealed" a situation unknown to the general public or that either the government or the party wished to defend. The mismanagement, low labor morale, and financial losses of Vörös Csillag had been notorious throughout Hungary for years. Soon after Haraszti's stay, they became so compelling that the firm received the singular distinction of being the only Hungarian enterprise in postwar history to be dissolved. In contrast, Moldova's examination of the textile industry took place in the wake of a well-publicized, special priority modernization program (thus, the book's title). But far from showing great improvements, *Sacred Cow* presents a picture of ongoing waste, inefficiency, and disorganization.

11. Nor does the story end here. Haraszti apparently wrote *A Workers' State* initially under a contract with Magvetö Press, but when he submitted the finished manuscript, it was personally rejected by Kardos himself. According to an editor at Magvetö, the grounds for the rejection were literary and aesthetic: "Haraszti is not a writer, he is a polemicist and a propagandist." Haraszti, of course, feels the motivation was political. By Haraszti's account, it was Kardos who turned the manuscript over to the police, having told Haraszti, "Not even the worst enemies of socialism have gone so far."

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Ironically, whereas Haraszti's portrayal of life in a machine plant relies on comparing socialism in practice with socialism in theory — and thus constitutes a critique from the left — Moldova draws a rather unfavorable comparison between the current day textile industry and a highly idealized version of its capitalist predecessor. If Haraszti argues that industrial life is not better under socialism, Moldova suggests it may well be worse. Leo Goldberger, the prewar proprietor of a now state-owned textile plant, emerges in *Sacred Cow* as a dynamic, entrepreneurial hero, as determined to produce first-rate textiles as he is to make money doing it. Whether negotiating with government officials for special benefits, raising capital, installing new technology, or attending to his labor force, Goldberger is in command of the situation. The result, according to Moldova, is a well-run and competitive business operation with diligent, trained employees who are loyal to the firm and the trade.

Modern management, in contrast, finds its craftsmanship and initiative buried under a pile of bureaucratic controls and political restrictions in a trade whose relative prestige and salary scales dropped dramatically with the postwar emphasis on heavy industry. Executives bemoan their lack of discretion ("Decisions can require the signatures of 90 people, 85 of whom have not the slightest idea of the issues involved."[12]) and the rigidities of the procedures they must follow (dyes, for example, must be "ordered when it is still impossible to estimate what we need [so of course] the firm is incapable to adapting to buyers' needs on time."[13]). Machines stand idle for lack of mechanics or parts with which to repair them; designers create patterns which are filed away and forgotten; workers don't even know the name of the enterprise director ("Once he came around, after an accident. I for one never saw him again."[14]). Working conditions are often unsafe and unhealthy, and "the trade union only knows how to say thank you."[15] A chronic labor shortage makes it difficult to attract and retain qualified personnel at all levels, thereby making workloads heavier and hours longer for those who remain. Turnover and absenteeism are high, maintaining discipline a thankless task in the absence of effective incentives and sanctions ("Punish him [for not coming in on the night shift]? I'll be happy if he shows up tomorrow to do his regular job."[16]).

Nor does the situation improve moving up the industrial hierarchy. The supervising ministry itself found its wishes thwarted when a local party organization insisted on naming its own man — a former city party secretary with no knowledge or experience of textile production whatsoever — to be the director of a brand new, ultra-modern knitwear enterprise. The plant rapidly acquired a national reputation for its mismanagement and losses. And although the local party could install its favorite son as general director, it was quite helpless when the two assistant directors on whose expertise it had counted decided to quit and move elsewhere.

In short, although Entrepreneurial Heroism may have marked the textile industry under capitalism, there is no heroism at all in modern socialism. As Moldova presents it, the rules of the system barely permit individuals to perform routine tasks, let alone undertake the kind of individual action out of which heroism is born. The Leo Goldbergers of prewar days are no longer in command but neither, it appears, is anyone else. Formal rules impersonally regulate human behavior; the result is neither repression nor sacrifice but simple, undramatic frustration. No one is a hero, no one is a martyr, and everyone is a victim.

12. *A Szent tehen*, p. 530.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 134.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 309.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 336.

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"Everyone is not a victim" in *A Workers' State*, however, as Haraszti himself observed. On the contrary, there is great scope for individual initiative and someone ("Them") is very much in command all the time. Nevertheless, there is no heroism in *A Workers' State* either — only a deep-rooted and all-pervasive hypocrisy.

Where Moldova focusses on how the rules frustrate the ability of individuals to simply do their daily jobs, Haraszti shows the techniques and strategies available to accomplish personal objectives within a nominally impersonal system. Whether it is the gypsy who joins the party to sleep with an enterprise secretary, quality controllers cooking sausage during work hours, foremen playing favorites with subordinates, or workers doing private work on company machines, individual action is the name of the game in *A Workers' State*.

Certainly, the same regulations workers and executives complain of in *Sacred Cow* govern Haraszti's Vörös Csillag. But whereas the rules comprise the essence of industrial life in Moldova's account, for Haraszti it is the systematic violation and negation of the rules that constitute the key to the Hungarian industrial system. Thus, Haraszti dutifully learns the safety regulations of Vörös Csillag during his apprenticeship merely to find that output targets can be met only by completely ignoring them in practice: "A piece-rate worker does not earn money just by working, but rather because he works without observing the regulations."[17]

Nevertheless, one's ability to abuse the rules for one's own benefit is contingent on one's position within the industrial hierarchy: in a system whose practical operation is based on the principle "everyone is on his own,"[18] the resources each one disposes of at the outset are a critical determinant of what she/he winds up with in the end. And here workers are at the bottom, as evidenced by hundreds of petty incidents ("The clerk who works in the foreman's office doesn't earn a lot of money, because she is a clerk, and because she is a woman. But she can send for me, pass on orders from the chief, do me favors, or discriminate against me...In the factory, everyone who is not a worker has the institutionalized possibility and opportunity to humiliate the workers...The opposite is not true."[19]) and even in the very language of the factory itself. In the plant, the answer to the hotly debated question, "Who is a worker in socialist society?" is immediately transparent: he who speaks of "Them" ("...this *Them* transcends the walls of the factory and encompasses...everything which is above, far away, outside the power of whoever is speaking."[20]) is invariably a worker, those who say "us" (" 'we have made it our aim...our objective is,' or '...we decided...we achieved...' etc."[21]) participate in and identify with power.

But it is in the determination of wages, the all-important piece rates, that the worker's position is most clearly revealed, according to Haraszti. Here, one can earn a little more or a little less, but one can never beat the norm, the quintessence of the system. Determined by nonmanual cadres, its purpose is "the maintenance of our wages...at a level which has been predetermined"[22] all the while keeping alive the illusion that the worker reaches his wage and output levels "voluntarily," thanks to his own efforts. For if he works quickly, time rates are cut; if "profit-sharing" is introduced, opportunities for overtime are reduced; if automated equipment is installed, work loads are increased. The norm, for Haraszti, is the symbol of a system that does everything to workers in the name of workers so that the product of their labor can serve those who are not workers. The problem, then, is not merely that the system is hypocritical; hypocrisy *is* the system.

17. *A Workers' State*, p. 44.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 131.

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Where the picture Moldova presents suggests socialist industry simply does not, and perhaps cannot, perform, Haraszti argues that it performs very well indeed — providing one is not a worker. He thereby attributes a degree of intentionality, even malice to an anonymous and unspecified "Them" that is quite lacking from the Moldova account. On the one hand, this is what made *A Workers' State* into a politically unacceptable manuscript; on the other, it is the book's greatest weakness as both literature and sociology.

That is, workers are just as alienated in Moldova's textile industry as they are at Haraszti's Vörös Csillag; the working conditions are just as bad, if not worse, the accident rate as high, the management as distant. In fact, one could come to the same conclusions Haraszti came to in *A Workers' State* reading *Sacred Cow*. But one can come to other conclusions as well: there is no deus ex machina manipulating everything, as in Haraszti's book, but an ambiguous reality the reader is left to interpret. Certainly, one can take a worker's complaint to Moldova as to the low upper limits on his pay as evidence that wage levels are : "predetermined" as Haraszti says. And one can also interpret it as a product of egalitarian wage policies that deprive an equally frustrated management of a way to motivate and reward workers. Likewise, one can explain the 70-hour week put in by *Sacred Cow's* "overtime queen" by the system's clever ability to exploit her needs. But, alternatively, it may be the very same system's insistence on full employment that makes it impossible for the plant to find additional workers to relieve her.

The point here is not that one or another analysis is correct, but simply that a space must be left for the reader to judge if the work itself is to be valid. The writer presents and thereby structures reality, but reality itself is ambiguous and must remain so. If not, aesthetic distance is destroyed and one is left holding a political tract, not a work of literature. This is precisely the problem with Haraszti's otherwise very valid manuscript: its purpose is ultimately to unmask the system, not to present reality. As a consequence, the reader comes to suspect the integrity of the reportage itself, almost as if Haraszti were "using" his material for purposes it was not meant to serve. For example, most of Moldova's criticisms are not made by the author at all, but by the various employees in the industry he talked with: reality, in effect, is left to speak for itself. Haraszti occasionally quotes workers or other figures too, but typically in the context of discussing his own reactions, thus taking the words of others as evidence for the highly specific argument he is making.

Haraszti thus presents contemporary socialism in essentially manichean terms: Evil is equated with the status quo while Good is left as an undefined alternative. One may agree or disagree with him, but in neither case can one really acquire any deeper insight or understanding of the author's reality — the only explanation allowed is the Evil attributed to the deus ex machina, be it called "Them," a "New Ruling Class," "Communist Totalitarianism," or whatever. At the same time, the deus ex machina quality that makes *A Workers' State* — along with much other dissident writing — ultimately unsatisfying as literature is the main source of its notoriety as a political document: the same manicheanism making it politically inadmissible in the East gave it all too warm a welcome in the West.

The problem here is not, then, that the "official" condemnation of Haraszti's book as "not literature, not art" is correct — much less than it was the real reason for Magvetö Press's rejection of the manuscript. True, *A Workers' State* is not A Great Work of Art, but neither is *Sacred Cow* a Hungarian equivalent of *Germinal*. Meanwhile, Haraszti certainly produced a publishable manuscript, one which in fact is more informative and

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makes much better reading than many other books of the same genre that have appeared in Hungary and thus presumably satisfy the exacting aesthetic standards of Hungarian publishers. Moreover, not even in the Soviet Union, let alone Hungary, do authors stand trial merely for writing bad books. In sum, Haraszti's work was rejected on political, not aesthetic grounds: as noted above, *A Workers' State* simply went beyond the bounds of the permissible.

The real difficulty, however, is that the official condemnation of Haraszti's book is not wrong, either: the book *does* polemicize; it does not "imitate reality," to use Aristotle's terms, but instead levels an a priori accusation against "Them" and marshalls reality to back it up. Ironically, the manichean stance Haraszti assumes actually hinders the reader from understanding social reality much in the same way the partisans of Socialist Realism once did. Indeed, at the extreme, one approach is merely the mirror image of the other: rather than selfless, dedicated leaders and workers, sacrificing and striving together for the realization of Socialism, we now find cynical, self-serving rulers exploiting equally cynical and alienated masses for their own narrow benefit. In both cases, reality is nothing but a subjective reflection of the intentions attributed to a mystified Ruling Elite rather than an objective, ambiguous set of circumstances, valid in their own terms. But it is only by gaining insight into the latter that one is able to understand how a given social reality "might" be different. Paradoxically, by insisting on going beyond the permissible, Haraszti quite unintentionally lends a certain plausibility to the criticism of precisely those he accuses at the same time that his subjectivism undermines just the kind of inquiry he presumably seeks to advance.

And herein lies the profound dilemma of the dissident writer in Eastern Europe today. Given the international political context within which he writes and given the rather wide limits of the "permissible" in a country like Hungary, nowadays the writer must frequently choose between being either a dissident or a writer; the days in which one could be — practically by definition — both have become increasingly rare. Liberalization has effectively forced dissident literature to acquire much of the "over-political" quality previously characterizing regime writers; the dissident writer must literally proclaim his disagreement so loudly that the aesthetic and/or scientific objectivity of his work suffers as a result. All in all, for the East European writer who wishes to maintain a critical stance yet uphold his aesthetic integrity, liberalization is as much a problem as a blessing.

Ellen Turkish Comisso

Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, Hans Spier, eds. *Propaganda and Communication in World History.* The University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu, 1979. Vol. I, 631 pages. Vol. II, 561 pages. Vol. III, 562 pages. $75.00 the set.

Although communication has been long in development, the "communication revolution" is a modern prodigy.[1] Propaganda has been around almost as long as communication, but became a revolutionary force only through the "communication

1. Taking 1975 as a base point, Daniel Lerner has calculated the proximate ages and stages of this revolution: print, 500 years; film, 100 years; radio, 50 years; television, 20 years; satellites, 10 years. In spite of the fact that the effect of the invention of movable type in the West was genuinely revolutionary, the emergence of print as a social institution did not occur until the "penny press" — the first of the "mass" media — became a social force in the 19th century.

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revolution." As Lasswell wrote in 1939: "This is the Age of Propaganda. Popular discovery of propaganda was made in the World War of 1914-1918."[2] World War I inaugurated a new era of "crisis politics" in Europe, resulting in Communism in Russia, fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany, Falangism in Spain, and a multitude of anti-democratic movements around the world. This process of crisis politics was accelerated after World War II, which saw the fall of the European empires and the emergence of new nations beyond Europe.

In 1954 at Columbia, Paul Lazarsfeld argued that the comparative study of communication systems required a clarification of the role of the mass media in international communication, attention to the role of oral transmission of communication materials, and an examination of the nature of public opinion and the opinions influenced by the circulation of news. But more to the point is the context within which they understood their task: "The impetus to undertaking the study of communications processes on a worldwide basis at the present time stems perhaps more from needs deriving from the world political situation than from purely scholarly interests. The whole program of such comparative communications really reflects a rather general trend in American operations abroad. While it is inappropriate to talk about an American empire, it is entirely in place to discuss the large and growing sphere of American influence. In this regard, a comparison with the British Empire suggests itself. The British Empire was based on an elaborate colonial administration where the civil servants came face to face with the local population. . . in the American sphere of influence there is little face to face contact with the local population. Whatever influence is exercised has to be established largely by remote control — propaganda and information services. It can be predicted, therefore, that international communications research will be a natural concomitant of the current American situation in world politics."[3]

In the same year at Stanford, Lasswell and Lerner became respectively senior consultant and research director of a project on "the world revolution of our time." This project was also comparative, but its focus was "to fill the great void in our knowledge of the historical contexts from which our present preoccupation with propaganda and communication evolved." Speier, who emigrated from Germany to the U.S. in 1933, worked for the FCC and the Office of War Information during World War II and was then director of the social science division at the Rand Corporation, joined Lasswell and Lerner in 1967. Over the quarter century between the initiation of their project and the multi-volume publication of its results in *Propaganda and Communication in World History* the editors lived through changes in venue but not of purpose. They also witnessed the creation of that world communication network that Lazarsfeld saw developing through the political expansion of American operations abroad.

Adhering to the customary distinction between communication as an incisive process and propaganda as deliberately manipulated communication, the editors of *Propaganda and Communication in World History* specify propaganda as a "deliberate effort to influence outcomes of controversy in favor of a preference" (I, p. 5), i.e., propaganda is differentiated from the deliberate transmission of information. Moreover, when they speak of "communication as ends and means" and emphasize political power outcomes and when they state specifically their goal of shedding light on

2. Harold D. Lasswell and Dorothy Blumenstock, *World Revolutionary Propaganda: A Chicago Study* (New York and London, 1939), p. 3.

3. Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Charles Y. Glock, "The Comparative Study of Communications Systems," unpublished paper on file at the Library Service Library, Columbia University.

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"the role of the common man as both subject and object of manipulation" (I, p. 9), they are concerned primarily with the "prevalence of propaganda."

Recognizing the place of technology in the history of propaganda and communication, the editors indicate nevertheless that communication is embedded in forms of social and territorial organization in the widest sense. They are concerned with the socio-historical functions of communication and the requirements for popular participation in the community's political life, with the modern political public and with public opinion as a force in political life: "When, where, why did communication — the exchange of subjective meaning, an exclusive ability of *Homo sapiens* — become the mass media?" (I, p. 19). They acknowledge that "technology is the history of man's learning to rearrange his environment" (I, p. 16), yet they also ask: "how can we rearrange the environment created by communication technology and reshape it to satisfy the human values needed by the people?" (I, p. 20).

In the Preface the editors indicate that the literature dealing with the historical context from which our present preoccupation with communication and propaganda evolved is barren save for a 1929 book by Wilhelm Bauer, *Public Opinion in World History*.[4] Although this book antedated the rise of Nazism and its "propaganda state," the subsequent "psychological war" in World War II, and the Cold War, it is regrettable that the editors did not provide a synopsis of it since it complements their own endeavors and remains a paradigm for the study of the history of communication and propaganda. In fact, Bauer's book can be taken as the starting point for a critical analysis of *Propaganda and Communication in World History*. Different from these volumes, Bauer's book is systematic, it focuses on politics in the evolution and economics in the revolution of communication, and it leaves no doubt that capitalist was the initiator of the modern communication revolution.

The titles of the individual volumes indicate the changing focus of investigation from Asia to the West to a global perspective: *The Symbolic Instrument in Early Times*; *Emergence of Public Opinion in the West*; *A Pluralizing World in Formation*. The theoretical model that guided the plan of all three volumes emphasizes a dual concern with the temporal order and with formal and technical analysis. There is a broad historical continuity linking the three volumes, although each volume stands on its own. The first is more historically cohesive; the second comes closer to the heart of the matter; the third raises more questions than it answers. The end result is regrettably less than one might expect owing to the editors' individual concerns and methodological predilections. It is, of course, next to impossible for 50 scholars to achieve the same unity of purpose as one, but not even the thread of public opinion holds these volumes together. Needed is an analytical introduction by one or all of the editors drawing the various theoretical and empirical strands together into some kind of consistent statement and conclusion. What does tie these volumes together — propaganda and "symbolic" communication — is conceptually weak and historically problematic.

Although the study of communication and propaganda should be complementary, Lasswell's "Age of Propaganda" dominates consideration of the past, the present and the future in these volumes. The upshot determines the expository mode. The historical context is ideational rather than institutional; the analytical focus is on "traditional societies" and current modernization theories that tend to explain everything and nothing rather than on economic and social regularities and the relation between ideas

4. Wilhelm Bauer, *Die öffentliche Meinung in der Weltgeschichte* (Wildpark-Potsdam, 1929). See also, by the same author, *Die öffentliche Meinung und ihre geschichtlichen Grundlagen* (Tübingen, 1914); and *Der Krieg und die öffentliche Meinung* (Tübingen, 1915).

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and the power structure. For example, the role of religion is given its due — Judaism by diaspora, Christianity by propaganda, Buddhism by transfer, Islam by conquest. But there is no attempt to discover a "uniformity of coexistence" between the institutional order (including the power structure) and religious thought.[5] Ideas, propagandistic or otherwise, do not exist in a vacuum as they do in most of these articles. We are treated to fascinating facts without the institutional foundations that make them meaningful in terms of the history of communication. Not only is capitalism virtually ignored as the context within which the modern communication revolution occurred and is still progressing, there is scarcely a mention of feudalism as the context for the development of public opinion in Western medieval societies and no mention of "Oriental despotism" or "hydraulic society" as the context of communication and propaganda in the great river valley empires of the ancient East.

The more fundamental issue here is the stress on "symbolic" communication. The editors state that the uniqueness of human communication as a mode of interaction lies in the employment of signs to mediate subjective events: "a sign is therefore a sound (or some other physical event) that is elicited by a subjective (symbolic) event or that elicits a subjective (symbolic) event" (I, p. 4). The most familiar being a word that connects sound with sense or meaning, the editors note word equivalents: pictures, monuments, drumbeats, and other objects or events such as marches, state funerals and public executions. This seemingly defined observation is, however, turned into a methodological principle determining the whole range of perceptions from early times to retrospects and prospects of "the symbolic instrument." At the outset, Margaret Mead's article "Continuities in Communication from Early Man to Modern Times" illustrates the limitations of this approach in revealing the historical context of the body politic. A. Leo Oppenheim makes the distinction between organizational (i.e., bureaucratic) and sign-producing (i.e., symbolic) communication (I, p. 111), and although he concentrates on the latter the distinction is crucial to an understanding of what is at issue here — concentration on the subjective or symbolic aspects of communication to the exclusion of the objective or structural aspects. Only when both aspects of communication — the structural and the symbolic — are considered together can the role of propaganda and public opinion be fully comprehended. Apart from the structural foundation, the symbolic instrument would still be searching for its place in history.

In the first volume, primarily to the great river valley empires of the ancient East, the stress is on similar aspects of a type of society never identified nor correlated, although its political manifestation and indeed its institutional structure have been known long before the emergence of classical Greece. The political economy of these Oriental or "hydraulic" societies required the organization of quick locomotion and intelligence and compelled the government to maintain centers of direction and coordination in all major regions of production.[6] Different from the typical feudal state, which established its authority only over a limited "royal domain" and a number of royal towns, the hydraulic regime placed its administrators and officers in all major settlements, which virtually everywhere assumed the character of government-controlled administrative and garrison towns. The bureaucratic power structure of Oriental despotism was further bulwarked by astronomy, record-keeping, "public works" and perhaps most

5. Karl A. Wittfogel, "Ideas and the Power Structure," in *Approaches to Asian Civilizations,* edited by William Theodore de Bary and Ainslee T. Embree (New York and London, 1964), pp. 86-97.

6. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven, 1959), pp. 27-59.

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significantly by constructions both hydraulic and non-hydraulic — irrigation and navigation canals and all forms of productive installations concerned with water; walls and other structures of defense, highways, edifices serving the public and personal needs of the secular and religious rulers such as palaces and capital cities, monuments, tombs, and temples. The aesthetic aspect of all these structures — the monumental style — bespoke their institutional meaning, which Hegel and Wittfogel thereafter observed as achieving its effect with a minimum of ideas and a maximum of material. The hydraulic rulers differed from the secular and priestly lords of the ancient and medieval West in that their construction operations penetrated more spheres of life and their control over the entire country's labor power and material enabled them to obtain much more monumental results. Indeed, the palace cities and temples of ancient Mesopotamia, the pyramids and royal monuments of Pharoanic Egypt, the city walls and gates of Imperial China, etc., all manifest the monumental style, which, as Wittfogel notes, the architectural concepts of Hellas transformed without destroying its monumental qualities.

Jacob J. Finkelstein recognizes the presence in Mesopotamia of large-scale architectural structures indicating the existence of "some form of hierarchically organized society," which must have had "to depend on at least a rudimentary bureaucracy for the enforcement of its policies and measures," and by the same token "some form of communication. . . in order to justify the maintenance of the Islamic position" (I, p. 52). In the empires of Mesopotamia, Assyria and Babylonia, Oppenheim sees the state as a political unit held together and helped to function by its central symbol, the king, who enhances his power by the use of linguistic and non-linguistic sets of signs as well as physical constructs, monuments and monumental buildings: "The two main sources of information we have [are] documents and monuments" (I, pp. 112 f.). John A. Wilson is primarily concerned to show that, aside from "physical memorials," ancient Egypt did not contribute "any significant element to the continuing philosophy, ethics or world consciousness of later times. . . as in the case of Babylonian science, Hebrew theology, or Greek or Chinese rationalism" (I, p. 172). Although physical memorials were not so prevalent or conspicuous in India, even the symbolic might have been more fully explored by R.S. Sharma in his treatment of the role played by propaganda in upholding political authority and its association with the divine element of royalty.

Arthur F. Wright no more gets his feet wet in the great rivers and irrigation canals of the Chinese empire than did Finkelstein and Oppenheim in the Tigris and Euphrates, Wilson in the Nile or Sharma in the Ganges. Although he concentrates on Buddhism and Confucianism, the latter which became a "state ideology" prescribing standards of behavior both for the elite and the masses, he makes no effort to show the compatibility of Confucianism with the nature and structure of Chinese despotism. We learn about record-keeping and instruments for popular indoctrination, but nothing about the system which brought them into being and sustained them over millenia. Most conspicuously absent, however, is any mention of the invention of movable type in 1045 by the commoner, Pi Sheng, during the Ch'-ing-li period of Northern Sung.[7] Its stunted development in Asia as compared with its progressive development after its later "invention" in the West can only be explained by the structural or institutional

7. Cf. O. Franke, *Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches: Eine Darstellung seiner Entstehung, seines Wesens und seiner Entwicklung bis zur neuesten Zeit* (Berlin, 1948), vol. IV, p. 400; 1952, Vol. V, pp. 194 ff. Cf. also Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China* (Cambridge, 1965), vol. 4, part II, p. 33, and 553. A full discussion of Pi Sheng's invention will appear in vol. 5, section 32, which has not yet been published.

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differences between the Asiatic mode of production and feudalism cum capitalism.[8]

George Kirk's article on classical Islam is more a historical overview than an examination of either communication or propaganda. Far more on target are the articles by Serif Mardin, Bruce McGowan and Talat Sait Halman on social and political communication in the Ottoman Empire. All three indicate the bureaucracy's control over communication and its modernization. Mardin emphasizes roads and postal networks; McGowan, record-keeping and also that the seat of government and authority at all levels naturally existed in the vicinity of markets. Halman describes the propaganda functions of poetry, particularly the "political" poetry motivated by considerations of public support. In all, the hybrid and to some extent transitional nature of the Ottoman Empire is clearly revealed but never explored. We never learn what type of society is undergoing modernization through contact with the West. S.N. Eisenstadt's article, "Communication Patterns in Centralized Empires," underscores the problematic analytical categories of "traditional societies" and "modernization." Attempting to identify what he refers to as "deep structural" patterns of continuity and change, we are exposed to observations so general that the specific character of all societies is lost.

Since the transitional links between the Orient and the Occident were not organizational or bureaucratic but sign-producing or symbolic, the conceptual focus at the conclusion of Vol. I and the beginning of Vol. II is in line with the fact. In this light, the decision to include Max Weber's essay on "Judaism: The Psychology of the Prophets" was sound, since it was Weber who cogently observed that new religious concepts never originated in the great centers of civilization but rather in areas adjacent to them and subject to their influence. Weber saw the Exile, the diaspora, as the great turning point of Western civilization. The great prophetic movement begun during the time of Samuel in the 11th century had given form to that religious ethic of social conduct which in Weber's view helped create the distinctiveness of the "whole cultural development of the West."[9]

In "Christian Missions in the Ancient World," Charles W. Forman points out that for two millennia Christians have been engaged in the effort to communicate their beliefs to others and that this communication was first and foremost propaganda. In "Classical Civilizations," John Ferguson notes that both the Greeks and the Romans had words for communication, but there was "no classical Greek or Latin word for 'propaganda' in the modern sense. If it was yours, you called it truth; if it was not yours, you called it lies. The thing existed, nameless though it might be" (I, p. 257). The most obvious examples of public propaganda were buildings, monuments or sculptural complexes, revealing the bureaucratic link between the East and the West in Hellas. But far more important were oracles and myths, indeed, the spoken word. The fact that all ancient literature was meant to be heard emphasized its political implications and led to the development of the "Recitatio" or oral "publication" in both Greece and Rome. Most important was the transition from the oral to the written word: "Despite the absence of printing, the written word has certain advantages as a means of communication. First, and most obviously, it was a means of communicating at a distance. Hence the emphasis on the letter. It is a curious fact, so familiar that we forget its oddity, that one third of the

8. There is no concrete evidence that the idea of movable type or knowledge of Pi Sheng's invention played any role in Gutenberg's invention. Cf. *A History of Technology*, ed. Charles Singer, E.J. Holmyard, A.R. Hall and Trevor I. Williams (New York and London, 1957), vol. III, pp. 378-379.

9. Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, fourth edition (Tübingen, 1966), vol. III, pp. 360 ff.

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sacred book of the Christians consists of letter. Second, and not so obvious, it made possible anonymous and pseudonymous publications. Everyone can see who is delivering a speech; no one can tell at a glance who has composed a writing. This is important for propaganda purposes" (I, pp. 289-290). Robert Brentano tells us that "propaganda was the characteristic gesture of Western medieval society. It was a box, or a stage, in which medieval peoples lived" (I, p. 552). The Christian instrument of propaganda was the book. The Bible told people how to shape their minds. Thus it appears that the letter (indeed, propaganda) was the connecting link between the predominantly oral tradition of classical antiquity and the predominantly written tradition of the Middle Ages and beyond.

In their Preface to the second volume, the editors pick up this theme at the outset. "The rise of Western civilization can be dated from the invention of the printing press in the mid-15th century." But this is only true in part, for not only in terms of communication and propaganda but in general Western civilization arose through the evolution of feudalism and the revolution of capitalism. This is, of course, no secret to the contributors to *Propaganda and Communication in World History*. But their concentration on the "symbolic" implies a causality that is not sustained by the evidence and a question that is never explicitly asked or answered. Concerning the former, there is no statement to the effect that the contributors consider the structural approach as valid as their own, such as one finds at the end of Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* where he acknowledges that it would also be necessary to investigate how Protestant asceticism was in turn influenced in its development and character by the totality of social conditions and in particular economic conditions.[10] The unanswered question is raised in high relief by Lerner in "The Revolutionary Elite and World Symbolism," which sums up all the articles in the second volume and to some extent also the third. Lerner writes: "The modern world has witnessed five major 'communication revolutions' based on technology, all of which were initiated or incorporated primarily in the West" (II, p. 376). Why in the West? All contributors recognize that the development of modern public opinion and the "communication revolution" took place in the West, but none of them addresses this question because the very asking of it is structural. Moreover, it cannot be answered outside that institutional framework which not only made possible the "enlarging symbolic" of the modern West but in part determined its character.

Writing on the material conditions and economic characteristics of feudalism, Marc Bloch observed that during the first feudal age the population over the whole of Europe was immeasurably smaller than it had been since the 12th century. This was even true in the provinces under Roman rule at the height of the empire. The most important towns had no more than a thousand inhabitants and much of the land was laid waste. The lack of density was further aggravated by unequal distribution and the obstacles to communicastion were many.[11] In fact, the principal source of the contradiction between universalist and particularist elements in the civilization of feudal Europe lay in the conditions of communication. Moreover, the balance of trade was distinctly unfavorable as compared with that of the East and the weakness of trade and of monetary circulation had a further consequence of reducing to insignificance the social function of wages.

The economic revolution of the second feudal age saw the closer association of human groups and easier traverse between them and the consolidation of new powers favored by

10. *Ibid.*, vol. I, fifth edition (1963), pp. 205-206.
11. Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society* (Chicago, 1961), p. 64.

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current demographic trends, such as the urban middle classes which owed everything to trade. The kings and the princes also derived large sums from the prosperity of commerce in the form of duties and tolls. They soon became aware of the vital importance of the free transmission of orders and the free movement of armies and, during the reign of Louis VI of France, the need to retain control of communications between the two capitals, Paris and Orleans, and beyond. Although there was no notable improvement in the conditions of roads, their security increased and there was the added provision of bridges which in the 12th century were thrown over all the rivers of Europe. Finally, an advance in harvesting methods had the effect of increasing substantially the efficiency of horse transport.

Links with neighboring civilizations underwent a similar transformation. Not only were ships plying the seas in greater numbers, but relations with the East became easier and more intimate: they had changed. Formerly the West had been almost exclusively an importer; now it became a great supplier of manufactured goods. Cloth dominated all the rest in the expansion of the European economy of the Middle Ages, even as did metal and cotton goods in 19th-century England.[12] The West embarked upon the economic conquest of the world by way of the East. The income from trade eased the currency situation and its effects were multiplied by the accelerated rhythm of circulation. The evolution of the economy involved a genuine revolution of social values. From the end of the 11th century the artisan and the merchant classes, having become much more numerous and indispensable to the life of the community, made their presence felt in the urban community. Now the practical needs and mental attitudes of especially the merchant class imbued the legal machinery of the age with a new spirit.

The elements of a new social order that were uneasily integrated into the old through the beginnings of finance- and trade-capitalism at the close of the 13th century spread from the northern Italian cities to western and northern Europe, first to the markets of the Low Countries and then to the great crossroads of foreign trade. The start of the assimilation of "bourgeois" humanism into the culture of the mobility during the rise of Florentine Renaissance society must be seen against this background. Habermas sees what he calls "bourgeois publicity" as characterizing an epoch.[13] In this light, "public opinion" in the strictest sense arose in England in the late 17th century and in France in the 18th century. The terms public (*öffentlich*) and publicity (*Leffentlichkeit*) stem from different historical phrases and enter into a murky association in their synchronic applications to the industrial and socio-political relations of bourgeois society. The model of Hellenistic "publicity," i.e., the polis, was handed down to us with its indigenous Greek interpretation intact and the characteristic normative power of its would-be classical frame has been passed on from the Renaissance to the present day. Over the centuries its continuity has been assured not by the social formation on which it was based but by its "ideology" — even by its paragon in the history of ideas. Above all, throughout the Middle Ages and in line with the categories of public and private as defined by Roman law, publicity came to be interpreted as *res publica*. Like Bauer, Habermas stresses that communication services such as the stock markets and the press developed not only in connection with the commercial requirements of early capitalism; they became themselves commodities. The concept of public opinion was born out of the structural transformation and developmental progress of bourgeois publicity and it is only thus that we can understand the "enlarging symbolic" of communication and propaganda in the modern West and in the modern world.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

13. Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1969).

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William Bouwsma's article on "The Renaissance and the Broadening of Communication" underscores that the Renaissance occupies a crucial position in the development of theories about communication and in the practical use of communication for promotion of concrete and political social forms. He draws particular attention to the political significance of humanism revealed in Bruni's *History of the Florentine People*, which, anticipating Machiavelli, eschews any considerations of ultimate values and depends only on the welfare and survival of the state. In her equally thoughtful article, "The Impact of the Reformation Era on Communication and Propaganda," Nancy L. Roelker argues that the drive of secular rulers to gain control over subjects whom they could not reach because of clerical immunity and privileges, especially in fiscal matters, was matched on the part of their subjects by a sharp rise in national feeling, i.e., an increasing tendency to identify themselves with a government and a culture transcending their localities but excluding fellow Europeans. Moreover, the link between preaching and the printed word distinguished the various Protestant Reformations from the Catholic. Protestant propaganda, like its motives, included both spiritual and secular elements, the latter including the search for justice, which was supposed to be the business of rulers. Though polar to one another, the religious and the secular both rose to higher levels of intensity in the 16th century. Although Peter Gay titles his article "The Enlightenment as a Communications Universe," he concentrates on that "little flock of philosophes" or that "philosophic family" which was drawn together by the "demands of political strategy," by the hostility of church and state, and by the struggle for enhanced prestige and increase of literary men. But behind this cohesion was a deeper bond, a common experience which marked them all — "the dialectical interplay of their appeal to antiquity, their tension with Christianity, and their pursuit of modernity" (II, p. 89). What is missing in Gay's article is that connecting link with the Reformation that Max Weber saw so clearly in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, where he wrote that victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, no longer needs the support of religious aceticism and that even "the rosy temper of its laughing heir: the Enlightenment" seems to be fading.[14]

Hans Speier's key article on "The Rise of Public Opinion" states at the outset that "the criterion for distinguishing between private and public opinion thus appears to lie in the realm of communication," but his point of reference is not communication but more precisely *res publica*, whose political meaning predates that associated with the term public opinion. He traces this quite rightly to Thomas Hobbes' distinction between public and private worship and states that "if we follow the lead Hobbes gives us, we may arrive at an understanding of public opinion that makes political sense and is useful for the purposes of this historical review." In order for public opinion to function, there must be access to information on the issues with which public opinion is concerned. The utilization of public opinion in international affairs by statesmen other than those who espoused revolutionary causes began at the Congress of Vienna, but the scope of governmental influence upon public opinion was limited throughout the 19th century. Public opinion was expressed by the political representatives of the electorate, by newspapers, and by prominent members or organizations of the middle class. During the 20th century, "it cannot be maintained without qualification that the modern advocates and practitioners of totalitarian government propaganda have superseded the theory and practices of the reformers who helped public opinion on its way to political prominence. It would be more correct to say that the participation of large masses of

14. Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, *op.cit.*, vol. I, p. 204.

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population in public affairs, characteristic of both government by public opinion an modern tyranny, is spurious in character under totalitarian regimes in that it is demonstrative rather than determinative of governmental action. It may also be said that in totalitarian regimes mass participation in politics is regarded by the intellectuals as a design to conceal the truth about political processes, whereas in the 18th century such participation was considered as a measure toward the ultimate elimination of the irksomeness of power, if not of power itself" (II, p. 159).

Not incidentally, Speier, as does Bauer, singles out Bismarck as a 19th-century statesman who valued the art of public opinion while at the same time failing to respect it, remaining indifferent to its moral claims and making no attempt to raise the level of its confidence. The contrast with Bauer's other statesman is made complete in Speier's "The Truth in Hell: Maurice Joly on Modern Despotism," introducing selections from Joly's *Dialogue in Hell Between Machiavelli and Montesquieu or the Politics of Machiavelli in the XIXth Century*, written in 1864 as a critique of Napoleon III. In the preface to the latest French edition, Jean-François Revel ascribes to Joly "a prophetic view" of the manipulation of public opinion by modern governments, referring in particular to De Gaulle's use of the electronic media.[15] Speier's commentary and the selections he chose not only draw attention to a long-neglected work, but in a sense constitute the conceptual core of the second volume: "Although critics have often pointed out that Joly's sympathies are on the side of Montesquieu, it would be more correct to stress that in the *Dialogue* he shared Montesquieu's moral preferences but regarded Machiavelli's knowledge of politics as superior to that of his adversary" (II, p. 314). It is Machiavelli who not only speaks the truth of human nature and of politics in Joly's work but is referred to most often by the contributors to the second and even the third volumes of *Propaganda and Communication in World History*.

Much of what Joly has to say about the secret police, the invasion of privacy by informers, political apathy, the abuse of the courts for political ends, the abasement of patriotic rhetoric, the corruption of moral standards, the cult of personality and much else applies as well to Bismarck's Prussia, Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia and other illiberal modern regimes as to that of Napoleon III.[16] But the main concern is with Joly's Machiavelli speaking to Montesquieu and to modern man: "One speaks often today of the power of public opinion. I shall show you that it is made to express whatever one wants when one knows well the hidden resources of power" (II, p. 318); "You have already been able to see, by means of the rapid outline I have just given you, what an important role the art of language is called upon to play in modern politics" (II, p. 321); "I foresee the possibility of counter-acting the press by the press itself. Since journalism is such a great force, do you know what my government would do? It would turn journalist, it would become journalism incarnate" (I, p. 322). Speier calls Joly's *Dialogue* "A political work concerned with the anatomy of power" and his excerpts "were selected with a view to showing above all Joly's understanding of the symbolic dimension of power" (II, p. 315). The work as a whole, however, reveals the structural dimension as well.

In "The Communication of Hidden Meaning," Speier contrasts the overt meaning of words in informative or propagandistic statements in which the meaning is clearly apparent with the covert meaning of words which lie below the surface in metaphors, allegories, Aesopian references and the like. Whenever freedom of expression is

15. Maurice Joly, *Dialogue aux enfers entre Machiavel et Montesquieu* (Paris, 1968), pp. xxii f.

16. The only phase of modern totalitarianism that Joly did not foresee was ironically that which his book, perverted by forgers in the infamous *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, helped to promote — genocidal anti-semitism.

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suppressed, the sensitivity to allusions increases. In all epochs of history repressive regimes have encountered the illusive power of criticism contained in literature old and new: "Writing between the lines then serves not only the objective purpose of spreading criticism obliquely but also the subjective need to gain a respite from pretended zeal for false causes" (II, p. 288). Ironically, the Aesopian language introduced in Russia in the 19th century to attack government officials, backward landlords, and greedy capitalists, was utilized by Lenin to evade the censors prior to the October Revolution, and today is utilized by critics of the Bolshevik regime both to evade the censors and to circumvent the all-pervasive propaganda.

There is certainly good reason beyond the "symbolic" for Saul K. Padover to write on "Karl Marx — The Propagandist as Prophet" and for William E. Griffith to write on "Communist Propaganda" and there is no denying that "The personality, career, and ideology of Karl Marx placed a permanent stamp on communist propaganda" or that "his ideology predisposed the communist movement toward a high priority for propaganda" (II, p. 239). It is also true that Lenin emphasized propaganda even more than Marx himself did and that the total communist commitment to both positive and negative propaganda control remains essentially unchanged and that propaganda is seen as essential both for political and social integration of communist societies. But one might also argue that Marx and Marxism and indeed communism and the Communist revolution have played equally significant roles in the development of world communication as in the prevalence of propaganda in that world. This subject remains unexplored.

Guenther Lewy's article, "Millenarianism as a Revolutionary Force," provides an appropriate background to Zev Barbu's search for the roots of "The Modern History of Political Fanaticism." Certain mass movements of modern times such as Nazism and communism share many of the characteristics of revolutionary millenarianism. The precondition for the rise of political fanaticism, however, was the separation of religion and politics. However much Machiavelli's prince might succumb to the appetite for power or love of glory, he could not be a fanatic because that would have disqualified him for the role as much in Machiavelli's eyes as in those of the philosophes. Even though political fanaticism is embedded in the secular humanistic civilization of the type developed in Europe since the Renaissance, the political man of the Enlightenment could not be a fanatic. He could be a despot, so long as he was enlightened, i.e., guided by human reason. Thus, there seems to be a paradox in the fact that even though the roots of political fanaticism are in the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment, it is a thoroughly modern phenomenon.

We find not so much an answer as an elaboration of this theme in Lerner's article, "The Revolutionary Elites and World Symbolism," in which he tells us that "the symbolic expansion of 'reality' is the tie that binds the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment into the historical sequence of rising identifications, expectations, and demands" (II, p. 371). Specifically, Lerner traces the historical sequence from World War I to World War II in order to clarify the "continuing spread of crisis politics," with special reference to its impact on "symbol management," thereby to discern the "symbolic components of contemporary world history" and "to construe political processes as communication processes." The symbolism of nations has for good or ill taken primacy in the language of power and has transformed political action as well as political discourse. The symbolism of class has also taken primacy in world communication, but Lerner contends that it has been transmuted from its usage in the Marxist lexicon. No longer does it mean "class conflict" that pits class against nation or

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the state conceived as the "agency of the ruling class"; rather, under Mussolini, Stalin and Hitler nation and class have fused: "The merging of Nation and Class into an ideology of national socialism, buttressed by an ethic of Growth or Development (GNP-oriented social change), has produced some conspicuous effects in the symbolic life of the new nations" (II, p. 375). This version of "national socialism" now diffused by symbol managers (i.e., intellectuals) in the new nations is said to be a variant of historical populism that has at once deep roots in major world religions and a strong base in the value goals that evolved in the modernization of the West: "The spread of populism in the historical West as in the contemporary new nations coincided with the rise of public opinion and the growth of communication networks" (II, p. 375). But the diffusion of populism required more than a new set of key symbols and thus Lerner proceeds on the basis of Lasswell's paradigm, "who says what to whom, through what channel, with what effects?" Although Lerner highlights the technology that has transformed Western and world communciation, he nevertheless contends that it is the propaganda focus as much as any other single element of post-World War II history that has shaped crisis politics in the contemporary world. It may be true that "the failure to diffuse a persuasive universal symbolism in a political area that has become technologically global contains ominous problems for the future of humanity," but Lerner's answer to this problem is even more suspect than his all-too-tidy analysis of the transformation of political symbols: "there is a clear and present need for a positive politics of preventive therapy [*sic!*]." Supposedly a global sharing of vicarious experiences such as the Olympic Games and man's first landing on the moon will suffice, but even Lerner's own analysis makes clear that symbols and symbol managers are at the root of the problem and that precisely because we now have the technological capacity of a world communication network we should be even more wary of them.

This is no more clearly demonstrated than in Lucien W. Pye's "Communication, Development and Power," in which he observes that colonialism was also an extraordinary historical communication process as Western ideas and practices were diffused on much of the non-European world. The process resulted in many teachers of Western culture becoming the ideals of non-Western peoples. Just as European authorities created the form and structure of the modern nation-state in their colonial administrations, so the colonial subjects in time asserted their claim to nationalism as the right to manage their own affairs. This set the stage for a great debate. The final policies of most colonial administrations were heavily oriented toward development and the intellectuals of the new states as well as their compatriot politicians learned to speak the language of development and modernization. But since they were unsure just what it should mean or how committed they should be to achieving it, the total effect of the colonial heritage in communication and development was highly ambiguous. Moreover, the introduction of Western technology for such mass communication as newspapers and journals raised serious questions as to what should be communicated. So long as there was the relatively unambiguous goal of independence, the media had a clear-cut function. But once the political objectives had been realized, the historic problem of what should be the developmental goals in non-European societies became linked with the more fundamental problem of building effective power in order to actually rule: "It was not generally recognized that the new nationalist leaders were likely to have problems because of inadequate power in their societies. In part this was the result of the fact that Western thought on the matter of political power had always tended to assume the automatic or 'natural' existence of power in any society and that the problem for political theory is how power should be controlled, balanced, checked,

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and generally regulated. Western thought was so addicted to the idea that power was a relative phenomenon that it did not take seriously the question of levels of power in different systems and what can happen when a society has little capacity to generate effective power" (II, 432-433). Thus evolved the strange irony of post-independence politics in many Afro-Asian states, where the new nationalist leaders were claimng their legitimacy as stemming from the colonial administrations who were once their declared adversaries. Since state-building and military power have become dominant themes in the post-colonial era, there is little doubt that control of the media and the creative use of the media will become central features in the establishment of the appropriate sense of ethnic identity.

The problems analyzed by Pye are nowhere more obvious than in the General Assembly of the United Nations and it is to this question that Oscar Schachter turns in "Rhetoric and Law in International Political Organs." Certainly the appeal of law is not only an indispensable feature of the rhetoric of political debate, it is deeply bound up with the fundamental needs of political organs for legitimacy in the international community. It is indeed rare, as Schachter notes, for a non-committed state in a political organization such as the General Assembly to assert that its attitude is determined by its own interests or political preference rather than by its understanding of the principles of the charter. It is also true that many governments will be concerned with demonstrating to their own constituencies (as well as to some segments of foreign communities) that they have supported commitments and lived up to expectations engendered by their acceptance of rules of international order. The process remains political, but the use of legal categories and legal argumentation involves more than rhetoric to cover up the play of power and interests: "In a variety of ways, often subtle, it has profound consequences for the political process and for institutional development."

Nevertheless, Barton Whaley demonstrates in "Deception — Its Decline and Revival in International Conflict" that deception is an important and sometimes dominant element in efforts to control or influence the leaderships of nations and foreign policy relations. He treats deception as "Information designed to manipulate the behavior of others by inducing them to accept a false or distorted presentation of their environment — physical, social or political" (II, p. 340). So defined, it is a special psychological mode of both communication and power: "In terms of communication it is disinformation, that is, information *intended* to mislead," as distinct from misinformation, which describes only the truth value of the information and not its intention. While what he has to say is intrinsically valid, it leads him to the false conclusion that "the difference in styles of deception between nations are more an accident of timing than of differences in so-called national characters." Certainly it has more to do with the structural or institutional nature of societies than either of these. His own example of the Soviet Union argues this most persuasively.

Harold R. Isaacs' article, "Changing Arenas and Identities in World Affairs," provides the logical if somewhat tendentious prelude to the colloquy on nuclear power at the conclusion of the second volume and the transition to the third with his statement: "The more global our science and technology, the more tribal our politics." He uses the example of an African village to suggest that man's tribalism is so deeply rooted in the condition of his existence that it will keep cropping up. Thus there is a need for a new look at the inwardness of basic group identity and the process of its interaction with politics: "As we tribalize or retribalize, what are the effects of all the ongoing pressure on human society to globalize?" He ends with riddles and questions: "What kind of balance can be struck between all that demands greater community among men and all

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that keeps them apart? What institutions and what political system will correspond to the global dimensions of technology and development and yet assure the pluralism demanded by the separateness that men insist on preserving?" (II, p. 422).

The editors argue that since the nuclear bipolarization of the world and the intensified Cold War have in one form or another shaped world politics and propaganda over the past quarter century, it seems appropriate to conclude a volume on the evolution of modern Western communication with "the dominant communication topic of our recent past and proximate future." They do so by republishing the "War Department Release on New Mexico Tests, 16 July 1945," Andrei D. Sakharov's "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom," and an original article by Speier on "The Chances for Peace," in which he acknowledges that "as the era of negotiation allegedly has displaced that of confrontation, and as 'relaxation of tension,' 'peaceful coexistence,' 'detente,' and 'renunciation of force' have become favorite terms in the political vocabulary, peace research has become fashionable in Western academic circles" (II, p. 508). The intentional ambiguity of this statement reflects the reality of the situation much more than Sakharov's cautionary warnings and programmatic proposals. Appropriately referring to Hobbes' observations on peace and war, in particular that peace is a continuum ranging from total peace to the point of severe crisis that marks the transition to war, and that between these two extremes there is international conflict, Speier remarks that "nuclear peace" is widely and rightly regarded as something much more important than the avoidance of "conventional war." There is little doubt that Sakharov is correct in stating that "a thermo-nuclear war cannot be considered a continuation of politics by other means (according to the formula of Clausewitz). It would be a means of universal suicide" (II, p. 475). But one might have expected the inclusion of statements by J. Robert Oppenheimer in this colloquy to compliment Sakharov's article. Or, if the purpose is to debate the issue, one might have expected contributions by such as Edward Teller and Herman Kahn. Part of the problem is that the purpose is unclear. Having stated that nuclear power is the dominant communication topic of our recent past and proximate future, we are never told how and in which way this is true.

Had the editors attempted to answer these questions, they might have given at least the semblance of continuity to the third volume, which reportedly "shifts the expository mode of the first two volumes from historical focus within a conceptual framework to an analytical focus within an historical context." But such is not the case, since the analytical focus is never clarified and the historical context never specified. Consequently, some fine articles appear to be lost in a potpourri: "A Pluralizing [*sic!*] World in Formation." They can be found only with reference to the structural transformations that have taken place since World War II.

The analytical focus should be that science has overtaken the role formerly played by economics in the communication revolution. The historical focus should be what Lazarsfeld called the "expanding American sphere of influence," since the United States was the initiator and is the driving force behind this revolution — technologically (film, radio, television, satellites), politically (the United Nations), and scientifically (nuclear power) —issuing in the "Americanization of Europe" and in a sense the world. Indeed, the two are linked in the world's leading capitalist country. Capitalism created neither technology nor science, but the capitalist revolution initiated both the technological and the scientific revolutions and this expanding "technocratic" sphere has usurped the industrial and commercial spheres in accelerating the communication revolution. Seen in this light, most of the articles in the third volume concerning science,

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social and political changes and future-gazing find their place, if not their symbolic intent.

Lasswell's lead-off article, "Must Science Serve Political Power?" tells us that "the aggregate impact of the scientific revolution has failed to revolutionize the basic structure of world politics" and that however universal the manifest content of scientific propositions or the procedures by which they are verified, they are parochially introduced. Since science is more and more contributing to power, the scientist, like the politician, is coming to terms with the militant structure of world power as a "typically oligarchal structure of internal politics." Contemporary reality suggests that more men are manipulated without their consent for more purposes and by more techniques by fewer men than at any other time in history. Whether or not this is true, Lasswell's programmatic solutions are nothing more than wishful thinking. He calls for "a continual seminar concerned with a provisional and changing map of the past, present and future of science and man" and concludes by propounding that "science and scientists in the aggregate need not serve political power in the future as they have in the past." Supposedly by working together in institutions of knowledge and participating in public associations, scientists will be able to assist in modifying the traditional reliance of society on coercive politics: "They can do so in the course of discovering how to obsolesce the institutions of militance and oligarchy and to cultivate institutions of civic order" (III, p. 15).

Jerome B. Wiesner takes a more realistic position in "The Marriage of Science and Government." Recognizing that the most crucial problems are those of the impact of science or, more precisely, science-based technology on policy, in particular defense policy, Wiesner traces the development of this so-called marriage from World War II, when the U.S. discovered that organized planned scientific efforts could have a tremendous impact on both war and society, to President Eisenhower's realization that the more money spent on defense, the more dangerous the world seems to become, to November 1957, when the first full-time special asssistant for science and technolgoy was created and the Science Advisory Committee was reconstituted and made directly responsible to the president. In Wiesner's view, "This new activity represented a true watershed in a relationship between scientists and the political process, particularly at the presidential level, for it brought a continuing voice and concern into the highest level of government" (III, p. 21). His outlook is optimistic: "Fortunately, despite all the rhetoric to the contrary, there does remain in this country a belief that knowledge based upon education and research is essential to the solution of most of our major problems" (III, p. 26).

Not only has natural science, for better or worse, come to play an increasing role in the formulation of government policy; social science in recent years has also assumed a growing and in some cases equally as problematic a role as evidenced by Joseph J. Spengler in "Social Science and the Collectivization of Hubris." Using mainly American data "for it is in the United States more than elsewhere that hubris now flourishes," Spengler indicates that the concern with immoderateness or arrogance may again be developing in the realm of applied natural and social science and having adverse effects particularly in the economic world. He traces the emergence of hubris to the post-1945 aura that has surrounded natural science and from which social science, economics in particular, has greatly benefited. The kudos for science, together with its support and self-confidence, continued until arguments concerning the misuse of science began during the Kennedy era. Moreover, since 1945 Spengler singles out two major changes — the ascendance of the apparatus of the state over the individual and lesser collectives,

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and the infiltration of social science together with its practitioners into the apparatus of the state. The former was initially precipitated by the war. The concentration and mobilization of economic power stemming therefrom has since been facilitated by ideology and that accessibility to personal power which many anticipate from the enlargement of the overall role of the state. There is no doubt that social science was greatly facilitated by the increasing role of natural science in government during and following the war. But it might as well be argued that this process began with social science during the New Deal, which saw a concentration and mobilization of power, particularly economic power, by the central government, which was then utilized in the conduct of the war and in the post-war period.

Spengler's three courses of action to guard society against the evil effects of hubris in the social sciences suffer from the same flaw as do those of Lasswell concerning the natural sciences in that corrective action is thought to reside in the scientists themselves. He calls for decentralization of economic and political authority in decision making, immunization of social and other scientists against hubris, and finally, foundations and other research facilities allowing more support to imaginative research and inquiry and less to pedestrian and expensive quantitative trivia by demanding real evidence of policy potentials and by weakening the control currently exercised over social-science practice and policy by a self-perpetuating "elite." To wit, the coup de grace: "Adeptness at modest communication of useful knowledge is bound to increase in utilitarian significance as the public at large becomes increasingly aware that social scientists are writing in too great measure for each other — taking in each other's esoteric verbal wash, so to speak. Having become aware of this state of affairs, philanthropoids, agents of the state, and currently captive audiences will demand a greater return on their investment in social science" (III, p. 447). We can only applaud Spengler's outspokenness in this regard, even though it unavoidably borders on that very hubris that he decries. But given the attraction to power of both the natural and the social scientists, only the government is in a position to regulate the relation between science and government.

Writing on "The Effects of Mass Media in an Information Era," Wilbur Schramm reveals that since the 1920s scholars have been withdrawing from the so-called "Hypodermic Needle model" of communication, which conceives of a message as transferred to or inserted in a receiver, in favor of the concept of equality between sender and receiver in the communication process. This last conceives of an active rather than a passive audience, i.e., an audience which uses communication rather than being used by it. W. Phillips Davison is concerned with how decisions about content are made and in specifying the forces that influence what is actually communicated in his article, "The Media Kaleidoscope: General Trends in the Channels." To be sure, the nature of political and economic systems plays a large part in determining the kinds of channels that emerge and the efficiency with which they function in turn helps to determine the nature of economic and political systems. Davison sees a trend in industrialized democracies toward greater concentration of power in the hands of those who control and operate the general news services, leaving the individual news consumer with less bargaining power than ever before: "the preponderance of control of the general mass media by either big business or big government suggests the desirability of searching for ways in which further diversification can be assured" (III, p. 214).

As the capacity of developing communication is growing, so is the extent to which that capacity can be used to serve social as well as individual functions which will play an important part in determining the future course of industrialized democracies.

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Although the primary socio-political functions served by the media in communist states are to solidify the power of the ruling elite, to cajole the masses to accept centralized direction and to aid in the fulfillment of economic, social and political plans, the media also performs important functions in the modern sections of these societies much as they do in the industrialized democracies. The growth of communication works both ways, making possible centralization and decentralization over large areas. Herbert Goldhammer's article, "The Social Effects of Communication Technology," stresses that as populations grow, the information and communication requirements for maintaining a different level of freedom also change. Moreover, definitions of freedom may increase as rapidly as or perhaps more rapidly than improvements in communication technology. More than this: "Without modern communication technology, it no longer would be feasible to contemplate the success of political systems involving a large amount of decentralized free choice" (III, p. 368). Unfortunately, modern communication technology does not by its very nature create these conditions.

L. John Martin tells us in "The Moving Target: General Trends in Audience Composition" that everything depends on how the public reacts to communication, that publics are numerous and changing in any society and that their members can and generally do belong to several at any given time. Moreover, publics are potential audiences to which a ruler or leader might appeal and of which he is always conscious. Recognizing the potential power that inheres in publics, leaders throughout history have consciously or unconsciously treated them as audiences to be manipulated through communication. Thus the concept of public is closely tied to public opinion because it acquires meaning only in the context in which it assumes a common bond of opinion, behavior or power. In 1935 Lasswell showed that publics could be identified in terms of the symbols that united them and Martin reveals that through a series of metamorphoses the concept of public has developed through the idea of an amorphous mystical force inherent in all states until in the 20th century there was a change of focus from publics to opinions: "The question changed from What opinions do publics spawn? to What publics swarm to or are united by particular opinions or symbols?" Thus Martin elaborates on "the concept of the target" and "the concept of the audience." The first is by no means new in communication and propaganda, although purposive targeting of messages for maximum effect is a product of the scientific age. Since a purposive message emanating from a motivated source is targeted for a specific segment of the public, as publics grow and disperse targeting requires more sophisticated media and more information about the component members of the public: "It is but a small step from the target concept to the audience concept. . . . The concept of audience involves communication with a target." In recent times, two factors have increased the importance of the audience — the democratic concepts advanced in the 18th century which linked ruler and ruled at least theoretically in an inseparable communication system, and the physical factor of the development of mass communication. But it is in the context of a "mass audience," i.e., mass in the sense of numbers and the dispersion of people, and audience in the sense of a dyadic relationship between source and recipient, that propaganda becomes meaningful as a form of communication.

With this in mind, Martin explores audience groupings in both commercial and international propaganda. Nazi Germany was essentially the product of propaganda and the first country to develop an effective worldwide operation. The ideal Nazi propaganda audience was the undifferentiated mass, preferably the crowd. By contrast, the British were elitist from the start. Their propaganda catered to the head on the assumption that the body and tail would follow. Most interesting, however, is Martin's comparison of Soviet and American propaganda. The Russians were the first to use

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radio for international propaganda and the targets of their propaganda are all those alienated elements of the public looking for an antipodal banner around which to rally in order to work out their resentment against the establishment. The guiding policy of Soviet propaganda calls for a target audience structure shaped like an inverted pyramid. The international propaganda of the U.S. is, like that of Britain, addressed to an elite audience. Also like Britain, the U.S. does not assert with any great clarity its relation to its audience and the direction in which it is expected to move. But unlike Britain, the U.S. makes a great effort to seek out its audience "by the book" and makes a great issue of targeting for effectiveness. Most revealing is a quotation Martin reproduces from a 1962 USIA-sponsored study by the Bureau of Applied Cultural Research: "U.S. materials were directed at upper-class business and professional groups and these were already favorably disposed toward the U.S. Soviet publications, on the other hand, were aimed at the wider, middle- and lower-class elements" (III, p. 290). The curious conclusion drawn with respect to India in particular was that the U.S. "target audience contains those people with whom we had had the most success in the past, while the Communists appeal to those sub-elites among whom *they* have found the most followers." Martin concludes: "This is good politics because it is successful politics. It is also the stuff that political philosophy is made of.... If, therefore, there is any trend in audience composition in international propaganda, the trend is inextricably tied to the political philosophy of the propagandists." One might well question whether this is "good politics" or "successful politics" on the part of either the U.S. or the Soviet Union. But it certainly reflects their respective political philosophies.

"The Language of Politics: General Trends in Content" is the special concern of Ithiel de Sola Poole, who assesses the relative weight of old and new political symbols. In addition to war and the emerging nations, the third major source of vocabulary is radical ideology, but only the Russian Revolution produced an extensive and abrupt change in vocabulary that has persisted. Observing that certain life-style symbols, such as generation gap, have the same metaphor as missile gap, dollar gap, credibility gap, etc., which refer to behavior in the most private parts of life, have also become part of public political discourse, Poole speculates that political language may be entering into a process of accellerating an exponential change and such is certainly evident in "Rising Expectations: Frustrations," analyzed also by Spengler. Rising expectations presuppose the presence of a belief in man's improvement and improvability — both nourished by awareness of technological change. Prior to the modern era, a number of conditions were inimical to rising expectations — attitudes toward nature and environment; the degree to which the economy was "Faustian," presumably serving only knowledge and power; the rigidity of the social structure; an extremely low rate of population growth; unawareness of economic change; absence of a belief in progress and of the inclination to foment it; and poor means of communication. Rising expectations, like rising frustrations, are thus modern phenomena; the disparity between expectations and the capacity to satisfy them becoming pronounced only in the present century. With the weakening, if not complete destruction, of the link running from growth and capacity to growth of expectations — seen by Spengler as connected with the growth of the political power of the underlying population and the steady increase in the economic and social roles of the populace, i.e., the democratic state which increasingly has too much capacity to promise and distribute and too little capacity to preserve the hegemony of the market and price system — frustration seems to be rising at a rate relative to expectations. Both structurally and symbolically obscure is Spengler's solution, which "consists in increasing the role of homeostasis-producing agencies and in limiting the

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role of interventionist agencies to dissolution of concentrations of laboristic and industrial-commercial power not conducive to economies of scale and to the performance of functions that clearly lie outside the capacity of the private sector and of lesser jurisdictional components of the polity" (III, p. 79). Whatever that means, it leaves unresolved the question of rising expectations and frustrations on a world scale, which is the problem of world communication. To be sure, the West set the pattern and transmitted it to the world first through colonialism and then through "Americanization" just at that point when the first "world communication network" became operational. Moreover, partly because of its effects on the world, Western society in general and the United States in particular is experiencing the first shocks of limited resources, limited power and limited expectations. The solution to this developing crisis is in large part economic, but it will unquestionably have as much to do with attitudes toward as with capacities of the private sector. Even more fundamental is whether or not rising world expectations and frustrations will in the end lead to the elimination of the private sector. Inherent in this question is the fate of "public opinion."

A far different and strikingly original approach to world revolutionary trends is offered by Lewis M. Killian in "The Respect Revolution: Freedom and Equality." His thesis is that all political and economic revolutions of past history have had their social and psychological aspects, that their participants were also seeking respect for themselves and for the group with which they were identified. The social and psychological aspects have now come to the fore: "If indeed there is a revolutionary spirit that is reflected in both political revolutions and social unrest in the waning years of the 20th century, it is the aspiration for respect. . . . It is a new revolutionary spirit. . . insofar as it has come to overshadow the political and economic dimensions both as one of the causes of social unrest and as a justification for collective protest" (III, p. 98). There is a logic to Killian's argument that is undeniable. The achievement of political liberty and equality freed "the people" from the oppression of "higher orders" claiming legitimacy through heredity or divine right. The nation-state bound all, from the commoner and manual laborer to king and president, into a political unit in which all were equal in basic civil rights, thus transforming the sense of respect by such notions as "rights of man." The Industrial Revolution gave rise to new social classes and set the stage for a new form of social conflict between capital and labor, in response to which developed the ideology of modern socialism. During the 19th century, nationalism grew with the spread of political democracy and the development of industrial capitalism. Both the first and second waves of European revolutions, 1789 and 1848, shared the political definition of freedom and equality. With the elaboration and spread of socialist doctrines, the economic connotations of freedom and equality surfaced. Marx and Engels observed that political democracy did not produce liberty and equality so long as it was combined with capitalism. The Russian Revolution of 1917, although led by self-proclaimed Marxists, was not truly Marxist since it was led by soldiers and peasants rather than by an industrial proletariat. Since then, there has been no single universal trend for dominance of either the political or the economic scene. Despite the reality of technological progress and the illusions of political and economic progress, protest movements continue to erupt around the globe emphasizing the old themes of political liberty, economic equality and the right of self-government. Added to this is the Third World's rejection of the international dreams of both the Communist Powers and the

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"Free World" and also the resurgence of ethnicity. Thus today, as in the past, "beyond liberty and affluence lies *respect*. The quest for respect is dominant in the revolutionary spirit of the modern era" (III, p. 10).

The main problem with Killian's otherwise provocative thesis is his contention that "While the political and economic tones remain strong in the chord that rallies modern people to movements of protest and revolution, the psychological note of respect has become dominant." Why "psychological?" The "respect" dominant in the revolutionary spirit of the modern era is economic and political and in this sense that spirit is no different than it has been in the past. The respect gained from political liberty and economic equality is the right to self-determination and this right is certainly as much symbolic as it is structural, but to term it psychological is to take it out of the realm of concrete reality and to imbue it with a kind of existential quality. It may be true that the ideologists of anti-colonialism make clear that no amount of freedom and equality, political and economic changes will be sufficient without the eradication of "psychological colonialism." But it does not follow that "this new round of revolutions can be better understood if the focus is on the psychological dimension rather than on the political or economic." "Psychological colonialism" will disappear only when economic and political inequality disappear. It is certainly true that the revolutionary outbreaks since World War II have been more nationalist than socialist, that there is a growing trend toward "internal" nationalism, emphasizing cultural, ethnic, and even racial differences, and that "the new tribalism of the respect revolution should not be mistaken for a mere extension of the political and economic revolutions of the past." But such has to do with the decline of the traditional nation-state, its failure to extend either political liberty or economic quality to all, the failure of such international experiments as communism and the as-yet rudimentary attempts at world government, in part made desirable and even imperative by the very fact of the world communication revolution.

Considerably less engaging than Killian's thesis on the "respect revolution" and certainly no less convincing that his "psychological" proposition is Andrew Rolle's endeavor to disclose "The Historic Past of the Unconscious." He begins by stating: "We do not usually think of the historian as an expert who tries to communicate the meaning of the past to those who live in the present." Since one would be hard-put to find a historian who does not consider this his provenance, we hardly need Mr. Rolle to tell us that this is the historian's heaviest responsibility as custodian of the human record. The remainder of Rolle's article might well have remained in his "unconscious." One cannot argue with the fact that "the improvement of historical communication gives historians a chance to influence the future," although it is difficult to understand why more so than in the past since knowing the work of historians has not visibly kept men from repeating the mistakes of the past. We are told that "man has deceived himself by propagandizing his past." Why? "His very intellect is distorted." How? "For there is more than one plane of historical reality. Beneath the patterned world which we historians normally portray lie motives rooted in the unconscious mind. Understanding of these vitalities plunges us into that repressed behavior which stems from man's neolithic origins. Out of such dark, prehistoric beginnings emerge some of our most primal fantasies" (III, p. 404). Indeed, and this is one of them. Rolle sees his task as "to show how the communication of man's past has been based upon incomplete, conscious-level analysis." Attempting to shed light on his subject, he leaves us in the dark: "If historians have too little heeded the role of an instinctoid consciousness it is because its workings remain mysterious in all branches of knowledge." Not to put too fine a point upon it, Rolle's article provides one of the two points of comic relief in these volumes, the other being Arnold A. Rogow's

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undressing of "Love and Intimacy: Mass Media and Phallic Culture." This last has our private motivations channeled into acceptable public acts through the socialization process evidenced in the mass media in advanced industrial societies. Rogow defines phallic culture as one "whose sexual ethic regards women and men as primarily outlets for gratification." In toto, his article reads like something left over from what passed for social science in some radical journals in the 1960s.

As Alex Inkeles sees "The Emerging Social Structure of the World," we seem to be living in one of those rare historical eras in which "a progressive quantitative process becomes a qualitative transformation." The widespread diffusion of this sense of a new, global interrelatedness is identified by the wide currency of such catch phrases as "world government," "global village" and "spaceship earth." What is distinctive about the problem before us is that "it moves us beyond even the largest customary unit of social analysis, namely, the nation-state, to focus on the entire human population of the globe." Moving away from autarky, Inkeles sees interconnectedness, dependence, integration and conversion. Nevertheless, he recognizes that "anyone who insists that the emergence of a common standard of economic and political organizations for modern nation-states is inevitable must be prepared to acknowledge that this outcome can be expected to arise only after a span to be calculated in centuries rather than in decades. And, I fear, he must be prepared to face a very difficult task in specifying whether the common system that presumably will emerge will be more like that of the United States or that of the Soviet Union, or some variant altogether distinct from these" (III, p. 507). The only process that Inkeles sees as truly common to all states of the modern world is their growing power to control the lives of their citizens. But owing to the various levels of development among the world's nation states, he sees a large amount of diversity for at least another century.

Quite a different outlook is expressed by Lasswell in "The Future of World Communication and Propaganda." Underscoring "the symbolic instrument as an accelerator of history," he begins with the statement: "It is plausible to predict that, barring catastrophe, the peoples of the globe will eventually acquiesce in propaganda on behalf of a public order of planetary scope" (III, p. 517). Considering two contrasting projections of the future of mass communication — one assuming a relatively smooth sequence of mutual influence and change, the other depicting a zigzag course with important levels of conflict, he nevertheless believes that the rise of the symbolic in world history carries with it *"the progressive subordination of change to the impacts of communication."* He recognizes that among the critical factors to be estimated in projecting the role of communication and propaganda is the relative advantage afforded by the symbolic instrument to political elites. But he suggests that among the characteristics giving the symbolic instrument a competitive advantage in many situations are "the *rapidity, parsimony,* and *realism* that result from the management of signs and symbols as means of sharing common experiences and of mobilizing common actions on a large scale" (III, p. 531). After all this positive thinking, Lasswell in conclusion seems to lack the courage of his convictions. He states that he does not view any construct of the future as inevitable: *"The essential proposition is that if man's potential for dignity and creativeness is to be realized, the symbolic instrument must be used to equalize the pluralism of authority and control that prevents the absolutization of political power"* (III, p. 533).

If there is little agreement on the future of propaganda and communication, there is at least agreement that an understanding of its past is essential to that future and that its present is, as it has always been, a political matter of the utmost consequence. With

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science and politics joined, the structural transformations of capitalism and communism (which is rapidly acquiring the scientific means of the communication revolution), alone or together will decide the future of propaganda and communication in world history. Propaganda has played an ambiguous role in the development of world communication — as a particularizing force it has also served a universalizing process. With the technological achievement of a world communication network now operational, the U.S. and the Soviet Union are utilizing this universalizing process for particularist ends. Although the one promotes the freedom of public opinion while the other looks to control it, both seek to turn public opinion in a particular direction. This underscores the significance of what Bauer called "the triumphant march of the freedom of public opinion," which he saw halted on the borders of fascist Italy and Communist Russia. It was soon halted on the borders of his own country, Germany, with the advent of Nazism; and has since been halted on many other borders throughout the world. It has not been stopped. But the fact that the propaganda potential of the communication revolution is now universal makes the subject of these volumes more than timely. If they do not fully answer the questions Bauer left to future historians, they raise even more disturbing questions in their mirror of the past and present.

G.L. Ulmen

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